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Monthly Law Journal Article: Probable Cause For Arrest Will Ordinarily Defeat First Amendment Retaliation Claim, 2019 (7) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
A U.S. Border Patrol agent, while standing on U.S. soil near the border with Mexico, shot and killed a 15-year-old Mexican boy who was on Mexican soil. The boy had run back into Mexico after entering U.S. territory. The agent argued that the boy was involved in an illegal border crossing attempt, while the decedent’s parents argued that he was merely playing a game with friends involving running across a culvert. The parents filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the agent under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, #301, 403 U.S. 488 (1971), claiming that the shooting violated the boy’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Bivens does not apply to claims based on a cross-border shooting. Its expansion to recognize causes of action not expressly created by Congress is “a disfavored’ judicial activity.” While the Bivens claims in this case were based on the same constitutional provisions as claims in cases in which damages remedies have been recognized, the context—a cross-border shooting—is significantly different and involves a “risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into the functioning of other branches.” The Court stated that foreign relations are “so exclusively entrusted to the political branches . . . as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry” and pointed to the risk of undermining border security. Congress has “repeatedly declined” to authorize the award of damages against federal officials for injury inflicted outside U. S. borders. When Congress has provided compensation for such injuries, it has done it by empowering Executive Branch officials to make payments under “appropriate circumstances.” Hernandez v. Mesa, #17-4678, 140 S. Ct. 735, 206 L. Ed. 2d 29, 2020 U.S. Lexis 1361, 2020 WL 889193.
An important new U.S. Supreme Court ruling greatly limits the circumstances under which a suspect arrested with probable cause can assert a claim for damages for alleged violation of their First Amendment free speech rights by that arrest. An 8-1 majority of the Court ruled that an arrestee’s claim that two police officers retaliated against him for his protected First Amendment speech by arresting him for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest could not survive summary judgment. The incident occurred during a winter sports festival, “Arctic Man,” a raucous winter sports festival held in a remote part of Alaska. One of the officers was speaking with a group of attendees at the festival when the seemingly intoxicated plaintiff started shouting at them not to talk to the police. When the officer approached him, the plaintiff began yelling at the officer to leave. Rather than escalate the situation, the officer left. Minutes later, the plaintiff approached a second officer in an aggressive manner while he was questioning a minor, stood between him and the teenager, and yelled with slurred speech that the officer should not speak with the minor. When the plaintiff stepped toward the officer, the officer pushed him back. The first officer saw the confrontation and initiated an arrest. After he was handcuffed, the arrestee claims that the first officer said "bet you wish you would have talked to me now." The only evidence of retaliatory animus identified by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the plaintiff’s affidavit alleging that statement by the first officer. But that allegation said nothing about what motivated the second officer, who had no knowledge of the plaintiff’s prior run-in with the first officer.In any event, the Court found that the retaliatory arrest claim against both officers could not succeed because they had probable cause to arrest him. The existence of probable cause to arrest defeated his First Amendment claim as a matter of law. Under the Court’s analysis, the existence of probable cause for an arrest will ordinarily bar a claim that the arrest was made in retaliation for protected First Amendment speech. The Court’s opinion did provide for a small exception to this general rule where officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their discretion not to do so, particularly with arrests made for very minor offenses. An unyielding requirement to show the absence of probable cause in such cases could pose “a risk that some police officers may exploit the arrest power as a means of suppressing speech.” The presence of probable cause will not bar a claim that the arrest was made in retaliation for protected First Amendment speech when objective evidence is presented that the plaintiff was arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of protected speech had not been. Nieves v. Bartlett, #17-1174, 2019 U.S. Lexis 3557 (May 28, 2019),
. A man pled guilty in Indiana state court to dealing in a controlled substance and conspiracy to commit theft. Police seized a Land Rover he had purchased with money he received from an insurance policy when his father died. The state sought civil forfeiture of the vehicle, charging that it had been used to transport heroin. Observing that he had recently purchased the vehicle for more than four times the maximum $10,000 monetary fine assessable against him for his drug conviction, the trial court denied that request. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, but the U.S. Supreme Court vacated that ruling. It held that the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which incorporates and renders applicable to the states Bill of Rights protections “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty,” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”The Excessive Fines Clause carries forward protections found in sources from the Magna Carta to the English Bill of Rights to state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. Excessive fines undermine other liberties, the Court stated. They can be used to retaliate against or chill the speech of political enemies. In considering whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates a Bill of Rights protection, the question is whether the right guaranteed—not every particular application of that right—is fundamental or deeply rooted. The Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated regardless of whether application of the Clause to civil in rem forfeitures is itself fundamental or deeply rooted. Timbs v. Indiana, #17-1091, 203 L. Ed. 2d 11, 2019 U.S. Lexis 1350, 2019 WL 691578.
Police responded to a 911 call from a woman about domestic violence at the apartment where she lived with her husband, her children, and a roommate. Officers arrested her husband, but he was later released. A month later, police received a 911 call from the roommate’; mother, who reported hearing the roommate and wife both screaming for help in a phone call that was quickly disconnected. Two officers dispatched to the residence spoke to the wife through an open window. A man inside the apartment told her to back away from the window. A man then opened the front door, came outside, closed the door despite orders not to do so, and tried to brush past an officer, who quickly took him to the ground and handcuffed him without hitting him or displaying any weapons. The man was the wife’s father, and he sued two officers for excessive use of force. A federal appeals court agreed that the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, but remanded as to excessive force claims, denying the officers qualified immunity. The Supreme Court reversed as to one officer and vacated as to the officer who took down the plaintiff and handcuffed him. The decision concerning the first was “quite puzzling,” the Court found, in light of the trial court’s conclusion that only the second officer was involved in the excessive force claim. As to that second officer, it did not suffice for a court simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force, deny qualified immunity, and then remand for a trial on the question of reasonableness. An officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it. The appeals court’s formulation of the clearly established right was far too general as the court made no effort to explain how case law prohibited the second officer’s actions in this case. Escondido v. Emmons, #17-1660, 2019 U.S. Lexis 11.
On remand from the United States Supreme Court, in a case in which the Court rejected the “provocation” doctrine of the Ninth Circuit finding liability for an otherwise justified shooting found to have been provoked by an illegal entry, the Ninth Circuit held that the unlawful entry into a residence by two sheriff's deputies, without a warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances, was the proximate cause of the subsequent shooting and injuries to plaintiffs. Therefore, the appeals court panel permitted the federal claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983 despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling. The appeals court panel ruled that if an officer has a duty not to enter in part because he or she might misperceive a victim's innocent acts as a threat and respond with deadly force, then the victim's innocent acts cannot be a superseding cause. In this case, the victim’s action of moving the gun so that it was pointed in the deputies’ direction was not a superseding cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The panel also held that plaintiffs had an independent basis for recovery under California negligence law in light of Hayes v. County of San Diego, #S193997, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 305 P.3d 252 (2013). On remand, the panel noted that the judgment shall be amended to award all damages arising from the shooting in the plaintiff’s favor as proximately caused by the unconstitutional entry, and proximately caused by the failure to get a warrant. Judgment will also be entered for the plaintiffs on the California negligence claim for the same damages arising out of the shooting. Mendez v. County of Los Angeles, #13-56686, 897 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.2018).
Editor’s Note: For a discussion of the prior U.S. Supreme Court decision in the above case, County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, #16-369, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 198 L. Ed. 2d 52, 2017 U.S. Lexis 3396, see U.S. Supreme Court Rejects the Ninth Circuit’s Provocation Doctrine on Officer Shootings, 2017 (8) AELE Mo. L. J. 101.
After a man towed his floating home into a city owned marina, he became a critic of the city’s plan to seize waterfront homes for private development. He sued to try to block the plan. He alleged that city officials devised an official plan to intimidate him. A police officer handcuffed him carried him out from a city council meeting that he was trying to address. The arrest was allegedly for violating the council’s rules of procedure by discussing issues unrelated to the city and refusing to leave the podium. The prosecutor determined that there was probable cause for his arrest, but dismissed the charges. In a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the trial court instructed the jury that, for the plaintiff to prevail on his retaliatory arrest claim, he had to prove that the officer was motivated by impermissible animus against his protected speech and lacked probable cause to make the arrest. A federal appeals court upheld a judgment for the city. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated. The existence of probable cause did not bar the plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim because his case, is “far afield from the typical retaliatory arrest claim.” He still must prove the existence and enforcement of an official policy motivated by retaliation which is unlike an on-the-spot decision by an individual officer. The Court noted that the plaintiff alleges that the city deprived him of the right to petition, “one of the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.” Lozman v. Riviera Beach, #17-2,1, 2018 U.S. Lexis 3691.
A woman sued police officers, as well as a current and past mayor after the officers visited her apartment to investigate a noise complaint, gained warrantless entry, and proceeded to engage in abuse. They then cited her for disorderly conduct and interfering with law enforcement. She claims that at one point she knelt and began to pray but an officer ordered her to stop and another officer refused to investigate her complaint that she had been assaulted by residents of her apartment complex and threatened to issue a citation if she reported this to another police department; that the police chief failed to investigate the officers’ conduct; and that the mayors were aware of unlawful conduct by police officers. She asserted a violation of her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and her Fourth Amendment right to be free of any unreasonable search or seizure. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the First Amendment protects the right to pray but there are circumstances in which an officer may lawfully prevent a person from praying. Here, the officer’s order to stop praying allegedly occurred during the course of investigative conduct. That implicates Fourth Amendment rights; the First and Fourth Amendment issues were “inextricable.” It was unclear whether the officers were in the woman’s apartment based on her consent or had some other ground consistent with the Fourth Amendment, or whether their entry or continued presence was unlawful. Her complaint did not state what the officers wanted her to do when she was allegedly told to stop praying. Without these answers, it was impossible to analyze the free exercise claim. The issue of qualified immunity demanded consideration of the ground on which the officers were present and any legitimate law enforcement interests that might have justified an order to stop praying. Sause v. Bauer, #17-742, 2018 U.S. Lexis 4037.
A police officer shot a woman less than a minute after arriving with other officers at the scene where it had been reported that a woman was acting erratically and hacking a tree with a knife. When he fired, the woman was holding a large kitchen knife, had taken steps towards her female roommate, and had refused to drop the knife despite two orders to do so. Her injuries were not life threatening and she matched the description of the suspect given by the 911 caller. All of the officers later said that they subjectively believed the woman was a threat to her roommate. She had a history of mental illness. Her roommate said that she did not feel endangered. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the officer, stating that even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, which “is not at all evident,” the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Although the officers were in no apparent danger, the shooting officer believed that the plaintiff was a threat to her roommate. He had mere seconds to assess the potential danger and was separated from the women by a chain-link fence. This was “far from an obvious case” in which any competent officer would have known that shooting her would violate the Fourth Amendment. None of the decisions relied on by the court of appeals supported denying the officer qualified immunity. Kisela v. Hughes, #17-467, 2018 U.S. Lexis 2066.
Police raided a loud late-night party in a vacant house after hearing that illegal activities were going on there. The house was in disarray, with a smell of marijuana and liquor on display. There was a “makeshift strip club” in the living room, and several men with a naked woman in a bedroom. Those present told inconsistent stories, with two identifying “Peaches” as the tenant and saying that she had given permission for the party. When the officers spoke by phone to Peaches, she eventually admitted that she did not have permission to use the house. The owner of the premises indicated that he had not given anyone permission to be there. The officers arrested those present for unlawful entry. Several sued for false arrest. A jury awarded a total of $680,000 in damages to multiple arrestees. After an award of attorneys’ fees, the total awarded added up to nearly $1 million. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed with this award, and held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the partygoers. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers made an “entirely reasonable inference” that the partygoers knew they did not have permission to be in the house. The condition of the house and the conduct of the partygoers allowed the officers to make “common-sense conclusions” about human behavior and infer that the partygoers, who scattered and hid, knew the party was not authorized. Their implausible answers gave the officers ample reason to believe that they were lying. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity even if they lacked actual probable cause because a reasonable officer could have interpreted the law as permitting the arrests. District of Columbia v. Wesby, #15-1485, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453, 2018 U.S. Lexis 760.
A U.S. Border Patrol agent standing on the U.S. side of the border with Mexico shot and killed an unarmed 15-year-old Mexican boy standing in Mexico. The decedent had been playing a game that included running up the embankment on the U.S. side of the border. The decedent’s parents filed a Bivens federal civil rights lawsuit for damages against the agent. A federal appeals court upheld dismissal of the lawsuit. The U.S. Supreme Court has vacated that ruling, ordering further proceedings. It noted that a direct Bivens implied right of damages against federal officers who allegedly violated a citizen’s constitutional rights is not available “where there are special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” On remand, the appeals court must consider “whether the Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. In this case, the lower court concluded that the prohibition on excessive force did not apply to the decedent as a foreign national on foreign soil. But the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the boy’s nationality and the extent of his ties to the U.S. were unknown to the agent at the time of the shooting. Hernandez v. Mesa, #15-118, 2017 U.S. Lexis 4059.
The U.S. Supreme Court has unanimously overturned a 9th Circuit federal appeals court decision that imposed liability on an officer’s use of deadly force even though the force was deemed justified at the time, rejecting a “provocation” doctrine that based that liability on a finding of illegal entry under the theory that the improper entry created the conditions that necessitated the use of force. A $4 million award of damages to the two individual plaintiffs was vacated. The Ninth Circuit's provocation rule, which held that an officer’s otherwise reasonable and lawful defensive use of force was unreasonable as a matter of law if the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent response and the provocation was an independent constitutional violation, conflated excessive force claims with other Fourth Amendment claims and improperly permitted excessive force claims that could not succeed on their own terms. County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, #16-369, 2017 U.S. Lexis 3396, 2017 WL 2322832 (May 30, 2017).
A man was searched during a traffic stop
and a vitamin bottle containing pills was found. Officers conducted a field
test which proved negative for controlled substances. They arrested him and an
evidence technician at the police station also got a negative result for controlled
substances when he tested the pills but reported that one of the pills tested
“positive for the probable presence of ecstasy.” He was charged with unlawful
possession and a judge, relying solely on an officer’s complaint, ruled that
there was probable cause to hold the detainee pending trial. A state police lab
then again tested the pills and found no controlled substance, but not before
the detainee had been in custody for 48 days. The detainee sued the city and
its officers more than two years after he was arrested but less than two years
since the criminal case was dismissed. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected lower
court rulings that a two year statute of limitations barred an unlawful arrest
claim and that the pretrial detention after legal process was initiated barred
a Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment prohibits detention without
probable cause. When the legal process has begun, but probable cause was not
satisfied, as here where the judge’s probable cause determination was allegedly
based on fabricated evidence, it does not cut off a Fourth Amendment claim. The
unlawful detention claim was properly brought under the Fourth Amendment,
rather than the due process clause. On remand, the appeals court was ordered to
hold further proceedings on when the claim accrued, unless it found that the
city waived its timeliness argument. Manuel
v. Joliet, #14-9496, 197 L. Ed. 2d 312, 2017 U.S. Lexis
2021, 85 U.S.L.W. 4130.
A 911 call reported that a male
motorist was a drunk driver on the highway. The women who made the call
followed his car with their bright lights on. He pulled over at an off-ramp to
confront them, and then drove to a secluded home where he lived with his
brother. Two officers went to the residence after interviewing the women. The
two men inside became aware of them and asked “who are you?” and “What do you
want?” The officers said “Hey (expletive), we got you surrounded. Come out or
we’re coming in,” and one shouted “Open the door, State Police, open the door.”
The men inside allegedly only heard “we’re coming in” and not the
identification,” They armed themselves and yelled “We have guns.” One of them
fired two shotgun blasts from the back door at an officer. Then the second man opened
a window and pointed a handgun in an officer’s direction. An officer
fired at him but missed. A third officer, who had arrived late on the scene,
shot at this man and killed him. Both the trial court and a federal appeals
court denied this officer qualified immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the officer did not violate any clearly established law. The Court declined to consider whether a
reasonable jury could infer that the third officer had witnessed the other
officers’ deficient performance and should have realized that corrective action
was necessary before using deadly force because neither lower court addressed
that argument. The lower court erred in concluding that a police officer was
not entitled to qualified immunity on an excessive force claim where no settled
Fourth Amendment principle required the officer, who arrived late to the scene
and witnessed shots being fired by one of several individuals in a house, to
second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his fellow officers or shout a
warning to an armed occupant before shooting, and thus, there was no clearly
established law that would have placed the constitutional question beyond
debate. The Court expressed no opinion on whether the first two officers were
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court found it necessary to clarify the
test for granting qualified immunity to an officer: “Today, it is again
necessary to reiterate the longstanding principle that ‘clearly established
law’ should not be defined ‘at a high level of generality.’ … As this Court
explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to
the facts of the case. Otherwise, ‘[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the
rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability
simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.’ … The panel
majority misunderstood the ‘clearly established’ analysis: It failed to
identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances as [the
third officer] was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the
majority relied on Graham, Garner, and their Court of Appeals progeny, which—as
noted above—lay out excessive-force principles at only a general level. Of
course, ‘general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving
fair and clear warning’ to officers, but ‘in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent,’” White v. Pauly,
#16-67, 137 S. Ct. 548, 196 L. Ed. 2d 463, 2017 U.S. Lexis 5, 85 U.S.L.W. 4027,
26 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 409.
The defendant police
officer and a number of co-workers routed vehicles damaged in accidents to a
repair shop in exchange for kickbacks. He was criminally charged with obtaining
money from the body shop owners under color of official right in violation of
the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 371 and conspiring to do so. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the argument that because the Hobbs Act prohibits the obtaining of
property "from another" that a Hobbs Act conspiracy required proof of
agreeing to obtain property from someone outside the conspiracy. The defendant
could be convicted of conspiring to violate the Act based on proof that he
reached an agreement with the owners of the property in question (the shop
owners) to obtain some of their property (money) under color of official right.
The Court stated that its decision did not transform every bribe of a public
official into a conspiracy to commit extortion. Ocasio v. United States,
#14-361, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 194 L. Ed. 2d 520, 2016 U.S. Lexis 2932, 84 U.S.L.W.
4245.
The highest court in
Massachusetts upheld a state statute prohibiting the private possession of stun
guns against a constitutional Second Amendment challenge, on the basis that
stun guns were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment's
enactment and therefore were not protected by it. The court also reasoned that
stun guns were "dangerous per se at common law and unusual" because
they were a modern invention, and that "nothing in the record to suggest
that [stun guns] are readily adaptable to use in the military." The U.S.
Supreme Court vacated this decision, stating that "the Second Amendment
extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even
those that were not in existence at the time of the founding," and that it
had previously rejected the argument that "only those weapons useful in
warfare are protected" by the Second Amendment. The case involved a woman
with an abusive boyfriend who found that protective orders she obtained proved
futile so she accepted a stun gun from a friend to protect herself and when she
brandished it, the ex-boyfriend got scared and left her alone. She was then
convicted of violating the state law that barred private possession of stun
guns, Caetano v. Massachusetts, #14-10078,194 L. Ed. 2d 99, 2016 U.S. Lexis
1862.
Both federal and state courts hearing federal
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 have discretion to award a
prevailing party (other than the federal government) reasonable attorneys' fees
under 2 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has restricted such
awards to prevailing defendants only to cases in which the plaintiff's lawsuit
was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." The Idaho
Supreme Court held that it was not bound by that interpretation of the law and
made a Sec.1988 award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant in a Sec.
1983 lawsuit without first deciding whether the plaintiff's claim was
"frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. Sec. 1988 is a federal statute, so the Supreme Court's interpretation
is final and binding on all courts, federal or state. James v. Boise,
#15-493, 136 S. Ct. 685, 2016 U.S. Lexis 947.
Rather than submit to an officer armed with an arrest
warrant, a man drove off in his car, leading officers on a high-speed chase.
The pursued man twice called police dispatch, claiming that he had a gun and
threatening to shoot the officers. The dispatcher broadcast these threats and
the possibility that the motorist might be intoxicated. A tire spike strip was
placed beneath a highway overpass in an attempt to stop the pursued vehicle. A
state trooper drover to that location, radioing a plan to shoot and disable the
car. He later spotted the vehicle and fired six shots. The car engaged the
spikes, hit the median, and rolled. The motorist was killed by the trooper's
shots. No shots hit the car's engine block, radiator, or hood. The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed a denial of qualified immunity to the trooper on an excessive
force claim. The Court did no address whether firing at the vehicle in this
manner under these circumstances was a Fourth Amendment violation, but rather
ruled that the trooper was entitled to qualified immunity because prior
precedents did not indicate that it was "beyond debate" that he acted
unreasonably. He had confronted a fugitive that was reported to be intoxicated,
who was trying to evade arrest through a high-speed car flight, and who had
twice threatened to shoot officers. At the time of the shooting, the vehicle
was moments away from reaching the trooper's location. Mullenix v. Luna,
#14-1143, 2015 U.S. Lexis 7160.
Hotel owners and a lodging association challenged
the constitutionality of a Los Angeles Municipal Code section requiring hotel
operators to keep certain information about hotel guests on the premises for 90
days and make it available to any officer. It punished as a misdemeanor failure
to make the records available. Upholding a federal appeals court ruling in
favor of the plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Code section was
facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment as it failed to give the
hotel operators an opportunity for pre-compliance review, such as the issuance
of a warrant or issuance of an administrative subpoena. The Court found that
hotels were not a closely regulated industry lacking a reasonable expectation
of privacy, that warrantless inspections were not necessary to further the
regulatory scheme, and that there was insufficient constraint on the discretion
of officers to decide which hotels to search under what circumstances. City of
Los Angeles v. Patel, #13-1175, 2015 U.S. Lexis 4065.
A woman living in a group home for the mentally
ill started to act erratically and threatened to kill her social worker. Two
officers were sent to the home to escort her to a facility for temporary
evaluation and treatment. When they entered her room, she grabbed a knife,
threatening to kill them. They retreated and closed the door, but later reentered,
concerned about what was going on within the room, and allegedly without
considering if they could accommodate her disability. She again confronted them
with the knife, and after pepper spray failed to subdue her, they shot her
multiple times. She sued the city for alleged disability discrimination in
arresting her without accommodating her disability, and the two officers for
allegedly violating her Fourth Amendment rights. A federal appeals court ruled
that the Americans with Disabilities Act applied and that the issue of whether
the plaintiff's disability should have been accommodated should be decided by a
jury. It also held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity,
since it was clearly established that, in the absence of a need for immediate
entry, officers cannot forcibly enter the home of an armed, mentally ill person
who has been acting irrationally and threatened everyone who entered. The
U.S. Supreme Court granted review, but dismissed its review of the issue of whether
the ADA "requires law enforcement officers to provide accommodations to an
armed, violent, and mentally ill suspect in the course of bringing the suspect
into custody" as "improvidently granted." A review of this issue
was based on the assumption that the city would argue that the ADA does not
apply when officers face an armed and dangerous person. Instead, the city
argued that the plaintiff was not "qualified" for an accommodation
because she posed a direct threat to others, a threat which could not "be
eliminated by a modification of policies, practices or procedures, or by the
provision of auxiliary aids or services." Since the court below had not
addressed the issues in that context, review by the U.S. Supreme Court was not
proper. The Court also noted that the parties in the case had also failed to
address the related question of whether a public entity such as the defendant
city could be vicariously liable for damages under Title II of the ADA for an
arrest made by its officers. The Court did hold, however, that the two
individual defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth
Amendment claims. They did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights
when they opened her door the first time, and could, without a doubt, also have
opened her door the second time if she had not been disabled. Their use of
force in response to her threats with the knife was reasonable. So the only
remaining question was whether they violated her Fourth Amendment rights when
they opened her door the second time rather than attempting to accommodate her
disability. As there was no clearly established law on that issue, they were
entitled to qualified immunity. City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,
#13-1412, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 2015 U.S. Lexis 3200.
A K-9 officer stopped a motorist for a traffic
violation, and issued a warning after attending to everything related to the
stop, including checking driver's licenses. He then asked for consent to walk
his dog around the vehicle, which was refused. The officer continued to detain
the motorist until a second officer arrived and then retrieved his dog who
alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. A search subsequently found
methamphetamine. The detention lasted about seven to eight minutes following
the time the warning was issued until the dog alerted. The U.S. Supreme Court,
by a 6-3 vote, held that absent reasonable suspicion the extension of a traffic
stop in order to conduct a dog sniff constitutes an unreasonable search. On
remand, the court should consider whether the detention for the dog sniff was
independently supported by individualized suspicion. Rodriguez v. United
States, #13-9972, 2015 U.S. Lexis 2807. While the decision was made in the
context of a criminal proceeding, the Court's reasoning would also apply in a
federal civil rights lawsuit.
The plaintiffs claimed that an officer illegally
entered the backyard of their property, going onto their deck without a search
warramt. A federal appeals court ruled that these actions violated the Fourth
Amendment as a matter of law, as the "knock and talk" exception to
the warrant requirement mandates that officers begin such encounters at the
front door, where there is an implied invitation to go. The U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the appeals court's determination that the officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity. A government official sued for civil rights
violations under Section 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless they
violated a statutory or constitutional right that was "clearly
established" at the time of the alleged conduct. There was no clearly
established precedent at the time that the "knock and talk" exception
to the warrant requirement had to begin at the front door. Carroll v. Carman,
#14-212, 135 S. Ct. 348, 190 L. Ed. 2d 311, 2014 U.S. Lexis 7430.
A Massachusetts start statute making it illegal
to knowingly stand on a public sidewalk or way within 35 feet of the entrance
or driveway to any reproductive health care facility, including an abortion clinic,
violated the First Amendment rights of anti-abortion protestors. The unanimous
court decision found that the law was content neutral and that an exemption
allowing those who worked in the facility to enter or remain within the buffer
zone was reasonable. But the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve
significant governmental interests and the buffer zone compromised the
protestors' ability to engage in counseling of patients on the sidewalk or to
distribute literature to arriving patients. This amounted to excluding abortion
protestors from areas of the public way historically open to speech and debate.
McCullen v. Coakley, #12-1168, 2014 U.S. Lexis 4499.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that officers
did not use excessive force when they shot the driver of a vehicle fleeing from
a traffic stop to end a dangerous high-speed car chase. Both the driver and his
passenger died. While the Court ruled that this conduct did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, even if it had, the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity when no cases were cited that clearly established the
unconstitutionality of using deadly force to end a high-speed car chase. Firing
a total of 15 shots during the 10-second span was reasonable when the driver
never abandoned his attempt to flee. While ordinarily, a trial court order
denying summary judgment is not a final decision and therefore not immediately
appealable, a denial based on a qualified immunity claim can be immediately
appealed, and therefore the federal appeals court had jurisdiction to hear the
appeal, but erroneously did not grant the officers qualified immunity. Plumhoff
v. Rickard, #12-1117, 2014 U.S. Lexis 3816
The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously held that
Secret Service agents who moved protesters away from a location where President
George W. Bush was dining on an outside patio were entitled to qualified
immunity on First Amendment viewpoint discrimination claims. It ruled that a
federal appeals court had erred in finding that viewpoint discrimination could
be inferred from the alleged lack of a legitimate security rationale for the
different treatment given to two groups of demonstrators present at the event.
The anti-Bush demonstrators, the agents could believe, posed a potential
security risk to the President, based on their particular location, while the
demonstrating Bush supporters, based on their location, did not. As the
anti-Bush demonstrators, unlike the pro-Bush demonstrators, were within
weapons' range, it could not plausibly be shown that the agents could show no
rationale for requesting or ordering the eviction of the anti-Bush
demonstrators. Wood v. Moss, #13-115, 2014 U.S. Lexis 3614.
A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court ordered further
proceedings in an excessive force lawsuit brought by a unarmed man who a police
officer fired three shots at, with one of the bullets puncturing his right
lung. At the time, the plaintiff was approximately 15 to 20 feet away from the
officer on the front porch of his parents' home. The Court found that the
appeals court, in upholding summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity
for the officer, had erred by failing to view the evidence on summary judgment
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff on the facts. Instead, the appeals
court improperly resolved disputed issues concerning the lighting present, the
demeanor of the plaintiff's mother, the plaintiff's positioning during the
shooting, and whether he had shouted a direct threat, in favor of the officer,
the moving party on the summary judgment motion. Tolan v. Cotton, #13-551, 2014
U.S. Lexis 3112.
The totality of the circumstances gave a California
Highway Patrol officer reasonable suspicion that a driver was intoxicated based
on his pickup truck matching the description of a vehicle that a 911 caller
reported as having run her off the road. The officers smelled marijuana as they
approached, and they found 30 pounds of it when they searched the truck's bed.
Reasonable suspicion considers “the totality of the circumstances,” and depends
“upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
reliability.” The 911 call had adequate indicia of reliability based on the
short time before the suspect vehicle was spotted and the caller's claim of
eyewitness knowledge. A reasonable officer would conclude that a false tipster
would think twice about calling 911. Reasonable suspicion for a brief
investigative stop does not require that an officer "rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct." The fact that the officer failed to observe
additional suspicious conduct during the short period that he followed the
truck did not destroy the reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. The traffic
stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Navarette v. California,
#12-9490,188 L. Ed. 2d 680, 2014 U.S. Lexis 2930.
Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Nevada claiming
that a Georgia police officer who searched them at a Georgia airport while
working as a deputized DEA agent had seized a large quantity of cash from them.
After they returned to their Nevada residence, he allegedly drafted a false
probable cause affidavit in support of the forfeiture of the funds. No
forfeiture action was ultimately taken. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Nevada federal trial court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the
Georgia police officer, because he lacked "minimal contacts" with
Nevada. Walden v. Fiore, #12-574, 188 L. Ed. 2d 12, 2014 U.S. Lexis 1635.
A protestor was barred from entering a military
base's designated protest area because of alleged prior acts of trespass and
vandalism. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the protest area was included as a
portion of the military installation, making it a federal crime to reenter it
after being ordered not to do so by an officer or person in command. U.S. v. Apel,
#12-1038,188 L. Ed. 2d 75, 2014 U.S. Lexis 1643.
Two officers responded to a call concerning a
disturbance involving a person armed with a baseball bat in a neighborhood
known for gang violence. A man was seen running towards a residence and ignored
an order to halt. He did not appear to be holding a bat. He entered the gate of
a six foot fence enclosing his front yard. The officer believable that the man
had committed a jailable misdemeanor by disobeying the order to stop, and also
feared for his safety. He kicked open the gate. A woman was behind the gate and
was struck and injured by it. A federal appeals court found that the
warrantless entry was unconstitutional as the woman had the same expectation of
privacy in the curtilage of her home as in the residence itself, the pursued
man had only committed, at most, a minor offense, and there was no immediate
danger. The appeals court also found that the officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity. Reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that courts
throughout the country were divided as to whether an officer who has probably
cause to arrest a fleeing misdemeanant can enter a home without a warrant in
hot pursuit. Without deciding whether or not the warrantless entry was
constitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that while it was possible that
the officer was mistaken in thinking that his actions were justified, he was
not "plainly incompetent," and was therefore entitled to qualified
immunity. Stanton v. Sims, #12-1217, 2013 U.S. Lexis 7773.
Officers who make a lawful arrest for a serious
offense may take and analyze a cheek swab of the arrestee's DNA. Like
fingerprinting and photographing, it is a legitimate police booking procedure
that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Maryland v. King, #12-207, 2013
U.S. Lexis 4165.
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled by 5-4 that
officers, under ordinary circumstances, must attempt to get a search warrant
before compelling drunk driving suspects to submit to a blood test. "[T]he
natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an
exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a
warrant." A warrantless blood test might be justified by exigency in some
cases under the totality of the circumstances, determined on a case by case
basis. Missouri v. McNeely, #11-1425, 133 S. Ct. 1552.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld
a decision of the Florida Supreme Court suppressing evidence of marijuana
plants and drug trafficking found in a residence during a search conducted with
a search warrant. The search warrant was obtained on the basis of the fact that
a drug-sniffing dog that police brought onto the front porch of the defendant's
home alerted there. While the police officers could, without a warrant,
approach the home and knock on the door, since any private citizen could do
that, their bringing of a trained police dog to explore the area around the
home in the hopes of discovering incriminating evidence was a Fourth Amendment
search without probable cause, as there was no customary invitation to bring
such a dog onto the porch, which was part of the home's curtilage, entitled to
as much protection from search as the home itself. While this was a criminal
case, the same principles would apply in a civil rights lawsuit. Florida v.
Jardines, #11-564, 2013 U.S. Lexis 2542.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
rejected the ruling of the Florida Supreme Court that the state had to, in
every case, present an "exhaustive set of records" concerning the
reliability of a drug sniffing dog used to find probable cause to search a
vehicle. The proper test as to whether probable cause existed was the totalty
of the circumstances test. In this case, there was evidence of the dog's training
and his proficiency in finding drugs. The officer had probable cause to search
the car and the defendant had not adequately contested the evidence of the
dog's reliability. Florida v. Harris, #11-817, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1121.
Police officers were sued for preventing
demonstrators from carrying pictures of aborted fetuses during anti-abortion
demonstrations. The plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction against this
practice as violating their First Amendment rights but were not awarded
attorneys' fees under the theory that they were not "prevailing
parties" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 since they had not been
awarded money damages. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated this decision, noting
that the plaintiffs had prevailed because the injunction ordered the defendants
to change their behavior in a way that directly benefitted the plaintiffs.
Lefemine v. Wideman, #12-168, 2012 U.S. Lexis 8566 (per curiam).
It was not clearly established, at the time of a
2006 arrest, that an arrest supported by probable cause could violate the First
Amendment. The plaintiff was arrested by Secret Service agents protecting Vice
President Dick Cheney after he was overheard saying on his cell phone that he
was going to confront the Vice President and ask him "how many kids he's
killed today." He touched the Vice President's shoulder and made
statements critical of the war in Iraq. The agents were entitled to qualified
immunity as the U.S. Supreme Court stated that it has never held that there is
a First Amendment right to be free of a retaliatory arrest supported by
probable cause, and the plaintiff's action in touching the Vice President
provided probable cause for the arrest for assault. Reichle v. Howards,
#11-262, 2012 U.S. Lexis 4132.
A firefighter sued a city and a private attorney
hired by the city to conduct an internal investigation of his conduct for
violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The firefighter was
suspected of malingering while supposedly off work on account of illness. The firefighter
argued that the attorney's order to him to produce building materials stored at
his home violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He had been seen
buying the building supplies and the issue was whether he had been installing
the building materials rather than being ill. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
the private attorney was entitled to qualified immunity along with other
individual defendants despite not being a city employee. A private individual
temporarily retained by a city to carry out its work is able to seek qualified
immunity from civil rights liability. In this case, the city needed the
attorney's experience and expertise in employment law. Filarsky v. Delia,
#10–1018, 132 S. Ct. 1657; 2012 U.S. Lexis 3105.
In a federal civil rights lawsuit claiming that
the chief investigator for a prosecutor's office conspired to present, and did,
in fact, present false testimony to a grand jury, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that the investigator was entitled to absolute witness immunity on all claims
arising from his grand jury testimony. A witness in a grand jury proceeding is
entitled to absolute immunity just as is a witness who testifies at a trial.
The Court found that there is no reason to distinguish law enforcement witnesses
from lay witnesses in civil rights actions. The rule that a grand jury witness
has absolute immunity from any civil rights claim based on the witness’
testimony may not be circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness
conspired to present false testimony, or by using evidence of the witness’
testimony to support any other claim concerning the initiation or maintenance
of a prosecution. Rehberg v. Paulk, #10-788, 2012 U.S. Lexis 2711.
A prisoner was questioned for between five and
seven hours in a conference room at a prison by two deputies who asked him
about crimes he was accused of engaging in before his incarceration. He
confessed and was later convicted, with the confession admitted into evidence
despite the fact that he had been given no Miranda warnings during the
questioning. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the prisoner had not been taken
into custody for Miranda purposes, since he was told at the beginning and
reminded later that he was free to leave and go back to his cell. Additionally,
he was not physically restrained or threatened, was interviewed in a well-lit,
average-sized conference room where the door was sometimes left open, and was
offered food and water. These "facts are consistent with an environment in
which a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and
leave, subject to the ordinary restraints of life behind bars." Howes v.
Fields, #10-680, 2012 U.S. Lexis 1077.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that officers were
entitled to qualified immunity and could not be held personally liable for
obtaining a potentially invalid overly broad warrant when they could reasonably
have believed that the warrant's scope was supported by probable cause. In this
case, any arguable defect in the warrant would have become apparent only based
on a close examination of the warrant application and comparison of the
supporting affidavit to the warrant's terms to determine whether the affidavit
sufficiently established probable cause to search for all items listed in the
warrant. In this case, a shotgun was confiscated while executing a search of a
home under a warrant for "all guns and gang-related material." The
"fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest
indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner."
The Court concluded that the "officers' judgment that the scope of the
warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not
'plainly incompetent.'" Messerschmidt v. Millender, #10-704, 2012 U.S.
Lexis 1687.
Police were entitled to qualified immunity for
their warrantless entry into a home based on exigent circumstances and the
totality of the circumstances. They were investigating reports that a student
who lived there had written a letter with a threat to "shoot up" the
high school he attended. The mother and son inside initially ignored the
officers' knocks on the door, and she hung up on an officer when he called on
the phone. The mother and son then stepped outside, and the mother ran inside,
followed by her son, and refused to let them in when they asked whether any
guns were present in the home. The officers responded by following them inside,
and ultimately concluded that the rumors of the threat were false. Under these
circumstances, a reasonable officer could believe that he had a right under the
Fourth Amendment to enter the home without a warrant when there was a
"reasonable basis for concluding that there is an imminent threat of
violence." Ryburn v. Huff, #11–208, 2012 U.S. Lexis 910. 2012 WL 171121.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that attaching a GPS
device to a vehicle to track a criminal suspect constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment. It upheld the ruling of a federal appeals court suppressing
the evidence and overturning a conviction based on it, since the device was
attached without a valid warrant authorizing it. The Court declined to consider
the government's alternative argument that the attachment and use of the device
was a reasonable search, because it was not raised in the courts below. U.S. v.
Jones, #10-1259, 2012 WL 171117, 2012 U.S. Lexis 1063.
A defendant's criminal conviction for driving
while intoxicated was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court because the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not allow the introduction of
a forensic report into evidence for the purpose of proving a fact in a criminal
trial using the in-court testimony of an analyst who is not the one who
performed or observed the test reported and who did not sign the certification
contained in the report. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, #09-10876, 2011 U.S. Lexis
4790.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a California
state law prohibiting the rental or sale of violent video games to minors
violates the First Amendment. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., #08–1448,
2011 U.S. Lexis 4802.
Even though a candidate for chief of police won
his election, he sued his opponent for violation of his federal civil rights,
as well as claims under state law, for allegedly interfering with his right to
seek public office. A federal court dismissed the federal claims as frivolous,
and sent the other claims to state court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that
reasonable attorneys' fees could be awarded to the defendant under 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 1988, but only for costs that the defendant would not have incurred
"but for the frivolous claims." Fox v. Vice, #10-144, 2011 U.S. Lexis
4182.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that former Attorney
General Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity in a lawsuit by a man
detained after the events of 9/11/2001 under a federal material witness
statute. The plaintiff claimed that the government had a policy of using this
statute to detain innocent persons suspected of terrorism without charges.
The Court held that the objectively reasonable arrest and detention of a
material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional on the basis of allegations that the arresting authority had
an improper motive. Ashcroft did not violate clearly established law and thus
is entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of the arrest, not a
single judicial opinion had held that pretext could render an objectively
reasonable arrest pursuant to a material-witness warrant unconstitutional. Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd, #10-98, 2011 U.S. Lexis 4021.
The U.S. Supreme Court has vacated a federal
appeals court ruling that the decision to seize and interrogate a minor at
school about suspected sexual abuse without a warrant, court order, exigent
circumstances or parental consent was unconstitutional, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear an
appeal of the appeals court's holding by the defendants despite the fact that
they were granted qualified immunity from liability. The Supreme Court did not
rule on the merits of the rule adopted by the federal appeals court as to the
interrogation of juveniles at school, but vacated the ruling as moot since the
minor has moved to another state and therefore no longer has a stake in a
ruling concerning the practices of California governmental employees. Camreta
v. Greene, #09–1454. 2011 U.S. Lexis 4016.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling,
overturned a $14 million jury award to an innocent man who spent 14 years on
death row before being exonerated. The plaintiff had sued the prosecutors'
officer, claiming that its failure to adequately train staff members concerning
the obligation not to hide a blood test that would have established his
innocence caused his conviction. While the failure to train on the obligation
to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence can be the basis for government
liability for violation of civil rights, the plaintiff must show that this
reflected a deliberate indifference to the rights of the accused, which
normally requires a showing of a pattern of similar constitutional violations
by untrained employees. Connick v. Thompson, #09-571, 2011 U.S. Lexis 2594.
Members of a church who demonstrated near the
funeral of a dead U.S. soldier killed in combat had a protected First Amendment
right to express their message that God was punishing the U.S. for tolerating
homosexuality by the death of soldiers. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
church's message was on an issue of public concern, so that a jury verdict for
the soldier's father against the church of $2.9 million in compensatory damages
and $8 million in punitive damages (reduced by the trial court to $2.1 million
in punitive damages) for emotional distress and intrusion into seclusion was
improper. Additionally, the protest took place on public land adjacent to a
public street and in compliance with local law enforcement's instructions that
demonstrators remain 1,000 feet away from the church where the funeral services
were held. Snyder v. Phelps, #09-751, 2011 U.S. Lexis 1903.
A man sentenced to death after being convicted of
murdering his girlfriend sought to challenge his conviction in Texas state
court by seeking DNA testing of various untested evidence from the crime scene,
including knives, an axe handle, vaginal swabs, fingernail clippings, and
certain hair samples. State courts rejected his plea for DNA testing, finding
that he had not made a required showing that he "would not have been
convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing." He then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against the
prosecutor, seeking injunctive relief requiring the DNA tests. By a 6-3 vote,
the U.S, Supreme Court held that claims concerning the right to DNA testing
could be asserted not only in habeas corpus proceedings, but also in federal
civil rights lawsuits. Success in having the testing done would not necessarily
imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction. The Court therefore ordered
further proceedings on the merits of the plaintiff's claim that denying him the
DNA testing violated his due process rights. . Skinner v. Switzer, #09-9000,
2011 U.S. Lexis 1905.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a 6-to-2 decision,
ruled that statements made to police by a wounded crime victim who died before
the trial of the case began may be admitted into evidence without violating the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The statements were made
identifying the shooter, the majority concluded, for the primary purpose of
enabling the officers to deal with an emergency (the armed man) rather than for
the primary purpose of providing evidence of the crime. Michigan v. Bryant,
#09-150, 2011 U.S. Lexis 1713.
A former prisoner in an Ohio facility
claimed that a correctional officer had sexually assaulted her on two
consecutive nights, and sued two superintending prison officers, a case manager
on her living unit, and a prison investigator. She claimed that the case
manager failed to take any action to prevent the second assault after she
reported the first one, and that the investigator retaliated against her for
her accusations by placing her, shackled and handcuffed, in solitary
confinement in a cell without adequate heat, clothing, bedding, or blankets.
The trial court denied the defendants summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity, finding that there were disputed material issues of fact,
and the defendants did not appeal that ruling. After a full trial, a jury
awarded the plaintiff $350,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against the
case manager and $275,000 against the investigator. The defendants did not then
file a motion seeking judgment as a matter of law after the verdict, nor did
they seek a new trial. Instead, they argued, on appeal, that the trial court
should have granted their motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity. A federal appeals court agreed, and reversed the jury's verdict. The
U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, reversing the appeals court, and holding that a party
may not appeal a denial of summary judgment after a district court has
conducted a full trial on the merits. There was no "purely legal"
issue of qualified immunity preserved for appeal, as the dispute was not over
what the pre-existing law was, but instead what the facts were--such as whether
the case manager was adequately informed, after the first attack, of the
assailant's identity. The defendants could not argue, on appeal, that the
plaintiff had not proven her case, as they failed to raise an issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence by a post-judgment motion for judgment as a matter
of law. Ortiz v. Jordan, #09–737, 2011 U.S. Lexis 915.
Plaintiffs who were accused of child abuse in
California, but were later exonerated, had their names added to a Child Abuse
Central Index, where they would remain available to various state agencies for
at least 10 years. There was no state mechanism for contesting the inclusion of
their names, nor had Los Angeles County created any procedure to do so. They
sued the county and public officials, claiming that this violated their
constitutional rights. They sought damages, injunctive relief and declaratory
relief. A federal appeals court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment required
the state to provide those on the list with notice and a hearing, and that the
plaintiffs were entitled to declaratory relief and were prevailing parties
entitled to attorney's fees, including $60,000 from the county. The county
objected, claiming that as a municipal entity, it was liable only if its
"policy or custom" caused the deprivation of a plaintiff's federal
right, but a state policy caused any deprivation here. The appeals court ruled
that the plaintiffs did prevail against the county on their claim for
declaratory relief because the policy or custom requirement did not apply to
prospective relief claims. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding that there
can be no municipal liability in the absence of a finding of an official policy
or custom regardless of the type of relief sought or awarded. Los Angeles Cty.
v. Humphries, #09–350, 2010 U.S. Lexis 9444
Having previously found a Second Amendment
individual right to bear arms in striking down a handgun ban in the federal
District of Columbia, the U.S. Supreme Court has extended that ruling, in a
case involving a handgun ban by the City of Chicago. By 5-4, the Court held
that the rights guaranteed by the Second Amendment also apply to the states and
their subdivisions through the Fourteenth Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago,
#08-1521, 2010 U.S. Lexis 5523. A website presents case filings, briefs, and
opinions in this case at the district court, appeals court, and Supreme Court
levels.
By 6-3, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a federal statute which criminalizes providing
"material aid" to designated foreign terrorist organizations even
when the aid provided is purportedly aimed at facilitating training for
peacefully resolving conflicts or asserting human rights claims. “At bottom,”
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, “plaintiffs simply disagree with
the considered judgment of Congress and the executive that providing material
support to a designated foreign terrorist organization — even seemingly benign
support — bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization.” Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, #08-1498, 2010 U.S. Lexis 5252.
A man being interrogated for three hours
regarding a shooting was largely silent, but did not explicitly invoke his
right to remain silent, or ask for an attorney. Towards the end of the
questioning, he answered yes to a question as to whether he prayed to God to
forgive him for the shooting. He moved to suppress his statements, arguing that
his silence invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. In a 5-4
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, noting that a suspect's Miranda
right to counsel must be invoked "unambiguously," and that the same
standard applies to invoking the right to remain silent. Berghuis v. Thompkins,
#08-1470, 2010 U.S. Lexis 4379.
A federal statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, provides
for the awarding of a reasonable attorney's fee for the prevailing parties in
federal civil rights lawsuits. In this case, concerning alleged problems with
the foster care system in Georgia, the plaintiffs sought an award of $14
million in attorneys' fees--half of which was based on a "lodestone,"
(the number of hours worked by lawyers and their employees, multiplied by
prevailing hourly rates in the community), and the other half of which
represented a requested fee enhancement for purportedly superior work and
results. The trial court, however, awarded fees of $10.3 million, reducing the
number of hours because of "vague" billing records, but enhancing the
award by 75% for superior work and results. A federal appeals court approved
that result. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the calculation of
an attorneys' fee may be increased due to superior performance, "but only
in extraordinary circumstances." The factors to be considered are spelled
out by the Court's decision, and the Court held that the trial court in this
case failed to adequately justify its 75% fee enhancement. The trial court in
such cases must provide a "reasonably specific explanation for all aspects
of a fee determination, including any enhancement." Perdue v. Kenny A.,
#08–970, 2010 U.S. Lexis 3481.
A federal criminal statute that outlawed the
selling of videos depicting cruelty to animals when the underlying conduct was
illegal under applicable state or federal law violated the First Amendment. It
was constitutionally overbroad and regulated expression based on its content,
which made it presumptively invalid. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to carve
out another category of speech as unprotected based on what was depicted and
the nature of the underlying conduct, such as it had created for child
pornography. The Court also rejected the argument that the statute was saved by
a requirement that the banned videos lack “serious religious, political, scientific,
educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value," as the First
Amendment protects not only speech with such characteristics. "The First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative costs and benefits. The
First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis
that some speech is not worth it.” The case itself involved the application of
the statute to videos depicting dog fights. U.S. v. Stevens, #08–769, 2010 U.S.
Lexis 3478.
A Pakistani Muslim was arrested on suspicion of
terrorist activity by federal agents following the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attack and detained in restrictive conditions. He filed a federal civil rights
action against a number of federal officials, including the Attorney General
and the F.B.I, director, claiming that he had been unjustly labeled a person of
"high interest" because of his race, religion, or national origin.
The lawsuit also objected to the arrest and detention of thousands of Arab
Muslim men during the September 11th investigation, as well as to purportedly
overly harsh conditions of confinement. The Court overturned the denial of the
government's motion to dismiss the lawsuit, finding that there were
insufficient facts pled to show purposeful and unlawful discrimination. There
was no showing that the policy under which the plaintiff was detained was the
product of discrimination. The Court noted that because the September 11th
terrorist attacks were carried out by Arab Muslims, "it is not
surprising" that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest
and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the
policy's purpose was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. The Court stated that
the appeals court below should determine whether the plaintiff should be
allowed to amend his complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015, 2009 U.S. Lexis
3472.
The search by school personnel of a13-year-old
female student's underwear, seeking prescription strength and over the counter
pain medication barred by school rules without advance permission, was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, as the facts presented did not provide
reasonable suspicion justifying extending a permissible search of the student's
belongings and person to one in which she was made to pull out her underwear.
Despite this, school officials were entitled to qualified immunity since there
was not, at the time, clearly established law on the issue. "We would not
suggest that entitlement to qualified immunity is the guaranteed product of
disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the
fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges, disagrees about the
contours of a right does not automatically render the law unclear if we have
been clear. That said, however, the cases viewing school strip searches
differently from the way we see them are numerous enough, with well-reasoned
majority and dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently
clear in the prior statement of law." Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1. v.
Redding, #08-479, 2009 U.S. Lexis 4735.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a federal civil rights
lawsuit brought by a man convicted of sexual assault and other crimes, held
that the plaintiff had no constitutional right to post-conviction access to the
state's evidence for DNA testing for the purpose of attempting to prove his
innocence. The Court also reasoned that it was a legislative task to develop
procedures and rules for obtaining access to such evidence for DNA testing.
District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial Circuit v. Osborne, #08–6,
2009 U.S. Lexis 4536.
Supervisory prosecutors were entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity in a federal civil rights lawsuit brought by a prisoner
who showed that his murder conviction had depended on false testimony provided
by a jailhouse informant, a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court held. The plaintiff
claimed that his conviction had been caused by the failure of the supervisors'
failure to properly train and supervise prosecutors or to develop an
information system containing potential impeachment material concerning such
informants, in order to disclose it to criminal defendants and their defense
attorneys. Absolute immunity from liability applied because the actions or
inactions involved here concern how and when to make impeachment information
available at trial, and, therefore, are directly connected with a prosecutor's
basic trial advocacy duties. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, No. 07-854, 2009 U.S.
Lexis 1003.
A man whose conviction for selling drugs to an
undercover informant he voluntarily admitted into his residence was overturned
sued Utah state law enforcement personnel who carried out a warrantless search
of the premises. The trial court found that the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity based on the adoption, by some courts of the
"consent-once-removed" doctrine, allowing warrantless entry by
officers into homes after consent to entry has previously been given to
undercover officers who have observed drugs or other contraband in plain view.
This was found to have entitled the officers to have reasonably believed their
entry to have been lawful. Based on a two-step procedure spelled out by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194, a federal appeals court
rejected the qualified immunity defense, based on a rejection of the expansion
of the "consent-once-removed" doctrine to the facts of the immediate
case, in which the person initially voluntarily admitted into the home was not
an undercover officer, but merely an informant. The U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously reversed. The Court first found that the Saucier two-step procedure
for finding qualified immunity should not be "regarded as an
"inflexible requirement." The two-steps involve first determining
whether the facts claimed constitute a violation of a constitutional right, and
secondly, whether that right was "clearly established" at the time,
with qualified immunity applying unless the conduct alleged violated such a
clearly established right. While this two-step analysis may still be useful in
some cases, the first step of deciding whether a constitutional right was
actually violated may be avoided in instances such as the immediate case where
it can be found that it was not clearly established, at the time of the conduct
at issue, that the conduct was unlawful. In this case, at the time of the
warrantless search, it was not clearly established that the officers' entry was
unlawful, based on the adoption of the "consent-once-removed"
doctrine by two state Supreme Courts, and three federal appeals courts. The
officers could act in reliance on these decisions even when the federal appeals
court governing their area had not yet decided the issue, particularly where no
federal appeals court had then explicitly rejected the doctrine at issue.
Pearson v. Callahan, No. 07-751, 2009 U.S. Lexis 591.
The U.S. Supreme Court has announced that it will
decide whether a man convicted of sexual assault and kidnapping fourteen years
ago has a constitutional right to access to DNA from physical evidence
collected in the case for the purpose of conducting tests which he claims will
show his innocence, but which were not possible scientifically to perform at
the time of his trial. District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, # 08-06, cert.
granted, Nov. 3, 2008. Case below: Osborne v. District Attorney's Office,
#06-35875, 521 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2008).
The U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, ruled that a
D.C. ordinance banning handgun possession and requiring that lawfully owned
firearms be kept unloaded or bound by a trigger lock violates the Second
Amendment. The Court found an individual constitutional right to possess a
firearm for use for lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
District of Columbia v. Heller, No. 07-290, 2008 U.S. Lexis 5268.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an
arrestee's initial appearance before a magistrate or judge, when he learns the
charges against him, and his liberty is subject to restriction, constitutes the
beginning of an adversary judicial proceeding and triggers the arrestee's right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. This is true whether or not a prosecutor,
as distinct from a police officer, is aware of that first proceeding or involved
in it. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, No. 07-440, 2008 U.S. Lexis 5057.
In this case, Texas police arrested a man with
a prior felony conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, and brought
him before a magistrate judge, as required by state law, for a mandatory Fourth
Amendment probable-cause determination. At the hearing, bail was set, and the
arrestee was told the accusation against him. He was sent to jail, and released
after posting a surety bond. He had no money for a lawyer, and made a number of
oral and written requests for an appointed lawyer, which were allegedly
ignored.
He was later indicted, rearrested, and his bail
was increased, after which he was jailed when he could not post the bail. He
was later assigned a lawyer, who succeeded in getting the indictment dismissed.
The arrestee then sued the county for violation of civil rights, claiming that
if he had been provided with an appointed lawyer within a reasonable time after
the initial hearing, he would not have been indicted, rearrested, or jailed.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiff
arrestee had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at the time he first appeared
in court, even if the relevant prosecutors were not then aware of, or involved
in, his arrest or appearance at the hearing, and there was no indication that
the officer at the appearance had any power to commit the state to prosecute.
The Court noted that the federal government, the District of Columbia, and 43
states take the first step toward appointing counsel to indigent defendants
before, at, or just after an arrestee's initial court appearance The Court
found that no "acceptable justification" had been presented for the
minority practice of failing to do so.
When officers have probable cause to
believe that a person has committed a crime in their presence, the Fourth
Amendment permits them to make an arrest, and to search the suspect in order to
safeguard evidence and to ensure their own safety. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment when they made an arrest
that was based on probable cause but prohibited by Virginia state law, or when
they performed a search incident to the arrest. In this case, rather than
issuing a summons required by state law, the police arrested a motorist for the
misdemeanor of driving on a suspended license, and a search incident to the
arrest produced crack cocaine. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a decision of
the Virginia Supreme Court finding that the search violated the Fourth
Amendment because the arresting officers should have issued a citation instead
of making an arrest. While the decision was made in the context of a criminal
prosecution, the same reasoning would apply in a federal civil rights lawsuit
seeking damages. Virginia v. Moore, No. 06-1082, 2008 U.S. Lexis 3674.
In a case (Avena and Other Mexican Nationals)
involving 51 Mexican nationals confined in U.S. prisons, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that the U.S. had violated Article 36(1)(b) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by failing to provide them with notice
of their rights to contact the Mexican consulate after they were taken into
custody. The ICJ, therefore, held that each of these individuals were entitled
to review and reconsideration of the U.S. state court convictions, even if they
had failed to comply with otherwise applicable state rules concerning the
challenging of those convictions. In a prior decision, Sanchez-Llamas v.
Oregon, No. 04-10566, 548 U.S. 331 (2006), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
the Convention did not negate the need to apply state rules. The President of
the United States, however, issued a memo stating that the U.S. would
"discharge its institutional obligations" and have state courts follow
the ICJ decision. The Plaintiff in the immediate case, incarcerated in
Texas, then filed a Texas state court habeas application challenging his
capital murder conviction and death sentence because of the failure to inform
him of his rights under the Vienna Convention. The U.S. Supreme Court has now
held that neither the ICJ decision nor the President's memo are directly
enforceable federal law which would pre-empt state limits on the filing of
successive habeas petitions. The court further found that a treaty such as the
Vienna Convention is not binding domestic law in the U.S. when Congress has not
passed statutes to implement it, except if the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be "self-executing." The plaintiff's habeas
petition was therefore properly dismissed. Medellin v. Texas, No. 06-984, 2008
U.S. Lexus 2912.
U.S. Supreme Court rules that a passenger in a
car subjected to a traffic stop by a police officer is seized for Fourth
Amendment purposes, as much as the driver is, and therefore may challenge the
constitutionality of the stop. While the case arose in the context of a
criminal prosecution, its reasoning would also be applicable in a federal civil
rights lawsuit brought under the same circumstances. Brendlin v. California,
No. 06-8120 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007).
An officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment
by trying to terminate a high-speed pursuit when it appeared to threaten the
lives of by-standers, even when the manner of doing so involved placing the
fleeing motorist at a risk of death or serious bodily injury. Scott v. Harris,
No. 05-1631, 2007 U.S. Lexis 4748.
An award of $79.5 million in punitive damages in
a case involving an award of $821,000 in compensatory damages violated due
process and amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property when the jury
was motivated in part by a desire to punish the defendant for allegedly harming
persons who were not parties to the litigation. The case involved claims
against a tobacco company, rather than claims about law enforcement, but the
analysis in it, rejecting the roughly 100-to-1 ratio the punitive damage award
bore to the compensatory damages amount as "grossly excessive" may be
useful in also defending law enforcement personnel against excessive punitive
damage awards. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, No. 05-1256, 127 S. Ct. 1057
(2007).[N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that the statute of
limitations on a federal civil rights claim for false arrest which results in a
criminal prosecution starts to run on the date the arrestee is detained.
Wallace v. Kato, No. 05-1240, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007).[N/R]
The Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(b)(1)
provides federal employees absolute immunity from tort claims for actions taken
in the course of their official duties, and gives the Attorney General the
power to certify that a federal employee sued for wrongful or negligent conduct
was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the
incident. Once that certification takes place, the U.S. government is substituted
as the defendant instead of the employee, and the lawsuit is then governed by
the Federal Tort Claims Act. Additionally, if the lawsuit began in state court,
the Westfall Act provides that it shall be removed to federal court, and
renders the Attorney General's certification "conclusive" for
purposes of the removal. Once the certification and removal take place, the
federal court has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and cannot decide
to send the lawsuit back to state court. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court
also ruled that certification can take place under the Westfall Act in
instances where the federal employee sued claims, and the Attorney General also
concludes, that the incident alleged in the lawsuit never even took place.
Osborn v. Haley, No. 05-593, 2007 U.S. Lexis 1323. [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court: a civil rights lawsuit for
retaliatory prosecution in violation of a person's First Amendment rights must
be based on, among other things, the absence of probable cause to prosecute for
the asserted criminal charges. Hartman v. Moore, No. 04-1495, 126 S. Ct. 1695
(2006). [2006 LR Jul]
U.S. Supreme Court rejects claim that woman granted a
restraining order against her estranged husband had a constitutionally
protected due process property interest in having police enforce it. Plaintiff
alleged that the failure of police to do so resulted in the murder of her three
minor daughters by her husband while violating the order. Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzales, No. 04-278, 2005 U.S. Lexis 5214. [2005 LR Aug]
U.S. Supreme Court: Police officers did not act
unreasonably in detaining an occupant of a home in handcuffs during the
execution of a search warrant, and they also did not violate her rights by
questioning her, during the detention, concerning her immigration status.
Muehler v. Mena, #03-1423, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2005). [2005 LR May]
Officer who shot fleeing felon motorist in the
back was entitled to qualified immunity, U.S. Supreme Court holds, when prior
caselaw did not clearly establish that her conduct violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. Brosseau v. Haugen, No. 03-1261, 2004 U.S. Lexis 8275. [2005
LR Jan]
U.S. Supreme Court: a warrantless arrest is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as the officer, based on the
facts known to him, has probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.
The crime justifying the arrest need not necessarily be "closely
related" to the offense actually cited as the reason for the arrest.
Devenpeck v. Alford, No. 03-710, 2004 U.S. Lexis 8272. [2005 LR Jan]
U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether officers
were entitled to qualified immunity for arresting a motorist for tape recording
a traffic stop without consent, which was not a crime under applicable state
law, based on the existence of arguable probable cause to arrest him for crimes
"not closely related" to the charged offense. Alford v. Haner,
#01-35141, 333 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2003). The U.S. Supreme Court granted review
in Devenpeck v. Alford, #03-710, 124 S. Ct. 2014 (2004). [2004 LR Nov]
Arrest and conviction for failing to identify
himself by name while detained by an officer, in violation of a Nevada state
statute requiring persons stopped to provide such identification, did not
violate arrestee's Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
Court of Nevada, #03-5554, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4385. [2004 LR Jul]
U.S. Supreme Court grants review on case
involving the scope of permissible detention and questioning of persons, not
suspected of crime, found inside a residence during the execution of a search
warrant. Mena v. Simi Valley, Calif., 332 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
granted, Muehler v. Mena, No. 03-1423, 2004 U.S. Lexis 4190 (June 14, 2004).
[2004 LR Jul]
U.S. Supreme Court rules that states may be sued
for damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for acts of
disability discrimination which allegedly interfere with the constitutional
right of access to the courts, and that such claims are not barred by Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Court does not provide a clear answer about whether similar
lawsuits against governmental employees for damages are proper in other
circumstances of alleged disability discrimination in the providing of public
services or programs. Tennessee v. Lane, #02-1667, 2004 U.S. Lexis 3386. [2004
LR Jun]
U.S. Supreme Court finds that a search warrant
which failed to describe the items to be seized during the search of a Montana
ranch was "presumptively invalid," and that a federal agent who
applied for the warrant and then led the raid executing it was not entitled to
qualified immunity from liability, as the requirement in the Fourth Amendment
that a warrant describe with particularity the "persons or things to be
seized" is clearly stated. Groh v. Ramirez, #02-811, 124 S. Ct. 1284
(2004). [2004 LR May]
U.S. Supreme Court holds that a punitive damages
award of $145 million was excessive in a case where the compensatory damages
were $1 million. Such a disproportionate award of punitive damages violates the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts reviewing punitive
damages should consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
misconduct, (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by
the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between
the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, #01-1289, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). [N/R]
U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upholds city
ordinance requiring permits to hold more than 50-person events in a city park.
Ordinance was utilized to deny a permit for a large gathering to advocate the
legalization of marijuana, but was "content neutral," and therefore
did not have to have First Amendment related procedural safeguards. Thomas v.
Chicago Park District, No. 00-1249, 122 S. Ct. 775 (2002). [2002 LR Apr]
347:163 U.S. Supreme Court orders further
proceedings as to whether officers were entitled to qualified immunity in
lawsuit brought by anti-logging protesters claiming that the use of pepper
spray to compel their compliance with law enforcement orders was an excessive
use of force. Humboldt County v. Headwaters Forest Defense, #00-1649, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 5482.
344:115 Military police officer who shoved
protester into a van while arresting him at the scene of a speech by the U.S.
Vice President at a military based was entitled to qualified immunity; U.S.
Supreme Court rules that inquiry on qualified immunity is whether an officer
would have clearly known that his use of force was improper under the
particular circumstances faced, not merely whether the use of force is
ultimately judged reasonable. Saucier v. Katz, No. 99-1977, 121 S. Ct. 2151
(2001).
344:115 U.S. Supreme Court rejects "catalyst
theory" for the award of attorneys' fees in federal lawsuits; a plaintiff,
in order to be entitled to an attorneys' fee award must receive a court
judgment on the merits or a court- ordered consent decree; a voluntary change
in the behavior of the defendant will not suffice. Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, No.
99-1848, 121 S. Ct. 1835 (2001).
343:101 Rather than merely reviewing punitive
damage awards for "abuse of discretion" by trial courts, federal
appeals courts should conduct an "independent review" of whether such
awards are so excessive as to be unconstitutional, U.S. Supreme Court rules.
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., No. 99- 2035, 121 S.
Ct. 1678 (2001).
342:83 Fourth Amendment does not forbid a
warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a seatbelt violation,
even though it is only punishable by a fine. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, No.
99-1408, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
342:83 Hospital's policy, developed in
cooperation with local police and prosecutors, of subjecting some pregnant
women patients to drug tests, the positive results of which were turned over to
law enforcement to prosecute patients for use of cocaine, resulted in searches
which were unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of patient
consent. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, No. 99- 936, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
333:141 U.S. Supreme Court strikes down federal
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) as unconstitutional; some plaintiffs were
attempting to use statute to assert claims arising out of alleged sexual
assaults by law enforcement personnel. United States v. Morrison, #99-5, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000).
326:19 Publishing company was not entitled to an
injunction against statute placing restrictions on the release of and use of
information concerning the names and addresses of arrestees, which provided
that such addresses could not be used for the sale of any products or services;
statute on its face did not restrict commercial speech, but merely regulated
the release of information in the hands of law enforcement. Los Angeles Police
Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., #98-678, 120 S. Ct. 483 (1999).
321:131 U.S. Supreme Court rules that city
ordinance allowing officers to arrest persons who refuse to disperse after
being observed loitering with a gang member in a public place was
unconstitutional and failed to provide adequate standards for law enforcement
discretion. Chicago, City of, v. Morales, #97-1121, 119 S.Ct. 1849 (1999).
321:131 Monetary sanctions awarded against
plaintiff's lawyer in federal civil rights lawsuit were not immediately
appealable; any appeal must wait until the final resolution of the underlying
case. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, #98-727, 119 S.Ct. 1915 (1999).
319:99 U.S. Supreme Court unanimously holds that
allowing members of the news media to enter private residences along with law
enforcement officers during the execution of arrest or search warrants violates
the Fourth Amendment rights of the residents; individual defendant officers
were entitled to qualified immunity in two cases before the Court. Wilson v.
Layne, #98-83, 119 S.Ct. (1999); Hanlon v. Berger, No. 97-1927, 119 S.Ct. 1706
(1999).
318:83 U.S. Supreme Court holds that search of a
defense attorney, pursuant to a search warrant, at the courthouse where his
client was appearing before a grand jury did not violate due process; search of
attorney, even if calculated to "annoy" or to prevent consultation
with his client did not violate his right to practice his profession. Conn v.
Gabbert, #97-1802, 119 S.Ct. 1292 (1999).
315:35 U.S. Supreme Court reverses appeals court
decision requiring officers seizing property pursuant to search warrant to give
property owners detailed notices explaining state law procedures for asking
court to return seized property. City of West Covina v. Perkins, #97-1230, 119
S.Ct. 678 (1999).
314:19 U.S. Supreme Court to examine whether
allowing media to accompany law enforcement in executing arrest or search
warrants on private property violates Fourth Amendment and availability of
qualified immunity, at this time, for such actions. Wilson v. Layne, #96-1185,
141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998), reported in Liability Reporter No. 311, p. 174
(Nov. 1998), cert. granted, #98-83, 119 S.Ct. 443 (1998); Berger v. Hanlon,
#96-35251, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, Hanlon v. Berger,
#97-1927, 119 S.Ct. 443 (1998).
313:3 Despite the presence, in terminated
correctional officer's suit, of several claims against the State of Wisconsin
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, correctional defendants could still properly
remove the entire lawsuit from state to federal court, and the federal trial
court had jurisdiction to consider and rule on remaining claims not barred by
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht,
#97-461, 118 S.Ct. 2047 (1998).
313:3 Exclusionary rule does not apply to parole
revocation hearings. The rule would apply to a subsequent criminal trial, for
offenses committed while on parole, if police officers conduct an illegal
search of a parolee's person or premises. Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole
v. Scott, #97- 581, 118 S.Ct. 2014 (1998).
308:115 A police officer does not violate
substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless
indifference to life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a
suspected offender. Only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate
object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the
conscience necessary for a due process violation. County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998).
308:116 U.S. Supreme Court rejects imposition of
higher burden of proof on federal civil rights plaintiffs asserting that
defendants acted with unconstitutional motive. Crawford-El v. Britton, 118
S.Ct. 1584 (1998).
308:117 Unanimous U.S. Supreme Court rules that
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). applies to state prisons, based on
"unambiguous" text of statute; Court does not address question of
whether applying ADA to state prisons was a constitutional exercise of
authority by Congress; ruling expected to result in many more ADA lawsuits by
prisoners. Penn. Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, No. 97-634, 118 S.Ct. 1952
(1998).
Editor's Note: In one example of how this may
impact on local law enforcement, in an ADA suit brought in state court, the
judge refused to dismiss a suit, brought by a paraplegic inmate against a
sheriff and others, for transporting him in a van that was not wheelchair
accessible. Davis v. Mak, 1997 WL 133410 (Conn. Super. 1997).
306:83 Local legislators are entitled to absolute
immunity in federal civil rights lawsuits brought over introducing, voting for,
or signing an ordinance, regardless of their motives. Bogan v. Scott-Harris,
118 S.Ct. 966 (1998).
306:83 Appeals court order to trial court to
enter final judgment reducing amount of damages awarded to plaintiff by jury,
without allowing possibility of plaintiff obtaining a new trial, violated
Seventh Amendment constitutional right. Hetzel v. Prince William County, Va.,
118 S.Ct. 1210 (1998).
304:51 Prosecutor may be liable in federal civil
rights suit for making false statements, under oath, in connection with
application for arrest warrant; in certifying veracity of alleged facts which
were basis for warrant, she acted as a "complaining witness" rather
than as a lawyer, and prosecutorial absolute immunity did not apply. Kalina v.
Fletcher, 118 S.Ct. 502 (1997).
297:131 U.S. Supreme Court overturns $800,000
award against county based on alleged inadequate screening before hiring deputy
with arrest record who caused injuries to arrestee; single hiring decision
could not be the basis for municipal liability in absence of evidence that
sheriff consciously disregarded high risk that deputy would use excessive force
Bd of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl v. Brown, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997).
286:147 U.S. Supreme Court adopts
therapist-patient privilege protecting disclosures during therapy sessions from
compelled disclosure in court; affirms ordering of new trial in which jury
awarded $545,000 in police shooting case where jury was told it could presume
withheld therapy records would be unfavorable to officer Jaffee v. Allen, 116
S.Ct. 1923 (1996).
285:131 U.S. Supreme Court rules that an award of
punitive damages which was 500 times the size of the compensatory damages awarded
by a jury was "grossly excessive" and constitutionally violative of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment BMW of North America, Inc v.
Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996).
275:163 U.S. Supreme Court rules that prisoner
placed in disciplinary segregation following charges of misconduct was not
entitled to due process procedural protections; shift in focus in determining
whether state regulations create a constitutionally protected liberty interest
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995).
274:147 U.S. Supreme Court, resolving major split
between U.S. appeals courts, unanimously rules that defendants in federal civil
rights cases may not seek immediate appeal of denials of qualified immunity
when trial court bases such denial on basis that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial; immediate appeal in such cases is limited to reviewing
whether "clearly established law" violation is alleged, not issues of
sufficiency of evidence Johnson v. Jones, 115 S.Ct. 2151 (1995).
Oregon state constitutional provision prohibiting
judicial review of jury awards of punitive damages in most cases violates the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Supreme Court holds Honda
Motor Co, Ltd v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994).
Federal appeals courts reviewing the grant or
denial of an officer's qualified (good-faith) immunity defense must consider
all relevant legal precedents, including those which were not cited to or
discovered by the trial court. Elder v. RD Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994).
U.S. Supreme Court rules that peremptory
challenges of potential jurors based on gender violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment JEB v. Alabama Ex Rel TB, 114 S.Ct. 1419
(1994).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that courts should
dismiss federal civil rights suits seeking damages when a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff necessarily implies that invalidity of the plaintiff's criminal
sentence, but that sentence has not already been overturned Heck v. Humphrey,
114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994).
U.S. government not entitled to a presumption
that all persons supplying information to FBI during a criminal investigation
are "confidential sources" entitled to exemption from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act. U.S. Dept of Justice v. Landano, 113
S.Ct. 2014 (1993).
Lawsuit alleging that inadequate training led to
shooting death of plaintiffs' dogs during execution of search warrant was
properly dismissed; complaint had "all bark and no bite" in failing
to allege specific facts regarding the alleged inadequacy of police training;
U.S. Supreme Court grants review of case. Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence, 954 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir), cert granted, 112 S.Ct. 2989
(1992). U.S. Supreme Court subsequently held, in Leatherman v.Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence, No.91-1657, 507 U.S.163 (1993), that a federal court
may not apply a "heightened pleading standard" which more stringent
than the usual pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) in
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Rule
8(a)(2) requires that a complaint include only "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
Federal Tort Claims Act prohibition of
"punitive damages" against U.S. government does not bar awards for
future medical expenses or for loss of enjoyment of life Molzof v. US, 112
S.Ct. 711 (1992).
Civil rights plaintiff solely seeking monetary
damages who was awarded only $1 in nominal damages was a "prevailing
party," but was not entitled to attorneys' fee award of $280,000; Court
states that, in such cases, "the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at
all." Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S.Ct. 566 (1992).
U.S. Supreme Court rules that "significant injury"
is not a requirement for proving use of excessive physical force against a
prisoner in violation of the Eighth Amendment Hudson v. McMillian, 60 USLW
4151; 50 CrL 2051 (Feb 25, 1992).
Arrestees seized without warrants are entitled to
probable cause hearings "no later" than 48 hours after arrest County
of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991).
Any person signing papers submitted to court in
frivolous federal lawsuits can be assessed monetary sanctions, whether or not
they are an attorney Business Guides, Inc v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, Inc, 111 S.Ct. 922 (1991); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarax Corp,
110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990); Paveliv & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110
S.Ct. 456 (1989).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that $10 million
punitive damage award did not violate due process. Pacific Mutual Life Ins Co
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
State officials may be sued for damages in their
individual capacities in federal civil rights cases, even if they were acting
"in their official capacities" during the complained of conduct, U.S.
Supreme Court rules. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
Punitive damages are not, per se, a violation of
due process, but Supreme Court indicates that "extreme results" may
be "unacceptable" under due process Pacific Mut Life Ins Co v.
Haslip, 111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991).
U.S. Supreme Court holds that claims against law
enforcement officials for excessive use of force in making arrests are to be
analyzed under a fourth amendment objective reasonableness standard Graham v.
Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989).
U.S. Supreme Court allows attorneys to waive fees
in settlements Evans v. Jeff D, 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
U.S. Supreme Court allows civil rights plaintiffs
to recover huge attorney's fees in modest cases City of Riverside v. Rivera,
477 U.S. 561 (1986).
U.S. Supreme Court rules "prevailing
party" cannot recover attorney's fees for first pursuing administrative
remedies Webb v. Board of Ed of Dyer County, 105 S.Ct. 1923 (1985).
U.S. Supreme Court limits fee recovery Marek v.
Chesny, No 83-1437, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
Supreme Court overturns injunction issued against
LA police regarding use of choke holds City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 103 S.Ct.
1660 (1983).