Prisoner
Assault: By Officer
After a prisoner turned on a sink in a detox cell and let the water
overflow, a jailor allegedly punched him, knocked him to the floor, and
severely injured his jaw. While he was still curled up on the floor, the
jailor and a co-worker allegedly kicked him, mocked him for soiling his
pants, and stated, “We’re the law,
dawg. We can do what we want.” They then threw him into a restraint
chair, and the co-worker watched while the jailor allegedly punched his
face. Bruises on his wrists indicated his attempts to free himself. The
defendants allegedly then left him in the restraints, sitting in his own
feces. He woke up on the floor and asked to see a doctor. The jailor
testified that he and the co-worker took the prisoner to another room,
where a “doctor” looked at him and that the “doctor” was actually the
co-worker in disguise. When the prisoner filed a complaint, the jailor
wrote a report stating that the prisoner was the aggressor. The co-worker
signed the report and later wrote a corroborating report, claiming that
the prisoner had slipped on the water and hit the wall. The co-worker was
charged with depriving the prisoner of his civil rights, 18 U.S.C. 242,
and falsifying a record to impede a federal investigation, 18 U.S.C.
1519.2. The court allowed the prosecution to introduce testimony that the
co-worker had battered a different prisoner and concealed that crime over
his objection and offer that if the jury believed that he committed the
charged assault, he would admit intent. A federal appeals court vacated the
ruling admitting the testimony. The charged conduct provided a sufficient
basis for the jury to find intent. The prior-act evidence had only
incremental probative value. Evidence of the co-worker’s guilt was not
overwhelming. Absent the prior-act evidence, his arguments that the
prisoner lied might have persuaded the jury. The prisoner testified that
he could not remember much about the co-worker’s role. United
States v. Asher, #17-6251, 2018 U.S.
App. Lexis 34947 (6th Cir.).
Prisoner
Discipline
A federal appeals court affirmed the denial of three petitions for habeas
relief arising from disciplinary proceedings in which he was sanctioned
for sending threatening letters from prison. The court ruled that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
Prohibited Acts Code 203, which prohibits inmates from threatening
another person with bodily harm or any other offense, addressed
legitimate penological concerns in a manner that was sufficiently narrow
to satisfy any constitutional concerns. The court also held that the
BOP's disciplinary actions were supported by sufficient evidence. Lane
v. Salazar,
#17-35868, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis
35861 (9th Cir.).
A federal appeals court upheld the denial of three petitions for habeas
relief challenging the revocation of
good time credits. The prisoner was disciplined under the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) Prohibited Acts Code 203, which prohibits threatening
another person with bodily harm or any other offense. The court held that
when read reasonably in the context of the prison setting, and limiting
the phrase “any other offense” to criminal offenses or violations of BOP
rules, Code 203 is sufficiently narrow and clear to protect inmates’
First Amendment rights. Lane
v. Swain, #17-55578, 2018
U.S. App. Lexis 35855 (9th Cir.).
Prisoner
Suicide
An 18-year-old man was arrested for a misdemeanor and taken to a city
lockup. During their rounds, officers in the lockup asked him screening
questions. The arrestee displayed no signs of pain, injury, or infection,
did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, showed no
signs of withdrawal, and did not seem irrational or despondent. He had
not been carrying medication. He refused food. On the afternoon of his
second day in the lockup, an officer looked at the video monitor and saw
the arrestee hanging from a horizontal bar in his cell.
Guards immediately went to the cell, approximately 15 feet away, where
the arrestee had used his jeans to hang himself. He was taken to a
hospital where he died the next day. His mother sued the city for failing
to prevent her son’s death. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment
in favor of the city, noting the lack of evidence that the city was
deliberately indifferent to the risk of suicide for detainees held in
lockups or that the city’s policies and practices were the cause of the
arrestee’s death. Illinois Lockup Standards were in effect at the time of
the death. The plaintiff estate focused on the narrow circumstances of
the arrestee’s death rather than on official policies or unofficial but
wide-spread practices or customs and thus the claims against the city
were not adequate for liability Lapre
v. City of Chicago, #17-3024, 2018 U.S.
App. Lexis 35296 (7th Cir.).
Religion
An Indiana prisoner claimed that a prison and state Department of
Corrections officials unlawfully prevented him from fully participating
in Moorish Science Temple of America services held at the prison, in
violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. The trial court in screening the complaint, dismissed claims
against two defendants on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds and against
an officer who had not participated personally in any of the cited
actions; and allowed damages claims against the remaining defendants to
proceed. After discovery, the court granted the remaining defendants
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. A federal appeals court
affirmed in part, concluding that the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity on First Amendment claims for damages. The court
remanded in part, ruling that the district court misread the complaint,
which clearly seeks injunctive relief as well as damages. The court
should have read the inmate’s pro se free exercise claim as seeking
injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. On remand, the court first must determine
whether the free exercise claim and RLUIPA claims are moot, then consider
whether injunctive relief is warranted. There was, however, no basis for
injunctive relief on the establishment clause claim. Neely--Bey
Tarik-El v. Conley, #17-2980, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 12 (7th
Cir.).
Sexual
Offenders
A woman pled guilty to unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. An Ohio state law
required the determination of whether a person convicted of a sexually
oriented offense is a “sexual predator,” “likely to engage in the future"
in "sexually oriented offenses.” Her classification as a sexual
predator was affirmed on appeal, which required her to register with the
sheriff for the rest of her life and provide detailed personal
information. She must provide written notice of any changes, and verify,
in person, the current address of her residence, school, and place of
employment every 90 days. Failure to comply is a felony. Her registration
information is publicly disseminated through an Internet sex-offender
database, and she may not reside within 1,000 feet of any school and is
barred from living in federally subsidized housing. The law provides that
“[i]n no case shall the lifetime duty to comply . . . terminated.” She
sought a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional in preventing
her from obtaining a hearing to demonstrate that she is no longer “likely
to reoffend.” A federal appeals court upheld the statute, first holding
that named state officials did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity and
that the plaintiff had standing. Her classification was based on her
likelihood of reoffending as of the time of the classification hearing,
and the restrictions stemmed not from her current dangerousness, but from
that assessment. Due process does not require the opportunity to prove a
fact that is not material to the statutory scheme. Doe
v. DeWine, #17-3857, 2018
U.S. App. Lexis 34774, 2018 Fed. App. 0265P
(6th Cir.).
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