UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MARVIN LEE PRINCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ROY RYDER,
Assistant Deputy Warden at
Huron Valley Men's Facility, et al.,
Defendants -Appellees.
Nos. 07-2031/07-2050
March 5, 2008, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
ORDER
Marvin Lee Prince ("Prince"), a pro se Michigan
prisoner, appeals a district court judgment dismissing his complaint as
frivolous and failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)
and 1915A(b)(1) in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
appeal was assigned Case No. 07-2031. Prince subsequently filed a duplicate
appeal from the same district court judgment, which is Case No. 07-2050. Prince
has also filed two motions for the
appointment of counsel, a motion to amend his complaint, and a motion to compel
the production of documents.
Prince filed this complaint against several Michigan prisoner
administrators, officials, and medical personnel, along with the Riverside
Correctional Facility in Sutherland, claiming that these defendants have subjected
him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment
rights. Among other things, Prince accuses the officials and medical personnel of:
1) exposing him to some type of electrical currents emitted by "security
devices" that prison officials have implanted in the prison bunks,
ceilings, and other areas; 2) lacing his coffee and food with chemicals,
without his knowledge, that have caused him mental and physical damage; and 3)
pumping a chemical agent into the ventilation system, causing the prisoners to become
numb so that the officials may subject them to sexual and other physical abuse
and experimentation. Prince requested monetary damages and injunctive relief.
The district court referred the complaint to a magistrate judge,
who issued a report and recommendation to dismiss the complaint as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Prince
filed objections to the report and recommendation, repeating the allegations
set forth in his initial complaint and arguing that he is being negligently
treated. The district court considered Prince's objections, and adopted the
report, dismissing the complaint as frivolous and ordering that the dismissal
be counted as a "strike" for purposes of filing frivolous suits
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The district court certified that an appeal
would not be in good faith, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), but later
granted Prince's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), on appeal.
On appeal, Prince repeats his allegations of abuse by
"death ray" devices and by exposure to chemical agents within the
prison that he believes caused damage to his brain, heart and body tissue. He
also states that he has been denied access to a full medical examination to
assess the damage created by these conditions.
We affirm the district court's judgment for the reasons stated
by the district court. We review de novo a district court judgment dismissing a
complaint as frivolous. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997). Section 1915A directs the district court to review prisoner civil rights
complaints "before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing" and to dismiss the complaint if it is
frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Similarly, § 1915(e)(2)(B) directs the district court to
dismiss a case filed IFP any time the court determines that the complaint is
frivolous, fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The
complaint should be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
accepting all the factual allegations as true. Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684,
688 (6th Cir. 2006) . "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may
be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969, 167 L. Ed.
2d 929 (2007). Although a pro se litigant is entitled to a liberal construction
of his pleadings and filings, this Court's standard of review requires more
than the bare assertion of legal conclusions and must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a
recovery under some viable legal theory. See Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712,
716 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547
U.S. 1111, 126 S. Ct. 1911, 164 L. Ed. 2d 663 (2006); Bovee v. Coopers
& Lybrand C.P.A., 272 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 2001); Boswell v. Mayer, 169
F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999).
The district court properly concluded that Prince's allegations
were delusional to the point that his claims lacked any arguable basis in law
or fact. In her report and recommendation, the magistrate judge quoted,
verbatim, an accurate representation of the substance of Prince's entire
complaint. On appeal, Prince expounds upon those allegations, in greater
detail, focusing on the "death ray" devices and chemicals being
administered through the prison food and through the ventilation system that he
believes the defendants are using to intentionally harm and "slowly
kill" him. In fact, Prince claims that the defendants did kill him, but
that he revived in the morgue. Prince explains the harmful result, as follows:
Patient spent 10 years
within the MDOC and experienced every security device used here. These devices
either function on high frequencies of ions, electron, neurtrons [sic] and
protons, etc. are a form of anyone of these devices being used at MDOC.
Plaintiff stated that its some type of odorless chemical agent being used that
causes dehydration and not documented through request for various test
performed. These [sic] is why employees are authorized to sabotage my criminal
and civil appeal, constant sexual abuse out of retaliation to give up civil
claim and conceal information and injury under false documentation.
Prince asserts that the
district court should have accepted all of his allegations as true, because
they are not "clearly irrationally or wholly incredible,"
particularly in light of his learning disability and his "label of mental
illness." However, his personal disabilities do not change the fact that
his alleged injuries are being caused by forces that he cannot rationally
establish exist.
Prince admits that an amendment to his complaint would not
"substantially alter" the complaint, but would "further explain
the names and function of these security devices being used that caused this
tortous [sic] injury sustained by plaintiff." However, we may not consider
information and allegations that were not first considered by the district
court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); McClung v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 270 F.3d
1007, 1011 (6th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, the district court's judgment is affirmed, Prince's pending
motions are denied as moot, and his appeal designated as Case No. 07-2050 is
dismissed as a duplicate appeal. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.