AELE Seminars
The Biometric, Psychological and Legal Aspects of Lethal and
Less Lethal Force and the Management, Oversight, Monitoring,
Investigation and Adjudication of the Use of Force
Apr. 30-May 3, 2018– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Public Safety Discipline and Internal Investigations
Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 2018– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Click here for more information about all AELE Seminars
A civil liability law publication for Law Enforcement
ISSN 0271-5481 Cite this issue as: 2018 LR February
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Firearms Related: Second Amendment Issues
First Amendment (2 cases)
Gang Activity
Privacy
AELE Seminars
The Biometric, Psychological and Legal Aspects of Lethal and
Less Lethal Force and the Management, Oversight, Monitoring,
Investigation and Adjudication of the Use of Force
Apr. 30-May 3, 2018– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Public Safety Discipline and Internal Investigations
Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 2018– Orleans Hotel, Las Vegas
Click here for more information about all AELE Seminars
A high speed pursuit then ensued, but the motorist eventually surrendered. In a lawsuit claiming excessive use of force, a federal appeals court noted that it was undisputed that no bullet hit the minivan or the occupants inside. The shooting officer’s affidavit stated that he was aiming at the left rear tire. The appeals court held the trial court should have granted the defendant officer summary judgment because the shots did not halt the van’s departure and, because they were fleeing, they were not seized at the time he fired his weapon, even if they had a subjective intent to submit to authority. Farrell v. Montoya, #16-2216, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 26620 (10th Cir.).
During a traffic stop, an officer observed what he thought were bags of marijuana in the car’s glove compartment. The officer first pointed his gun at the ground and then pointed it point blank at the driver, who was trying to move the bags. A pursuit ensued, which three officers joined.
The plaintiff can be seen in a video steering away from the first officer’s car in a vacant parking lot but the officer broadcast that the motorist “tried to ram my vehicle,” The motorist fled, entering a highway. The chase continued through two red lights in an uninhabited area. A second officer twice collided with the pursued car, causing the driver to lose control. A third officer rammed the motorist’s car, which stopped, then slowly moved forward. The motorist’s and first officer’s cars collided at low speed. Gunshots were heard on the recording. And the motorist, struck by three bullets fired by a fourth officer, died.
The appeals court ruled that the deceased did not present an imminent or ongoing danger and therefore the shooting officer's use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable and in violation of the deceased’s constitutional rights because the officer fired after the deceased’s car had passed the point where it could harm him, the officer had time to realize he was no longer in immediate danger, and it was relevant that the officer repeatedly violated police procedures; Despite this, although the officer's conduct fell outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment, controlling authority at the time of the events had not clearly established the rights now identified, so he was entitled to qualified immunity. The officer's violation of police department policies did not require a different outcome because the violation did not cause the officer to lose his qualified immunity. Latits v. Phillips, #15-2306, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 26650, 2017 Fed. App. 0292P (6th Cir.).
Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a man to death
when the basis of their appeal was factual arguments about materiality and sufficiency
of the evidence, which should be made to a jury and did not run to a legal
issue on appeal. The trial court did not make any legal determinations based
upon facts viewed in the light most favorable to the estate, it merely held
that the factual dispute at this stage prevented such an analysis. Franklin
v. Peterson, #16-4429, 2017 U.S. App.
Lexis 26540 (8th Cir.). |
The two plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that policies and regulations governing protests and demonstrations at the airport violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The trial court granted the injunction in part, concluding that the plaintiffs made the necessary showing with respect to their claim that the challenged regulations were unreasonable because they did not contain a formal process for expediting permit applications in exigent circumstances. It also enjoined airport officials from enforcing certain regulations governing the location of permitted protests and picketing restrictions, including the size of signage. A federal appeals court reversed, largely because the court below applied the wrong legal standard in resolving whether the elements for granting a preliminary injunction were met: “[t]he district court’s flawed analysis and clearly erroneous factual finding led it to conclude that Plaintiffs demonstrated a strong likelihood of succeeding in their challenge to the lack of an exigency provision in [the Denver Municipal Code]. The court abused its discretion in so concluding.” It erred by relying on its own belief that the defendants could shorten the permit period to 24 hours in exigent circumstances. McDonnell v. City and County of Denver, #17-1071, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 206 (10th Cir.).
Insane Clown Posse, a Michigan music group, performs songs with “harsh language and themes.” Its fans, who call themselves “Juggalos,” wear distinctive tattoos, clothing, and insignia, including clown face paint and the “hatchetman” logo. The Attorney General’s National Gang Intelligence Center's (34 U.S.C. 41507) 2011 gang-activity report, described Juggalos as “a loosely-organized hybrid gang.”
Four states currently recognize Juggalos as a gang. Juggalos who claim that they do not knowingly affiliate with any criminal gang, but have suffered violations of their Fifth Amendment due-process rights and a chill in the exercise of their First Amendment expression and association rights due to the designation, sued the Justice Department and FBI under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(b). Some claimed that they had been detained. An Army Corporal with Juggalo tattoos alleged that he is “in imminent danger of suffering discipline or an involuntary discharge.” Local law enforcement caused a musical event to be canceled. A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit. The designation was not reviewable because it was not a final agency action and was committed to agency discretion by law. The group’s gang designation did not limit or compel action by other government actors and no government officials were required to consider or abide by the gang designation. Further, the gang designation did not result in legal consequences since the harms that the group suffered were caused by third parties who discretionarily relied on the gang designation, and the harms suffered by the group constituted a decision to act that rested on the shoulders of others and not the agency action. Parsons v. United States Department of Justice, #16-2440, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 25446 (6th Cir. 2017). |
Gang Activity
****Editor's Case Alert****
A man arrested and charged with misdemeanor criminal contempt for allegedly violating a permanent anti-gang injunction. He argued that he was not an active gang member covered by the injunction and that enforcement of the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process. The trial court ruled that the injunction burdened the defendant’s constitutionally-protected liberty interests, and that he was entitled to some adequate predeprivation process to determine whether he was an active gang member covered by the injunction. Because no predeprivation process was available to him to challenge the determination that he was covered by the injunction, the trial court held that enforcement of the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process. An intermediate California appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the misdemeanor criminal contempt charge based on the application of the injunction to the defendant. People v. Sanchez, #F071330, 2017 Cal. App. Lexis 1137.
Editor’s Note: For more on this issue under California law, see Use of Injunctions Against Gang Activity--Part 1: Basis of and Advantage of Injunctive Relief, 2009 (10) AELE Mo. L. J. 101. Use of Injunctions Against Gang Activity--Part Two: Constitutional Challenges, 2009 (11) AELE Mo. L. J. 101, and Use of Injunctions Against Gang Activity--Part Three: Practical and Procedural Issues, 2009 (12) AELE Mo. L. J. 101.
Privacy
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