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JEFFREY HARGETT, KIM A. OVERLIN, JIMMIE SMITH, and LOREN K.WALKER, individually, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. LINDA R. BAKER, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, MARY BASS, Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services, TIMOTHY BUDZ, Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the Joliet Correctional Center, RAYMOND WOODS, Clinical Director, and TRAVIS HINZE, Associate Clinical Director, Defendants.
Case No. 02 C 1456
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13721
July 25, 2002, Decided
July 25, 2002, Filed
Plaintiffs Jeffery Hargett, Kim
A. Overlin, Jimmie Smith, and Loren K. Walker brought this action individually
and on behalf of a class of persons similarly situated against Defendants Linda
R. Baker, Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, Mary Bass,
Head Facility Administrator for the Illinois Department of Human Services,
Timothy Budz, Facility Director of the Sexually Violent Persons Unit at the
Joliet Correctional Center, Raymond Woods, Clinical Director, and Travis Hinze,
Associate Clinical Director. Plaintiffs assert a civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Before the Court
is Defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety pursuant to
FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
Concerned with alarmingly high recidivism rates among sex offenders,
states began in the 1990's to enact civil commitment regimes for the detention
and treatment of those found to be "sexual predators" or
"sexually dangerous." Illinois revisited its existing regime for
civil commitment of the "sexually dangerous" by enacting the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act in 1997. See 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. Under Illinois'
civil commitment program, a "sexually violent person"
("SVP") is defined as a "person who has been convicted of a
sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually
violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by
reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in
acts of sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f). Once found to qualify as an
SVP under the Act, the person is committed to the custody of the Sexually
Violent Persons Unit operated by the Illinois Department of Human Services
(the "DHS") at its Joliet Correctional Center. See 725 ILCS 207/40.
SVPs confined under the Act remain in DHS custody until such time as "the
person is no longer sexually violent." 725 ILCS 207/40(a).
Plaintiffs filed a class action
complaint challenging what they characterize as the impermissibly punitive
conditions of their confinement and the
constitutionally inadequate treatment they receive as detainees in the
Sexually Violent Persons Unit in Joliet. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that
the punitive conditions and inadequacies of the treatment program work together
to deprive SVPs at the Joliet facility of a realistic opportunity to progress
through the treatment program and gain their release. Plaintiffs' class action
complaint seeks, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the conditions of
confinement and mental health treatment of the SVPs violate rights protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs also
request a permanent injunction against Defendants compelling them to implement
a plan correcting the alleged constitutional deficiencies in the current
program. Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
DISCUSSION
Standard
In
ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must construe all well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 474 (1974).
A motion to dismiss will not be granted unless it "appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which
would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L.
Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). Motions to dismiss test whether the plaintiff
has properly stated a claim upon which relief could be granted, not whether the
plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236.
Illinois Department of Human Services as Defendant
Citing to the large body of cases dealing with municipal liability in §
1983 claims, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs' real action lies against the
Department of Human Services and that the official capacity claims against them
should be dismissed as redundant. Defendants ask the Court to disregard the
well-established principle that states and state agencies enjoy immunity from
suit in federal courts under the Eleventh Amendment. See Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 152 L. Ed. 2d 962, 122 S.
Ct. 1864, 525 U.S. (2002) (reexamining the boundaries of state
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). In addition to Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit, neither a state nor a state agency is viewed as a
"person" for purposes of § 1983 and are therefore not amenable to
suit. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). Despite the
broad immunity from suit enjoyed by states and state agencies, plaintiffs may
file actions for prospective relief against state officials in federal court
when they allege that enforcement of state law violates rights guaranteed by
the federal Constitution. See Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908). Plaintiffs were
correct in naming the officials in question, rather than the Department of
Human Services, as the proper defendants in this case. See Lett v. Magnant, 965 F.2d 251, 256 (7th
Cir. 1992).
§
1983 - Inadequate Mental Health Treatment
Defendants assert that there is
no set of facts Plaintiffs could produce to substantiate their claim that the
treatment program provided to SVPs is constitutionally inadequate. As an
initial matter, Defendants contend that
substantive due process does not require states to provide mental health
treatment to civilly detained, sexually violent persons. Contrary to
Defendants' suggestion, the issue of whether or not involuntarily civilly
committed SVPs possess a substantive due process right to meaningful mental
health treatment was not definitively resolved by Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). Indeed, the language used in
Hendricks suggests divergent resolutions of this question. Compare Id. at 366 (stating that, even if the
primary objective of the Kansas Act is to continue incarceration and not to
provide treatment, "this does not rule out that an ancillary purpose of
the Act was to provide treatment, and it does not require us to conclude that
the Act is punitive"), with Id.
at 368 n.4 (citing Allen v. Illinois, for the proposition that "the State
serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons
by committing them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric
care and treatment." 478 U.S. 364, 373, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S.
Ct. 2988 (1986)). The Illinois SVP Act is, however, distinguishable from the
Kansas Act in one important aspect. As noted in Hendricks, the Kansas Supreme
Court found that, in enacting the Kansas SVP Act, "the clear and
overriding concern of the legislature [was] to continue the segregation of
sexually violent offenders from the public. Treatment with a goal of
reintegrating them into society [was] incidental, at best." 521 U.S. at
365 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). In contrast, the primary purpose of the
Illinois SVP Act is to give the individual an opportunity to receive treatment
for his propensity to commit sexual offenses. See People v. Trainor, 196 Ill.2d 318, 752 N.E.2d 1055, 1058-59,
256 Ill. Dec. 813 (Ill. 2001)(stating that, in creating and amending the Act,
the primary objective of the Illinois legislature was to provide for individual
treatment of SVPs "designed to effect recovery"). When, as in
Illinois, treatment is used as a primary justification for civil confinement,
fundamental fairness requires that the involuntarily civilly committed person
receive such individual treatment as will provide him a meaningful chance to
improve and win his eventual release. See, e.g., Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002); D.W. v.
Rogers, 113 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 1997); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79,
92-95 (3d Cir. 1986).
The
Court recognizes that, under the professional judgment standard set forth in Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982), states
enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens and that the decisions of
the professional decision maker overseeing a state institution are
presumptively valid. Liability may be imposed only when treatment decisions
represent a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards." Id. While Youngberg certainly sets a high bar for
Plaintiffs, the question of whether professional judgment has in fact been
exercised by the administrators of the Joliet facility cannot be resolved on a
motion to dismiss. Recent
cases such as McKune v. Lile, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 536 U.S. (2002) may have made it extremely
difficult for Plaintiffs to advance arguments regarding certain aspects of
their treatment, but it is still possible that Plaintiffs could establish that Defendants failed to
exercise professional judgment in other aspects of the SVP treatment program.
§
1983 - Conditions of Confinement
Defendants repeatedly and
vigorously remind the Court that cases such as Youngberg and Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995) require federal courts
to afford "appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 482 (citations omitted). Fair enough. Appropriate deference
is not, however, unbounded deference, which is precisely what Defendants seem
to be seeking when they contend that Plaintiffs' challenge to the conditions of
their confinement fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
While Youngberg and Sandin require substantial deference to the judgment of
officials managing state institutions, these and other cases also recognize
that this deference is not absolute.
For civil commitment of SVPs to
operate within the bounds of the Constitution, a purpose of that confinement,
even if it is only an ancillary purpose, must be treatment as opposed to
continuing punishment for past crimes.
Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366-68, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997).
Moreover, "persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to
more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at
321-22. Reviewing a challenge
to an earlier version of Illinois' Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, the Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff in that case had not demonstrated that sexually
dangerous persons in Illinois were confined under impermissibly punitive
conditions. The Court also found that the conditions imposed on Illinois' SVPs
at that time bore a reasonable relationship to the State's interest in treatment.
See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,
373, 92 L. Ed. 2d 296, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986). However, the Court noted that
"had petitioner shown, for example, that the confinement of such persons
imposes on them a regimen which is essentially identical to that imposed upon
felons with no need for psychiatric care, this might well be a different
case." Id. This may or may not be such a case. The bar which Plaintiffs
must eventually clear to survive summary judgment on the conditions of
confinement aspect of their claim is admittedly high, but it is not so
insurmountable as to require the Court to hold that no set of facts, if proven,
would entitle them to relief. Regardless of whether they will ultimately
prevail on the merits. Plaintiffs' complaint challenging their treatment and
the conditions of their confinement properly states a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge
United States District Court
Date: July 25, 2002