AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Civil Liability of
Law Enforcement Agencies & Personnel
Back to list of subjects Back to Legal Publications Menu
Assault and Battery: Handcuffs & Restraints
Monthly
Law Journal Article: Civil Liability for the Use
of Handcuffs: Part I - Handcuffs as Excessive Force, 2008 (10) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil
Liability for the Use of Handcuffs: Part II - Use of Force Against
Handcuffed Persons, 2008 (11) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Force
and the Fatigue Threshold: The Point of No Return, 2010 (6) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
Monthly Law Journal Article: Teaching 4th Amendment Based
Use-of-Force, 2012 (7) AELE Mo. L. J. 501.
Monthly Law Journal Article: The Use of Electronic Control
Weapons Against Handcuffed or Restrained Persons - Part 1, 2012 (9) AELE
Mo. L. J. 101
Monthly Law Journal Article: The Use of Electronic Control
Weapons Against Handcuffed or Restrained Persons - Part 2, 2012 (10) AELE
Mo. L. J. 101.
A Detroit woman heard a banging at the front door of her home. The next thing she knew, there were a group of people wearing all black standing in her living room with masks concealing their faces and only their eyes visible. They were police officers executing a search warrant. One officer threw her to the ground, put his knee in her back, and handcuffed her. She complained that the handcuffs were tight, but the officer allegedly told her “shut up, b----, you shouldn’t be so fat.” When she repeated her complaint, he allegedly replied “if you don’t shut your f---ing mouth I can blow your head off and nothing can be done.” Days later, the woman was diagnosed at a hospital with musculoskeletal strain in her chest and wrist bruising. She sued for excessive force and deliberate indifference. A federal appeals court upheld the denial of motions for qualified immunity, governmental immunity, and summary judgment in favor of the police department and officers on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The plaintiff had created a genuine issue of material fact of whether the officers violated her clearly established right to be free from excessively tight handcuffing that causes physical injury. The officers were also not entitled to immunity on the state law battery claim stemming from the handcuffing because there was evidence that the officer who handcuffed her tightened them in bad faith after she complained. McGrew v. Sergeant Duncan, #18-2022, 937 F.3d 664 (6th Cir. 2019).
A woman’s federal civil rights lawsuit asserted that two officers used excessive force in the course of arresting her and her minor son in a school parking lot. A federal appeals court overturned the denial of summary judgment for the officers based on qualified immunity. The officers’ actions did not violate the clearly established rights of the woman and her son since there was no controlling authority at the time establishing a right to be free from any of the three uses of a Taser in the dart mode applied to the plaintiff. The officers faced a situation involving “aggressive” behavior and a “chaotic combative” scene during which the woman stepped towards an officer when told to step back. The plaintiff therefore failed to identify a consensus of cases that placed the excessive force question “beyond debate” at the time of the incident, so qualified immunity was appropriate. The woman did not calm down until after the third activation of the Taser. An officer also did not violate a clearly established right by handcuffing the son’s wrists behind his back. Rudley v. Bryant, #18-2533, 935 F.3d 651 (8th Cir. 2019).
A couple asserted claims arising from a School Resource Officer’s (SRO) treatment of their eight-year-old autistic son. Their claims were for disability discrimination under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Their son, a second grader, was diagnosed with autism, oppositional defiant disorder, and separation anxiety disorder. He weighed approximately 87 pounds, and was about 58 inches tall. He received Special Education services. The child was serving an in-school suspension in the principal’s office and became visibly upset, using obscenities, crumpling papers, and throwing items on the floor. He referred to a weapon in his backpack and produced what he referred to as “home-built nunchucks,” which actually consisted of a jump rope provided by the school as part of a “Jump Rope for Heart” program. He twirled the jump rope and attempted to hit the principal, and threw a cup of coffee against the wall, before running into the hallway with his jump rope. An SRO arrived, handcuffed the boy, and took him back to the principal’s office. The officer allegedly sat face-to-face with the boy, screamed at him, called him names, including “punk” and “brat,” mocked him, and laughed at him. He allegedly continued antagonizing the boy and aggravating the situation until the parents arrived. When his mother asked the officer if he realized handcuffing a child with autism would traumatize him, he replied: “You know what? You're right, I don't know that. I'm not a psychologist.” He also said, You know what, he has no sign on his head that says, ‘I have autism, I hit people.’ You can't do that in a free society.” He then continued to laugh and make comments such as “Great parenting!” The parents and child were told by the officer to leave the school, and he filed various criminal charges against the boy. An internal affairs investigation found that the officer’s actions were “unprofessional and unreasonable,” as well as “demeaning, berating and antagonizing.” He was terminated by the city as a result.A federal appeals court overturned the grant of the defendants’ motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment, finding that there were material disputes of fact and that this case was distinguishable from Hainze v. Richards, #99-50222, 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000), a case involving an officer shooting a mentally disturbed suicidal man armed with a knife, because there were no exigent circumstances in the present case. The court ruled that a jump rope in the hands of an eight-year-old child was not a weapon, and was not capable of inflicting the same injuries or damage as a real weapon, even if he called the jump rope his “nunchucks.” At a minimum, the court stated, whether an eight year old twirling a child’s jump rope created a danger of physical harm or a potentially life-threatening situation was a dispute of material fact requiring further proceedings. Wilson v. City of Southlake, #18-10342, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 26069 (5th Cir.).
A deputy sheriff had sufficient probable cause to arrest a woman for battery after a fight with her sister over the specifics of the last wishes of their cancer-stricken mother. The information he received indicated that she had battered her sister. Further, the information was credible and his investigation was sufficient. The federal appeals court also ruled that the deputy did not use excessive force in making the arrest by pulling the arrestee’s arms, cinching the handcuffs too tight, or tugging on her fingers and arms to remove her ring. The court found that the force used here “wasn’t remotely unusual or disproportionate. Officers routinely pull arrestees’ arms behind their backs, and we have repeatedly held that painful handcuffing alone doesn’t constitute excessive force.” Huebner v. Bradshaw, #18-12093, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 25020, 2019 WL 3948983
(11th Cir.).
A 7-year-old grade school student sued a public school police officer and the school principal for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He was handcuffed at the school following an outburst from him against a classmate who had been persistently teasing him. A federal appeals court concluded that neither the officer nor the principal had violated the student’s rights, and they were both entitled to qualified immunity on excessive force and unreasonable seizure claims. Under the circumstances, a reasonable officer could believe, based on the boy’s recent resistance, that keeping him in handcuffs for 15 minutes until a parent arrived was the reasonable thing to do. The officer could have also believed that his actions were needed to prevent the student from attempting to leave or pose a risk of harm to himself. Additionally, the principal’s failure to intervene and have the officer remove the handcuffs was reasonable because of her previous experience with the student. She had previously found it necessary to restrain him several months before. Even if the reasonableness of the officer and the principal’s actions were questionable, the student could not show that a reasonable official would have been on notice that their conduct violated a clearly established right. Because there was no violation of the student’s constitutional rights, the municipal liability claims also failed. K.W.P. v. Kansas City Public Schools, #17-3602, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 23023, 2019 WL 3489104 (8th Cir.).
A police officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from a motorist’s claim that he used excessive force during a routine traffic stop for speeding and to check whether the tint on the vehicle’s windows complied with state law. The federal appeals court held that a police officer, like the one here, was not entitled to qualified immunity when he intentionally applies unnecessarily tight handcuffs to an arrestee who is neither resisting arrest nor attempting to flee, thereby causing serious and permanent injuries. In this case, the plaintiff was in handcuffs for more than five hours and suffered nerve damage to his hands and wrists. The court held that such injuries were not de minimus (minimal) and could be a basis for liability. Sebastian v. Ortiz, #17-14751, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 7477, 2019 WL 1187012 (11th Cir.).
Officers responding to a report about an armed hostage situation arrested a suspect. In the course of making the arrest, they took him to the ground, struck him, and rendered him unconscious with a carotid restraint maneuver. While he was unconscious, they handcuffed his arms behind his back, zip-tied his legs together, and moved him into a seated position. He subsequently sued for excessive force, claiming among other things that when he gained consciousness, the officers resumed hitting him and placed him into a second carotid restraint, rendering him unconscious a second time, even though he was then handcuffed and otherwise restrained. A federal appeals court held that the officers acted reasonably under the circumstances, at least until the plaintiff was handcuffed and restrained. They were entitled to quailed immunity for their conduct until he was handcuffed and restrained, but not for their alleged conduct after that point. McCoy v. Meyers, #17-3093, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 8943 (10th Cir.).
Two officers saw a group near a high school, including known street gang members. The youths crossed the street after the assistant principal told them to leave. When school was over, they harassed pedestrians and flashed gang signs. The officer told them to leave the area, and they moved a block away, in front of a house, and continued their actions. The officers told them to disperse or be arrested. One boy rode his bike back to the school’s lawn. The officers decided to arrest him for trespassing. They could have issued a simple citation but believed that he would continue to loiter. They instructed him to get off his bike and put his hands behind his back. He cooperated, and they escorted him to their squad car where an officer’s handling caused his arm to break. In a federal civil rights lawsuit, the court granted the defendants summary judgment. A federal appeals court reversed in part. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the record established that he was fully cooperative when the officer moved his arm with enough force to break it, which does not support the conclusion that he was placing the plaintiff in handcuffs with objectively reasonable force. Avina v. Bohlen, #17-1902, 882 F.3d 674 (7th Cir. 2018).
Two police officers were sent to a hotel
in response to a phone tip that a man had come out of his room with a gun and
threatened to shoot another resident's dog. The man claimed that he had been
nowhere near the room where the incident had allegedly taken place, and tried
to explain that to the officers who proceeded to arrest him. He claimed that he
also told them that he had prior rotator cuff injuries and shoulder surgeries
which precluded him from placing his hands behind his back, and that he
repeatedly complained to them of his pain when he was handcuffed. In a lawsuit
claiming excessive use of force, he stated that the officers ignored his
complaints, aggravating his prior medical injuries. A federal appeals court
upheld the rejection of qualified immunity for the officers. It held that if
the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, the officers violated his clearly
established rights. Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, #15-1722, 2016 U.S.
App. Lexis 18502, 2016 Fed. App. 256P (6th Cir.).
A seven-year-old second grade student in a public
school received special education services because of autism. One morning, he
disrupted his class, ran away from the staff, kicked a social worker, and
kicked and shot rubber bands at a school security officer. To protect the
student and others, the security officer handcuffed the child to a chair.
Before doing so, the officer called the child's mother, who granted her
permission to restrain him, and repeatedly warned the child to calm down. The
officer was aware of the child's disability. Afterwards, the child's parents
sued the school system under the Americans with Disabilities Act, arguing that
it denied the child a protected benefit of education and discriminated against
him on the basis of disability. A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment
for the defendant, agreeing that the plaintiffs had failed to show disability
discrimination either by showing denial of a protected benefit, the implementation
of a policy that imposed a disparate impact on the disabled, or failing to act
on a request for reasonable accommodation. J. V. v. Albuquerque Public Schools,
#15-2071, 813 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2016).
An arrestee sued arresting officers for excessive
force, based on his claim that they refused to accede to his request that he be
handcuffed with his hands in front of him rather than behind him. He said that
he had explained that he had recently undergone stomach surgery and therefore
could not have his hands cuffed behind his back. A federal appeals court held
that the defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the
plaintiff had no clearly established constitutional right to be cuffed with his
hands in front of him. The officers were aware that the plaintiff had a serious
and recent criminal history, they encountered resistance from him in making the
arrest, and they did look at the site of his recent surgery and believed that
using the standard handcuffing technique would not cause a new injury or
exaggerate an existing one, especially as his scar was on his stomach. Most of
the prior cases finding excessive force incident to handcuffing involved
arrestees who had injuries to their shoulders or arms. Hunt v. Massi, #14-1379,
2014 U.S. App. Lexis 23204 (1st Cir.).
A man claimed that while he was in traffic court
a deputy beckoned him to a group of officers, warning him not to
"eyeball" them. When he objected that he was not doing so, an officer
allegedly told him to shut up, and grabbed him. When he asked the officer to
let go, he claimed, a number of officers handcuffed him, threw him against a
wall, causing a nose bleed, threw him to the floor and twice deployed a Taser
in the stun mode against him, before hog tying him and dragging him away. He
was subsequently found guilty of disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to
arrest. A federal appeals court overturned the dismissal of an excessive force
claim. A finding of excessive force on the pat of the officers would not necessarily
imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction fr disorderly conduct and
resisting arrest, so that the conviction did not bar the civil rights claim.
Colbert v. City of Monticello, #13-3037, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 24555 (8th Cir.).
An arrestee stated a viable claim for excessive
force. If, as he claimed, his head was slammed against the pavement with
extreme force after he was handcuffed and was lying prone on the ground, the
force used would have been excessive, disproportionate, and unnecessary. This
would be the case even if he did lift his head off the hot pavement. Officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity, as it was clearly established that a
handcuffed, non-resisting arrestee had a right to be free from excessive force.
Saunders v. Duke, #12-11401, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 17334 (11th Cir.).
When two officers allegedly jerked a man up by
his arms at a time when he was already handcuffed and under control, and did so
with sufficient force to cause serious injury to his shoulder area, this claim,
if true, violated clearly established law, so the officers were properly denied
summary judgment. It was, however, reasonable for the officers to detain and
handcuff the man, who was the roommate of a parolee whose home they were
searching, since he was belligerent and refused to remain seated. Blazek v.
Iowa City, #12-3785, 12-3786, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 15008 (8th Cir.).
Police officers were entitled to qualified
immunity on claims that handcuffing and removing from a school an eleven-year-old
boy when there was concern about his behavior and welfare because he had not
taken his medication was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It was not and
still is not clearly established that handcuffing and driving a juvenile from
his school to a relative's place of business violated his rights. C. B. v. City
of Sonora, #11-17454, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 18931 (9th Cir.).
A Californis man claimed that sheriff's deputies
unlawfully arrested him and beat him during the incident while he was handcuffed
and not resisting arrest. He sued under a state statute authorizing damage
claims "against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats,
intimidation, or coercion, with an individual's exercise or enjoyment of rights
secured by federal or state law," known as the Bane Act. The jury awarded
damages on the plaintiff's claims totaling over half a million dollars, and
$989,258 in attorneys' fees. A California intermediate appeals court upheld
this result, rejecting an argument that the Bane Act required a showing that
the "threats, intimidation, or coercion" caused a violation of a
separate and distinct constitutional right in addition to a Fourth Amendment
violation. The court ruled that Fourth Amendment rights are among those
protected by the statute. Bender v. County of Los Angeles, #B236294,
2013 Cal. App. Lexis 536.
An arrestee sued a city, claiming that he had
suffered a broken leg when an officer allegedly compelled him to sit down while
he was restrained in handcuffs. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the
city was entitled to summary judgment as it was immune from liability for acts
of its employees performing police duties unless the officers acted in reckless
disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal
activity at the time of the injury. Nothing showed that the officer acted in
reckless disregard for the plaintiff's safety and well being. City of Jackson
v. Gardner, #2012-IA-00517-SCT, 108 So.3d 927, 2013 Miss. Lexis 68.
A woman claimed that county employees conspired
with the father of her child, a sheriff's deputy, to obtain an invalid warrant
lacking probable cause to search her house, to use excessive force during the
execution of that warrant, and then to arrest her without probable cause. The
unlawful search and false arrest claims were rejected, as there was probable
cause to search her home and arrest her, based on allegations that she had
fraudulently used the deputy's personal credit card to make purchases. However,
as there was evidence that she did not pose a threat to officer safety and was
not resisting arrest, her excessive force and conspiracy claims survived and
should be decided by a jury. She claimed that the defendants pointed weapons at
her, grabbed her by the arms and shoulders, and pushed her in the back down a
hallway, before handcuffing her in an extremely tight manner. Cameron v. Craig,
#11-55927, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 7563 (9th Cir.).
A deaf man arrested in a domestic violence
situation involving him and one of his deaf children stated a viable disability
discrimination claim. He asserted that handcuffing him in the back prevented
him from writing notes in order to communicate with the deputies. "The
injury is the failure to make communication as effective as it would have been
among deputies and persons without disabilities." The deputies were
entitled to qualified immunity from liability, however, based on the exigent
circumstances involved in a domestic violence situation. With the deputies
concerned about their own safety and the safety of the man's family, it was
reasonable to try to accommodate his disability by calling an American Sign
Language trainee to assist in communication, and by attempting to use his
father as an interpreter, even though those accommodations were not the best
practices. Seremeth v. Board of County Commissioners Frederick County,
#10-1711, 2012 U.S. App. Lexis 5105 (4th Cir.).
An officer arrived at the home to investigate
complaints that a woman and her parents had taken unauthorized control of an
elderly woman's property and care there. The officer confronts a caretaking
woman outside the home, and asked her about the location of the elderly woman.
When she refused to answer his question, and attempted to flee inside the
house, he placed her under arrest for obstruction, grabbed her arm, and
handcuffed her after a struggle. A federal appeals court rejects First
Amendment and Fifth Amendment claims, ruling that there was no clearly
established law that the woman had a right to refuse to answer the officer's
questions during a Terry investigative stop. The officer was entitled to
qualified immunity, as he could reasonably, under these circumstances, believe
that her refusal to answer his question amounted to obstruction. The court also
rejected a claim that the officer handcuffed the woman too tightly, finding
that any injury was de minimis (minimal). Koch v. City of Del
City, #10-6105, 660 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2011).
Officers who allegedly shoved one occupant of a
residence and pointed assault rifles at all of them while executing search and
arrest warrants were not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive use of
force claim. They allegedly used this force well beyond the time it took to
arrest the suspect sought, who was taken into custody and removed almost
immediately after the officers entered. The rifles were pointed at the
plaintiffs while they were subdued and handcuffed in their rooms. The court
found that no reasonable officer would have thought that such conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances. They were, however, entitled to qualified immunity for
keeping the arrested suspect's teenage sister and parents detained in handcuffs
in the living room for approximately forty-five minutes to an hour after the
arrest while they searched for weapons believed to be present. Mlodzinski v.
Cormier, #10-1966, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 11117 (1st Cir.).
After a pawn shop owner told police that a
customer who previously sold him a fake watch was back trying to sell more of
them, an officer arrived and almost immediately handcuffed him before asking
him any questions. When the watches turned out to be genuine, he was released.
The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on a civil rights claim
concerning the handcuffing. To apply handcuffs during an investigatory stop,
the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that such restraints are necessary
for a legitimate purpose or that the suspect is armed and dangerous. It is
"well established that if suspects are cooperative and officers have no
objective concerns for safety, the officers may not use intrusive tactics such
as handcuffing absent any extraordinary circumstances." El-Ghazzawy v.
Berthiaume, #10-2058, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 5095 (8th Cir.).
An officer had probable cause to arrest a man for
forgery for allegedly trying to cash a fake money order, even though the money
order ultimately proved to be genuine, when he was told by a local post office
that the money order was fake. The officer, under these circumstances, was not
required to attempt to verify with the out-of-town post office that issued the
money order that it was genuine rather than fake. The officer was also not
liable for requiring the arrestee, for a time, to stand outside in the cold in
handcuffs that allegedly were too tight. Sow v. Fortville Police Department,
#10-2188, 2011 U.S. App. Lexis 2804 (7th Cir.).
Deputies did not use excessive force in allegedly
placing handcuffs too tightly on a burglary arrestee. It was objectively
reasonable for them to finish their initial investigation and clear the area
before addressing the arrestee's complaints about his handcuffs being too
tight. They subsequently loosened them. The deputies also had probable cause to
arrest him for burglary, having seen him carrying things out of a house they
believed no one was permitted to enter, which he admitted entering through a
window, defeating his false arrest claim. The arrestee's statement that he was
the attorney for the co-administrator of the estate connected with the
premises, even if true, did not end probable cause to detain him for
investigation of a burglary. Beltran v. County of Los Angeles, #08-56007, 2010
U.S. App. Lexis 22013 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
National Guardsmen helping police officers with
post-hurricane law enforcement stopped a motorist for speeding. He made three
phone calls from the scene, one to police, to complain that Guardsmen had used
a racial slur against him, one to his wife, an attorney, and one to his
insurance company. His wife witnessed him being handcuffed when she arrived. A
federal appeals court ruled that there was probable cause to stop the motorist,
and that handcuffing him, without more, did not constitute an excessive use of
force, even if they were allegedly adjusted too tight. Lockett v. City of New
Orleans, #09-30712, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 9261 (5th Cir.).
A motorist was stopped for speeding and then arrested
on an outstanding warrant, over her protests that the record of the warrant was
mistaken. The bench warrant for an alleged probation violation had, in fact,
been requested to be recalled, but the court had not yet entered the order. The
arrestee was then handcuffed and shackled to a wall at the county station for
most of the twelve and one-half hours she spent in custody while waiting for
city police to come get her. She claimed that she suffered various physical and
mental injuries as a consequence. A diabetic, she was allegedly denied
permission to get her insulin from her vehicle, and allegedly told that she
would be fine without it for a day. The trial court granted summary judgment to
the defendant officer on her excessive force claim arising from her
handcuffing. The appeals court upheld this result, finding that the plaintiff,
although an innocent and wronged party, failed to show that the arresting
officer committed a due process violation. He was not to blame for the majority
of her ordeal, as he had only been on duty for four and a half hours of the
time she remained handcuffed. As to the appropriate legal standard under the
Maryland state Constitution for excessive force claims for force used by
officers on a person in custody following a valid arrest, the court ruled that
it was whether the force used amounted to punishment, rather than whether the
force used shocks the conscience. The actions of the county police indicated
that they had no intention to punish the plaintiff. They thought that she would
only be shackled for a short time, they offered her food and drink, and they
permitted her to use the bathroom. Smith v. Bortner, #2667, 2010 Md. App. Lexis
112.
While claims that officers illegally entered an
arrestee's home, tampered with evidence, and illegally interrogated him for ten
hours were rejected, as an award of damages on them would imply the invalidity
of his conviction, which had not been set aside, he could still pursue an
excessive force claim against officers based on the manner of his handcuffing
during questioning. A finding that the force used in doing so was excessive
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction, since
no such claim was made in his motion to suppress evidence in his criminal
trial, so the issue was not previously litigated. Flood v. Schaefer, #09-1390,
2010 U.S. App. Lexis 4566 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).
A police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity from liability for excessive force after entering a suspect's home,
since it was clearly established that hitting a "neutralized suspect"
who is handcuffed is objectively unreasonable. The officer acted reasonably,
however, in entering the home when he was responding to a 911 call from the
man's neighbor reporting that he was yelling at his daughter, and that the
daughter might be "getting beat." The officer encountered the father
as a man irate and out of control, shouting profanities at him when he merely
tried to determine whether the daughter was ok. Schreiber v. Moe, #09-1337 2010
U.S. App. Lexis 4537 (6th Cir.).
A woman seized following a domestic
disturbance claimed that an officer refused to loosen her handcuffs when she
complained that they were too tight, and pushed her face into the ground after
she was already subdued and handcuffed. The officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity in an excessive force lawsuit, as the Fourth Amendment right
not to be subjected to unduly tight handcuffs was clearly established, and the
officer admitted that the detainee had complained of their tightness and that
he disregarded the complaint. Bruising, skin marks, and the pain the detainee
claimed created a genuine factual issue as to whether she suffered an injury
during the 40 to 50 minutes she was handcuffed. Morrison v. Board of Trustees
of Green Township, #08-3051, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 22159 (6th Cir.).
An arrestee who experienced a dislocated shoulder
during an arrest sued police officers, claiming that they used excessive force.
When he complied with the officers' orders to lay face down on the ground and
let them handcuff him behind his back, he allegedly told an officer of a prior
right shoulder injury, requesting that he be picked up by the left arm. If
true, this established that the officers could be found to have used excessive
force in picking him up using his pre-existing injured arm, which they had no
justification for, allegedly causing a dislocated shoulder. Claims against the
officer who picked up the arrestee were reinstated. Jones v. Garcia, #08-1968,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 21801 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
After a man mistakenly shot himself twice, his
wife summoned police to provide assistance. He claimed that, despite the
seriousness of the gunshot wounds to his bicep and stomach, the officers
handcuffed him in a painful manner that aggravated his injuries. Rejecting
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity for the officers, a federal
appeals court found that the additional injuries that allegedly were caused by
the officers' actions, and the manner in which they applied the handcuffs
despite knowledge of the man's gunshot injuries, were sufficiently serious to
support a possible constitutional claim for excessive force. Fisher v. City of
Las Cruces, #07-2294, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 22825 (10th Cir.).
Police stopped a vehicle after money was seen
flying out because an occupant had left his billfold on top of the car when
leaving a gas station. The occupants, then suspected of a non-existent bank
robbery, were required to kneel down. They asked for their car door to be
closed so that their dog would not run out, but officers allegedly refused
their request, and the dog was shot in the head when he came out of the car. A
trial court did not err in refusing to grant the officers qualified immunity,
as it was a question for the jury to decide if the officers used excessive
force under the circumstances. The appeals court upheld a jury verdict for the
plaintiffs. A reasonable officer would have known that it was an excessive use
of force to slam a man to the ground while he was handcuffed and held by two
officers, when he rose up reacting to his dog being shot. Smoak v. Hall, #08-5442,
2009 U.S. App. Lexis 19978 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).
Officers acted reasonably with respect to the
force used while handcuffing an arrestee. While he contended that their actions
had caused him shoulder injuries, the court noted that he refused to put his
hands behind his back, and merely explained that he thought it would
"hurt." He did not tell the officers about any purported infirmities
or pre-existing injury that could be aggravated by handcuffing. The officers,
in quickly pulling his hands behind him in order to accomplish the handcuffing,
did not act in a manner that could be expected to "clearly injure"
typical arrestees. Stainback v. Dixon, #08-3563, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 14115
(7th Cir.).
A corporal smashed a car's windshield while lunging
at it when it failed to turn at a roadblock as directed. The car rolled the
corporal, who then forcibly handcuffed and arrested the motorist. In an
excessive force lawsuit brought by the motorist, the corporal was entitled to
qualified immunity. The court found that the forcible handcuffing was justified
by the motorist's actions, which interfered with an officer's performance of
his duty. The court also stated that even if the corporal violated the
motorist's rights by breaking his windshield, any right involved was not
clearly established. Claims against the county were rejected because the county
did not set policy for the sheriff's department, as well as claims against the
sheriff's department, based on the facts. Vandewalle v. Moffa, #3:07-CV-400, 2009
U.S. Dist. Lexis 19303 (N.D. Ind.).
Arrestee failed to show that a deputy used
excessive force in handcuffing him. While the arrestee informed the deputy that
he had a right shoulder injury before he was handcuffed, an officer is not
required to believe everything an arrestee says, especially when it is said
while the officer is in the process of applying the handcuffs. Additionally,
the deputy did readjust the handcuffs five minutes after the arrestee expressed
his discomfort. The court also rejected a claim for "negligent use"
of excessive force, noting that Florida courts had found such a claim to be an
"oxymoron." Secondo v. Campbell, #08-14983, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 7726
(Unpub. 11th Cir.).
In a criminal appeal, an intermediate California
appeals court finds that police officer did not have a sufficient basis to
handcuff a motorist whose truck they stopped in a high gang, high narcotics
area, and whose passenger had admitted that she was carrying drugs. The court
rejected the argument that an officer's concern about the motorist's height,
which was 6'6", and fears for safety in light of the fact that those
involved in drugs may carry weapons justified the handcuffing. The court found
that the handcuffing was not reasonably necessary for the investigative
detention, that the motorist's subsequent consent to a search was coerced, and
that drugs subsequently found on the motorist should be suppressed. People v.
Stier, #D051505, 168 Cal. App. 4th 21 (4th Dist. 2008).
To establish liability for excessive force in the use
of handcuffs, a detainee must establish both that police applied the handcuffs
unnecessarily tightly, and that they ignored his complaints that the cuffs were
too tight. In this case, an officer was not shown to have violated the
plaintiff's rights, as the handcuffs were removed in response to the
plaintiff's complaints. The defendant officer was not, however, entitled to
qualified immunity on the plaintiff's claim that he used excessive force while
"cramming" him into the back seat of the patrol vehicle. Vance v.
Wade, #07-5930, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 23952 (6th Cir.).
Officer was not entitled to summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity on arrestee's claim that he suffered injuries
when he was handcuffed behind his back, despite an allegedly obvious and severe
medical condition resulting from ten surgeries to his body, which he informed
the officer about. The arrestee claimed that the officer took only a
"cursory" glance at the surgery site and his injury, made a "sarcastic"
remark and continued to handcuff him behind his back despite a request that he
be handcuffed in front. If true, this could violate the arrestee's
constitutional rights, and further proceedings were required to resolve factual
disputes. Dixon v. Donald, No. 07-5587, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 19188 (Unpub. 6th
Cir.).
Federal appeals court upholds multiple uses of
Taser against handcuffed motorist arrested on highway who refused to comply
with instructions to stand up and walk to deputy's car. A deputy made an arrest
of a motorist during a traffic stop at night on a highway in a location where
there was passing traffic. He contended that he had to use force, including
multiple applications of a Taser, to accomplish the arrest, due to the
motorist's resistance. The arrestee, described in the court decision as
"financially destitute and homeless," allegedly became
"agitated" about getting a ticket, and, despite the deputy's repeated
requests that he do so, refused to sign the traffic citation, which is required
by Florida law. The deputy warned him twice that, if he did not sign, he would
be arrested, and the motorist then said, "arrest me," and allowed
himself to be handcuffed. He then got out of his car. As the deputy walked
towards his patrol car with the arrestee, the arrestee, a 23-year-old man who
was 6 feet, 2 inches tall and weighed 180 pounds, allegedly dropped to the
ground behind his car, crossed his legs, and continued sobbing, refusing to get
up and walk. When the deputy warned him of the possibility of getting hit by a
passing car on the highway, the arrestee allegedly said, "My life would be
better if I was dead." A federal appeals court overturned the trial
court's denial of the deputy's motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity. The appeals court found that the deputy only used the Taser
after first trying other approaches such as persuading the motorist to stop his
resistance, attempting to lift him, and warning him repeatedly that the Taser
would be used against him and then providing him with time to comply. The
motorist, at the time, was handcuffed, but refused to stand up and go to the
deputy's car, according to the court. The court reasoned that the presence of
passing traffic created a possible hazard of injury, and that the Taser did not
cause significant injuries such as burns requiring medical attention. Under the
circumstances, the court concluded, the use of the Taser, which was used three
times, was reasonable and moderate non-lethal force. The court also noted that,
while the arrestee was handcuffed at the time, his feet were not bound, and he
was moving. The court stated that the "Plaintiff resisted arrest. Given
this circumstance in the context of all the other facts, Deputy Rackard’s
gradual use of force, culminating with his repeated (but limited) use of a
taser, to move Plaintiff to the patrol car was not unconstitutionally
excessive. In addition, even if Plaintiff could establish that some of the
deputy’s use of force violated the Fourth Amendment, the deputy still would be
entitled to qualified immunity because the applicable law at the time did not
clearly establish that the deputy’s conduct -- given the circumstances -- was
unconstitutional." The court also stated that: "We do not sit in judgment
to determine whether an officer made the best or a good or even a bad decision
in the manner of carrying out an arrest. ... "The government has an
interest in arrests being completed efficiently and without waste of limited
resources: police time and energy that may be needed elsewhere at any moment.
... We also reject the district court’s rationale that had Deputy Rackard
simply waited for back up, two officers could have lifted [Plaintiff] and
carried him to the car without any application of force. A single officer in
the deputy’s situation confronting a non-compliant arrestee like Plaintiff need
not -- as a matter of federal constitutional law -- wait idly for backup to
arrive to complete an otherwise lawful arrest that the officer has started. ...
That an officer has requested more police assistance does not make the use of
force before reinforcements arrive unreasonable." A strong dissent in the
case stated that "I write to express my view that the Fourth Amendment
forbids an officer from discharging repeated bursts of electricity into an
already handcuffed misdemeanant—who is sitting still beside a rural road and
unwilling to move—simply to goad him into standing up." Buckley v.
Haddock, No. 07-10988, 2008 WL 4140297, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 19482 (Unpub. 11th
Cir.).
A motorist's lawsuit claiming that a city police
officer used excessive force against him during a traffic stop should be stayed
under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, a magistrate judge recommended, because the city
employing the officers filed for bankruptcy protection, so that any judgment
for damages could impact the bankruptcy estate's property. Additionally, the
magistrate recommended denial of the officers' motion for summary judgment as
there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether an officer used
excessive force against the motorist, handcuffing him, dislocating his finger,
kicking him, knocking him to the ground, jumping on him, and hitting him, after
which other officers allegedly joined in the beating, actions that the officers
disputed. Garfield v. Kenney, No.CIV S-07-0100, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 71791
(E.D. Cal.).
Officers were on notice, based on prior cases
finding "compression asphyxia," that keeping a person who was in a
state of "excited delirium" restrained with his or her chest to the
ground while applying pressure to the back and ignoring pleas that the subject
could not breathe constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. They
were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit alleging that
they caused a man's death by restraint or positional asphyxiation by keeping
him prone and handcuffed while in an agitated state, suffocating him under
their weight. Arce v. Blackwell, No. 06-17302, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 20162
(Unpub. 9th Cir.).
Motorist's statement that he had consumed "one beer
three hours ago" was sufficient to provide officers with reasonable
suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests, or entitle her to qualified immunity
for doing so. Qualified immunity was denied, however, on a claim that the
officers used excessive force in unduly tightening the arrestee's handcuffs.
Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, No. 07-2148, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 16543 (10th
Cir.).
A search warrant presented to the occupant of a
building was not invalid simply because the copy shown to him lacked the
signature of the issuing judge. The court found that the original of the
warrant was properly signed and issued, and was supported by probable cause.
The court also found that it was legitimate for officers to detain the building
occupant while conducting their search, which was occasioned by his employment
of a suspect, even though the search did not involve a quest to find
contraband. The court also rejected the occupant's argument that excessive
force, which injured his wrists, was used in handcuffing him and detaining him
in a squad car during the search. Housley v. City of Edina, No. 07-1330, 2008
U.S. App. Lexis 3799 (8th Cir.).
Police officers did not use excessive force
against woman detained on suspicion of shoplifting or in allegedly pushing her
into a wall. She was only handcuffed for five minutes, the court noted, and any
marks on her wrists from the handcuffs vanished within a day. Further, the push
against the wall did not leave any mark or wound. Segura v. Jones, No. 07-1013,
2007 U.S. App. Lexis 29231 (10th Cir.).
Police did not act in an objectively unreasonable
manner by handcuffing a 78-year-old motorist with his arms behind his back,
despite his claim that it was painful for him to place his arms there. The
motorist had rear-ended an officer-s vehicle stopped at an intersection.a
vehicle stopped at an intersection. The officers took the extra precaution of
handcuffing him in this manner because of the plaintiff's intoxication and
resulting unpredictability, and forced his arm behind his back only after he
twice refused to obey a command to put it there. Marvin v. City of Taylor, No.
06-2008, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 27950 (6th Cir.).
Police officer acted reasonably in handcuffing
arrestee behind his back even though he claimed to have told the officer that
he recently had back surgery. The court found that the arrestee did not show
any objective indication of injury which would inform the officer that
handcuffing him in this manner might aggravate pre-existing injuries.
Additionally, the arrestee failed, following the handcuffing, to complain to
the officer about back pain or discomfort. Minor v. City of Chesterfield, Mo.,
No. 4:05CV00586, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39990 (E.D. Mo.).
Arrestee's excessive force claim, based on
allegation that her handcuffs were applied too tightly, was not meritorious
when her only injury was bruising on her wrists and arms. Leaving her in a
patrol car for, at most, 30 to 45 minutes with tight handcuffs was not excessive
force. Deputies did not, however, have probable cause to arrest the plaintiff
for interference with their duties or hindering apprehension, if the facts were
as the arrestee claimed, so that they were not entitled to summary judgment on
her false arrest claim. Freeman v. Gore, No. 05-41684, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis
7604 (5th Cir.).
Red marks which arrestee had on his hands from
handcuffs he claimed were too tight did not constitute a significant injury to
support a claim for excessive use of force. Cortez v. McCauley, No. 04-2062,
478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007).
Arrestee's claim that officers handcuffed him too
tightly, by itself, was insufficient to assert a valid claim for excessive use
of force. Photos of his arms that the plaintiff presented showed only minor red
marks, and may have shown a modest amount of swelling. These injuries were too
minimal to support a constitutional claim. Montes v. Ransom, No. 05-11206, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 3837 (5th Cir.).[N/R]
Arrestee failed to show that an officer used
excessive force against her in handcuffing her, and the failure to show that
any officer violated her rights barred any claim against the city for alleged
inadequate training as to how to handcuff disabled arrestees. The record in the
case also showed that the county's policies regarding the
booking/fingerprinting procedures for disabled arrestees was adequate. Calvi v.
Knox County, No. 06-1843, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 30276 (1st Cir.). [N/R]
Police officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity on claim that he used excessive force against arrestee by slapping
him, but was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that he used excessive
force by making the handcuffs too tight. The officer himself did not justify
the slap by a need to protect himself or others, or subdue the arrestee, but
rather stated that it was administered because of the arrestee's "smart
mouth." Nothing in the record, however, indicated that the arrestee had
complained about the handcuffs being overly tight. Pigram v. Chaudoin, No.
05-6660, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 25073 (6th Cir.). [N/R]
Deputy did not use excessive force in restraining
and handcuffing man being arrested on domestic battery charges, even though his
actions led to an injury to the arrestee, when the man resisted and the
incident took place in a crowd at the state fairgrounds in an atmosphere of
"hostility" with crowbars and hammers readily available. Kenyon v.
Edwards, No. 05-3487, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 22737 (8th Cir.). [2006 LR Nov]
Mississippi police officer did not act in a
reckless manner in failing to adjust handcuffs on an arrestee who complained
that the cuffs were too tight. He could not, therefore, be held liable for the
arrestee's subsequent injuries under state law. Bradley v. McAllister, No. 2004-CA-01657,
929 So. 2d 377 (Miss. App. 2006). [N/R]
Detective did not use excessive force in applying
handcuffs to detainee when the detainee failed to complain that they were too
tight. Robbins v. Lappin, No. 05-2569, 170 Fed. Appx. 962 (7th Cir. 2006).
[N/R]
Keeping an eleven-year-old unarmed boy in
handcuffs for 15 minutes, and pointing a gun at his head, while search and
arrest warrants were served on his parents' home, if true, could be found to be
an excessive use of force. Federal agents were not entitled to qualified
immunity. Tekle v. U.S., No. 04-55026, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 20583 (9th Cir.).
[2006 LR Oct]
Officer's alleged over-tightening of arrestee's
handcuffs did not constitute excessive force when the arrestee failed to
complain that they were too tight at the time, and no physical injury occurred.
Liiv v. City of Coeur D'alene, No. 03-35821, 130 Fed. Appx. 848 (9th Cir.
2005). [N/R]
Police officer whose improper application of
handcuffs to arrested 16-year-old allegedly caused a 1.3% permanent impairment
was not entitled to a directed verdict in an excessive force lawsuit. Plaintiff
was properly awarded $153,000 in damages and $51,692.15 in attorneys' fees.
Hanig v. Lee, No. 04-2758, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 14436 (8th Cir.). [2005 LR Sep]
While police officer had adequate probable cause
to arrest motorist for reckless driving after observing her going 76 miles per
hour in a 45 mile per hour zone, genuine issues as to whether he improperly
used excessive force against her after she was handcuffed, jerking her up by
the handcuffs in a manner severe enough to cause a disabling injury, barred
summary judgment for him in her federal civil rights lawsuit. Polk v. Hopkins,
#04-1130, 129 Fed. Appx. 285 (6th Cir. 2005). [N/R]
Officers did not use excessive force in the
course of handcuffing a motorist arrested for a non-violent traffic offense,
even though she had a reverse shoulder prosthesis in her shoulder, and suffered
a broken humerus when her hands were handcuffed behind her back. Evidence
showed that the arrestee smelled of alcohol, refused to take field sobriety
tests, was "combative" during her handcuffing and detention, and
failed to inform the officers of the prosthesis until after the handcuffing
process had begun. Schultz v. Hall, No. 3:04CV242, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (N.D.
Fla. 2005). [N/R]
Officers acted reasonably in handcuffing and
detaining a minor girl even if they were aware of her mental disability of
Down's Syndrome, when she had failed to comply with their instructions and had
produced a gun from her pocket in the course of their investigation of someone
knocking on doors in the neighborhood while possibly holding a gun. Further,
she was only detained for approximately four and one-half minutes and handcuffed
for one and one-half minutes. Tenorio v. City of Hobbs, No. 04-2103, 113 Fed.
Appx. 879 (10th Cir. 2004). [N/R]
Officer whose attempt to handcuff woman being
arrested for trespass in movie theater and assaulting an officer resulted in a
broken arm was not entitled to qualified immunity from her excessive force
claim. Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dept., No. 03-1707 2004 U.S. App. Lexis
23786 (6th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
Deputy acted in an objectively reasonable manner
in putting his foot on an arrestee's face when he raised his head as he lay on
the ground being handcuffed after disobeying orders to immediately drop his
shotgun. The arrestee was "not docile," and subsequently was found to
possess another gun on his person. Crosby v. Monroe County, No. 03-13716, 2004
U.S. App. Lexis 26973 (11th Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Feb]
While an arrestee's claim that officers used
excessive force against him after handcuffing him could move forward, based on
genuine issues of fact as to what happened, and whether officers were entitled
to qualified immunity from liability, the plaintiff failed to make any showing
that an official policy or custom of the city or its police department led to
his injuries. Claims for municipal liability, therefore, were properly
rejected. Arrestee's testimony in a deposition that he "might" have
been yelling and waving his arms, and making a fist at the officers as he
approached them, and his admission that he reached for one officer's gun belt
and touched it, warranted summary judgment for the defendant officers on his
claims that they also used excessive force against him prior to handcuffing
him. Ross v. City of Toppenish, No. 03-35234, 104 Fed. Appx. 26 (9th Cir.
2004). [N/R]
Arresting officers were not entitled to qualified
immunity from arrestee's claim that they used excessive force in insisting on
handcuffing her with her hands behind her back despite the fact that she was
unarmed, was not resisting arrest and had allegedly informed them that she had
a disability stemming from having undergone shoulder fusion preventing her from
placing her hands behind her back to be handcuffed. The arrest was for
loitering for purposes of prostitution. Court finds that reasonable officers
should have known that it was unreasonable to proceed with forcibly handcuffing
her under these circumstances without further inquiry into her disabling
condition. Rex v. City of Milwaukee, 321 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
[N/R]
Federal appeals court finds that trial judge, in
granting qualified immunity to deputy on dentist's claim that he was arrested
without probable cause, and wrongfully subjected to handcuffing so tight that
the injuries required him to leave his profession, improperly acted "as a
jury" in choosing to believe deputy's version of the incident rather than
the plaintiff's. Court also finds that it is "well-established" law
that overly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive force. Wall v. County of
Orange, #02-56032, 364 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2004). [2004 LR Jul]
Deputy sheriff acted in good faith entitling him
to official immunity under Texas state law on claims for injury asserted by
mental patient he restrained and handcuffed for purposes of transport to mental
health facility. Hidalgo County v. Gonzalez, No. 13-03-00131-CV, 128 S.W.3d 788
(Tex. App. --Corpus Christi--2004). [N/R]
Police officers did not violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of mental patient they placed in wrist and ankle restraints at
the request of mental health facility staff members. Patient's history of
violent outbursts and mental conditions made the action reasonable. Officers
were also entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly leaving patient in
restraints when they left, after being told by staff that patient was about to
be escorted to another facility. Lucero v. City of Albuquerque, No. 02-2280, 77
Fed Appx. 470 (10th Cir. 2003). [N/R]
Officer was improperly granted summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity on claim that he used excessive force in the
course of handcuffing suspect arrested under "rather benign
circumstances," when a reasonable officer would know that this violates
the Fourth Amendment. Kopec v. Tate, No. 02-4188, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004).
[2004 LR May]
Arrestee's claim that his wrists were "sore,"
although uninjured, following his allegedly tight handcuffing, was not
objectively sufficient for a federal civil rights claim for excessive use of
force. Wilder v. Village of Amityville, 288 F. Supp. 2d 341 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
[N/R]
Claim that deputy sheriff "violently
handcuffed" arrestee, causing physical injury, and that there was no
justification for his action, was sufficient to state a claim for excessive use
of force. Mladek v. Day, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (M.D. Ga. 2003). [N/R]
Surgeon awarded $33 million in damages for
permanent nerve damage to hand, resulting in inability to perform surgery
unassisted, following tight handcuffing when detained by Los Angeles police who
mistakenly believed that the rental car he was driving was stolen. Police
department responsible for $14.2 million of award, with rental car firm which
placed license plates on car which were reported stolen to pay $18.8 million.
Gousse v. City of Los Angeles, No. BC252804, Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, filed June 21, 2001, jury award, November 19, 2003. Reported in the Los
Angeles Times, November 20, 2003. [2004 LR Jan]
Use of hog-tie restraint against arrestee who had
a head wound and had been sprayed with pepper spray, and was also allegedly
compliant at the time of the restraint, was an excessive use of force, and
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from possible liability for
arrestee's subsequent death from positional asphyxia. There was also evidence
to show that county officers widely used hog-tie restraints but that no
training in the use of such restraints was provided. Garrett v. Unified
Government of Athens-Clarke County, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (M.D. Ga. 2003). [2003
LR Jul]
Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
on a claim that they kept two apartment occupants handcuffed for two hours
while their apartment was being searched under a warrant. The complaint alleged
that they were kept handcuffed long after the officers had reason to believe
that they were not connected with persons sought in connection with a shooting.
Seaman v. Karr, #27935-5-II, 59 P.3d 701 (Wash. App. 2002). [N/R]
Arrestee, who was "thoroughly
uncooperative" and allegedly intoxicated, did not have a "clearly
established" Fourth Amendment right not to be tightly handcuffed, since
various federal trial and appeals courts disagreed on the issue. Istvanik v.
Rogge, #01-3395, 50 Fed. Appx. 533 (3rd Cir. 2002). [2003 LR Mar]
Medical records did not support arrestee's claim
that highway patrol officer used excessive force in handcuffing him following
arrest for failure to produce driver's license. Arrestee claimed that handcuffs
were so tight that his hands turned "blue," but medical records
indicated a "pink" color to his hands on the night of the arrest. Andrews
v. Elkins, 227 F. Supp. 2d 488 (M.D.N.C. 2002). [N/R]
Officer's alleged delay in loosening handcuffs
for approximately ten minutes after arrestee complained that they were too
tight, even if true, did not violate the arrestee's clearly established rights,
so that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Kopec v.
Tate, 230 F. Supp. 2d 619 (E.D. Pa. 2002). [N/R]
City could not be held responsible for arrestee's
injuries from officer's alleged excessive use of force while arresting and
handcuffing motorist when officer's actions, if they occurred, would have
clearly violated the city's policies and training that officers received
regarding the use of force. The possibility that the officer was not taught a
particular procedure for taking a handcuffed suspect to the ground did not
alter the result, particularly when there was no evidence of other similar
incidents. Nelson v. City of Wichita, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Kan. 2002).
[2003 LR Feb.]
Deputy sheriff's alleged action in handcuffing an
arrestee "too tightly" and refusing to loosen the handcuffs after
learning that the arrestee had preexisting arm and shoulder injuries would have
violated clearly established law. Turek v. Saluga, #01-3986, 01-4018, 47 Fed.
Appx. 746 (6th Cir. 2002). [2003 LR Jan]
Mere fact that an arrestee was handcuffed did not
mean that police officer acted excessively in using any amount of force.
Officer was justified in using more force than would ordinarily be necessary
based on arrestee's active resistance and the location of the incident in which
the officer was alone at night on a "lonely stretch of country road."
Youngblood v. Wood, #01-3109, 41 Fed. Appx. 894 (7th Cir. 2002).[2002
LR Dec]
Arresting officer did not use excessive force in
handcuffing arrestee despite his claim that his arm was injured. Officer
"need not credit everything a suspect tells him," and arrestee
displayed no obvious signs of physical injury. Rodriguez v. Farrell, #00-13147,
294 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Oct]
Defendant officers were not entitled to summary
judgment on the issue of whether they used excessive force in handcuffing a
suspect and carrying him to a vehicle, but their use of a four-point restraint
to tie his arms and legs together when he continued to resist efforts to
control him did not constitute excessive use of force. Tobias v. County of
Putnam, 191 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). [N/R]
City held liable by jury for $1 million for death
of disabled detainee who fell face forward on the sidewalk after officers took
away his cane and handcuffed him behind his back when he allegedly became
verbally resistant to them. The officers argued that the decedent had fallen
without warning and that he may have died of acute alcohol intoxication, or
suffered a seizure or black out which caused him to fall. Eady v. City of Los
Angeles, No. TC 014-169 (Los Angeles Co., Calif. Superior Court, May 8, 2002),
reported in The National Law Journal, p. B3 (July 22, 2002). [N/R]
A genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether officers should have known, objectively, that they were putting the
handcuffs on a detained person so tightly that they would cut into her skin and
cause permanent damage, but officers' subsequent use of force to push detainee
to her knees and place her in restraints at a hospital where she was
involuntarily admitted was not excessive. Threlkeld v. White Castle Systems,
Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ill. 2002). [N/R]
Officers' use of handcuffs during an investigatory
stop of a suspect who fled from officers in a high crime area where there had
recently been a shooting of a police officer by an individual with a machine
gun and who had made a motion as though he were carrying a weapon was not an
excessive use of force. Officers' display of their weapons during the stop was
also justified. Mearday v. City of Chicago, 196 F. Supp. 2d 700 (N.D. Ill.
2002). [N/R]
Arrestee was entitled to a new trial in his
excessive force lawsuit against the arresting officer when jury was wrongly
instructed that it must find that the arrestee suffered a "serious
injury" to find for the plaintiff. Bastien v. Goddard, No. 00-2224, 279
F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2002). [2002 LR Jun]
Arrestee did not succeed in showing that officer
used excessive force in the application of handcuffs during the arrest. Under
the evidence presented, it was reasonable for officers to conclude that their
suggestion of leaning forward in the police car had relieved the arrestee's
pain, and his complaints were "similar to those normally voiced by others
who are similarly restrained." Ostrander v. State of New York, 735
N.Y.S.2d 163 (A.D. 2001). [N/R]
347:163
Seventh-grade student handcuffed by police officer in principal's office after
he allegedly attacked principal and stepped on officer's foot could not recover
damages for "excessive force" in the absence of physical injury from
the handcuffing; officer and principal were entitled to qualified immunity.
Neague v. Cynkar, No. 99- 4533, 258 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2001).
343:99 Overly tight application of handcuffs on a
nonviolent detainee may be excessive use of force, in the absence of any
indication that detainee would resist or attempt to flee. Kostrzewa v. City of
Troy, #00-1037, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001).
EDITOR'S NOTE: See also: Soares v. Connecticut, 8
F.3d 917 (2nd Cir. 1993) (refusing to hold that handcuffing is per se
reasonable).
343:99 Woman arrested following physical
altercation with her daughter was not subjected to excessive force merely
because of "handcuffing too tightly"; officers' conduct did not
amount to disability discrimination just because arrestee suffered from
multiple sclerosis. Glenn v. City of Tyler, #00-40133, 242 F.3d 307 (5th Cir.
2001).
341:68 Officer acted objectively reasonably in
handcuffing motorist who eluded capture for thirty-to-forty minutes; motorist's
alleged injuries from handcuffing were not significant enough to support an
inference of excessive force. Krider v. Marshall, 118 F. Supp. 2d 704
(S.D.W.Va. 2000).
[N/R] Trial court erred in preventing jury from
hearing testimony from officer that the technique he used in handcuffing an
arrestee was in accordance with official department policy. LaLonde v. County
of Riverside, No. 98- 55887, 204 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2000).
326:21 Louisiana trial court properly awarded
$90,000 lump amount (to be reduced by 1/3 for plaintiff's degree of fault) to
motorist allegedly injured by "too tight" handcuffing after he
attempted to leave the scene while officer was writing traffic tickets; state
Supreme Court rules, however, that motorist was not entitled to an additional
$89,600 for psychiatric expenses, since therapy concerned many matters, such as
his marriage and father's death. Bryan v. City of New Orleans, No. 98-1263, 737
So. 2d 696 (La. 1999).
Injuries to an arrestee, including a bloody lip,
a red mark and swelling on the leg, and pain resulting from overly-restrictive
handcuffs was insufficient to predicate liability. Hamilton v. Broomfield, #95
Civ. 3241, 1998 WL 17697 ( S.D.N.Y.). {N/R}
317:68 Handcuffing of 9-year-old girl taken into
custody for throwing acorns at apartment window did not constitute an assault
or excessive use of force; minor was not injured and purpose of handcuffing her
was protective. Brach v. McGeeney, 123 Md. App. 330, 718 A.2d 631 (1998).
317:67 City could not be held liable for
inadequate training or supervision concerning arrests for disorderly conduct or
proper use of handcuffs when plaintiff failed to show a record of prior
incidents which would indicate deliberate indifference to a known problem. Gold
v. City of Miami, #96-5395, 151 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1998).
315:35 County policy of handcuffing all arrestees
was "inherently reasonable" in light of possible risks of not doing
so; handcuffing arrestee suffering from asthma was not excessive force. Limbert
v. Twin Falls County, 955 P.2d 1123 (Idaho App. 1998).
Placing leg shackles on arrestee was not
unreasonable despite her statement that she had a "problem" with her
leg. Lear v. Township of Piscataway, 566 A.2d 557 (NJ Super AD 1989).
Officers sued for handcuffing arrestee so tightly
that his wrists bled Lake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1982).
Missouri court upholds officer's right to
handcuff non resisting arrestee Healy v. City of Brentwood, 649 S.W.2d 916 (Mo
App. 1983).
Deputy sheriff liable for $15,000 for using
excessive force when he handcuffed persons with little justification for making
an arrest Bauer, v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1983).
City could be liable for method of handcuffing
arrestees in paddy wagons causing injuries; city could also be liable if it had
a policy of covering up police misconduct Brown v. City of Chicago, 573 F.Supp.
1375 (N.D.Ill. 1983).
No liability for death of arrestee who died of
asphyxiation after being cradle cuffed Vizbaras v. Prieber, 761 F.2d 1013 (4th
Cir. 1985).