ANGEL BENITA PIEDRA, Plaintiff, vs. PAGE TRUE, et al.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION No. 98-3046-GTV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
169 F. Supp. 2d 1239
October 13, 2001, Received
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in
the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21). The case involves
claims by plaintiff Angel Benita Piedra that defendants, prison officers,
physically assaulted him while he was incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. Plaintiff alleges that the assaults
violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Defendants respond that they were acting with reasonable force made necessary
by plaintiff's disruptive behavior. Defendants argue, among other things, that the
court should grant summary judgment
because they are entitled to qualified immunity regarding plaintiff's claims.
For the reasons stated below, the court concludes that defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity and grants defendants' motion. n1
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are
taken from the summary judgment record and are uncontroverted. Defendants
submitted a statement of material facts with their motion for summary judgment,
and plaintiff did not controvert any of those facts or offer any additional
facts in his response. However, plaintiff attached an affidavit to his verified
complaint, and the court has considered the facts contained in the
complaint [*1241] and affidavit to the extent that they
controvert any facts alleged by defendants.
On September 24, 1996, plaintiff was incarcerated at the United States
Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. The evening of September 24, plaintiff
attempted to assault prison staff with a telephone. He also barricaded his cell
by securing a bed sheet to the cell bars. When prison officers entered his
cell, they found a half gallon of homemade wine. The officers handcuffed
plaintiff and took him from his cell to the Special Housing Unit
("SHU"). Plaintiff alleges that while he was handcuffed, the officers
beat him and kicked him in the face. The officers admit that during the walk to
SHU, they used force to restrain plaintiff because plaintiff continued to
display disruptive behavior, including kicking them, spitting at them, and
verbally assaulting them. Once plaintiff arrived at SHU, he continued to
struggle and was placed in ambulatory restraints. During the September 24
struggle, plaintiff received a laceration on his left eyelid which required
stitches. Plaintiff alleges that he also received lacerations "all over" his body, but the
medical records only indicate a bruise on his left shoulder. Plaintiff also
claims that his vision is permanently damaged as a result of the officers'
actions.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's complaint (which
was drafted pro se) appears to allege a cause of action for violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. n2 Such a claim
is the only claim addressed in plaintiff's response to defendants' summary
judgment motion (which was drafted by plaintiff's appointed counsel). This
opinion therefore will only address qualified immunity as it applies to
plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim.
Qualified immunity shields
an individual government official performing discretionary functions from liability
for civil damages insofar as his or her conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Butler
v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 1999). To determine
whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court
first must decide whether the plaintiff has "'asserted a violation of a
constitutional right at all.'" Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924,
931 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 114 L. Ed.
2d 277, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991)). If the plaintiff has made a valid claim, then
the court must evaluate whether the asserted right was clearly established such
that a reasonable person in the official's position would have known that his
or her conduct violated that right. See id.; Merkel v. Leavenworth County
Emergency Med. Servs., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 975, No. 98-2335- JWL, 2000 WL 127266, at *10 (D. Kan. Jan. 4, 2000).
The concern of the immunity
inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal
constraints on [a] particular [officer's] conduct. It is sometimes difficult
for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive
force, will apply [*1242] to the factual situation the officer
confronts. An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but
have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is
legal in those circumstances. If the officer's mistake as to what the law
requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity
defense.
Saucier v. Katz, 150 L. Ed.
2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2001). The Supreme Court recently clarified
that, in excessive force cases, the inquiry whether a defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity should be distinct from the inquiry whether a defendant used
excessive force. See generally Saucier,
150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151. In accordance with the Supreme Court's
instruction, this court now considers defendants' claim of qualified immunity
before addressing the merits of plaintiff's case.
Prison officers are given
some latitude in dealing with disruptive prisoners. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320, 89 L.
Ed. 2d 251, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986) ("In making and carrying out decisions
involving the use of force to restore order in the face of a prison
disturbance, prison officials undoubtedly must take into account the very real
threats the unrest presents to inmates and prison officials alike, in addition
to the possible harms to inmates against whom force might be used."). The
Supreme Court recently stated that "if an officer reasonably, but mistakenly
believed that a [prisoner] was likely to fight back . . . the officer would be
justified in using more force than in fact was needed." Saucier, 121 S.
Ct. at 2158.
On the other hand, prison
officers may not use a prison disruption as an excuse for exercising unfettered
and unjustified force. Prison officers abuse their authority and violate a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
when they use excessive force which results in the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). When
prison officers are threatened with a disturbance, the test for whether force
involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" turns on
"'whether [the] force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.'" Id. at 6 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21) (additional
citations omitted).
In the instant case, the only evidence before the court arguably
suggesting that the prison officers were acting maliciously or sadistically is
plaintiff's assertion that they beat and kicked him while he was handcuffed.
Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of being "beaten" are too general
to establish that a constitutional violation occurred and are not supported by
the medical records. Furthermore, plaintiff's allegations must be considered in
light of the prison officers' numerous affidavits stating that plaintiff was
swinging a telephone at them and kicking, spitting, and verbally assaulting
them. Based on plaintiff's violent acts, the prison officers were justified in
assuming that plaintiff would "fight back" in retaliation for any force used by the officers.
The Tenth Circuit recently
issued an unpublished opinion with facts similar to those in the instant case.
In Cruz v. Webb, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 8898, No. 99-4107, 2000 WL 531626 (10th Cir. May 3, 2000), a
prisoner was on "dry cell status," where he was held in a cell
without a toilet because he was suspected of smuggling contraband into the
prison. 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 8898, 2000
WL 531626, at *1. When the prisoner was ready to defecate, he was given a
bucket so that officers could search for
[*1243] contraband. See id.
After the prisoner finished defecating, he flushed something down a toilet in a
breach of discipline. See id. When the prison officers ordered him to get
against a wall, the prisoner hesitated, and the officers sprayed Lysol in his
direction. See id. at *2. Once the officers handcuffed the prisoner, they
pushed him into a wall, where the prisoner hit his head and was knocked
unconscious. See id. The Tenth Circuit noted that "the rapidly developing
set of events required the officers to make quick decisions to restore
discipline." Id. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting
of summary judgment, stating that the "[prisoner's] evidence [did] not
show that the officers acted other than in a good-faith effort to restore
discipline. . . ." Id. at *3. As in Cruz, plaintiff has failed to present
any evidence which would show that the officers were not acting in a good-faith
effort to restore discipline. Plaintiff did not provide the court with any
evidence in support of his response to defendants' summary judgment motion, so
the court is left to consider only plaintiff's verified complaint and the
attached affidavit. Based on these documents, plaintiff is unable to establish
that his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment has
been violated.
Even if the court were to conclude that plaintiff has established a
constitutional violation based upon the uncontroverted facts, plaintiff cannot
defeat the second prong of the qualified immunity defense. Under Tenth Circuit
law, it is not clear that prison officers may not use force on a combative
inmate even after that inmate is handcuffed. A reasonable officer could have
believed that plaintiff remained a threat to his or others' safety,
particularly since the officers' affidavits state that plaintiff remained
combative even as they escorted him
down the hall. The law is clearly established that officers may use more force
than necessary when they reasonably expect that a prisoner will fight back. See
Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2158. Accordingly, the court concludes that
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. n3
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE
COURT ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21) is
granted. The motions contained in documents 33 and 40 are denied as moot.
The case is closed.
Copies of this order shall
be transmitted to counsel of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Kansas City,
Kansas, this day of September 2001.
G. Thomas VanBebber
United States Senior District Judge
n1 Also pending before the court are Defendants' Motion for Order of Dismissal or, in the Alternative, for Order Granting Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) and plaintiff's Motion for Assignment of Case for Trial Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 40 in Conjunction with Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 43 (a,d,e) Taking of Testimony (Doc. 40). In light of the court's ruling with respect to document 21, both of these motions are denied as moot.
n2 Plaintiff's affidavit attached to his
complaint also mentions the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff's
assertion that the rights guaranteed by these amendments have been violated is
inapposite. An allegation of excessive force by a prisoner should be analyzed
under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, not Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
394, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989). Furthermore, the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against deprivations by a state. Plaintiff's complaint names
only federal employees.
n3 The court notes that one defendant, Page
True, has been sued for not disciplining the officers who allegedly beat
plaintiff. Although this opinion does not address the allegations against
defendant True individually, the court concludes that he is also entitled to
qualified immunity because there was no constitutional violation. Consequently,
there was no reason he should be expected to discipline the officers.