AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Civil Liability of
Law Enforcement Agencies & Personnel
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Police Plaintiff: Assault and Battery
A police officer was assaulted and injured during a public demonstration against alleged police misconduct called by a Black Lives Matter group. He sued the group and one of its leaders/organizers. A federal appeals court ruled that the officer failed to adequately show that the defendant leader was vicariously liable for the conduct of the unknown assailant or that he entered into a civil conspiracy with the purpose of injuring the officer. It ruled, however, the plaintiff officer adequately alleged that the defendant leader was liable in negligence for organizing and leading the demonstration to illegally occupy a highway. In doing so, he arguably breached his duty of reasonable care in the course of organizing and leading the demonstration in that by ignoring the foreseeable risk of violence that his actions created, the leader failed to exercise reasonable care. The trial court erroneously dismissed the lawsuit on First Amendment grounds, as the illegal conduct was not protected by the First Amendment. The leader ordered the demonstrators to violate a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction by blocking the public highway. Doe v. McKesson, #17-30864, 945 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 2019) rehearing denied. 2020 U.S. App. Lexis 2696 (5th Cir.).
While on duty at a “Black Lives Matter” protest demonstration, an officer was hit with a heavy object by an unidentified person, suffering serious injuries. He sued Black Lives Matter, the group that organized the protest, and one of the leaders of the group. The trial court dismissed the officer’s claims on the pleadings and denied his motion to amend the complaint. A federal appeals court remanded for further proceedings on the claims against the group leader. While the officer had not adequately alleged that the leader was vicariously liable for the actions of the unknown assailant or that he entered into a civil conspiracy with the purpose of injuring the officer, the court did rule that the officer adequately alleged that the defendant was liable in negligence for organizing and leading the demonstration to illegally occupy a highway. The appeals court found that the trial court erred in dismissing the action on First Amendment grounds. The officer failed to plead facts that could allow the court to conclude that Black Lives Matter was an entity capable of being sued. Doe v. McKesson, #17-30864, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 23866, 2019 WL 3729587 (5th Cir.).
A courtroom marshal was not entitled
to absolute immunity on excessive force claims by two bail enforcement agents
removed from a court room at a judge's request. He was not performing a
judicial function, and allegedly used force in excess of what the judge
commanded and the Constitution allows. He was, however, entitled to qualified
immunity from liability, since there was then "chaos" in the court
room and undisputed evidence that at least one of the two plaintiffs was intent
on disobeying the court's instructions. It was not "beyond debate"
that the marshal used an unreasonable level of force. Brooks v. Clark County,
#14-16424, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 12510 (9th Cir.).
A sheriff, captain,
sergeant, and watch commander were not liable for a detainee's brutal attack on
a female courtroom deputy, inflicting severe brain damage, when he was brought
to the courtroom from a holding cell and disarmed her. The courtroom deputy,
the appeals court noted, was not in custody, so that the failure to provide
adequate security to prevent the attack violated her due process rights only if
the defendants acted with deliberate indifference or engaged in conduct that
was conscience shocking, which was not the case here. Further, the courtroom
deputy was exposed to the danger of such an assault by the nature of her
employment, and the claims against the defendants amounted to those similar to
negligence, not deliberate indifference or conscience shocking behavior. Hall
v. Freeman, No. 08-11238, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 18421 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).
An off-duty officer tried to help a stranger who
claimed he was being robbed, who turned out to be a drug dealer being chased by
an on-duty police officer. The off-duty officer, when he realized what the
situation was, placed himself in a prone position on the floor in an indication
of surrender. The on-duty officer allegedly kicked the off-duty officer
repeatedly and stomped on his buttocks and groin until he saw a police badge on
the off-duty officer's neck. The injured off-duty officer sued the on-duty
officer and the District of Columbia, asserting claims for excessive use of
force. A federal appeals court ruled that the trial court acted erroneously in
granting qualified immunity to the defendant on-duty officer. The facts, as presented
by the plaintiff off-duty officer, showed that the on-duty officer violated his
Fourth Amendment rights, and a reasonable officer would have known that the
actions allegedly taken, under the circumstances, were not lawful. The common
law negligence claims against the District were properly dismissed, however.
The off-duty officer's exclusive remedy on those claims was to seek benefits
under the Police and Firefighters Retirement and Disability Act. A trial was
ordered on the off-duty officer's civil rights claims. Johnson v. D.C., No.
06-7136, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 13289 (D.C. Cir.).
County could not be held liable for injuries
policeman suffered when he was assaulted while buying narcotics as part of a
joint task force. The alleged failure of the defendants to warn him that a
suspect had been released from jail, who then recognized him when he tried to
buy drugs and assaulted him was not actionable in the absence of a special
relationship with the officer sufficient to overcome the governmental immunity
that otherwise barred the lawsuit. The relationship between the officer, the
village and the county while participating in the task force was also similar
to that of an employee to his employer. Rodriguez v. County of Rockland, No.
2006-00834, 2007 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 9830 (A.D. 2nd Dept.).
In a police officer's lawsuit for assault and
battery against the sister of an arrestee, the sister was not barred from
claiming that her actions did not constitute civil assault by her prior guilty
plea to a misdemeanor crime of resisting arrest. Her "ambiguous" plea
admitting to a "struggle" with the officer did not necessarily admit
that she had attacked him, as the criminal charge was not criminal assault, so
collateral estoppel did not apply. Dougherty v. Weinert, 809 N.Y.S.2d 758 (Sup.
App. Term, 1st Dept. 2005). [N/R]
City of New York was not liable for police
officers injuries when he was struck in the head with a flashlight by another
officer while assisting in making an arrest. There was no evidence that the
other officer acted with any intent to violate state criminal law, so there was
no liability under McKinney's General Municipal Law Sec. 205-e imposing
liability for police injuries caused by statutory violations. Warren v. City of
New York, 791 N.Y.S.2d 650 (A.D. 2nd Dept. 2005). [N/R]
Police officer was not acting within the scope of
his employment when he allegedly injured a deputy sheriff at a defensive
tactics training program by placing him in a neck restraint, causing him to
fall. He was therefore not entitled to defense and indemnification by the
county which employed him in a personal injury lawsuit filed against him by the
deputy. Riehle v. County of Cattaraugus, 794 N.Y.S.2d 186 (A.D. 4th Dept.
2005). [N/R]
Restaurant owners and corporation might be
liable for employee's act of spitting on the food to be served to a state
trooper, since food preparation was within the scope of his employment, but
there was no showing that the restaurant or its owners ratified the employee's act.
Phillips v. Restaurant Management of Carolina, L.P., #COA00-411, 552 S.E.2d 686
(N.C. App. 2001). [N/R]
305:67 Police department employee, allegedly
assaulted by two officers as she reported to work at jail in civilian clothes,
awarded $1,957,120 for negligence and excessive force. Jones v. City of Los
Angeles, BC053303, L.A. Superior Central Ct., L.A., Calif., Jan. 15, 1998,
reported in Los Ang. Daily Jour. (Verd. & Stl.) Vol. 111, No. 30, p. 5
(Feb. 13, 1998).
306:90 City and officer who allegedly hit another
officer during baton training exercise, resulting in disabling injury, liable
for $2.35 million in damages; suit claimed negligent supervision by city.
Hamilton v. City of Brawley, Cal. Imperial County Super. Ct., No. 84701, Nov.
24, 1997, 41 ATLA L. Rptr. 94 (April 1998).