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MUJAHID FARID, Plaintiff, -vs- GLENN S. GOORD,
Acting Commissioner; R. K. JAMES, Captain; WALTER R. KELLY, Superintendent; T.
MONIN, Sergeant; DONALD SELSKY, Director of Special Housing; and R. SIMMONS,
Correction Officer; Individually and in their official capacities, Defendants.
96-CV-0737C(F)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
200 F. Supp. 2d 220
February 9, 2002, Decided
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Mujahid Farid commenced
this action, pro se, while in custody of the New York State Department of
Correctional [*224] Services ("DOCS"), at the Attica Correctional
Facility ("Attica"). Farid brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, claiming violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On
August 4, 1998, the court assigned Mark C. Poloncarz, Esq., to act as attorney
for Farid. Item 48. n1
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment. Item 19. That motion
was denied as premature. Item 52. The court ordered the parties to conduct any
necessary discovery. Id., p. 9. Discovery is now complete, and defendants have
again moved for summary judgment. Item 60.
Numerous affidavits and deposition transcripts are on file in connection
with this motion, including those relied on in the prior motion. The documents
forming the record herein are: Defendants' Notice of Motion in Support of
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 18, 2000, Item 60;
Affidavit of defendant Randy James, dated August 14, 1997, Item 21; Affidavit
of defendant Walter R. Kelly, dated August 15, 1997, Item 22; Affidavit of
defendant Richard Simmons, dated September 19, 1997, Item 23; Affidavit of
defendant Donald Selsky, dated August 12, 1997, Item 24; Affidavit of defendant
Thomas Monin, dated September 29, 1997, Item 25; Affidavit of Anthony J.
Annucci, dated August 21, 1997, Item 26. Most affidavits have exhibits
attached.
Also on file are: Declaration of Michael A. Siragusa, Esq., in Support
of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dated July 18, 2000, Item 61; and
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56, dated July
18, 2000, Item 62.
Attached to the Siragusa Declaration are numerous transcripts: Exhibit
B, transcript from the December 9, 1999 Monin deposition; Exhibit C, transcript
from the December 9, 1999 Simmons deposition; Exhibit D, transcript from the
December 9, 1999 James deposition; Exhibit E, transcript from the December 9,
1999 deposition of Sibatu Khahaifa; and Exhibit F, transcript from the October
27, 1999 deposition of plaintiff Farid.
Also filed are: Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment, dated September 13, 2000, Item 65; Plaintiff's Statement of
Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56, dated September 13, 2000, Item 66; and
Plaintiff's Amended Statement of Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56, dated October
18, 2000, Item 68.
The
court issued an order dated June 29, 2001, Item 69, asking counsel whether they
objected to including Farid's Article 78 decision by New York State Supreme
Court Acting Justice Mark H. Dadd in the record. The State did not object,
although it pointed out that the State Court decision had no res
judicata/collateral estoppel effect here. Item 70. Farid's counsel did not object,
Item 71, and the decision is now part of the record. Item 72.
All
parties have briefed the issues relevant to this motion. Defendants did not
request oral argument, and the motion was submitted for decision.
II.
FACTS
On April 12, 1996, Farid alleges
that Corrections Officer Rademacher failed to allow adequate time for him and
certain other inmates to finish their breakfast. Farid claims that Rademacher
became abusive when he complained that another [*225] corrections officer,
Sergeant Honiski, witnessed the event. Item 66, PP8 - 9, and Ex. A. While
acknowledging that an incident occurred at
the time and place alleged by plaintiff, defendants deny any improper
conduct by Rademacher.
On April 13, 1996, Farid
prepared a petition ("Petition") entitled "Abusive Conduct by
Correction Officer," which Farid and five other inmates signed,
"requesting an official investigation of this officer and his conduct. . .
." Item 66, Ex. A. Farid sent the Petition directly to the Superintendent
of Attica, defendant Walter R. Kelly, and Glenn S. Goord, Commissioner of DOCS.
Item 61, Ex. F, p. 13.
The First Amendment claims
brought by Farid revolve around the investigation into the charges contained in
the Petition and the investigation of another incident that occurred on April
15, 1996. The April 15 incident involved a search of Farid's cell and work
area, as a result of which charges were lodged against him in a Misbehavior
Report. Farid asserts that the searches were motivated by an intent to retaliate
against him for complaining about Rademacher via the Petition. Item 61, Ex. E,
p. 19. He also asserts that his First Amendment rights were violated by
imposition of the disciplinary charges for authoring and possessing certain
articles found during the search of his work area. In the circumstances of this
case, it is important to consider who authorized the search of Farid's cell and
work area, and the timing of the searches and severity of the charges in
relation to the investigation of the Petition.
As
indicated by a date-stamp, defendant Kelly received the Petition on April 15,
1996. Item 66, Ex. B. Kelly forwarded it down the chain of command for
investigation. First, the Petition went to Deputy Superintendent E.R. Donnelly,
via a transmittal dated April 15, 1996. Id. at Ex. C. Then, Donnelly forwarded
it to his subordinate, Lt. Khahaifa, via a transmittal dated April 15, 1996.
Id. at Ex. D.
Ultimately, Khahaifa forwarded the Petition to his subordinate,
defendant Monin, where it remained for investigation and response. However, in
what appears to be a departure from usual procedure, there exists no
transmittal slip from Khahaifa to Monin. As discussed infra, the parties
disagree on the issue of whether defendant Monin received the Petition from Khahaifa
on April 15, or sometime thereafter. There is an annotation on the face of the
transmittal from Donnelly to Khahaifa which reads: "Recv'd 4-17-96
Rademacher." Id. Monin testified that he made that note and that it
indicates the date he received the transmittal. Item 61, Ex. B, p. 12. During
his deposition, Khahaifa could not rule out having spoken to Monin about the
Petition on the day he received the transmittal from Donnelly (April 15). Item
61, Ex. E, pp. 7-8. Farid, in his deposition, noted that he had filed petitions
on a number of other occasions (Item 61, Ex. F, pp. 65, 66), and it had been
his experience that he would receive a response to the complaint on the very
day it had been filed. Id., p. 73.
At the time Farid prepared the
Petition, there was an inmate grievance procedure available to inmates at
Attica. On numerous occasions, he had availed himself of that procedure. Item
66, PP51-58. However, Farid did not have confidence in the grievance process
and opted instead to complain about officer Rademacher directly by petition.
Id. He did not believe it violated any rule or regulation to have the Petition
signed by other inmates who he alleges were also affected by defendant's
conduct. Id. at P58.
In a seemingly unrelated
incident on April 15, an inmate named Pratt was preparing for a family visit.
He had in his [*226] possession a copy of an article entitled "The Rude
Awakening of RIP" ("Rip Article") dated July 1995, which Farid
had authored. Pratt wanted to take a copy of the article with him on his visit
to give to his fiancee. As required by the rules, he voluntarily showed the
article to the corrections officer serving as package window clerk prior to
taking it into the visit. See testimony of Pratt, Transcript from Farid's Tier
III Hearing at 9. A copy of the Tier III Hearing Transcript is attached as Ex.
E to James Aff. ("Tier III Trans."), Item 21. A copy of the Rip
Article which Pratt delivered to the package window officer is attached to the
Simmons Aff., Item 23, as Ex. B. n2 Farid denied knowing inmate Pratt prior to
the April 15 incident and testified that he had no idea how Pratt obtained a
copy of the article. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 7. Pratt testified that he did not know
Farid and that he found a copy of the article in a cell he was cleaning. Id. at
9.
A. Farid's Cell and Library Work Station
Searches
The package window officer, who
was neither identified nor deposed, refused to allow Pratt to take the article
into the visiting room, telling Pratt it could be "misconstrued."
Item 21, Ex. E, p. 9. The officer contacted defendant Simmons, a corrections
officer assigned to "B" Block where Farid was then housed. Item 23,
P4. Simmons in turn contacted Monin, the "B" Block Supervisor, about
the article, and pointed out that Farid's name was on the document. Simmons
explained the circumstances surrounding the receipt of the document to Monin.
Item 61, Ex. C, p. 6. Monin reviewed the Rip article, Item 25, P5, and felt it
was "inflammatory." Item 61, Ex. B, p. 6. C.O. Simmons recounted that
"as a result of the volatile and inflammatory content of the
article," Sgt. Monin ordered a search of Farid's cell and his work
area in the law library. Item 23, P5. n3 Item 61, Ex. B, p. 6. The cell search
occurred while Farid was at his job in the law library. Item 23, P5.
The
contraband receipt, signed by N. Petito, reports that two documents were seized
from Farid's cell and ultimately treated as contraband: an "unauthorized
Petition" (a copy of the April 13, 1996 Petition), and "various ACF
copy machine illegal copies." Item 23, Ex. D.
[*227] Prior to or contemporaneously with the Library Search, defendant
Monin ordered Farid, who had been working in the law library, returned to the
block. Item 61, Ex. C, pp. 5-6. On his way back to his cell, Farid was stopped
and questioned by defendants Simmons and Monin about the Rip Article. Id., pp.
6-7; Item 66, PP21-22. Farid admitted to Simmons and Monin that he wrote the
article and had a right to do so. Id., P23. n4
Although Officer Simmons denied that he was involved in the search of
Farid's work area in the law library, Item 23, P5, his signature appears on the
contraband receipt as "officer conducting search" of Farid's work
area. n5 Item 23, Ex. D. The time of day that the searches took place is not
indicated on any of the documents. The following items were seized from Farid's
law library work station and treated as contraband: (1) a copy of a membership
application form for The Center for Law and Justice ("CFLJ"), which
had previously completed information whited-out; (2) various allegedly
non-legal documents found on Farid's law library disk; (3) another article
written by Farid entitled, "The Prison Industrial Complex (Or the Final
Solution to the Three-Fifths Problem)," ("Three-Fifths Article");
and (4) copies of the Rip Article. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 2; Item 21, Ex. A (Inmate
Misbehavior Report); Item 23, Ex. D (Contraband Report and Receipts).
The
Rip Article draws parallels between the New York State prison system and its
prisoners and the fable of Rip Van Winkle. Simmons comments that the article
advocates the use of violence and "mass prisoner mobilization" as a
means to redress what Farid alleges constitutes "deplorable conditions in
prison." Item 23, P4. The Rip Article concludes: "If Pataki's vicious
onslaught doesn't provide the catalyst for mass prisoner mobilization, then
what else could?" Simmons and Monin maintain that the article contained
"volatile and inflammatory" language. Item 23, P5; Item 25, P6. Given
their interpretation of the Rip Article, Simmons and Monin claim that the
ensuing searches of Farid's work area in the prison law library and Farid's
cell were justified. n6 Item 61, Ex. B, p. 6.
[*228] Farid describes both the Rip and Three-Fifths articles as
"neither inflammatory nor detrimental to the safety of the prison but are
instead well written, satirical, and recite various aspects of prison
life." Item 66, P43. He noted that the Rip article was published in The
Middletown Times Herald, the local newspaper in the community where he was
incarcerated before his transfer to Attica. Item 61, Ex. F, pp. 59-60.
As
indicated supra, Farid alleges that the searches conducted by defendants were
motivated by an intent to retaliate against him for complaining about
Corrections Officer Rademacher via the Petition. Item 61, Ex. F, p. 19.
Thus, Farid alleges that the
retaliatory searches violated his First Amendment right to petition the
government for redress. This claim makes it essential to determine whether
defendants knew about the Petition before or after the searches in question.
Farid also argues that his First
Amendment rights were violated by imposition of disciplinary charges and
penalties for authoring and possessing the Rip Article and the Three-Fifths
Article found during the search of his law library work station. Item 65, pp.
8-9. n7 The possession of the two articles, as well as the Center for Law and
Justice Application and a copy of the Petition, were also cited as grounds for
disciplinary measures against him. Item 21, Ex. E, pp. 18 - 19; Item 21, Ex. A.
Logically, he argues, the possession of the documents could not be treated as a
violation of prison rules, nor considered detrimental to prison security,
unless their content was considered. Additionally, the Tier III finding of
guilt for violation of Rule 102.10, making threats (see p. 13, infra), depends
entirely on the evaluation of the content of the documents. Item 21, Ex. E, p.
19.
Simmons and Monin claim that they first learned of the Petition when it
was seized as contraband from Farid's cell on April 15. Item 23, P9; Item 25,
PP8, 10. Farid disputes this time frame, arguing that it is likely that Monin
knew about the Petition prior to his cell and work area search. Noting that the
Petition was immediately forwarded down the chain of command on April 15, and
ultimately from Lt. Khahaifa to defendant Monin, Farid argued in his Memorandum
of Law:
The exact date that Lieutenant Khahaifa
either spoke to Monin or forwarded the matter to Monin is unknown. During his
testimony Khahaifa could not rule out speaking with Monin with regard to this
matter. It is possible that Lieutenant Khahaifa spoke to Monin about the matter
on the day he received the request from Donnelly [April 15, 1995]. During his
deposition, Khahaifa, in response to questions about what he did after
receiving the buck slip [transmittal] from Deputy Supt. Donnelly, stated that
he "spoke to Sergeant Monin probably. It was an incident in B Block and he
was the B Block sergeant. So that would be my next course of action, to get in
touch with the block sergeant and have him interview the inmate if I was not
going to specifically interview him."
Item 65, p. 6, citing Khahaifa Dep. (Item 61,
Ex. E) at pp. 7-8. See also Item 66, PP15 - 16. Monin asserts he was assigned
[*229] to investigate the allegations in the Petition on April 17, 1996. Item
25, P15.
B. The Disciplinary Charges
For
possession of the alleged contraband, Monin ordered Farid detained in keeplock
pending investigation, which led to disciplinary charges. Item 25, P23. After
being released from keeplock on April 18, because the investigation was not completed
within 72 hours, Farid was again placed in keeplock on April 19 pending
resolution of the disciplinary charges and completion of the disciplinary
process. Id., PP23, 24. On April 19, defendant Simmons prepared a misbehavior
report charging Farid with the following violations:
102.10--Inmates shall not, under any
circumstances, make any threat, spoken, in writing, or by gesture.
103.20--Inmates shall not request or solicit
goods or services from business or any person other than immediate family
members without the consent and approval of the facility superintendent or
designee.
104.12--Inmates shall not lead, organize,
participate, or urge other inmates to participate, in work-stoppages, sit-ins,
lockins, or other actions which may be detrimental to the order of facility.
114.10--Inmates shall not smuggle or attempt
to smuggle or solicit others to smuggle any item in or out of the facility or
from one area to another.
116.10--Inmates shall not lose, destroy,
steal, misuse, damage or waste any type of State property.
7 NYCRR 270.2; Item 21, P3 and Ex. A. The
misbehavior report was served on Farid on April 22, 1996. Id. at P4. He was
found guilty in a Tier III hearing on all but the smuggling charge. Although
Farid does not raise this point, the court finds it difficult to determine
which charge (specifically, the one relating to making a threat, and the one
relating to action detrimental to the order of the facility) relates to which
document; the Misbehavior Report does not connect the specific charges to the
specific documents.
In
the Misbehavior Report, Simmons recited the various rule violations, and then
described the events surrounding the filing of the charges. He noted that after
the searches, he asked Farid if he had authored the Rip article, to which Farid
answered, "Yes. I'm entitled to my viewpoints. You don't necessarily have
to agree to them." Item 21, Ex. A. Simmons then stated: "it should be
noted that this article contained Inflammatory Information in regards to DOCS
operations . . . ." Id. He commented that finding "numerous"
copies of the article also showed Farid's "intention to distribute these
among the population." Id. Simmons noted that the other items of concern
were the "unofficial Petition filed against a staff member," the
Three-Fifths Article, the CFLJ application, and yet another 28-page article,
entitled "One God Must Die" which indicated "ACF 10" n8 on
it. Id.
Simmons concluded that the Rip Article was detrimental to the order of
the facility, based solely upon his reading of the article. Item 61, Ex. C, p.
24. Yet, Simmons acknowledged that in cases where a document's appropriateness
was at issue, questions about censorship were determined by committee: "we
have media review process that them types of articles would go through."
Id. at 25 - 26. There is no evidence that Simmons ever submitted any [*230] of
the documents seized from Farid, upon which the disciplinary charges were
based, to the media review committee. It is reasonable to assume that if the
documents at issue were called to the attention of the Media Review Committee,
the Committee would review them pursuant to Directive 4572. See infra, Section
IV(E).
C. Investigation of the Petition
Ultimately, Monin investigated the complaint against Rademacher that
Farid made via the Petition. Monin's report to Lt. Khahaifa is dated April 23,
1996. Item 25, Ex. B. Monin states that Farid and one other signatory to the
Petition refused to be interviewed about the incident. He spoke to the four
other signatories, who confirmed that the incident occurred and that
Rademacher's comments were inappropriate. However, those signatories apparently
agreed it was an isolated incident. Officer Rademacher denied any improper
conduct. Item 22, Ex. A.
In
his report, Monin notes that there were approximately 30 inmates at breakfast
at the time of the incident, and only six had any problem with Rademacher.
Then, without giving any reason, he concluded, "It should be further noted
that the six inmates who signed the petition are of the Muslim faith who
obviously conspired together to compose this complaint." Id. Farid claims
that Monin had a general disdain for Muslim prisoners. Item 61, Ex. F, pp.
84-85.
Farid offers additional testimony that Monin harbored animosity towards
him personally. He alleges that Monin once stopped him on the block and said:
"why don't [you] go back to Africa and do some complaining there."
Item 61, Ex. F, pp. 82-83. Plaintiff claims that Monin made similar derogatory
comments to him on several occasions and that defendant Simmons was present on
many of those occasions. Id.
DOCS Commissioner Goord referred Farid's Petition to George Bartlett,
DOCS Deputy Commissioner, for a response. In a letter to Farid dated May 30,
1996, Mr. Bartlett referred to Supt. Kelly's investigation into Farid's
allegation, and found that four of the thirty inmates interviewed "indicated
if they were not given sufficient time to eat, it was an isolated
situation." Item 22, Ex. B. He concluded that no evidence had been found
to support Farid's allegations. Id. Mr. Bartlett may also have based his report
on the investigation conducted by Attica First Deputy Superintendent, Michael
Giambruno, who wrote a memorandum about the incident to Israel Rivera,
Assistant Commissioner of DOCS. Item 25, Ex. E.
Based on the confusion created by defendants' own documents and
testimony over who ordered the cell search, Farid argues that Monin's testimony
concerning when he learned of the Petition is inherently suspect and should be
disregarded as "self-serving." Item 65, p. 7. Defendants argue that
Farid has no objective evidence that Monin knew about the Petition before the
cell and work area searches were conducted, and that Farid's argument is purely
speculative and insufficient as a
matter of law.
D. The Tier III Hearing
Defendant James was assigned as the hearing officer for the Tier III
disciplinary hearing on the charges brought against Farid. After Corrections
Officer L. Bek was assigned as Farid's "inmate advocate," he met with
him on April 23, 1996. Item 66, P27; Item 21, P4 and Ex. C. Farid and Bek
identified the following witnesses they wished to call at the Tier III hearing:
inmates Tindel, Jones, and Pratt, and Lt. [*231] Bradt and Officer Petito. Id.
The hearing was held on April 24.
Farid first sought James' recusal as hearing officer. That request was
summarily denied, with James refusing to hear argument. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 3.
Farid explained during his deposition that he had some questions about the
impartiality of Officer James based on information he possessed that James may
have been a "crusader" who targeted Muslim inmates. Item 61, Ex. F,
pp. 67-69.
Farid next sought to raise an argument that the hearing was untimely.
James also summarily rejected that argument without giving Farid an opportunity
to argue the point. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 3. Later, this was the basis upon which
the New York State Supreme Court nullified the Tier III process and ordered
Farid's record expunged.
After the inmate witnesses were called, Farid sought to call corrections
personnel, Lt. Bradt and Officer Petito, who were on his witness list. Id., pp.
17-18. He argued that the testimony of Lt. Bradt was relevant because documents
indicated he ordered the cell search, and there was significant confusion on
that issue created by available documents. He asserted that the testimony of
Officer Petito was also relevant because he actually conducted the search of
his cell. Farid wanted to introduce evidence that there was no copy of the
Petition in his cell when Petito searched it, a fact that would support his
argument that Monin and Simmons knew about the Petition independent of the
searches and that the Petition precipitated the search. Id., p. 18.
Defendant James refused Farid's request to call those two witnesses,
finding that Bradt's testimony would be irrelevant and Petito's testimony would
be redundant. Id. at 18 - 19. See also Item 21, Ex. F. James accepted without
question the chronology set forth in Simmons' Misbehavior Report, i.e., that
Monin and Simmons did not know about the Petition until after the searches in
question. Id. at P12 and Ex. F.
Denying Farid's request to call Petito and Bradt as witnesses, Capt.
James stated that the charges against him concerned possession of contraband
only.
This witness [Petito] was denied due to
redundancy. You acknowledged possession of the unauthorized petition in your
work area and you have stated that your whole purpose in calling CO Petito is
to verify that you did not possess a copy in your cell. Both the misbehavior
report and 2077 forms indicate that a copy was found in both your cell and work
area. Possession is the issue, and you have acknowledged possession.
Item 21, Ex. E, p. 19.
Furthermore, Capt. James dismissed out of hand any argument by Farid
that the searches which found the
alleged "contraband" were motivated by any retaliatory intent. Id.
Regarding the documents at issue, James' findings were as follows:
1.
Rip Article, Three-Fifths Article, and the Petition. James stated that "my
review of the papers [the Rip Article and apparently, sub silentio, the
Three-Fifths Article] indicate a clear attempt at urging participation in
actions detrimental to facility order . . . ." He continued: "The
insightful [sic] material is very threatening." This interpretation
supported James' conclusion that Farid violated Rule 102.10. Item 21, Ex. D
("Hearing Disposition Rendered"). James referred to the Petition as
"unauthorized" during the course of the hearing, but took no
testimony concerning the charge that Farid violated Rule 104.12
(demonstration). He found that Farid had "acknowledged possession of the
unauthorized petition in your work area . . . . Possession [*232]is the issue .
. . ." Item 21, Ex. E, p. 19, and thus was guilty of the charge. James
ultimately concluded that "The insightful material is very threatening."
Id. at 19. However, he never articulated how the various writings were
inflammatory, other than providing his conclusory assessment which echoed the
appraisal of Monin and Simmons.
2.
Smuggling. Farid had been charged with a violation of Rule 114.10--smuggling.
This charge alleged that he had caused inmate Pratt to attempt to
"smuggle" the Rip Article out on a visit. He was found not guilty on
this charge.
3.
CFLJ Application. The hearing officer found that possession of the CFLJ
application indicated Farid's intent to solicit money from other inmates
because there was a $5.00 membership fee payable to CFLJ. Item 21, Ex. E, p.
20. The hearing officer found that because he whited out information on this
previously completed application form, Farid intended to distribute it. Farid
admitted as much; although he denied he had an actual opportunity to distribute
the form before disciplinary charges were brought. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 20; Item
66, PP46 - 47. The hearing officer concluded that his intent to distribute the
CFLJ application violated Rule 103.20. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 20. Farid did not
think it would be against the facility's policies to ask other inmates if they
would be interested in joining an approved organization that he himself had
already received approval to join. Item 65, p. 11.
4.
Various 'ACF 10' Copies. The hearing officer concluded that "your article
was copied in the law library in your work area, and that is sufficient proof
that you copied these non-legal materials against the guidelines and procedures
misusing the copier. None of the written material is remotely legal in nature
and is contraband in the law library." Item 21, Ex. E, p. 20. This was
found to violate Rule 116.10 as a misuse or waste of state property. Farid
claimed that the articles were legal, not personal, material. Item 21, Ex. E,
pp. 6-7. He testified at his deposition that he had always paid for non-legal
copies. Item 61, Ex. F, p. 43.
To
impress upon Farid "the serious nature of this type of organized
disruption," James imposed a penalty of six months of keeplock with one
month suspended, a recommendation for thirty days loss of good time; and six
months loss of certain privileges including: packages, commissary, telephone,
and personal television, with one month suspended. James also recommended that
Farid's position as an employee in the law library be reconsidered. Id. at 19,
20. James ordered the destruction of all the material seized as contraband
and used as evidence at the hearing.
Farid sought review of the Tier III findings through normal channels
provided by state law. His appeal was decided by defendant Selsky, Deputy
Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services. Selsky affirmed the
findings of defendant James in a one-sentence decision rendered on June 21,
1996. Item 21, Ex. I; Item 24, PP6 - 7. The decision read, "On behalf of
the Commissioner and in response to your recent letter of appeal, please be
advised that your Superintendent's Hearing of April 24, 1996, has been reviewed
and affirmed on June 21, 1996." Item 21, Ex. I.
Thereafter, Farid commenced an Article 78 proceeding in New York State
Supreme Court, Wyoming County, challenging the legitimacy of the Tier III
hearing.
That decision, which ordered that Farid's record be expunged of all
references to the Tier III hearing, was based on the fact that the hearing did
not commence within seven days of Farid's confinement, as required [*233]by 7
NYCRR 251-5.1(a). Item 72. Interestingly, Justice Dadd, in dicta, commented
that:
the record shows that the hearing officer
stated insufficient grounds for refusing to interview the officers who
authorized and conducted the search of his cell as witnesses pursuant to the
petitioner's request (see Exhibit F, p. 19; see Matter of Wong v. Coughlin, 137
A.D.2d 272, 529 N.Y.S.2d 45 [1988]). Petitioner sought to challenge the basis
for the cell search and to prove that the charges were filed in retaliation for
a complaint he had filed against an officer. Petitioner had a right to present
such proof (see Matter of Wilson v. Coughlin, 186 A.D.2d 1090, 590 N.Y.S.2d 798
[1992]; Patterson v. Coughlin, 198 A.D.2d 899 [1993]). Furthermore, it appears
that the disposition was partly based upon the hearing officer's review of the
content of the written materials seized from the petitioner's cell. Since these
materials were destroyed as contraband, the record is insufficient for full
judicial review of this matter and further administrative hearings on the
report would be impossible (see Matter of Bell v. Coombe, Supreme Court of
Wyoming County, Index No. 17,346, Memorandum and Judgment dated March 27, 1995,
annexed).
Farid v. Goord, Index No. 17,905, New York
State Supreme Court, Wyoming County, Dec. 2, 1996.
III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
A. RETALIATION FOR PETITION
Farid alleges that he had a
First Amendment right to prepare and send the Petition and that defendants
violated that right by retaliating against him by means of the searches and
disciplinary measures taken against him.
B. CONTENT AND POSSESSION OF CERTAIN
DOCUMENTS
Farid was found guilty at the
Tier III Hearing of violating disciplinary rules by possessing the Petition,
the Rip Article, and the Three-Fifths Article. Captain James found these
documents urged "participation in actions detrimental to the facility
order," and evidenced an intent to distribute "insightful
material." Item 21, Ex. E, p. 19.
Farid alleges that he had a First Amendment right to possess these
documents. Further, he claims that the discipline imposed was content-based and
did not rely exclusively on possession. Item 65, pp. 10-11. He argues that
James could not consider the documents contraband and dangerous to prison
security unless he read them. Although at one point in the Tier III hearing
James stated the charge related to the contraband articles centered on
possession, he admitted that he had read them and found them "detrimental
to the order of the facility." Item 61, Ex. D, p. 15.
C. DUE PROCESS
Farid alleges that he was not
provided with a fair Tier III hearing in violation of the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he claims that defendant James' refusal
to hear argument on the issues of recusal and timeliness, and James' refusal to
allow him to call Lt. Bradt and Officer Petito as witnesses, violated the
procedural due process protections afforded inmates in prison disciplinary
hearings. Farid alleges that James' unquestioning acceptance of the chronology
set forth in the misbehavior report, i.e. that Monin and Simmons learned of the
Petition after the cell and law library searches, evidenced his bias as hearing
officer. Item 65, p. 12.
[*234] Farid noted that he prevailed in a
State Court Article 78 proceeding upon establishing to the satisfaction of the
state court that there was a procedural defect in the Tier III hearing. Id.
IV.
DISCUSSION
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, the court is required to view any permissible inferences to be drawn
from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 334 (2d
Cir. 1997).
The
movant seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of identifying those
portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). However, once this burden has been met, the non-moving party
"may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S.
Ct. 2505 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Moreover, "when the
moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
The
Second Circuit has repeatedly held that a court must be cautious in granting
summary judgment where a party's state of mind is at issue. Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life, 92
F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996). This is particularly true where the moving party
possesses the evidence most likely to demonstrate the required knowledge or intent. In such cases, the court must
carefully scrutinize the record for circumstantial proof which supports the
opponent's allegations. Id. "If reasonable minds could differ as to the
import of the evidence and . . . there is any evidence in the record from any
source from which a reasonable inference in the nonmoving party's favor may be
drawn, the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment." Brady v.
Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir. 1988) (quotation and citation
omitted). See also Finley v. Giacobbe,
79 F.3d 1285, 1291 (2d Cir. 1996).
B. DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
As
a preliminary matter, certain defendants may be eliminated at this stage of the
proceedings. "It is well settled in this Circuit that 'personal
involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a
prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983'." Colon v. Coughlin, 58
F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d
Cir. 1994)). The personal involvement of a supervisory defendant may be shown
by evidence that: (1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged
constitutional violation; (2) the defendant, after being informed of the
violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong; (3) the
defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices
occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom; (4) the
defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the
wrongful acts; or (5) the defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the
rights of inmates by [*235] failing to act on information indicating that
unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Colon, 58 F.3d at 873 (citation omitted).
No
evidence links the administrators of the Department of Correctional Services,
nor the upper management of Attica, with improper conduct nor animus towards
Farid. As to defendant Superintendent Kelly, his only participation is that he
received plaintiff's Petition on April 15 and sent it down the chain of command
for investigation. Defendant Goord is sued as Acting Commissioner of DOCS. The
record reveals only that Goord referred Farid's Petition to Deputy Commissioner
Bartlett for investigation. Item 22, Ex. B. Defendant Selsky's exclusive
involvement is as DOCS' designee to hear Tier III appeals. See Turner v. Grant,
2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4364, 2000 WL 362032 (W.D.N.Y., Mar. 29, 2000) ("The
court has found no constitutional violation related to plaintiff's disciplinary
hearing to which defendant Selsky might have been alerted by plaintiff's
appeal.") 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4364, 2000 WL 362032, Id. at *6.
No
allegations are made that any of these individuals were personally involved in
the events at issue, nor that their policies or neglect led to those events.
Therefore, the action is dismissed with prejudice as to defendants Glenn S.
Goord, Walter R. Kelly, and Donald Selsky. The remaining defendants are:
Captain Randy James, Correction Officer Richard Simmons, and Sergeant Thomas
Monin.
C. STATE LAW CLAIMS
In
his complaint, Farid alleges that defendants Simmons, Monin, and James violated
the state law of conversion and DOCS regulations regarding confiscation and
destruction of his documents. Item 1, Fifth Cause of Action. The court agrees
with defendants' position that the state law claims for damages against
correctional officers "shall be brought . . . in the court of claims as
a claim against the state"
pursuant to New York Corrections Law § 24(2). Thus, a federal court, acting as
a state court in addressing pendent state law claims, would not have
jurisdiction in such an action. Baker
v. Coughlin, 77 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1996). The court thus grants summary judgment
to all defendants on this claim.
D. RETALIATION FOR PETITION
Farid argues that the cell and
library searches, and the discipline imposed thereafter, were in retaliation
for the exercise of his First Amendment right to petition the government for
redress. It is settled law that an inmate's "right to complain to public
officials and to seek administrative relief is protected by the First
Amendment." Gaston v. Coughlin et. al., 81 F. Supp.2d 381, 386 (N.D.N.Y.
1999), citing Gagliardi v. Village of
Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994). See also Taylor v. Sullivan, 980 F.Supp 697, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); and
Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 585 (2d Cir. 1988). In Hynes v. Squillace, 143
F.3d 653, 657 (2d Cir. 1998), the Second Circuit held:
In
order to sustain a retaliation claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he
engaged in constitutionally protected conduct and that the "protected
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the prison officials'
decision to discipline the plaintiff." Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79
(2d Cir. 1996). Once the plaintiff carries his initial burden, "the
defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have
disciplined the plaintiff 'even in the absence of protected conduct.'"
Id., quoting Mt. Healthy City School
Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 50 L. Ed. 2d 471, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977).
On the issue of retaliation, the
defendants offer direct evidence in the form of Monin's and Simmons'
affidavits, and deposition [*236] testimony, denying any retaliatory motive and
asserting that neither knew about the Petition until after the cell and library
searches. Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact on
this point.
The Second Circuit noted that the ease with
which prisoners can assert retaliation claims warrants close scrutiny of those
claims: "Because we recognize both the near inevitability of decisions and
actions by prison officials to which prisoners will take exception and the ease
with which claims of retaliation may be fabricated, we examine prisoner's
claims of retaliation with skepticism and particular care." Colon v.
Coughlin, et al., 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995), citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d
Cir. 1983).
1.
Did Farid Engage in Constitutionally Protected Conduct?
The
first Hynes factor to be analyzed in determining whether a First Amendment
retaliation claim survives summary judgment is rather straightforward. Farid's
claimed conduct, filing a petition, is constitutionally protected. Graham v. Henderson,
89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996); Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 588-89 (2d Cir.
1988). "Retaliation against a prisoner for pursuing a grievance violates
the right to petition government for the redress of grievances guaranteed by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and is actionable under § 1983."
Graham, 89 F.3d at 80. The right to petition government for redress of
grievances-in both judicial and administrative forums-is "'among the most
precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.'" Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d at 589, quoting
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 19 L. Ed.
2d 426, 88 S. Ct. 353 (1967).
Defendants, citing Duamutef v. O'Keefe, 98 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 1996), argue
that Farid did not have a constitutionally protected right to circulate inmate
petitions. Item 36, pp. 8-10. The Second Circuit has held that "prison
regulations provide an effective procedure for inmates to communicate their
grievances to prison authorities. . . . So long as [the grievance procedure] is
open, we believe it is permissible for prison officials to bar the circulation
of petitions." Duamutef, 98 F.3d at 24 (emphasis added). In his affidavit, Defendant Kelly
asserts, "Commonly, inmates use that grievance process to challenge the
denial of a privilege or a violation of the minimum conditions of their
confinement." Item 22, P19. However, he points to no rule or regulation
that prohibits inmates from petitioning the Superintendent directly.
Secondly, neither Superintendent Kelly,
Commissioner Goord, nor anyone else on the chain of command disciplined Farid
for sending the Petition. Instead, both Goord and Kelly forwarded it through
channels so that the charges could be investigated. From these facts, it can be
inferred that petitioning was a proper--or at least non-objectionable--means to
communicate grievances. See Richardson v. Coughlin, 763 F. Supp. 1228, 1234-35
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). These facts also belie Kelly's assertions in his affidavit
that "plaintiff does not have a right to circulate a petition challenging
the conditions of confinement in a correctional facility," while providing
no authority for the same. Item 22, P19.
Because Duametef did not forbid
petitions, but made exercise of that constitutional right dependent on whether
the prison official barred it, and because there is nothing in the record
indicating that such a regulation was in effect at Attica at the time of the
incident, the court finds [*237] that the first Hynes factor, whether Farid
engaged in protected conduct, is met.
2.
Was the Protected Conduct a Substantial or Motivating Factor in Farid's
Discipline?
The
next Hynes factor requires the court to determine whether the filing of the
Petition was a substantial or motivating factor in Farid's subsequent
discipline. Farid alleges that the Petition prompted the discipline; defendants
assert it did not. At the very least, a question of material fact exists
concerning this issue.
Circumstantial evidence can serve as evidence of retaliation. Colon, 58
F.3d at 872. However, the Colon court said: "If this circumstantial
evidence represented the sum total of Colon's proof, we might be inclined to
affirm the grant of summary judgment based on the weakness of Colon's
case." Id. at 873. See Gaston v.
Coughlin, 81 F. Supp.2d 381, 386 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). Mindful of the limitations on
Farid to access defendants' motivations, the court finds enough factors that
weigh in his favor to find that his claim is substantial and his Petition may
have prompted the disciplinary charges.
Farid claims that Monin had a
pre-existing bias against inmates of the Muslim faith in general. He points to
gratuitous language about a conspiracy of Muslim inmates hypothesized by Monin
in his April 23, 1996 investigation report concerning the April 12 breakfast
incident, Item 25, Ex. B, and to other
derogatory and harassing comments such as: "Why don't [you] go back
to Africa and do some complaining over there." Item 66, P65. Taking the
facts in the light most favorable to Farid, these comments could serve as
circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.
Moreover, there is "temporal
proximity" between the receipt of the Petition by the Attica
administration and the disciplinary action against Farid. Gaston, 81 F. Supp.2d at 386. Concerning
whether Monin may have known about the Petition on the day of Farid's cell and
law library search, Khahaifa could not rule out speaking to Monin regarding
Farid's Petition on April 15, the date Khahaifa received the transmittal slip from
Donnelly. This would be well before the April 17 date that Monin acknowledges
receiving the request for review.
Also, and significantly, once the search
took place on April 15, charges were not assessed against Farid until Simmons'
Misbehavior Report dated April 19. As Farid observes in his brief, "it is
quite possible that Monin and Simmons spoke about the matter prior to the date
that Simmons wrote the report. Both of the officers were assigned to B-Block,
Monin was Simmons['] superior, and it was Monin that initiated the disciplinary
proceedings against the Plaintiff by asking Simmons to conduct an investigation
into the matter." Item 65, p. 8. Providing the non-moving party with every
favorable inference, it is possible that Monin may have known about the
Petition on April 15, before the search of Farid's cell and work area was
conducted. In any case, Monin knew about it at some time on April 15, well
before the filing of the Misbehavior Report.
Under the circumstances, the Petition may
have been a substantial or motivating factor in drafting the charges against
Farid, who the officers perceived as a leader in protesting the alleged
behavior of officer Rademacher and thus had a motive to single him out for
retaliation. In the Misbehavior Report, Simmons describes the Petition as an
"unofficial Petition filed against a staff member . . . ." Item 21,
Ex. A.
In addition, the gravity of the charges,
when compared to the evidence in support, [*238] suggest enough of a disparity
to legitimize the claim of retaliation. Farid was charged with and found guilty
of improper solicitation, based solely on the fact that he possessed copies of
a freely available CFLJ application. The CFLJ was an approved organization, and
Attica had authorized a disbursement for Farid's membership dues. Item 31, p.
17; Item 66, P50. Two inmate witnesses at Farid's Tier III hearing described
the ready availability of the membership applications in the law library. Farid
was not charged with distributing, but intent to distribute. Defendants provide
no rule or regulation that an inmate may be disciplined for such an intent.
The making-threats charge
related to the articles. However, there is no evidence that Farid ever sought to distribute the
articles to other inmates. The Rip article had apparently been submitted to and
printed in an outside newspaper prior to this incident. A reasonable reading of
the Rip article would cause a reviewer to conclude that it did not incite
violence or disruption, and that its intended audience was not even other
prisoners. At the Tier III hearing, Pratt, the inmate who attempted to 'clear'
the article with the package window officer, testified that he voluntarily
offered it to the officer for review, saying "go ahead and read--there's nothing
there." Item 21, Ex. E, p. 9. Pratt's assessment was that the article
contained nothing inflammatory that could be "construed as anything
detrimental." Id., p. 10. No evidence indicates that any inmate ever
threatened prison security as a result of reading Farid's articles. n9
The
charge of "organizing activities which may be detrimental to the order of
the facility" related to the Petition. Id. There is no evidence indicating
that any inmate ever threatened prison security as a result of signing the Petition
which, despite defendants' claims, was a permissible way for prisoners to
assert grievances. n10
Concerning the charge of misusing state property, Farid testified that
he had used the law library copy machine for personal copies on many occasions.
He understood the rule as being "pay the cost of copying, have it put on
the books on what they had--they had a record book for how many copies a
particular inmate had in his account, and take it up there to be copied."
Item 21, Ex. F, p. 62. He had done that before, and apparently had not been
disciplined for doing so.
Although defendants deny that the Petition formed any part of the reason
for their conducting the search, the issue of retaliation in this case turns
largely on the assessment of the credibility of the primary players, defendants
Monin and Simmons, and plaintiff Farid. Such credibility issues are "not
readily amenable to resolution on summary judgment." Colon, 58 F.3d at
873.
3.
Would Farid have been Disciplined even in the Absence of Protected Conduct?
Once Farid carries his initial
burden, "the defendants must show by a [*239]preponderance of the evidence
that they would have disciplined the plaintiff 'even in the absence of the
protected conduct.'" Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 50 L. Ed.
2d 471, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977)).
Assessing this factor, the court must analyze whether Farid would have
been disciplined absent the 'improper' motive of retaliation for filing the
Petition. In this regard, the court views Farid's act of filing the Petition in
isolation from the other charges emanating from the alleged smuggling incident
of April 15. Defendants insist that the Petition investigation was totally
unrelated to the series of events following discovery of the allegedly
contraband article. Item 27, PP87, 122. Consequently, Farid would not have been
disciplined at all as a result of his authorship of the Petition. Defendants
cite the content of the Rip article, not the Petition, as setting off the chain
of events that resulted in the disciplinary charges. It appears unlikely that
Farid would have been charged with or disciplined for solicitation, organizing
activities, or misusing state property if not for the actual content of the articles
which provoked the spate of charges.
Given this analysis, the court
finds that Farid has provided enough evidence to defeat defendants' motion for
summary judgment on First Amendment retaliation grounds against defendants
Monin and Simmons.
E. CONTENT AND POSSESSION OF ARTICLES AND
OTHER DOCUMENTS
This claim relates to the documents seized from Farid's cell and library
work area which were deemed contraband and which were at issue at the Tier III
hearing. Item 21, Ex. A. The documents at issue are: the Petition, the Rip
Article, the CFLJ application, and the Three-Fifths Article.
Even though a prisoner is incarcerated, he or she retains First
Amendment rights, within limits. "Although inmates retain some of their
constitutional rights during incarceration, the Supreme Court has stated that
'the fact of confinement and the needs of the penal institution impose
limitations on constitutional rights, including those derived from the First
Amendment, which are implicit in incarceration.'" Leitzsey v. Coombe, 998
F. Supp. 282, 286 (W.D.N.Y., 1998) (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners'
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629, 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977)). In cases
raising First Amendment concerns, the courts must be particularly vigilant about
content-based censorship. The Second Circuit, in Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754
F.2d 1015 (2nd Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 350 n.2, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987), described the
court's role as balancing deference to the expertise of prison guards and
administrators in making decisions about the potential for unrest as they
enforce regulations, with their duty to insure that the "precious
constitutional rights" of inmates are not being abridged. 754 F.2d at 1018.
Most prison-related First Amendment cases concern inmates' challenges to
prison regulations which they argue impinge upon their rights. See, e.g.,
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Many
cases, like Abdul Wali for example, concern regulations governing the content
of material coming into the prison.
Although Abdul Wali concerned an inmate's right to receive publications,
it provides guidance concerning how content-based [*240] determinations are
made in a prison setting. The court looked first at DOCS Directive 4572, which
provides guidelines for receipt and review of literature, and requires the
establishment of "facility media review committees" in prison
facilities. Those committees are
charged with determining what materials may be denied to inmates based on
content. 754 F.2d at 1024. The decision in Abdul Wali was made at the highest
level of judicial review, while in this case it was made at the very lowest
level of review by two correction officers who, under the regulations, had no
authority to make such a review.
DOCS Directive 4572, provides in pertinent part:
I. POLICY. It is Departmental policy to
encourage inmates to read publications from varied sources if such material
does not encourage them to engage in behavior that might be disruptive to
orderly facility operations. Accordingly, inmates shall be allowed to subscribe
to and possess a wide range of printed matter such as books, magazines and
newspapers, subject to the provisions of this directive, because these items
may promote constructive individual development.
In the event that the Superintendent, or his
designee, believes that printed material addressed to an inmate represents a
possible threat to orderly facility operations, that material will be referred
to the Facility Media Review Committee (FMRC) for its assessment and
disposition.
II. STANDARDS. . . .
. . .
C. The publication should not incite violence
based on race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, or nationality.
"Incite violence," for purposes of this guideline, means to advocate,
expressly or by clear implication, acts of violence.
. . .
H. . . .
Publications which discuss different
political philosophies and those dealing with criticism of Governmental and
Departmental authority are acceptable as reading material provided they do not
violate the above guidelines. For Example, publications such as. . . The
Militant, . . . and Revolutionary Worker shall generally be approved unless
matter in a specific issue is found to violate the above guidelines.
III. PROCEDURE. In view of the above
considerations, the Department specifies the following procedures for the
evaluation and approval or disapproval of literature for inmates.
. . .
B. . . .
When there is a good faith belief that a
publication already belonging to or in possession of an inmate violates one or
more of the media review guidelines, said publication shall be confiscated and
referred to the FMRC for review and decision.
C. . . .
The FMRC shall meet at least once weekly
unless there are no publications for review.
Directive 4572 also provides for various methods of appeal if a
publication has been disapproved by the FMRC.
The
importance the Abdul Wali court placed on compliance with DOCS Directive 4572
is clear:
The DOCS guidelines provide corrections
officials great leeway in determining what literature is permitted into prison
facilities, yet assure that each decision represents the consensus of a [*241]
number of penological professionals, rather than the bias or animosity of a
particular official. . . . Where a corrections official chooses to ignore
established standards and procedures, however, he must be prepared to
demonstrate that his decision--reached in consultation with no one, and made in
reliance on no more than his personal beliefs--is supported by reasonable
justification.
Id. at 1036.
In
this case, no attempt was made by defendants to comply with Directive 4572 by
referring any of the documents to the committee in spite of the fact that
defendant Simmons noted the existence of a "media review committee"
at Attica. Item 61, Ex. C, p. 28. The committee was not consulted about any of
the documents determined to be contraband, and there is no explanation why this
was not done. Rather, the documents were evaluated for content by defendants
Monin and Simmons, and then by James. Further, none of them made an effort to
comply with the instruction given in Abdul Wali that where a corrections
officer chooses to ignore established standards or procedures, he must be
prepared to demonstrate that his decision is supported by reasonable
justification.
This failure to comply with procedures is
sufficient to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, in
addition, when considering the content of the documents at issue, the court is
convinced that defendants fail to make the requisite showing on their motion
for summary judgment that Farid's First Amendment claims should be dismissed.
Specifically:
a.
The Petition
The
Petition was prepared by Farid and sent directly to the Superintendent of
Attica. The Superintendent forwarded it down the chain of command for
investigation. Thus, prison officials at the highest levels knew that Farid had
prepared the Petition and should logically have assumed that he retained a copy
of it. At no time did any high-ranking prison official treat the Petition as
either "unauthorized" or as contraband. Yet, Simmons, Monin, and
James, on their own, concluded that the Petition was "unauthorized"
and contraband. They came to this conclusion even though Monin's report, which
investigated the complaint made via the Petition, dated April 23, 1996, did not
opine that the Petition was unauthorized or contraband. Item 25, Ex. B.
Almost as an afterthought, defendants assert that Farid was preempted by
the prison grievance system from bringing his complaint by petition. Item 22,
PP16 - 21. Defendants did not assert that argument at any time from the first
receipt of the Petition by Kelly through Monin's report of the Petition's
allegations. If that is in fact to be
considered in support of defendants' finding the Petition
"unauthorized" and contraband, it is curious that no other signatory
to the Petition was charged with violation of prison codes. This underscores
Farid's claim that he was retaliated against by being singled out for
discipline.
b.
The Rip Article and the Three-Fifths Article
Defendants advance no evidence that either article actually inspired or
provoked any inmate to any behavior, volatile or otherwise. No evidence linked
the newspaper publication of the Rip Article to any prison unrest or showed
that Farid intended to provoke unrest. Most decisive, the articles are quite
benign and obviously satirical. They are thoughtful, well-written political and
social commentaries that use [*242] historical allusions to make their point.
n11 Simply because the Rip article contains the words "mass
mobilization" does not mean that it can reasonably be interpreted as
Farid's issuing a call for mass mobilization of prisoners.
The
Three-Fifths article draws parallels between the Military Industrial Complex of
yesteryear and the Prison Industrial Complex of today. n12 This article, as
well, cannot be reasonably interpreted as calling for any kind of inmate action
"which may be detrimental to the order of the facility," in violation
of Regulation 104.12.
c.
Center for Law and Justice Application
Farid claims that copies of the application were available on the
counter in the Law Library. That is corroborated by testimony of two other
inmates, Tindell and James, at Farid's Tier III hearing. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 15;
id., p. 16.
Again, there is a troubling disparity between the way Farid was treated
and the way other inmates were treated. Tindell admitted that he had written
the CFLJ and had received materials from them. Farid had seen him reading the
material and asked him for an application. Id., p. 15. Yet, Tindell was not
charged with any violation of regulations prohibiting solicitation of other
inmates, misuse of the copier, or possession of contraband. Farid testified
that he whited-out the information on a copy of the form he possessed so that
he could distribute the form to other inmates who might wish to join the CFLJ.
Id., p. 13.
Captain James found that the application "clearly solicits
money" due to the application fee required. Id., p. 20. Payment of Farid's
yearly dues was approved by the Attica administration. Item 66, P46. Therefore,
it may be assumed, at least for purposes of this motion, that the organization
is an "authorized" organization. Any funds required for membership
were solely payable to the organization and not to Farid. It is a stretch to
treat intended, but unaccomplished, circulation of a document concerning an
authorized organization, calling for no remuneration to Farid, as a
solicitation of other inmates.
Mindful of the latitude to be accorded prison officials to exercise
discretion in matters potentially affecting the safety and order of the prison
environment, the court must pay special attention to First Amendment matters.
In this case, defendants' broad discretion is not impinged, since on the
present record there is no reasonable basis to find that the seized documents
[*243] posed a threat to the safety and good order of Attica. On the present
record, neither the content of the documents, nor the context in which they
were allegedly recovered, represents advocacy of violent prison unrest.
The
court finds that there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether
defendants Simmons, Monin, and James' views of the articles as constituting
threats, and the Petition as an unauthorized document that urged other inmates
to participate in actions detrimental to the order of the facility, were
reasonable. For the reasons set forth above, the court denies defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the issue of First Amendment violations based on
Farid's authorship and possession of the articles and their content.
F. DUE PROCESS
Farid asserts that defendant James, the Tier III hearing officer, was
not impartial, refused to let him call witnesses, and refused to entertain some
of his objections in violation of his due process rights. Specifically: (a)
James refused to hear argument why he should recuse himself as hearing officer
(Item 21, Ex. E, p. 3); (b) James refused to hear argument that the proceeding
was untimely (id.); (c) James denied Farid's request to call Lt. Bradt and officer Petito as witnesses (id.
at 19); and (d) James accepted without question the chronology of events set
forth in the misbehavior report, i.e., that Monin and Simmons first learned of
the Petition after conducting the cell and library searches. Id.
Farid argues that James simply accepted the recitation of facts in the
misbehavior report, and James rejected his claim that no copy of the Petition
was in his cell and that the only copies were found in his library work area.
Id. See also copies of Forms 2176, Item 21, Ex. F.
Due
process requires that prison disciplinary hearings be impartial. Russell v. Selsky, 35 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir.
1994); Colon, 58 F.3d at 871. However, the level of impartiality required of
prison officials conducting disciplinary proceedings does not rise to the level
of impartiality required of judges generally.
Francis v. Coughlin, 891 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1989). Even so, an inmate
must be given "an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety
and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in
his defense . . . ." Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). An impartial
hearing officer "is one who, inter alia, does not prejudge the evidence
and who cannot say . . . how he would assess evidence he has not yet
seen." Patterson v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 564, 570 (2d Cir. 1990).
Here, James denied Farid's request to call witnesses (Bradt and Petito),
whose testimony Farid considered as critical to the merits of his defense that
the Petition could not have been found in his cell and that the charges were
filed in retaliation for his leadership role in authoring and filing the
Petition. Calling the officers would not have implicated any safety concerns. A
similar refusal by a hearing officer to hear testimony challenging the
corrections officer's rendition of facts in a misbehavior report was held to
deprive an inmate of a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. Colon, 58 F.3d at 871. Farid also alleges
that James harbored a pre-existing bias against Muslim inmates, claiming that
James intentionally positioned himself as hearing officer for disciplinary
hearings involving Muslim inmates. Item 61, Ex. F, p. 68; Item 66, P29. For
that reason, Farid sought James' recusal as hearing officer. James denies any
bias.
[*244] The court finds that there is an issue of fact as to whether
James' refusal to consider the merits of Farid's principal defense to the
charges against him was objectively reasonable, and whether James' decisions
violated Farid's federally protected due process rights. See Colon, 58 F.3d at 871. Summary judgment in
favor of James on this claim is not appropriate.
All parties agree that Farid
succeeded in obtaining reversal of the Tier III judgment through an Article 78
proceeding in state court. Although the Article 78 court based its holding on
the fact that the hearing was untimely under the regulations, a procedural
defect sufficient to warrant reversal and expungement, it also commented on
James' denial of allowing correctional officers to be questioned by Farid. Item
72. While this decision has no res judicata effect, it serves as persuasive authority
that Farid's due process rights were violated.
G. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Defendants argue that, as a matter of law, nothing they did rises to the
level of a constitutional violation. In the alternative, defendants allege that even if some of their acts rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, they are entitled to qualified immunity
for such conduct because they acted in the good faith belief that their conduct
was proper.
Qualified immunity does not bar declaratory and injunctive relief. Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir.
1995). Even if qualified immunity were established in this case, it would not
provide grounds for dismissal of all of Farid's claims. Id. at 81. It is a defense which defendants
must plead and prove. Daumutef v. J.M.
Moran, et al, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5045, 1998 WL 166838 at 1 (N.D.N.Y. 1998),
citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
640, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980).
A
public official is not immune from damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he
"knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights"
of the plaintiff. O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975) (quoting
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322, 43 L. Ed. 2d 214, 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975)).
This rule applies to prison officials. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555,
562, 55 L. Ed. 2d 24, 98 S. Ct. 855 (1978).
The
inquiry must be directed to the "objective reasonableness" of the
official's acts. The official will be held liable when his or her conduct
"violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). Whether the law on a
particular issue was clearly established is a question of law to be determined
by the court. Stein v. Bd. of New York,
Bureau of Pupil Transp., 792 F.2d 13, 18 (2d Cir. 1986). The district court looks
to case law decided by the Supreme Court and decisions of the circuit court of
appeals under which it operates. While courts are urged to resolve issues of
qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage in 42 U.S.C. § 1983
litigation, where a factual question material to the issue exists (such as the
reasonableness of the officers' actions), the issue cannot be resolved on a
motion for summary judgment. Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 240 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("Summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not
appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a
determination of reasonableness." (Citation omitted)). "In other
words, if any reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants' actions
were objectively unreasonable, [*245] then the defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment" on qualified immunity grounds. Minigan v. Irvin, 977 F. Supp. 607, 611 (W.D.N.Y. 1997), citing
Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987).
1.
Retaliation
A prisoner's right against
retaliation for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, such as
petitioning the government for redress of grievances, has been clearly
established since at least 1988, in this circuit with Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d
at 589-90 (citing Supreme Court precedent, United Mine Workers v. Ill. State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 19 L. Ed. 2d 426, 88 S. Ct. 353 (1967)). See Richardson v. Coughlin, 763 F. Supp. 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). The court finds that
defendants Monin and Simmons would have been aware of such existing law; and
thus, qualified immunity does not provide them with a defense on the First
Amendment retaliation claim.
2.
First Amendment Violations
Over twenty-five years ago, the Supreme Court wrote, "There is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94
S. Ct. 2963 (1974). The next year, the Second Circuit opined, "First
Amendment rights to hold and express beliefs and receive information are
entitled to 'special solicitude.'" Morgan v. La Vallee, 526 F.2d 221, 224
(2d Cir. 1975) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
83-84, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) citing Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 405-06, 40 L. Ed. 2d 224, 94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974). This right is so
deeply ingrained that prison regulations start with that axiom of American
Democracy as a point of reference, and then proceed to limit the right when a
writing is considered threatening and thus detrimental to prison security. In other words, prison inmates retain
"those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with . . . status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system." Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1053 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation
omitted). The defendants have pointed to the security and order of the prison
population as being the penological interest threatened by the content of the
articles and Petition. Consequently, the test which this court must apply is
whether there is "substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response . . . ." Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 827, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974).
In
this latter regard, New York Corrections Law § 138 provides: "Inmates
shall not be disciplined for making written or oral statements, demands, or
requests involving a change of institutional conditions, policies, rules,
regulations, or laws affecting an institution." N.Y. Correct. Law § 138(4)
(McKinney's 1987). As the discussion, supra, indicates, it is certainly a
reasonable conclusion both that Farid's speech was compatible with New York's
penological objectives, and that the officials' response was exaggerated. See Salahuddin v. Harris, 657 F. Supp. 369,
376-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
It
is also objectively reasonable that defendants Simmons, Monin, and James would
have been aware of Farid's First Amendment rights. In addition, because the
court has found that there is a genuine question of material fact as to whether
defendants Simmons', Monin's, and James' views of the articles as inflammatory
and containing threats were objectively reasonable, qualified immunity is
unavailing to defendants on this claim.
[*246] 3. Due Process
The
basic standards regarding a prisoner's right to call witnesses and present
evidence at a disciplinary hearing were articulated in Wolff v. McDonald, 418
U.S. 539 (1974). See also Russell v. Selsky, 35 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1994). An
inmate subject to a disciplinary hearing is entitled to an impartial hearing
officer. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570-71; Russell, 35 F.3d at 59. It is objectively
reasonable that defendant James would have been aware of such precedent. Thus,
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether James was reasonable in
(a) deciding the correctional officer witnesses Farid sought were irrelevant
and redundant, (b) refusing to entertain his procedural objections, and (c)
refusing to recuse himself. Therefore, qualified immunity does not provide him
a defense on this ground.
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing,
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to defendants Goord, Kelly, and
Selsky is granted. Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to defendant
James is granted on the retaliation claim, but denied on the First Amendment
and Due Process claims; and the motion for summary judgment of defendants Monin
and Simmons is granted on the due process claim and denied on the retaliation
and first amendment claims.
The
court will meet with counsel on Wednesday, April 24, 2002, at 10 a.m.
So
ordered.
JOHN T. CURTIN
United States District Judge
Dated: February 9, 2002
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Initially, Prisoner's
Legal Services was appointed to represent Farid pursuant to an Order filed
April 9, 1997. Item 4. However, Prisoner's Legal Services was permitted to
withdraw when its funding was not renewed by New York State. Items 44, 46.
n2 The record contains
numerous references to allegations that Pratt was attempting to
"smuggle" the article out of the prison. However, it is established
by available documentary evidence and testimony that Pratt voluntarily
surrendered the article for review by the package window officer, as required
before taking it with him on his visit. Furthermore, Pratt was never charged
with any disciplinary violations (Item 21, Ex. E, pp. 10-11), and the smuggling
charge was the one charge against Farid that was dismissed at the disciplinary
hearing.
n3 It is confusing and
unclear who ordered the search of Farid's cell. In spite of Simmons' and
Monin's testimony that Monin ordered the cell and library searches, Item 61,
Ex. B, p. 6, other evidence indicates that a Lieutenant Bradt ordered the cell search. Item 21, Ex.
E, p. 18. The "Inmate Misbehavior Report," containing the
disciplinary charges against Farid, written by defendant Simmons, states that
the cell search was conducted "by order of the watch commander (Lt.
Bradt)." Item 21, Ex. A. However, the documents generated subsequent to
the cell search indicate otherwise. A "Cell Frisk Log Sheet"
indicates that Farid's cell was searched pursuant to the authorization of Lieutenant
Kirkpatrick. Item 23, Ex. D. Defendant Simmons identified the documents
attached as Exhibit D to his affidavit as "documents generated relative to
the search of plaintiff's cell and work area . . . ." Item 23, P9. A
"Search Contraband Report" concerning the search of Farid's cell
identifies the "Supervisor Authorizing Search" as Lieutenant Sweeney.
Item 23, Ex. D.
n4 There is some confusion
regarding whether Farid was questioned only about the Rip Article, or about
both articles. Simmons' Affidavit seems to indicate that Farid was questioned
only about the Rip Article. Item 23, P8; Item 25, P7. But see Item 61, Ex. C,
pp. 6-7, and Item 66, PP19 - 23, indicating Simmons and Monin questioned Farid
about the Rip Article and the Three-Fifths Article.
n5 During his deposition,
Simmons explained his signature on the Contraband Receipt as "my receipt
to inmate Farid for the articles that were taken from the law library; not
necessarily taken by me . . . ." Item 61, Ex. C, p. 11. However, he
admitted that the officer who conducts the search usually fills out the form.
Id., pp. 13-14. Elsewhere, however, Simmons affirms that he "was not
involved in the search of plaintiff's cell, nor the search of plaintiff's work
area in the law library." Item 23, P5.
n6 There are two versions of
the Rip Article in the record on this motion. The one obtained from inmate
Pratt is discussed above. A slightly different version was found in Farid's law
library work station. Item 66, Ex. E; Item 61, Ex. F, pp. 58 - 59. Farid
testified that the version found in the search of his library work station was
an "updated" version of the article. Id. Upon review of these
documents, the court finds a statement concerning "mass prisoner
mobilization" but can find no statement regarding "deplorable
conditions." The "mass prisoner mobilization" language appears
in two contexts. The first: "It is an historical fact that mass prisoner
mobilization, coupled with the civil rights movement, was the principal cause
of much of the reform in the early 1970s." Item 23, Ex. B, p. 2. The
second: "If Pataki's vicious onslaught doesn't provide the catalyst for
mass prisoner mobilization, then what else could? One thing for sure, Rip has
been given the wake-up call." Id. at p. 5.
n7 The copy of the
Three-Fifths article in the record bears the date May 1996. Item 66, Ex. F. No
attempt is made to reconcile the fact that this article is dated after the date
the searches were conducted. One possible explanation is that the documents
actually seized and subsequently used at the Tier III hearing were ordered
destroyed after the hearing by the hearing officer, Captain James. Item 21, Ex.
D.
n8 ACF 10 indicates the
Attica Correctional Facility Law Library copy machine. Item 21, Ex. A. Farid
worked in the Law Library.
n9 It is troubling that
inmate Pratt, who admittedly also "possessed" the Rip Article, was
not charged with a violation of prison rules. Item 21, Ex. E, p. 10. This
evidences that to some extent defendants singled out Farid for adverse
treatment.
n10 The New York State
Supreme Court held in Abdur-Raheem v. Goord, 244 A.D. 2d 937, 665 N.Y.S. 2d 152
(2nd Dept. 1997), that to find an inmate guilty of violating Rule 104.12,
"the inmate must 'lead, organize, participate, or urge other inmates to
participate * * * in actions,' and not merely intend to do so." In the
case at bar, no evidence exists that Farid actually attempted to organize, etc.
other inmates to any action detrimental to the order of the facility.
n11 The Rip article
comments, from a prisoner's point of view, on how prison conditions have
worsened over the years. Among the "inflammatory" statements cited by
defendants, which provoked the searches and disciplinary charges, are the
statements, "Mass prisoner mobilization coupled with the Civil Rights
movement was the principal cause of prisoner reforms in the early 1970s."
Evidently this was an historical reference. Item 66, Ex. E, p. 2. Farid points
to the massive prison-building campaign promoted by former Governor Cuomo as
bringing in its wake a lessening of prisoner's rights. He then comments how the
pendulum has now swung back to pre-1970 conditions and provides examples of
difficulties experienced by prisoners. The article ends by musing that Gov.
Pataki's policies could be a blessing in disguise: "If Pataki's vicious
onslaught doesn't provide the catalyst for mass prisoner mobilization, then
what else could? One thing for sure, Rip has been given the wake-up call."
Id., p. 4. That statement is a commentary that Pataki's policies may provoke
prisoner reaction, not urging that action follow.
n12 It refers to current
inequalities between white and black Americans, and posits that the "War
on Crime" is "a shabbily disguised way of declaring war on African
descendants and other people of color in the United States." Item 66, Ex.
F, p. 4.