AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Civil Liability of
Law Enforcement Agencies & Personnel
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Parking Tickets and Traffic Offenses
A federal appeals court
upheld the dismissal of a class action
lawsuit challenging a village’s red light camera program. The plaintiff
motorists claimed that the tickets they received were invalid because the
notices lack a proper municipal code number citation. They also argued that the
village denied them due process by limiting the defenses that could be asserted
before a hearing officer to contest a violation. A federal appeals court ruled
that the process that the plaintiffs received was constitutionally sufficient
and therefore they had failed to state a federal due process claim. The plaintiffs received notice of each automated red
light violation that included a detailed description of the violation, and they
had right to a hearing with a hearing officer. The private interest at stake, a
$100 fine, was relatively small, and expressly limiting defenses to preclude
the members’ challenge that the violation notice was void for failing to
include a proper citation to the code section did not present a risk of
erroneous deprivation, as it had no bearing on culpability and furthered
“administrative efficiency.” Knutson v. Village of Lakemoor,
#18-3729, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 22952, 2019 WL 3490663 (7th Cir.).
Plaintiff motorists who received citations for running red lights filed a lawsuit challenging a city’s red light ordinance, allowing the installation and operation of cameras to enforce traffic-control-device violations at specific intersections. A federal appeals court ruled that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims had to be dismissed because they failed to sufficiently allege that they suffered a violation of their constitutional rights. The dismissal of the federal claims was warranted because the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The plaintiffs asserted that the ordinance imposed a criminal penalty without providing constitutionally sufficient procedural safeguards. But what the ordinance actually imposed, however, was a civil penalty, and therefore the procedures in the ordinance were constitutionally sufficient. Having found no viable federal claims, the court declined to consider the state law claims. Worthy v. Phenix City, #17-14718, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 21250, 2019 WL 3226873 (11th Cir.).
A city used a common parking ordinance enforcement practice known as “chalking.” Parking enforcement officers use chalk to mark the tires of parked cars to track how long they have been parked at a particular location. They then return to the car after the posted time for parking has passed, and if vehicles in the area still have chalk marks, indicating that the vehicle has not moved, a citation is issued. A motorist who frequently received such citations sued the city and a parking enforcement officer, arguing that chalking violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search.The trial court ruled that, while chalking may have constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, the search was reasonable. A federal appeals court reversed, characterizing the practice as a regulatory exercise. The chalking, the appeals court reasoned, involves a physical intrusion and is intended to gather information. While automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy, the need to deter drivers from exceeding the time permitted for parking before they have even done so is not sufficient to justify a warrantless search under the community caretaker rationale. Taylor v. Saginaw, #17-2126, 922 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2019).
A group of drivers sued a city and
the company which installed and operated an Automatic Traffic Enforcement (ATE)
system, claiming that the system violated their right to procedural due
process, their fundamental right to travel, a state statute, and caused unjust
enrichment for the city and company. Drivers who had not received citations
from the system had no standing to assert their claims. While six drivers had
standing to bring procedural-due-process claims because the allegations that
the ATE procedure was inadequate sufficiently established an injury in fact for
standing, they did not state a violation of their procedural-due-process
rights, did not allege a violation of the right to travel under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, and there was no Equal Protection violation. Hughes v.
City of Cedar Rapids, #15-2703, 840 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2016).
A woman claimed that a
state trooper started harassing her in 2007, tailgating her in an off-duty
vehicle, parking behind her, and questioning her about her driving. When the
officer and the female motorist's adult son exchanged heated words, the officer
at first allegedly stated that the motorist would receive an additional ticket
because of her son's statements and then left without issuing any tickets when
the son stated that he would complain to the officer's supervisor. After the
motorist complained abut this, the officer, hours later, arrived at her home
and delivered three tickets. After her son mentioned the alleged harassment at
a restaurant, the trooper, accompanied by a fellow officer, again returned to
the home, resulting in a confrontation with the woman's son-in-law. A federal
appeals court ruled that a First Amendment retaliatory prosecution claim was
time barred as it was filed two years after the tickets were delivered to the
woman, which was the date the claim accrued, rather than the later date of the
trial when she was convicted on the tickets. The trial court erred, however, in
dismissing a Fourth Amendment constructive seizure complaint against the
trooper on the basis that the plaintiff failed to specifically identify in that
claim that she was proceeding under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 rather than merely
under the Fourth Amendment. Smith v. Campbell, #14-1468, 782 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir.
2015).
After a man parked his car on the street outside
his suburban home in violation of an ordinance, an officer placed a parking
ticket face down under his windshield wiper. The ticket included the man's
name, birth date, sex, weight, height, driver's license number, an outdated
address, and the vehicle identification number and description of his car. He
then filed an attempted class action lawsuit under the federal Driver's Privacy
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 2721, forbidding the disclosure of personal
information obtained in connection with motor vehicle records except for
specified uses "in connection with any civil, criminal, administrative, or
arbitral proceeding" and "use by any government agency, including any
court or law enforcement agency, in carrying out its functions." Upholding
the rejection of the privacy claim, a federal appeals court noted that there
was no evidence that anyone had ever taken a parking ticket off a car
windshield in the suburb in question and used the personal information on the
ticket for any purpose. It stated that, had the municipality made all the
information present on the ticket accessible to the public on the Internet or placed
"highly sensitive" information, such as the motorist's Social
Security number, on the ticket, there might have been a greater risk of a
"nontrivial" invasion of privacy that outweighed any benefit to law
enforcement. Senne v. Village of Palatine, #13-3671, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 7118
(7th Cir.).
A class action was filed challenging the issuing
and form of automated speeding tickets issued under a state speed camera
statute. Rejecting the plaintiffs' claims, a federal appeals court found that
service of the speeding citations via first class mail satisfied due process,
that the automated citation process used did not violate due process, and that
the citations could be used as evidence at trial. Any flaws in the enforcement
process could have been raised in the state court, where there was an adequate
opportunity to do so, but the drivers failed to raise such issues there. Snider
International Corporation v. Town of Forest Heights, #12-2490, 739 F.3d 140
(4th Cir. 2014).
A village was entitled to summary judgment on claims
that information placed on its parking tickets violated the federal Drivers
Privacy Protection Act. While the information listed on the tickets was a
"disclosure, it was an acceptable use of the information for purposes of identification
and verification of the person to whom the ticket was issued. The court
commented, however, that not all the information on the tickets may be
necessary, while not spelling out which information might be problematic. Senne v. Palatine,
#1:10-cv-05434, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 168677 (N.D. Ill.). For prior opinions,
see Senne v. Village of Palatine, #10-3243, 695 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. en banc.
2012), cert. denied, #12-573, 133 S. Ct. 2850, 186 L. Ed. 2d 909, 2013 U.S.
Lexis 4737.
A police officer placing a parking ticket
underneath a car's windshield wiper blade may have violated the federal
Driver's Privacy Protection Act. The court noted that the ticket disclosed the
full name, address, date of birth, sex, height, weight, and driver's license
number of the driver, with all that information obtained from state records.
"The possibilities for identity theft are obvious," the court stated,
and the municipality failed to show how the disclosed information being stated
on the ticket played a role in its law enforcement efforts so as to come within
an exception to the statute. The court rejected arguments by the municipality
that the plaintiff motorist was required to prove that someone other than
himself actually viewed the information on the ticket on his vehicle in order
to pursue his claim under the statute. Senne v. Village of Palatine, #10-3243,
2012 U.S. App. Lexis 16328 (7th Cir. en banc.).
A car owner received, over a 14 month period, 24
"bogus" traffic tickets and made seven trips to court to get them
dismissed. He claimed that this harassment may have stemmed from his estranged
wife's relationship with certain police officers. A federal appeals court ruled
that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a "class-of-one" equal
protection claim by stating that he had been intentionally singled out for
these tickets, which served no conceivable legitimate purpose. He was not
required to show that there were other similarly situated individuals who had
not been subject to similar harassment. Due process claims were properly
dismissed, however, as the writing of "bogus" traffic tickets did not
rise to the level of conduct which shocks the conscience. Geinosky v. City of
Chicago, #11-1448, 675 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2012).
A motorist's claim that a city's action, in
fining him an amount for a traffic violation under a city ordinance that was in
excess of the amount of the fine authorized by state statutes for the same
offense violated his federal constitutional rights was rejected by a federal
appeals court. Under a city ordinance, the motorist was fined $150 for careless
driving, along with a $15 amount for court costs and a $1 administrative fee,
while state law punishes careless driving with a $30 fine. The city stopped the
practice after the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled in Sauby v. City of Fargo,
#20070202, 747 N.W.2d 65 (2008) that doing this violated state law. Despite
this, the previous imposition of a higher fine on the plaintiff did not violate
constitutional due process, equal protection, or the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on excessive fines. Mills v. City of Grand Forks, #09-2119, 2010
U.S. App. Lexis 15308 (8th Cir.).
Motorists in Cleveland, Ohio sued the city,
challenging the decision to enforce a traffic camera ordinance, which involves
taking pictures of motorists who run red lights at certain locations, against
drivers who lease, and do not own, their cars. They argued that such
enforcement of traffic citations against them amounted to an unconstitutional
taking of property without just compensation, in light of the fact that the
ordinance did not originally provide for liability on the part of lessees. The
ordinance was subsequently amended to provide for lessee liability. The lawsuit
involved citations the city enforced against lessees prior to the amendment of
the ordinance. A federal appeals court ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to
assert a constitutional claim under the Takings Clause of the U.S. or Ohio
Constitution, since the ordinance in question did not aim at the seizure of or
"otherwise impair" an "identifiable" fund of money. The
court did, however, order further proceedings on the plaintiffs' claim that
such enforcement of the traffic camera ordinance unjustly enriched the city in
violation of state law, which the trial court had not analyzed. McCarthy v.
City of Cleveland, #09-4149, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 23203 (6th Cir.).
A Tennessee motorist filed a federal civil rights
lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a city's court processing fee for
those charged with running red lights based on photographs of their cars taken
by a company that forwarded the photos to the city, which then issued a
citation and assessed a $50 fine. Under the city's ordinance, motorists who
choose to challenge the citation and fine are informed that, if they chose to
do so, they will be assessed a $67.50 court processing fee. A federal appeal
court ruled that the plaintiff motorist, while having standing to challenge the
citation as improper because the processing fee amounted to more than the
possible fine, had an "unripe" claim, because the city, at oral
argument, had agreed to give her a hearing. Only after she actually attended
such a hearing could she have "suffered a hardship" allowing her to
go forwards with her claims. Williams v. Redflex Traffic Systems, Inc.,
#08-5545, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21637 (6th Cir.).
An increase in the initial $23 parking ticket
fine to $519, which occurred as the result of the assessment of a $16 per month
late penalty fee, did not violate the excessive fines provision of the
Constitution, despite the plaintiff's argument that he never received the
initial ticket. The city did mail him an additional notice of the ticket, and
he failed to pay it. The growth of the amount due could be attributed to his failure
to pay or contest the ticket, not to any unconstitutional action by the city in
designing the late fee penalty. The court also rejected the plaintiff's due
process claim, finding that he received adequate notice of his right to contest
the ticket and of the late fee penalty. Wemhoff v. City of Baltimore, Civil
Action No. CCB-08-1209, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 104398 (D. Md.).
A city system involving capturing photos of cars
running red lights or making illegal turns, and then imposing fines on the owners
of such vehicles, regardless of whether or not they were the driver, did not
violate the due process or equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is, the court noted, no "fundamental right" to avoid
being seen on a public street or to run a red light, nor did the
"modest" $90 fine involve any fundamental property right. It is
rational to fine the vehicle owner rather than the driver, since the driver
could blame others, as it is likely that the driver would not be revealed in
the photographs. Idris v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1363, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 42
(7th Cir.).
A police officer had probable cause to stop a
motorist and issue a citation for driving without headlights on after sundown
and without wearing a seat belt. The motorist himself did not deny that he had
been stopped on the date, so that the fact that the defendant officers' motion
for summary judgment stated the wrong date for the incident, stating a date in
which the motorist had been out of the state, did not matter. The plaintiff
also did not deny driving after sundown with his headlights off and without
wearing his seatbelt, which was broken. Austin v. Gaskins, No. 4:07cv420, 2008
U.S. Dist. Lexis 66153 (N.D. Fla.).
The legality of automated red light enforcement
traffic citations and contingency fee contracts with private providers was
upheld by an intermediate California appellate court. In re Red Light Photo
Enforcement Cases, #D048882, 2008 Cal. App. Lexis 873 (4th Dist.).
City's
action in imposing late fees for those who do not timely pay parking tickets,
even if unauthorized by any municipal ordinance, was not a violation of
federally protected civil rights, such as due process. Tickets did provide
recipients of the time within which to pay and the amount of the late fee, and
the city's action did not involve any fundamental rights or constitute conduct
shocking to the court's conscience. Rector v. City and County of Denver,
#02-1434, 348 F.3d 935 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Placing parking tickets on illegally parked cars
was sufficient to provide due process notice to vehicle owner of the claimed
parking violations and of the fact that accumulating three unpaid and
unappealed such tickets could result in the placing of an immobilizing
"wheel boot" on the auto. Plaintiff showed, however, that the city
failed to provide a "meaningful opportunity" to be heard before or
after the placement of such a "boot" on his car, since the tickets
did not explain how to contest the validity of the placement or explain how and
when the "boot" could be removed. Individual defendants, however,
including the city's mayor, a police officer, and a parking monitor, were
entitled to qualified immunity from liability because the law in the area of
"wheel booting" was not clearly established. Gross v. Carter, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 995 (W.D. Ark. 2003). [N/R]
Vehicle owner had no privacy interest in auto parked on city street; no warrant
was required to seize vehicle after default judgment issued for failure to pay
parking fines. Administrative parking violation notices provided were
sufficient to give vehicle owner notice of available pre- and post-deprivation
remedies. Rackley v. City of New York, 186 F. Supp. 2d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
[2002 LR Jul]
A city's delay in setting a hearing date for a
number of weeks after a motorist's car was towed for alleged parking
violations, despite the owner's "insistent and immediate" demand for
a hearing violated both a California state statute, Ann. Cal. Vehicle Code Sec.
22852, and constitutional due process, as clearly established twenty-five years
before in Stypmann v. City & County of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338 (9th
Cir. 1977).
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