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SCOTT LEWIS RENDELMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA; LEWIS, Lt. Defendant-Appellee.
No. 99-56858
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
2002 U.S. App. Lexis 2055; 32
Fed. Appx. 804
January 17, 2002, Argued and
Submitted, Pasadena, California
February 5, 2002, Filed
NOTICE:
1] RULES OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE
REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
MEMORANDUM *
* This disposition is not
appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this
circuit except as may be provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appellant Scott Lewis Rendelman
appeals from the district court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A of his
Bivens claims and from the district court's grant of summary judgment on his
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act and his common law claims. The
appellant contends that the district court erred in concluding that appellant
had not stated a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment where appellant
suffered only minor injuries. The appellant also claims that the
district court erred in concluding that no issue of material fact existed as to
whether appellees had confiscated his property.
The
court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of a prisoner's complaint
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d
443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). The court reviews a grant of summary judgment de
novo, and must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, there is a genuine issue of material fact and
whether the district court applied the
appropriate substantive law.
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000).
In the prison context, the
Eighth Amendment prohibits only the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251, 106 S. Ct.
1078 (1986). This prohibition requires examining "whether force was
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 7, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). Here, appellant wrote a
threatening letter to a prison guard, who responded by shoving appellant
against a wall, poking him in the chest, and yelling in a threatening manner.
This provoked use of minimal force falls squarely within the "good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline" that the Eighth Amendment
permits in the prison context.
Appellant also raised a Bivens
claim for deprivation of property. This [**806]claim is foreclosed by the
existence of a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the loss. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 82 L.
Ed. 2d 393, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). Such a remedy exists in the Prison
Administrative Remedy Program. 28
C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.16.
The district court granted
summary judgment on appellant's deprivation of property claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The FTCA waives the federal
government's immunity from suit for certain torts of its employees. Fang v. United States, 140 F.3d 1238, 1241
(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 17, 97 L. Ed.
1427, 73 S. Ct. 956). This waiver is subject to specific exceptions enumerated
at 28 U.S.C. § 2680, including "any claim arising in respect of . . . the
detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by . . . any . . . law
enforcement officer." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). This exception is broad enough
to include prison guards, see
United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 397 (9th Cir.
1979), as well as claims arising from "negligent handling or storage of
detained property." Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854, 79 L. Ed.
2d 860, 104 S. Ct. 1519 (1984). The federal government has not waived its
sovereign immunity from, and the federal courts do not have subject matter
jurisdiction over, appellant's FTCA claims for deprivation of property.
The FTCA waives sovereign
immunity for assault and battery by law enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Under the FTCA, the law
of the jurisdiction where the tort allegedly occurred governs the rights and
liabilities of the parties. 28 U.S.C. §
1346(b); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 7 L. Ed. 2d 492, 82 S. Ct.
585(1962); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 51 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir.
1995). Under California
law, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving unreasonable force in a battery
action against a law enforcement officer. Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63
Cal. App. 4th 1269, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 616 (Cal. App. 1998). Even construing all inferences
in his favor, appellant has not raised a genuine issue of fact as to the
reasonableness of the prison guard's conduct.
AFFIRMED.
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