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KENNETH B. NICHOLS v. MARYLAND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION --JESSUP, et
al.
Civil Action No. DKC 99-2738
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
February 1, 2002, Decided
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Kenneth Nichols, a former prisoner at Maryland Correctional
Institution--Jessup, filed suit alleging constitutional violations, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Sergeant Alexis Cotay, Warden William
Filbert, Hearing Officer John Sandstrom, and Maryland Correctional
Institution--Jessup (MCI-J). Presently pending before the court is the
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment. The issues have been fully briefed and no hearing is deemed
necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, the court shall grant
the motion.
I. Background
This litigation arises from an
assault upon Nichols by his cellmate, David Gregg, during the afternoon of July
13, 1999. Gregg was assigned to be Nichols' cellmate on or about July 7,
1999. Nichols asserts that
Gregg began threatening his life shortly after they were placed together.
Paper No. 39, p. 3. He claims that he told Cotay on July 12 and 13, 1999 that
he was being threatened. Nichols states "I told him that he was down there
banging on the bunk, and he was making threats towards my life. . . . Like he
was going to kill me. He talking about getting a knife and all that stuff"
on July 12. Paper No. 39, Ex. E, p. 21. He asserts that he "told [Cotay]
the same thing" on July 13. Id. at p. 26. According to Nichols, Cotay
responded, "I don't roll like that. Deal with it." when Nichols
notified him of the threats Gregg was making. Paper No. 39, Ex. E, p. 34. Cotay
recalls the circumstances differently, testifying at the adjustment hearing
regarding the assault that Nichols wanted a move, Paper No. 38, Inmate Hearing
Record, July 16, 1999, but later stating in an incident report, signed August
4, 1999, that Gregg had requested a change. Paper No. 39, Ex. G. Cotay stated
in his declaration he told the requesting inmate he would have to see Captain
Dawson, who handled cell moves, and, if he had been told it was a
life-threatening situation, one or more of them could have been moved to
protective custody. Paper No. 38, Ex. 1.
As
a result of the injuries sustained from the beating by Gregg, Nichols was seen
in the dispensary on the afternoon of July 13 and was admitted to the infirmary
that day. Nichols was temporarily blinded and his entire face was swollen and
deformed. While facial x-rays were negative for fractures, Nichols was treated
for facial trauma. His injuries were severe enough that he was hospitalized for
approximately three days. The injuries he suffered on July 13, 1999, resulted
in chronic pain, recurring ear infections, and ongoing treatment at the Ear,
Nose and Throat Clinic (ENT) through July 2000. Nichols asserts that there was
a substantial delay in accessing medical care, but admits he was seen repeatedly
by medical professionals.
As part of his treatment for the
injuries suffered on July 13, 1999, and the severe ear pain that followed,
Nichols was prescribed Tylenol # 3, also known as Tylenol with Codeine, by the
medical personnel he was seeing at MCI-J. On approximately December 26, 1999,
Nichols submitted to urinalysis for drug screening and on January 5, 2000,
Nichols was charged with an Inmate Rule Violation for violating Institutional
Rule # 14 by testing positive for opiates. A hearing was held January 10, 2000,
and Nichols was found guilty of violating Rule # 14, based on Hearing Officer
Sandstrom's determination that the registered [*579] level of opiate in his
urinalysis was above that of an over-the-counter medication. Defendants admit
that Officer Sandstrom was mistaken in assuming that Tylenol # 3 was
over-the-counter Tylenol. Based on Sandstrom's determination, Nichols was
sentenced to disciplinary segregation for 60 days. Warden Filbert
affirmed the sentence on January 13, 2000, but, after meeting with Nichols'
father, Kirk Nichols, on January 24, 2000, Nichols was granted a new hearing.
Nichols' rehearing was held February 7, 2000, and he was found not guilty. On
April 12, 2000, Warden Filbert amended Nichols' wage and commitment records to
reflect an uninterrupted job assignment from December 27, 1999, the day after
his positive drug test. Nichols spent less than one month in disciplinary
segregation between his guilty verdict on January 10, 2000 and his rehearing on
February 7, 2000.
Nichols filed his original complaint pro se
on September 8, 1999. On April 6, 2000, the court appointed counsel to
represent Nichols. On June 15, 2000, Nichols, now having the benefit of
counsel, filed an amended complaint containing four counts against the four
defendants: Count One-failure to protect Nichols from Gregg; Count Two-failure
by prison officials to provide him with reasonable and adequate medical care;
Count Three-failure to investigate when Nichols tested positive for opiates and
otherwise to provide due process in disciplinary proceedings; Count
Four-retaliation against Nichols for pursuing his § 1983 action in federal
court. The Amended Complaint does not specify which Defendant or Defendants is
or are responsible for which claim. A fair reading of the facts and Plaintiff's
memorandum, however, would bring Count One against MCI-J, Sgt. Cotay, and
Warden Filbert; Count Two, MCI-J alone; Count Three, MCI-J, Warden Filbert, and
Hearing Officer Sandstrom; and Count Four, MCI-J, Warden Filbert, and Hearing
Officer Sandstrom. The court will proceed on that assumption.
II. Standard of Review
A.
Motion to Dismiss
A
court reviewing a complaint in light of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion accepts all
well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and construes the facts and
reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120
F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997). Such a motion ought not to be granted unless
"it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). The court, however,
need not accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County
Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989), or conclusory factual allegations
devoid of any reference to actual events.
United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment
A
motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there exists no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). In other words, if
there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by
a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250;
see also Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo
Properties, 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987); Morrison v. Nissan Motor Co.,
601 F.2d 139, 141 (4th Cir. 1979); Stevens v. Howard D. Johnson Co., [*580] 181
F.2d 390, 394 (4th Cir. 1950). The moving party bears the burden of showing
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);
Pulliam, 810 F.2d at 1286 (citing Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406,
414 (4th Cir. 1979)).
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of and construe the facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.
Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 437 (4th Cir. 1998). A
party who bears the burden of proof on a particular claim must factually
support each element of his or her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof
concerning an essential element . . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477
U.S. at 323. Thus, on those issues on which the nonmoving party will have the
burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to confront the motion for
summary judgment with an affidavit or other similar evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
In
Celotex, the Supreme Court stated:
In cases like the instant one, where the
nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue,
a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the
"pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file." Such a motion, whether or not accompanied by affidavits, will be
"made and supported as provided in this rule," and Rule 56 (e)
therefore requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her
own affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial."
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. However, "'a
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a fact issue.'" Barwick
v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958-59 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Seago v. North
Carolina Theatres, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 627, 632 (E.D.N.C. 1966), aff'd, 388 F.2d
987 (4th Cir. 1967)). There must be "sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be
granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Maryland
Correctional Institution -- Jessup
Defendants assert that the Maryland Correctional Institution-Jessup is
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment as a state agency, because it is
not a "person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Eleventh
Amendment to the United States Constitution is a bar to suits against a State
for damages in federal court, unless Congress has exercised its power under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to override this immunity or the State has waived
it. Will v. Michigan Dep't Of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). With regard
to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, neither method of overcoming the immunity has
occurred. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
n1
[*581] The definition of "State"
has been expanded out of necessity to include state agencies, such as the state
prison system. "It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a
suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the
defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. This jurisdictional bar
applies regardless of the nature of the relief sought." Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67, 104 S.
Ct. 900 (1984) (citing Florida Department of Health v. Florida Nursing Home
Assn., 450 U.S. 147, 67 L. Ed. 2d 132, 101 S. Ct. 1032 (1981) (per curiam);
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1114, 98 S. Ct. 3057 (1978) (per
curiam)).
Nichols does not even argue in
his opposition that the State of Maryland has waived its immunity with respect
to MCI-J. Accordingly, all counts against Maryland Correctional Institution -
Jessup will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. Sergeant Alexis Cotay
In
Count One, Plaintiff
asserts that Sgt. Cotay violated his rights by failing to protect him from a
violent, threatening cellmate. Two elements must be established for a
claim alleging failure to protect as set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994): 1) the deprivation must be
sufficiently serious; and 2) the prison official must have a state of mind that
is one of "'deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety."
Sgt. Cotay agrees that the injury suffered by Nichols was sufficiently serious
to meet the first element, but asserts that Nichols cannot succeed in
demonstrating deliberate indifference on the part of Cotay. In Farmer, the
Court held that deliberate indifference means that "the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at
837. This is a high standard to meet, as plaintiff must prove not only that
defendant was aware of the "facts from which a reasonable person might
have inferred the existence of the substantial and unique risk", but that
defendant actually drew the inference.
Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit has
held that "true subjective recklessness requires knowledge both of the
general risk and also that the conduct is inappropriate in light of that
risk." Id. Rich was decided on appeal from a finding of the district court
after a bench trial, where the trial judge made specific findings concerning
the Defendant's state of mind. It made clear, however, that actual knowledge of
facts from which a reasonable person might have inferred the existence of
substantial and unique risk to a plaintiff is not enough. In addition, a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant was aware that his conduct was inappropriate
in light of the risk. A defendant who unsoundly, stupidly, or negligently fails
to appreciate the risk is not liable under Rich.
Although there is a factual dispute as to whether Nichols or Gregg was
the prisoner who requested a change of cellmate and regarding precisely what
specific information was told to him about any threat, Cotay has consistently
stated that he was unaware of any threats and that he was only aware that one
man wanted to move. He testified that:
Mr. Gregg had just moved in with Mr. Nichols.
Neither inmate indicated to me that
there was a problem. I told them it would be their responsibility to see
Captain Dawson, who was responsible [*582] for cell moves. I told them that we
do not make random moves because of the overcrowded situation of the
institution. Had there been a life-threatening situation reported to me, one or
both of the inmates could have been moved to protective custody. That was not
the case."
Paper No. 38, Ex. 1.
Plaintiff relies on Sgt. Cotay's alleged response of "I don't roll
like that. Deal with it," to show deliberate indifference. Paper No. 39,
Ex. E, p. 34. To the contrary, that response, even if true, when coupled with
the advice to talk to the captain concerning a cell change and the acknowledgment
that assignment to protective custody would be ordered if a threat were truly
perceived, unequivocally prove that Cotay did not draw the inference that his
failure to act would increase the danger to Plaintiff. Instead, the evidence proves only that Cotay
did not perceive that there was an imminent threat to Plaintiff such that his
refusal to take immediate action was inappropriate. Nichols has forecast no
evidence sufficient to show that Cotay drew the inference that is required to
prove deliberate indifference to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of Sergeant
Cotay.
C. Hearing Officer John Sandstrom
A
hearing officer in a prison disciplinary proceeding may be liable if his conduct
"violated 'clearly established law' in conducting [the] hearing in the
manner in which he did." Barry v. Whalen, 796 F. Supp. 885, 895 (4th Cir.
1992). If "no action taken by [the hearing officer] violates any
established legal principles regarding the operation of prisoner disciplinary
hearings", the officer is not liable. Id. Only Count Three, alleging that
Nichols' due process rights were violated by a failure to investigate the
allegation that he had violated Rule # 14, and Count Four, alleging retaliation
for filing a civil rights complaint by denying Nichols his due process rights
in the disciplinary proceeding regarding his violation, pertain to Sandstrom.
n2
In Count Three, Nichols alleges
that his due process rights were violated by a failure to investigate minimally
the allegation that he was in violation of Rule # 14 when he tested positive
for opiates. The due process standards for prison disciplinary proceedings were
established in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S.
Ct. 2963 (1974), which held that "there must be mutual accommodation
between institutional needs and objective and the provisions of the
Constitution that are of general application." The Court held that prisoners are entitled to
procedural due process, but that they are not entitled to the "full range
of procedures" in prison disciplinary hearings. Id. at 561. Since Wolff,
the Court has stated that "the punishment of incarcerated prisoners . . .
does not impose retribution in lieu of a valid conviction . . . . It
effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals." Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). In
Sandin, the Court held that "discipline in segregated confinement [does] not
present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might
conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486. The only action taken
against Nichols after the [*583] administrative hearing was placement in
administrative segregation, which is not a protectable liberty interest.
Nichols was also removed from a job assignment but, after his appeal was
successful, the wage and commitment records were changed to reflect an
uninterrupted assignment. Because placement in segregation, by itself, is not "a
major disruption in his environment," Nichols was not denied his right to
due process by Sandstrom. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted
in favor of Hearing Officer John Sandstrom.
D. Warden William Filbert
It
is axiomatic that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be premised on personal
conduct and cannot rest on respondeat superior. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-695, 56 L.
Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). A supervisor may be liable if his alleged
supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinate misconduct is a
causative factor in a person's constitutional injuries. It is correct that
"supervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the
constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates." Slakan v.
Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984). In the context of a failure to
protect claim, however, a plaintiff must prove not only that "prisoners
face a pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm from some specified source, but
he must show that the supervisor's corrective inaction amounts to deliberate
indifference or 'tacit authorization of the offensive [practices].'" Id.
at 373, citing Orpiano v. Johnson, 632 F.2d 1096, 1101 (4th Cir. 1980). A
supervisor's "continued inaction in the face of documented widespread
abuses," id., might prove such a state of mind. "The proper question
is whether [a supervisor] acted wantonly, obdurately, or with deliberate
indifference to the pervasive risk of harm." Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d
1312, 1315 (4th Cir. 1991). If these requirements are not met, a supervisor is
not directly liable.
Plaintiff only discusses the
failure to protect claim and the allegedly inadequate disciplinary proceedings
in connection with Filbert. Thus, only Counts One, Three, and Four are at
issue. Nichols alleges that Filbert's failure to discipline Sergeant Cotay for
Cotay's willful failure to protect Plaintiff served to condone his actions,
thereby becoming a "causative factor in the constitutional injuries
[inflicted] on those committed to their care." Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d
368, 372 (1984). Nichols does not provide any evidence that Filbert was
deliberately indifferent to Gregg's threat against him. There is no evidence
that Filbert knew of Gregg's threat against Nichols prior to the attack, and
events that occur later are irrelevant. Plaintiff cannot satisfy the burden
under Slakan "by pointing to a single incident or isolated incidents"
as he does here. Id. at 373. Nichols,
therefore, fails to offer sufficient evidence that Filbert was deliberately
indifferent to the threat against him and he has not shown that there was a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of harm existing at MCI-J.
Nichols points to isolated incidents -- the failure to respond to his
request to be moved, an alleged failure to provide medical care, despite the
fact that there is no dispute that Nichols was seen frequently by the ENT
clinic, and his guilty verdict at the Rule Violation hearing, which was
reversed on appeal a month later after Nichols protested to Warden Filbert --
in an attempt to demonstrate a pattern of indifference. These are incidents
that occurred after the assault, most of which are not constitutional
violations, and do not characterize a pattern of deliberate indifference by
Filbert. The fact that Sergeant Cotay had one prior documented disciplinary
sanction against him does not constitute [*584] a pattern of misconduct. As the
court in Slakan so aptly put it, a supervisor cannot "reasonably be
expected to guard against the deliberate . . . acts of his properly trained
employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct."
Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373. Plaintiff does not allege that Filbert had -- or
condoned -- a policy of ignoring inmate requests to change cell assignments
based on threats of violence, nor does he adequately allege that there was a
deliberate and intentional pattern of depriving inmates of their due process
rights, depriving inmates of medical care, or retaliation for filing a claim.
Plaintiff also alleges that
Filbert deprived him of his due process rights by initially denying his appeal
for review of his Rule 14 violation as non-meritorious. However, the discipline
imposed upon Nichols by Sanstrom did not violate his due process rights under
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995),
because "placement in segregation is not a major disruption in his
environment". Nichols' placement in administrative segregation does
not afford him "a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to the
procedural protections set forth in Wolff." Id. at 487. In addition,
Nichols fails to mention that Filbert granted his appeal for review on January
24, 2000, just two weeks after the initial hearing. Filbert also corrected
Nichols' records to reflect uninterrupted work eligibility. Therefore, Nichols
has failed to identify a liberty or property interest of which he has been
deprived by Filbert as alleged in Count Three.
This record also fails to
support Nichols' claim of retaliation in Count Four, as it is well-established
that Filbert reopened his case for appeal within the prison disciplinary system
and modified his wage and commitment records so that they did not reflect an
interruption from the date of his initial hearing. His actions indicate that he
was attempting to protect Nichols' civil rights, rather than retaliate for a
civil rights complaint.
Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing indifference under the
standards of Slakan or deprivation of his due process rights under Sandin.
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted in favor of Filbert.
IV. Conclusion
For
the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted in favor of Maryland
Correctional Institution - Jessup on Counts One through Four. The motion for
summary judgment is granted in favor of Sergeant Alexis Cotay, Hearing Officer
John Sandstrom, and Warden William Filbert. A separate order will be entered.
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
February 1, 2002
ORDER
For
the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum Opinion, it is this 1st day of
February, 2002, by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, ORDERED that:
1. The
claims against Maryland Correctional Institution - Jessup BE, and the same
hereby ARE, DISMISSED;
2.
The motion of Warden William Filbert, Hearing Officer John Sandstrom, and Sgt.
Alexis Cotay for summary judgment BE, and the same hereby IS, GRANTED and
JUDGMENT BE, and the same hereby IS, ENTERED in favor of those Defendants and
against Kenneth B. Nichols on all counts; and
3.
The clerk will transmit copies of the Memorandum Opinion and this Order to
counsel for the parties and will CLOSE this case.
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
FOOTNOTES:
n1 The Supreme Court also has held that the fundamental rule of
federal jurisprudence exemplified by the Eleventh Amendment -- that
unconsenting states may not be sued in federal court by private parties --
reaches attempts by citizens to sue their own states. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238, 87 L. Ed.
2d 171, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 33 L. Ed.
842, 10 S. Ct. 504 (1890)).
n2 Defendant does not assert
he is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The Supreme Court has held that
hearing officers in prison disciplinary proceedings are not entitled to
absolute immunity, but may be entitled to qualified immunity. Cleavinger v. Saxner,
474 U.S. 193, 202-08, 88 L. Ed. 2d 507, 106 S. Ct. 496 (1985).
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