AELE LAW LIBRARY OF CASE SUMMARIES:
Civil Liability of
Law Enforcement Agencies & Personnel
Back to list of subjects Back to Legal Publications Menu
Federal Tort Claims Act
Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil Liability of U.S. Government Under the Federal Tort Claims Act For Actions of Federal Law Enforcement Officers – Part 1 of 2, 2020 (3) AELE Mo. L.J. 101
Monthly Law Journal Article: Civil Liability of U.S. Government Under the Federal Tort Claims Act For Actions of Federal Law Enforcement Officers – Part 2 of 2, 2020 (4) AELE Mo. L.J. 101.
A married couple convicted of tax offenses sued an FBI agent and an IRS agent for defamation for statements they made in comments to local news stations. The trial court denied discovery on the issue of whether the agents acted within the scope of their employment, substituted the U.S. government as the proper defendant, and dismissed the lawsuit for failure to file an administrative claim before suing, as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act. A federal appeals court ruled that the offending statements were made in the scope of the agents’ employment; and the plaintiffs had no right to even limited discovery, because they failed to allege any facts that, taken as true, suggested that the agents acted outside of the scope of their employment. They failed to claim that the interviews were not intended, at least in part, to serve the FBI and IRS. Bolton v. United States, #18-60700, 946 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2019).
The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking to hold the United States government liable for negligently performing a background check on Dylann Roof, the person who entered a church in Charleston, South Carolina and opened fire, killing nine worshippers. It was undisputed that if the background check had been performed properly, it would have prevented him from purchasing the firearm he used. The trial court dismissed these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A federal appeals court reversed, holding that neither the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) nor the Brady Act's immunity provision in 18 U.S.C. 922(t)(6) afforded the federal government immunity in this case. In regard to the FTCA, the court held that this case turned on the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) Examiner’s alleged negligence in failing to follow a clear directive, and that the government could not claim immunity under these circumstances. The appeals court further held, however, that the district court did not err by concluding that the government could not be held liable under the FTCA for declining to give Examiners access to the FBI’s National Data Exchange (N-DEx), and also rejected a claim that the government violated a mandatory directive by failing to maintain data integrity during the NICS background check. In regard to the Brady Act, the court held that the trial court erred in construing 18 U.S.C. 992(t)(6) to bar plaintiffs' claims where the plaintiffs sued the government rather than any federal employee, and the federal employees whose conduct formed the basis of this suit were not responsible for providing information to the NICS system. Sanders v. United States, #18-1931, 937 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2019).
Two members of an FBI/Grand Rapids task force were searching for a male suspect. Neither officer was wearing a uniform, but both were wearing lanyards displaying their badges. They knew that the suspect was a 26-year-old white male, 5ʹ10″ to 6ʹ3″ tall, with glasses, who bought a soft drink from a particular gas station every afternoon. The suspect’s driver’s license photo was seven years old. The defendants approached the plaintiff (who was not the suspect) near the gas station. The plaintiff, a 21-year-old student, 5ʹ10″ to 6ʹ3″, and wearing glasses, claims that the defendants never identified themselves. The defendants asserted that that one of them identified himself as a police officer. The plaintiff gave his name and followed instructions to put his hands on his head because the defendants “had small badges.” One officer removed the plaintiff’s wallet. The plaintiff then asked, “[a]re you mugging me?” and attempted to flee. An officer tackled him. The plaintiff then yelled for passersby to call the police. The officer then put him in a chokehold. The plaintiff claimed that he lost consciousness. He also responded by biting the officer, who started punching him in the head and face. Bystanders called the police and began filming. Officers arrived and ordered them to delete their videos because they could reveal undercover FBI agents. One bystander stated, “They were out of control pounding him.” A 911 caller stated, “[t]hey’re gonna kill this man.” Emergency room doctors released the plaintiff with painkillers. Police then arrested him. He spent the weekend in jail. A jury acquitted him of all charges. The trial court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claim against the United States, and granted the defendants summary judgment based on qualified immunity. With respect to the plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 or Bivens civil rights claims, a federal appeals court reversed. The FTCA judgment bar, 28 U.S.C. 2676, does not apply because the FTCA judgment was not on the merits. The defendants were not protected by qualified immunity. A jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff bore no resemblance to the suspect’s photograph. Under clearly established law, removing the plaintiff’s wallet during a protective search was unreasonable. Clearly established law held that using a chokehold when the plaintiff was attempting to flee was objectively unreasonable under these circumstances. King v. United States, #17-2101, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 5438, 2019 Fed. App. 0027P (6th Cir.).
In 2008, three people (one man and two women) took a Caribbean cruise which stopped at several foreign ports before returning to the U.S. A number of the foreign ports were known sources of narcotics. When reboarding the ship in Puerto Rico, a can of shaving powder in the man’s bag spilled on a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer. The plaintiff travelers later claimed that officers’ subsequent actions were retaliation for them laughing at the incident. Their bags were searched and nothing unlawful was found, but a notation was made in the Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) database that the man whose shaving powder had spilled had appeared “disoriented and nervous” and that it took him “some time” to state his employment when asked. The database already had entries from 2000, 2004, and 2006 linking the travelers to suspicions of engaging in drug smuggling. Their cabins were then searched, but no contraband was found. The three plaintiff travelers asserted claims against the officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, #301, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) for allegedly violating their Fourth Amendment rights and tort claims against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). A federal appeals court upheld summary judgment in favor of the officers and the government. The officers were entitled to qualified immunity because, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had ruled on September 4, 2008 that a search of a cruise ship cabin at the border had to be supported by reasonable suspicion, that standard could not be said to have been clearly established in the Third Circuit or the First Circuit on September 5 and 6, 2008, when the searches took place, as the officers could not reasonably be expected to have learned of this development within one or two days. That legal standard was therefore not “clearly established at the time. Further, the U.S. government was shielded from liability under the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, as the agents exercised discretion in making entries into the database and carrying out the searches. Bryan v. U.S., #17-1519, 2019 U.S. App. Lexis 1711 (3d Cir.).
The U.S. government was properly granted judgment against the plaintiff on his lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671-2680, because the Homeland Security agent who shot him during the execution of a search warrant at his residence for evidence of drug and gang offenses did not violate his clearly established rights. The court ruled that the U.S. government could not be held liable for the agent’s conduct unless the unlawfulness of the officers’ conduct was clearly established at the time they acted and that at the time the officers acted, no precedent clearly established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. When agents and officers entered the residence, there were no lights on in the apartment, other than the powerful flashlights held by the agents. The Homeland Security agent saw the suspect’s silhouette emerging from a bedroom. In Spanish, he yelled “police,” and ordered the suspect to show his hands and stay still. Ignoring these commands, the suspect lifted his shirt, reached for his waistband, and moved for cover behind a bedroom wall. His waistband contained no discernible "bulge." Before he drew his hand from his waistband area, two agents shot at his center mass. These actions, under the circumstances, did not violate clearly established law. Escalera Salgado v. U.S., #17-1838, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 35564 (1st Cir.).
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit for intentional torts under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screeners following a confrontational screening at Philadelphia International Airport, during which police were summoned. Under the FTCA, the U.S. government generally enjoys sovereign immunity for intentional torts committed by federal employees, subject to the “law enforcement proviso” exception, which waives immunity for a subset of intentional torts committed by employees who qualify as “investigative or law enforcement officers,” 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit, ruling that TSA screeners are not “investigative or law enforcement officers” under the law enforcement proviso. They “typically are not law enforcement officers and do not act as such.” The court noted that the head of the TSA, the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, has specific authority to designate employees to serve as “law enforcement officer[s]” 49 U.S.C. 114(p)(1) if he wishes to do so. An employee designated in this manner may carry a firearm, make arrests, and seek and execute warrants for arrest or seizure of evidence. Screening locations are staffed by both screening officers and law enforcement officers. Only those specifically designated as law enforcement officers fall within the “law enforcement proviso” of the FTCA. Pellegrino v. U.S. Transportation Security Administration, #15-3047, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 18821 (3rd Cir.).
A woman sued the U.S. government for false arrest and imprisonment by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers because the officers detained her after she presented them with an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), which she argued conclusively showed her right to remain in the United States. The lawsuit was filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). A federal appeals court ruled that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied in this case where the officers enforced a removal order. The court ruled that, what the plaintiff insisted was certain from the EAD and removed all discretion was, in reality, sufficiently uncertain as to leave discretion in the hands of the officers. Campos v. U.S., #16-61476, 2018 U.S. App. Lexis 10378 (5th Cir.).
Fire struck a woman’s home, killing her three-year-old son. An ATF forensic chemist wrote a draft report stating that no accelerants were present where fire investigators thought the fire had begun. The woman was prosecuted for starting the fire and then alleged that the investigators communicated their disappointment to the ATF chemist, who agreed to fabricate findings. The official report confirmed the presence of accelerants in the areas identified by the investigators and said that the heavy petroleum distillates were highly suspicious. Only the final official version of the report was given to state prosecutors, with the existence of the draft report not revealed. Convicted of felony murder based on that report, the woman was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment. After the draft report was revealed, a state appeals court reversed the conviction, based on the “Brady” violation of failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. Exonerated, the woman sued under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), claiming malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The trial court concluded that the intentional-tort exception to the FTCA’s general waiver of immunity applied, that the exception to that exception for law-enforcement officers did not apply, and granted the federal government summary judgment. A federal appeals court subsequently concluded that the record was not developed fully enough to support that result, that summary judgment on the issue of immunity was premature, and ordered further proceedings. Bunch v. United States, #16-3775, 2018 U.S. Lexis 2283 (7th Cir.).
A woman claimed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) negligently supervised the use of its surveillance equipment to keep tabs on her by her then-husband, an FBI agent. A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of her lawsuit against the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), holding that because the plaintiff did not plead sufficient specific facts to show that the challenged conduct in supervising did not involve a discretionary function she was not entitled to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity. Gordo-Gonzalez v. U.S., #16-2276, 873 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2017).
Customs and Border Protection agents
in Louisiana boarded a Greyhound bus and performed a routine check of passengers'
immigration status. A Mongolian citizen in the U.S. on an H-1B temporary worker
visa was unable to produce his immigration papers despite a law requiring him
to carry them. He was therefore arrested when the agents were unable to verify
his status, pursuant to the agecy's policy requiring detention under these
circumstances. He sued the U.S. government, claiming false arrest and
imprisonment under Louisiana law, as provided by the Federal Tort Claims Act's
waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government. The claim was rejected
under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act. The
court concluded that an investigation into a perso's immigratio status is
considered discretionary when that investigation culminates in a detainment
mandated by an agency policy. Tsolmon v. United States, #15-20609, 841 F.3d 378
(5th Cir. 2016).
Three masked intruders who invaded
a family home shot and killed the husband ad daughter and shot the wife in the
arm. The wife sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), 2680(a), claiming that the FBI had possessed
information about the impending home invasion but had failed to disclose it to
local law enforcement. She argued that such a disclosure might have prevented
the crime. The federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit,
agreeing that the FBI's decision as to whether to disclose such information was
the type of decision that Congress intended to shield from liability under the statute
and was covered by a discretionary function exception to liability. The
decision involved policy judgments about the reliability of the information,
the relative importance of the crime, and the FBI's mission and resources.
Gonzalez v. United States, #13-15218, 2016 U.S. App. Lexis 3195 (9th Cir.).
The estates of two people killed in a drunk driving
accident on a Native American reservation sued the federal government under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674, arguing that tribal police were
negligent in failing to locate and arrest the drunk driver prior to the
accident. A federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the claim, finding
that, under South Dakota law, applicable to the defendant under the FTCA, there
was no mandatory duty on police to protect a particular person or class of
people absent a special relationship. The tribal police in this case did
nothing that increased the risk of harm to the decedents by failing to arrest
the drunk driver after his erratic driving was reported. Sorace v. United
States, #14-2683, 788 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2015).
A D.C. prisoner was incarcerated for over two
decades in both federal and state prisons on a conviction for raping and
robbing a woman in 1981 when he was 18. After his parole, he was required to
register as a sex offender, limting his employment, housing, and other
opportunities. During his incarceration, he suffered multiple instances of
sexual and physical assaults, and contracted HIV. In 2012, at the age of 50, he
was exonerated and determined to be actually innocent of the robbery and rape,
based on DNA evidence. He reached a settlement of claims against the fedeeral
government under the Unjust Convictions Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1495 and 25a3, and
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq. of $1,128,082.19,
based on $50,000 times the 22.56 years he was incarcerated. Continuing to
pursue his claims against the District of Columbia inder the D.C. Unjust
Imprisonment Act, D.C. Code Sec. 2-421 et. seq., he was awarded $9,154,500 in
damages for wrongful conviction, unjust imprisonment, sexual and physical
assaults, contracting HIV, lost income, and physcal and psychological injuries.
A D.ZC. court found that his wrongful conviction and unjust imprisonment had
been a proximate cause of all these damages. It also rejected an argument that
D.C. was entitled to an offset from the award for the amount of the plaintiff's
settlement with the federal government. Odom v. District of Columbia,
#2013-CA-3239, 2015 D.C. Super. Lexis 2.
A Border Patrol agent shot and killed a
15-year-old Mexican boy who was standing in Mexico across the border from the
U.S. Claims against the U.S. government were properly rejected as the federal
government had not waived sovereign immunity on claims under the Federal Tort
Claims Act and the Alien Tort Statute did not waive sovereign immunity. The
plaintiff failed to show that any of the supervisory personnel sued were
personally responsible for the agent's actions. A Fifth Amendment due process
claim, however, could continue against the agent, and the plaintiffs had
alleged sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity. The boy and his
friends, at the time of the shooting, were playing a game in which they ran up
the incline of the culvert on their side of the border, touched the barbed-wire
fence, and then ran back down the incline. Hernandez. v. United States,
#12-50301, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 12307 (5th Cir.).
A Marine sergeant was accused of having committed
a sexual assault while on a recruitment detail at a middle school. A lawsuit
was filed against the U.S. government for the sexual assault under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The claim accrued when the plaintiff became aware of
her injury, not when she claimed to have learned of the Marine Corp's
negligence. Since she did not file an administrative claim until four years
after the incident, the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations would ordinarily
bar the claim, but during the appeal of the lawsuit's dismissal, the 9th
Circuit ruled in Wong v. Beebe, #10-36136, 732 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) that
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was available in FTCA cases.
The appeals court therefore ordered that the trial court hold further
proceedings to consider the plaintiff's equitable tolling arguments. Gallardo
v. United States, #12-55255, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 6964 (9th Cir.).
Two vehicle passengers injured in an accident
sought to hold a rural Alaskan city vicariously liable for their injuries that
were allegedly caused by a native village tribal police officer who was
certified as a federal employee for purposes of the lawsuit. The officer
ordered the two minors to ride on the back of a for wheeler he was driving
after he found them out in violation of curfew. They were thrown off the
vehicle when he lost control of the vehicle. The vicarious liability claim was
based on the theory that the city had a non-delegable duty to provide law
enforcement services to the community. The officer, a federal appeals court
found, was entitled to immunity from liability under both his tribe's sovereign
immunity and under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The injured plaintiffs' sole
remedy was against the federal government and the immunities available to the
officer extended to the city. M.J. v. United States, #11-35625, 2013 U.S. App.
Lexis 13416 (9th Cir.).
Federal agents and deputy sheriffs carried out an
inspection at a border checkpoint. A father and a number of others were
detained when his son fled the checkpoint in a vehicle. Three months after this
incident, the father and a passenger in that vehicle were stopped while driving
in a national park on the basis of a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) report that had
issued on the father's vehicle after the prior incident. Unlawful search and seizure
claims were rejected because the rangers who stopped the vehicle had a
reasonable suspicion that the vehicle might contain a fleeing felon or weapons.
The appeals court denied, however, federal agents' motion to thrown out a false
imprisonment claim under an exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims
arising from the detention of goods. No goods were then being detained after
the son fled the checkpoint in the vehicle. The court also rejected excessive
force claims against the rangers based on them drawing their weapons and
handcuffing the father and his passenger during their traffic stop since they
had reason to believe that those in the car might be dangerous. Davila v.
United States, #12-50044, 2013 U.S. App. Lexis 6749 (5th Cir.).
U.S. Marshals teamed up with local police to
conduct a roundup of fugitives in 24 states that resulted in 10,733 arrests.
One of the arrestees turned out not to be the arrestee sought, but someone else
with the same name, due to a clerical error by a city's police department. That
arrestee's lawsuit against the U.S. government was barred under the
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C.S. § 2680(a). Officers making the arrest did not have the arrest warrant
in their possession at the time the arrest was made, and were not required to
have it under the city's existing arrest policy. The plaintiffs also failed to
produce any evidence that the officers intended to falsely arrest the arrestee,
so a law enforcement exception to the intentional tort exception of the FTCA
did not apply. Milligan v. United States, # 10-5615, 670 F.3d 686
(6th Cir. 2012).
Lawsuits filed under the Federal Tort Claims Act
against the federal government claiming it was liable for two deaths because of
the F.B.I.'s thirty-year "alliance" with a mobster-turned-informant
were time-barred under an applicable two-year statute of limitations. The
mobster allegedly ordered the decedents' deaths. The plaintiffs had sufficient
information to assert their claims more than two years before they did so,
based on testimony in a hearing about the federal government's role in the
cases, and media reports of the information. Donahue v. U.S., #09-1950, 2011
U.S. App. Lexis 2644 (1st Cir.).
The federal government was not liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for the actions of a U.S. Special Agent who became
involved in an auto accident during a car chase with a motorcycle rider. He did
not act within the scope of his employment and acted as a private person while
driving home from work in an unmarked government vehicle when he became
involved in the dispute with the motorcyclist. Merlonghi v. U.S., #09-2387, 620
F.3d 50 (1st Cir.2010).
A woman from China and her husband sued the
federal government and a number of officials under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
asserting that an asylum officer demanded sexual favors from her in return for
assisting with her asylum application. He had the authority to grant her asylum
request, eliminating the need for a formal hearing on it. When she refused to
allow him to allegedly unzip and remove her pants, he denied her application A
federal appeals court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit in part, as the
plaintiff failed to establish that there was a specific duty violated under the
Fifth Amendment or any evidence that could establish the existence of an
unconstitutional policy. It did, however, reinstate an emotional distress
claim, and stated that emotional distress suffered from such a request for
sexual favors could potentially be proven and constitute an injury separate and
apart from battery. The U.S. government is immune under the Federal Tort Claims
Act from claims for battery committed by its employees.. Lu v. Powell,
#08-56421, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 18368 (9th Cir.).
In a lawsuit claiming that the government's
negligence resulted in the wrongful deportation of the plaintiff's son, brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the U.S. government was protected from the
lawsuit by the discretionary function exception of the Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec,
2680(a). Castro v. U.S., #07-40416, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 11241 (5th Cir.).
FBI agents allegedly protected a group of
murderers, referred to as the "Bulger gang," against apprehension and
prosecution, in order to use them as informants against La Cosa Nostra. This
allegedly continued for over twenty years, despite notice that the informants
were killers and would continue to commit murders. The estates of three persons
allegedly killed by the informants sued the FBI, FBI agents, and the
informants. The U.S. government was liable for the death of a man killed after
an FBI agent allegedly leaked his intent to incriminate an informant, making it
foreseeable that the informant would try to murder him. The government was also
liable for the deaths of an informant's former girlfriend and her daughter,
because a federal agent created an unreasonable risk of harm to them by helping
the informants avoid arrest. The federal agents' conduct was within the scope
of their employment, given that their superiors agreed to their actions to
protect the informants. The court rejected, however, claims by the decedents'
families for intentional infliction of emotional distress because they lacked
"contemporaneous" knowledge of the murders. An exception to liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq., for
discretionary functions did not apply, as the conduct of the FBI was found to
be criminal and in violation of the agency's guidelines. One family was awarded
a total of $1,150,000, a second family received a total of $1,352,005, and a
third received $219,795. Litif v. U.S., Civil Action #02-11791, 2010 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 7493 (D. Mass.).
Almost thirty years after four men were convicted
of involvement in an organized crime "gangland slaying," the F.B.I.
disclosed, for the first time, that it had all along possessed reliable
intelligence undercutting the testimony of a cooperating witness whose version
of the murder was the basis of the convictions, but had suppressed this
information. All four convictions were vacated, but by then, two of the men had
died in prison, the third had been paroled, and only the fourth was still
incarcerated. The two surviving men, along with the estates of the two
decedents, sued the U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2671-2680. After a bench trial, the court found the
government liable, awarding over $100 million in damages. A federal appeals
court, while commenting that the damage awards were "considerably higher
than any one of us, if sitting on the trial court bench, would have
ordered," nevertheless upheld the awards, finding that they were not
"so grossly disproportionate to the harm sustained as to either shock our
collective conscience or raise the specter of a miscarriage of justice."
There was no liability for malicious prosecution, the court held, as the U.S.
government had not initiated the murder prosecution of the four men by the
state of Massachusetts, but liability was found on the basis of a state law
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, applicable to the U.S.
government through the FTCA. Limone v. U.S., #08-1327, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis
19239 (1st Cir.).
As previously reported, a federal appeals court
panel held that a trial court improperly dismissed, on sovereign immunity
grounds, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims
against a federal DEA agent, since Congress, under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
waived sovereign immunity on such claims, including those stemming from
discretionary function acts of federal law enforcement or investigative
officers. Nguyen v. U.S., No. 07-12874, 545 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008). On a
reconsideration granted by the panel on its own motion, the court again stated
that such claims were expressly allowed by the plain language of the law, and
substituted a new opinion for the one previously issued. Nguyen v. U.S., No.
07-12874, 2009 U.S. App. Lexis 2127 (11th Cir.).
The
U.S. government could be sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the actions
of Federal Protective Services agents in instigating an alleged malicious
prosecution of a security company employee for false (incomplete) reporting
concerning an incident in which a security company employee locked out on the
roof of a federal building was purportedly naked. The agents, in encouraging
the prosecution of the plaintiff, allegedly falsely indicated that she knew of
the nudity, but failed to include it in her report. This, if true, fell outside
the scope of the agents' performance of a discretionary function, an exception
to liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), since it involved the alleged knowing
submission of false affidavits to the prosecutor and, ultimately, the state
court in an “effort to corrupt the fairness of the prosecution.” The fact that
no search, seizure, or arrest was involved did not alter the result. Reynolds
v. U.S., No. 08-1634, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 24720 (7th Cir.).
Trial court improperly dismissed, on sovereign
immunity grounds, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution
claims against a federal DEA agent, since Congress, under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, waived sovereign immunity on such claims, including those stemming
from discretionary function acts of federal law enforcement or investigative
officers. Nguyen v. U.S., No. 07-12874, 545 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2008).
A former Chicago police officer sentenced to
death on kidnapping and murder charges subsequently had his conviction overturned,
and sued FBI agents for allegedly "framing" him in violation of
his constitutional rights. A jury found for the plaintiff on these claims, and
$6.5 million in damages was awarded. The trial court subsequently granted
judgment to the U.S. government on malicious prosecution claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346, 2671-2680. The trial court
subsequently also vacated the jury's award to the plaintiff on the federal
civil rights claims, finding that the "judgment bar" rule of the FTCA contained
in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2676 barred the federal civil rights claims against the FBI
agents, even though the judgment against them had previously been entered.
Under the applicable provision of the FTCA, a judgment under the FTCA acts as a
"complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject
matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim." In this case, the plaintiff, by pursuing both federal civil
rights claims, and claims under the FTCA, and failing to drop the FTCA claims
after he received the jury's $6.5 million verdict on the federal civil rights
claim lost any right to collect on the jury's verdict. His decision to proceed
to take the FTCA claims to judgment, the court found, triggered Sec. 2676
and required the vacating of the jury's award after the FTCA claim was
rejected. A federal appeals court upheld this result. The appeals court stated
that it was "bound by the plain language of the judgment bar, which makes
no exception for claims brought in the same action, and gives no indication
that the sequencing of judgments should control the application of the
bar." Manning v. U.S.A., No. 07-1120, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 20996 (7th
Cir.).
The U.S. government and a capitol police officer
were sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligence in attempting a
traffic stop, followed by a high-speed chase of a stolen car, ending in a
crash. A car crash victim and the father of a deceased victim of the crash
claimed that the victims had accepted a ride in the stolen vehicle unknowingly,
shortly after it had been acquired in an armed carjacking. The court held that
applicable standard under the FTCA was local laws concerning vehicular
negligence applying to private citizens, not to government employees, and that,
under that standard, the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state a
claim for negligence under District of Columbia law. Lee v. U.S.A., Civil
Action No. 06-2184, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 62047 (D. Ok.).
An FBI agent who turned over potentially
exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor fulfilled her non-discretionary duty in
doing so, and the federal government could not be held liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b)(1) and 2671 et seq. for alleged
wrongful prosecution of the plaintiff for engaging in a sexual act with a
person under the age of twelve on an Indian reservation. The plaintiff's
conviction for the offense was overturned based on the prosecutor's failure to
turn that exculpatory evidence over to the defense. Once the FBI agent
presented the exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor, however, her actions
satisfied due process. Further, a private party in Montana, the location of the
case, who acted as the FBI agent did, would not have been liable for the
prosecutor's subsequent failure to turn over the material to the defense. Gray
v. Dept. of Justice, No. 07-35171, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9597 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).
Federal officers were not shown to have used
excessive force against an arrestee, so that the federal government had no
liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b)(1),
2671-2680. The court found, applying Wyoming law, that the force used during
the arrest was justified, and that any injuries suffered were "incidental"
to the reasonable use of force. The court also found no evidence of negligence
by the officers. The U.S. was entitled to a "common-law privilege"
defense protecting police officers from liability for using reasonable force
during a lawful arrest. The court also found that, even if the force used was
found to be unreasonable, comparative fault by the arrestee in resisting the
lawful arrest was over 50%, which would bar any liability for the government
under Wyoming law. The plaintiff could not claim that his arrest was unlawful,
as his attorney had previously agreed that no such claim was presented.
Fienhold v. U.S.A., No. 07-8058, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8597 (10th Cir.).
U.S. government was not liable for alleged
damages to hundreds of handguns and long guns, as well as ammunition and
packaging seized from a man's storage spaces by agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) under search warrants. A detention of
goods exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) barred the claim. Also, another waiver of sovereign
immunity in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c)(1)-(4) only applied to property seized
solely for the purpose of forfeiture, and, in this case, while forfeiture was a
possibility for some of the weapons, criminal investigation was also a
legitimate purpose of the seizure of the guns. Foster v. U.S.A., No. 06-56843
2008 U.S. App. Lexis 8125 (9th Cir.).
A federal trial judge has awarded $101.7 million
against the U.S. government on claims that the FBI was "responsible
for the framing of four innocent men" for murder, causing them to serve
decades for a crime they did not commit. Four men falsely convicted of a 1965
gangland murder, and their estates and families asserted claims against the
U.S. government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346
and 2671-2680 for malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and related claims. The trial court rejected
the argument that the U.S. government was entitled to immunity based on the
discretionary function exception to liability in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(a). The
FBI's alleged conduct in knowingly allowing an informant to provide perjurious
testimony in the murder trial, failing to reveal exculpatory evidence, and
failing to disclose information about the actual murderers for a period of
thirty years was unconstitutional and violated its own rules, the judge ruled.
The court found that the FBI's conduct was the cause of the convictions, and
that the conduct met the standard for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, as the alleged actions violated all standards of decency and were
intentional. The family members of the convicted persons were entitled to
damages, under Massachusetts law for bystanders' intentional infliction of
emotional distress. $1 million for each year of imprisonment was awarded to the
men falsely convicted, or their estates. The minor children of the convicted
men, and three of the wives of the convicted men were also awarded damages, as
were an adult child of one of the men, and a wife who divorced one of the men.
Two of the four men are now deceased, while two of them are still alive. Limone
v. U.S., No. 02cv10890-NG, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 54224 (D. Mass.). [Editor's
Note: The total damages awarded were $101.7 million].
Secret Service officers who stopped a motorist
based on an outstanding arrest warrant, and seized a bag including four
prescription eyeglasses from his vehicle were within the definition of
"any other law enforcement officer" in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(c) of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. The U.S. government, therefore, was protected from
liability by this statutory provision barring liability for "detention of
any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise
or any other law enforcement officer," on the motorist's claim concerning
the alleged failure of the Secret Service to subsequently return the
eyeglasses. Perez v. U.S., No. 06-CV-1508, 2007 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36843
(D.N.J.).
An arrestee's claims for alleged unlawful
detention accrued at the latest in 1996, so that claims he asserted under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in 2004, were barred by a two-year statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C.S. § 2401(b). Feurtado v. Dunivant, No. 06-56496, 2007
U.S. App. Lexis 14238 (9th Cir.).
Arrestee's claims for false arrest and malicious
prosecution under the Federal Tort Claims Act and for federal postal employees'
alleged violations of his federal civil rights accrued at the date that the
alleged wrongful prosecution of him ended, so that they were barred by an
applicable two-year statute of limitations. Braunstein v. U.S. Postal Service,
No. 05-16390, 2007 U.S. App. Lexis 8831 (9th Cir.).
The Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2679(b)(1)
provides federal employees absolute immunity from tort claims for actions taken
in the course of their official duties, and gives the Attorney General the
power to certify that a federal employee sued for wrongful or negligent conduct
was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the
incident. Once that certification takes place, the U.S. government is
substituted as the defendant instead of the employee, and the lawsuit is then
governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act. Additionally, if the lawsuit began in
state court, the Westfall Act provides that it shall be removed to federal
court, and renders the Attorney General's certification "conclusive"
for purposes of the removal. Once the certification and removal take place, the
federal court has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and cannot decide
to send the lawsuit back to state court. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court
also ruled that certification can take place under the Westfall Act in instances
where the federal employee sued claims, and the Attorney General also
concludes, that the incident alleged in the lawsuit never even took place.
Osborn v. Haley, No. 05-593, 2007 U.S. Lexis 1323. [N/R]
Motorist injured when his car was rear-ended by a
car which had itself been rear-ended by a vehicle driven by an FBI agent
was entitled to $651,037.01 in damages, including $100,000 for pain and
suffering, future lost wages of $408,562 based on diminished earning capacity,
and other damages for medical expenses and property damages. The award was made
in a lawsuit for negligence againstthe FBI agent under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2671-2680, and the court ruled that such negligence was the
cause of the accident. Roark v. U.S., No.6:05CV00041, 2006 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 74784 (W.D. Va.). [N/R]
In police officer's lawsuit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680, against an IRS agent who obtained his
arrest and prosecution, summary judgment was properly granted on false imprisonment
and malicious prosecution claims. A presumption of probable cause which arose
from the arrestee's indictment was not rebutted for purposes of the malicious
prosecution claim when there was no evidence that the IRS agent lied in his
testimony before a federal grand jury. Conrad v. U.S., No. 04-15402, 447 F. 3d
760 (9th Cir. 2006). [N/R]
Wife could not pursue her claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act against the U.S. government for the death of her husband,
allegedly murdered by FBI informants, since he failed to exhaust her available
administrative remedies before filing her lawsuit. Barrett v. U.S., No.
05-1905, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 22745 (1st Cir.). [N/R]
An arrestee's claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress against federal prosecutors and a postal inspector under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b), arising out of his arrest,
were subject to a two year statute of limitations in New York. Levine v.
Gerson, No. 05-0748, 164 Fed. Appx. 64 (2d Cir. 2006). [N/R]
In a lawsuit brought against the U.S. government
and an agent of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for false arrest
and malicious prosecution of a man for allegedly falsely obtaining government
funds for disaster relief assistance after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the World Trade Center, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. Sec. 2680(g) provides that a lawsuit against the U.S. government is the
exclusive remedy, barring New York state law claims against the agent. Applying
New York law to the claims against the U.S. government, the plaintiff could not
prevail on his false arrest claim when his arrest was carried out under a valid
arrest warrant, and could not recover on his malicious prosecution claim when
he failed to show that the prosecution against him was started with
"actual malice." Lewis v. U.S., No. 03 Civ. 10220, 388 F. Supp. 2d
190 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). [N/R]
Tribal police officer responding to a domestic
dispute between two non-Indians at a casino on tribal land was not engaged in
enforcing federal law, and therefore he and his police chief could not pursue
their claim for indemnification for claims of assault and battery against them
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h). The federal
government has not waived its sovereign immunity against indemnification claims
in such circumstances. Herbert v. U.S., No. 05-30223, 438 F.3d 483 (5th Cir.
2006). [N/R]
In negligence claim brought by driver under
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2671-80, for injuries
allegedly suffered during accident involving a car driven by an FBI agent, the
driver did not suffer "serious" injury as required for recovery under
New York's No-Fault Insurance Law. The driver had pre-existing cervical and
spinal damage and permanent injuries already in existence at the time of a car
accident did not qualify as "serious injuries" under New York law
applicable to FTCA lawsuit. Jones v. U.S., No. CV-04-1276, 408 F. Supp. 2d 107
(E.D.N.Y. 2006). [N/R]
Tribal police officer engaged in an attempt to
enforce tribal law was not a federal law enforcement officer within the meaning
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680, and the defendants were
therefore entitled to summary judgment in a lawsuit brought under that statute
for alleged excessive use of force. LaVallie v. United States, No. A1-04-075,
396 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. N.D. 2005). [N/R]
Motorist who was run over by Indian tribal police
vehicle while hiding on the ground in alfalfa field after abandoning vehicle at
the conclusion of high-speed chase could not recover damages under Federal Tort
Claims Act. His own negligence in eluding officers and hiding in the field
contributed to his injuries, barring recovery under applicable South Dakota
law. Good Low v. US, No. 05-1114, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 24517 (8th Cir.). [2006
LR Jan]
FBI and its personnel were not liable for death
of murder victim killed after self-proclaimed bank robber called FBI offering
to turn himself in, and allegedly killed the victim the following day after his
call was purportedly ignored. Liability was barred under the discretionary
function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec.
2680(a), as the decision as to how to respond to the phone call was
discretionary. McCloskey v. Mueller, No. CIV.A.04-CV-11015, 385 F. Supp. 2d 74
(D. Mass. 2005). [N/R]
Lawsuit against the U.S. government for alleged
FBI complicity in the organized crime murder of a man purportedly ordered by
two high-level FBI mob informants was barred because the victim's spouse failed
to file an administrative claim with the FBI for over two years after she
should have known, from publicly available information, that she had a possible
claim. Callahan v. U.S , No. 04-2466 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 22395 (1st Cir.).
[2005 LR Dec]
Dismissal of plaintiff's suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act is affirmed where a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
plaintiff has failed to show that defendants assaulted or maliciously
prosecuted him under Ohio law. Harris v. U.S., No. 04-3520, 2005 U.S. App.
Lexis 19058 (6th Cir.). [2005 LR Oct]
Undercover federal drug agent acted reasonably in
fearing for her life and shooting a suspect participating in an attempted armed
robbery during a drug transaction. U.S. government not liable under Federal
Tort Claims Act for agent's actions which caused suspect to be paralyzed from
the waist down. Morales v. US, No. 03-1743, 2005 U.S. App. Lexis 10082 (6th
Cir.). [2005 LR Sep]
Liquor store owners stated a viable possible
claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) based on
alleged conduct of FBI agents who allegedly passed their names on to racketeers
after they reported to police that they were victims of extortion by the
racketeers, resulting in damage to their businesses. The racketeers were
allegedly being protected by the FBI agents as confidential informants, and the
agents acted within the scope of their employment under the FTCA in taking
their alleged actions. The actions did not come within the "discretionary
function" exemption to the FTCA, because the agents had "no
room" for the exercise of discretion under extensive FBI regulations
concerning how to handle confidential informants. The claims asserted, however,
were time barred under the applicable statute of limitations, so the complaint
was dismissed. Rakes v. United States, No. CIV.A.02-10480, 352 F. Supp. 2d 47
(D. Mass. 2005). [N/R]
Federal Tort Claims Act did not provide jurisdiction for
claim, by subsequently exonerated arrestees initially convicted of bank
robberies, that FBI agents negligently failed to properly file and disclose
conflicting eyewitness identifications of other suspects, resulting in their
wrongful conviction. Wisconsin state law would not impose liability for
negligence on private persons in similar circumstances, so there could not be
liability for the U.S. government. Bolduc v. U.S., No. 03-2081, 2005 U.S. App.
Lexis 4718 (1st Cir. 2005). [2005 LR May]
Probable cause existed for arrest and prosecution
of man for bank robbery after which he was identified as the robber from
surveillance photographs by his former wife and subsequently identified by a
bank teller as the robber from a clear photograph of six men. Trial court
therefore properly dismissed malicious prosecution claim against U.S.
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346 and 2671.
Waller v. United States, No. 03-20877, 100 Fed. Appx. 254 (5th Cir. 2004).
[N/R]
Prior dismissal of a lawsuit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for the alleged intentional destruction of computer equipment and
data seized during the execution of a search warrant did not bar a subsequent
civil rights lawsuit against the federal agents involved in the search. Hallock
v. Bonner, No. 03-6221, 387 F.3d 147 (2nd Cir. 2004). [2005 LR Jan]
Activities of the U.S. Marshals Service while
attempting to provide protection to a federal judge and his home involved the
exercise of judgment, bringing their actions within the discretionary function
exception to liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671
et seq. This entitled the U.S. government to dismissal of a claim under the Act
by neighboring homeowners seeking money damages for alleged trespass, nuisance,
and invasion of privacy committed by the Marshals in the course of carrying out
their protective function. The judge was given 24-hour-a-day protection at his
residence because of threats to him resulting from his handling of terrorism related
court cases. Callahan v. United States, 329 F. Supp. 2d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
[N/R]
Postal inspector's undercover vehicle qualified
as a "police vehicle" under a New York statute granting qualified
exemptions from traffic laws from traffic laws when engaged in emergency
operations. The defendant inspector did not act in "reckless
disregard" of others' safety in following a person under surveillance
through a red light. The U.S. government was not, therefore, liable under the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq., for injuries to another
motorist in an ensuing traffic accident. Hodder v. United States, 328 F. Supp.
335 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). [N/R]
Wife who was attacked and injured by her husband when
he escaped from the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service after allegedly
violating a domestic violence order of protection could not pursue her lawsuit
against the Marshals Service and U.S. government when she failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1346, 2671 et seq. She also could not pursue federal civil rights
claims against federal officials under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the absence of
any allegation that they acted under color of state law. Cureton v. U.S.
Marshal Service, 322 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2004). [N/R]
Woman's claim that she was raped by a military
recruiter on U.S. government premises did not entitle her to pursue liability
claims against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b)(1) and 2680(h). Claims for alleged negligent hiring and
supervision of alleged assailant were barred because they arose from alleged
intentional misconduct, coming within an "intentional tort" exclusion
from the FTCA's waiver of governmental immunity. Verran v. United States, 305
F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Mich. 2004). [N/R]
Federal appeals
court finds that plaintiff who was awarded $87,000 in damages for alleged
battery by two police officers at veterans' hospital was improperly also
awarded $49,000 in attorneys' fees. While evidence showed, for purposes of
award under Federal Tort Claims Act, that officers acted "wantonly,"
the U.S. government did not act "wantonly" in presenting a defense
against the plaintiff's claims. Stive v. U.S., No. 03-2151, 2004 U.S. App.
Lexis 8346 (7th Cir.). [2004 LR Jun]
Police officer's failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies barred his bringing a lawsuit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) against federal officers seeking emotional
distress damages for their alleged failure to protect him from reprisals by
targets of an investigation of police corruption. Russo v. Glasser, 279 F.
Supp. 2d 126 (D. Conn. 2003). [N/R]
In a lawsuit brought by the family of an man shot
and killed by gang members after it was allegedly negligently revealed that he
was an FBI informant, the right to bring the lawsuit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671-2680, accrued at the latest on the date
when family members attended hearings at which the relationship between FBI
agents and gang members was revealed and widely reported in the media.
Accordingly, the court holds that the lawsuit should be dismissed as
time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. McIntyre v. United
States, 254 F. Supp. 2d 183 (D. Mass. 2003). [N/R]
U.S. government was not responsible, under
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(a) for the alleged
intentional misconduct of informants in a case where the indictment against the
plaintiff for conspiring to transfer human organs from executed Chinese
prisoners for human transplantation was dismissed. Such liability under the
statute was not possible when the informants were not employees acting within
the scope of their employment and were not investigative or law enforcement
officials. Plaintiff also failed to show that the conduct of federal agents
involved in the case fell outside the scope of the "operative
discretionary function exception" to liability under the statute for law
enforcement actions involving an element of discretion. Wang v. U.S., No.
02-6123, 61 Fed. Appx. 757 (2nd Cir. 2003). [N/R]
A factual issue existed as to whether a federal
employee was acting within the scope of his employment when his vehicle struck
a motorist's car as he was driving his own car at the time and made no effort
to attend purported work-related meeting after the collision despite the
drivable condition of his vehicle. Plaintiff could therefore challenge U.S.
government's attempts to substitute itself as the proper defendant and have the
case dismissed for the plaintiff's alleged failure to pursue administrative
remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b) within two
years of the accident. Ware v. Doane, 227 F. Supp. 2d 169 (D. Me. 2002). [N/R]
Former deputy U.S. Marshal's claim that the CIA
and Bureau of Narcotics tested psychoactive drugs on him without his consent or
knowledge was not barred by the intentional tort exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671 et seq., since they could be interpreted
as asserting claims for negligent supervision. Plaintiff's claims also were not
barred by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8116 et seq.
since his allegation that he was involuntarily given LSD while attending a
holiday party at the Post Office as part of a CIA experiment did not relate to
dangers created by his employment. Ritchie v. U.S.A., 210 F. Supp. 2d 1120
(N.D. Cal. 2002). [N/R]
Arrestee's claims for negligence and intentional
infliction of emotional distress growing out of his alleged wrongful arrest by
the U.S. Air Force and military police officers had to be dismissed, as
sovereign immunity for those claims were not waived under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2680(h). Tinch v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2d 313
(D. Md. 2002). [N/R]]
328:62 Federal government was not liable for
officer's alleged rape of female motorist when officer's actions were outside
of the scope of his employment; federal appeals court rejects "apparent
authority" as a basis for liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Primeaux v. U.S., No. 97-2691, 181 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 1999).
329:72 An arrestee's failure to challenge a
forfeiture proceeding concerning $11,000 he gathered to use for bail money
precluded him from asserting, in a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit, that he had
a property interest in the money at the time he claimed it was "illegally
seized." Bazuaye v. U.S., 41 F.Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 1999).
310:151 Federal drug agents' actions in arresting
the "wrong man" with the same name as that stated in an arrest
warrant was protected by the "discretionary function" exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act; federal government not liable even if agents acted
negligently in mistaken identity case before and after serving warrant. Mesa v.
United States, 123 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1997).
283:103 Federal officers' arrest of woman with
same name, social security number, birthdate, birthplace, and abdominal scar as
suspect sought in arrest warrant was objectively reasonable Rodriguez v. US, 54
F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1995).
275:165 Trial judge did not violate plaintiff's
Seventh Amendment jury trial right by awarding a lower amount against the U.S.
government on Federal Tort Claims Act claim than the amount a jury assessed as
damages in a federal civil rights claim brought against arresting federal
officer Engle v. Mecke, 24 F.3d 133 (10th Cir. 1994).
U.S. government liable for $779,30565 to estate
and family of woman murdered by indicted federal felon released from custody in
order to work as an informant for the INS; INS agents failed to adequately
supervise informant, to warn murder victim or local police department of his
release, or to take action to apprehend him Marin v. United States, 814 F.Supp.
1468 (E.D. Wash 1992).