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SHERRI A. TURNER, Plaintiff, v. RAYMOND M. KIGHT, et al.,Defendants.
Civil Action No. AW-01-1408
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, SOUTHERN DIVISION
192 F. Supp. 2d 391
March 25, 2002, Decided
March 25, 2002, Filed
This case arises out of various
claims of federal civil rights and state constitutional and common law violations
related to the arrest and detention of Plaintiff Sherri A. Turner by
Defendants Raymond M. Kight, [*394] Bruce P. Sherman, Rodney Brown, Richard
Kane, Robin Lewis, William Pechnick, Eric Brown, and Brian Phillips
("State Defendants"), as well as Defendants Arthur M. Wallenstein,
Theresa Hicks, Robert Andrews, and Montgomery County ("County
Defendants"). Several motions are pending before the Court: (1) State
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment [7-1; 7-2]; (2)
County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, or in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment [8-1; 8-2]; (3) State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative
to Strike [12-1; 12-2]; (4) County Defendants Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint and/or Motion for Summary Judgment [13-1; 13-2]; (5) Plaintiff's
Cross-Motion for Continuance to Permit Discovery [14-1]; and (6) Plaintiff's
Motion to Excuse Late Filing [17-1].
The
Court has reviewed the pleadings and applicable law and has determined that no
hearing is necessary. See D. Md. R. 105(6). For the reasons stated below, the
Court will deny as moot both the State and County Defendants' Motions to
Dismiss, or the in Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Court will grant
summary judgment to the Defendants on Counts I through VIII, and Counts X and
XI. In addition, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on Counts
IX and XII. The Court will dismiss all remaining state counts (Counts XIII to
XIX). Finally, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance to Permit
Discovery and will grant Plaintiff's Motion to Excuse Late Filing.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a forty-five year
old African American physician who resides in Montgomery County, Maryland. As a
result of an automobile accident in 1997, Plaintiff sustained spinal cord
injuries, which she claims rendered her disabled. See Pl.'s Am. Compl. at P6.
On February 7, 2002, Plaintiff's fifteen-year old daughter was struck by an
automobile and hospitalized for a week. Plaintiff stayed with her daughter
during the hospitalization period, and as a result missed a February 9, 2000
appearance in the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County for an oral
examination in aid of enforcement of a former landlord's money judgment.
Plaintiff claims that she sent a
letter dated March 7, 2000, to the state court requesting a new appearance date
for the following summer. On March 30, 2000, however, the state court issued an
arrest warrant for Plaintiff on a charge of contempt of court. According to the
arrest warrant, Turner was required to post bond in the amount of $5,500.00. On
April 6, 2000, the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office sent Plaintiff a notice
advising her of the arrest warrant and
requesting her immediate response. Allegedly without knowledge of the March 30
arrest warrant, Plaintiff sent the court a second letter by certified mail on
April 7, 2000.
Plaintiff claims that upon
receipt of the April 6 notice, she initiated telephone calls over the next
three days to the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office and spoke with three
individuals, including Defendant Kane. During the conversations, Plaintiff
claims that she explained that she is disabled, needed to arrange handicap
transport, and advised Defendant Kane that she would call him ahead of time to
let him know when she was coming so that she could come in and handle the
matter expeditiously. State Defendants claim that on April 7, 2000, Plaintiff
contacted the Sheriff's Office and advised it that she would turn herself in on
April 13, 2000. See State Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss, or in the [*395]
Alternative, for Summ. J., or, in the Alternative, to Strike ("Defs. 's
Mot. to Dismiss") at 3. State Defendants claim that Plaintiff called again
to change the turn-in date to April 14, 2000. However, Plaintiff did not appear
on either date, nor did she call to schedule an alternative date. Id.
Five days later, on April 19, 2002, Defendants Lewis and Pechnick, along
with a third officer, went to Plaintiff's home. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendants Lewis and Pechnick "stormed into Plaintiff's residence while
Plaintiff was in bed, terrifying Plaintiff's daughters." Pl.'s Am. Compl.
at P27. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lewis shouted orders to Plaintiff and
told her "'to stop talking because she was going to jail' and that she
'understood' Plaintiff and Plaintiff's 'game.'" Id. at P28. Plaintiff
alleges that she informed Defendant Lewis that she had been in touch with
Defendant Kane, and after verifying that information, Defendant Lewis told
Plaintiff to come to the Sheriff's Office by April 21, 2000, or else be
arrested and spend the weekend in jail. State Defendants claim that during the
visit, they "observed Turner walking down the steps of her home 'without
the assistance of a cane or a noticeable limp'" and that they agreed not
to arrest Turner, but to allow her a third opportunity to turn herself in.
State Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.
On
April 20, 2000, unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the District Court of Maryland for
Montgomery County set a May 17, 2000 hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
Body Attachment. On April 21, 2000, Plaintiff came to the Montgomery County
Sheriff's Office with her fourteen-year old daughter. Defendant Pechnick
instructed Plaintiff to leave her pocketbook and to accompany him, which she did.
Plaintiff alleges that she was then "taken to a room, handcuffed to a
table and arrested." Plaintiff claims that Defendant Pechnick then
searched Plaintiff and required her to surrender all her belongings, including
her medicine and neck brace, copies of the papers Plaintiff had filed with the
court, and documentation about her medical disability. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Pechnick noted Plaintiff's three spinal surgery scars, and commented
that the scars were "'nothing, they will go away.'" Pl.'s Am. Compl.
at P33.
Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant Pechnick drove her to a holding
cell at the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County and that when she
asked for her neck brace and medicine to alleviate pain and muscle spasms,
Defendant Pechnick refused her request. Plaintiff then alleges that she was detained for four
hours without any lunch, was in "excruciating pain and suffering from
muscle spasms and stiffness," and was once again denied her medication and
neck brace. Id. at P36.
Plaintiff claims that she was then taken to see a judge, who refused to
listen to her explanation about her motion to strike body attachment and
required that she post a $100.00 cash bond before her release. Plaintiff was
then taken to a holding cell for two hours while her daughter attempted to post
bond. Plaintiff claims that her daughter was incorrectly informed that
Plaintiff had $20.00, and that as a result, her daughter attempted to post only
$80.00, only to be told that another $20.00 was required. State Defendants
contend that because Plaintiff was unable to post the $100.00 bond, Plaintiff
was transferred pursuant to the state judge's order to the Montgomery County
Detention Center at approximately 2:45 p.m. State Defs.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.
Plaintiff next alleges that
Defendants Brown and Phillips took Plaintiff on a painful van ride to the
Montgomery County Detention Center, during which the officers [*396] refused to
answer her inquiries regarding the welfare of her child, her right to a
telephone call, her medicine, her tote bag with neck brace, an opportunity to
see a doctor, and how she could be expected to arrange bail. Plaintiff claims
that she was made to sit without seatbelts facing a steel door and that the
risk of trauma from any sudden stop caused Plaintiff to suffer paralyzing fear.
Plaintiff claims that when she
arrived at the Montgomery County Detention Center, she was again denied her
medication and medical attention and was subjected to "a prolonged period
of 'processing'." Pl.'s Am. Compl. at P44. On the other hand,
Plaintiff subsequently asserts that the booking process took approximately five
minutes. Id. at P45. Plaintiff also alleges that she was strip searched by
Defendant Hicks and then placed in a cell for six hours, during which time
Defendant Hicks, Andrews, and Phillips "repeatedly taunted and mocked and
denied [Plaintiff] medical attention." Id. at P47. Plaintiff claims that she continued to experience
uncontrolled pain, muscle spasms, and medication withdrawal symptoms, was
taunted by Defendant Phillips, and finally released at 9:30 p.m., approximately
twelve and a half hours after she first arrived at the Montgomery County
Sheriff's Office.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that subsequent to her release, she wrote
several letters complaining of the events. She claims that Defendant R. Brown
contacted her and "taunted, mocked and belittled" her. Id. at 50. In
addition, she received a letter from Defendant Sherman which stated that the
matter would be investigated; however, no corrective action was taken.
Plaintiff also alleges that she received copy of a memorandum from a Montgomery
County Council member to Defendant Wallenstein expressing concern about
Plaintiff's experience; however, Plaintiff is unaware if any response was
received from Defendant Wallenstein.
As
a result of the above stated factual claims, in her Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff claims due process violations as a result of the policies,
directives, and training condoned by Defendants Kight, Sherman, R. Brown, Kane,
Lewis, and Wallenstein and executed by their respective employees (Counts I,
II, III, IV, V, IX). In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Pechnick, E.
Brown, Phillips, Hicks, and Andrews violated her due process rights by arresting
her without an opportunity to be heard, denying her medical attention, and
causing her physical and emotional suffering (Counts VI, VII, VIII, X, XI).
Plaintiff further claims that Montgomery County is liable for ratifying
Defendants' acts and omissions in violating her constitutional rights (Count
XII).
Plaintiff also alleges several state claims. First, Plaintiff claims
violations of Articles 24 and 25 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights for the
Defendants' use of excessive force and summary punishment (Count XIII). Next,
Plaintiff claims compensatory and exemplary damages for intentional infliction
of emotional distress by Defendants Lewis, Pechnick, E. Brown, Phillips, Hicks,
and Andrews (Counts XIV, XV). Plaintiff also claims respondeat superior
liability for Defendant Montgomery County for compensatory and exemplary
damages due to the intentional torts Defendant police officers (Counts XVI,
XVIII). Plaintiff next claims respondeat superior liability for Defendant
Montgomery County for compensatory damages for the negligence of Defendants
committed within the scope of their employment (Count XVII). Finally, Plaintiff
claims negligence by Defendants Kight,
Sherman, Kane, R. Brown, Wallenstein, and Montgomery County for
compensatory damages for negligence in failing to provide adequate [*397]
training, supervision and control of employees Lewis, Pechnick, E. Brown,
Phillips, Hicks, and Andrews (Count XIX).
Plaintiff requests that the Court: (1) issue a declaratory judgment that
the acts, policies, practices, and procedures of Defendants violated her due
process and equal protection rights; (2) issue an injunction prohibiting
Defendants from engaging in the acts complained of and requiring Defendants to
take appropriate corrective action; (3) award Plaintiff $5,000,000 in
compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages; (4) expunge
Plaintiff's record of the arrest; and (5) award such other further relief as
may be deemed just and reasonable.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Both the State and County Defendants filed motions to dismiss, or in the
alternative, for summary judgment in response to Plaintiff's Complaint. Rather
than oppose the motions, Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint in an
apparent attempt to address the Defendants' arguments contained in their
motions. State Defendants again moved to dismiss the amended complaint, or in
the alternative, for summary judgment, or in the alternative, to strike the
Plaintiff's amended complaint. County Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, or in the alternative, for summary judgment.
"A party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a). Because no responsive motion has yet been served, Plaintiff's amended
complaint is properly before the Court. See
McDonald v. Hall, 579 F.2d 120, 120 (1st Cir. 1978) ("Neither a
motion to dismiss nor one for summary judgment is a responsive pleading for
purposes of Rule 15(a)"); Ocean Breeze Festival Park, Inc. v. Reich , 853
F. Supp. 906, 919 (E.D. Va. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Va. Beach Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Reich, 96 F.3d 1440
(4th Cir. 1996) (noting that "under Rule 7, motions are not considered responsive
pleadings"). As a result, Plaintiff's first complaint is superseded by the
amended complaint. See Young v. City
of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crysen/Montenay
Energy Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 226 F.3d 160, 162 (2nd Cir. 2000)) (noting that as
a general rule, "an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original
pleading and renders it of no legal effect"); 6 Charles Alan Wright, et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (2d ed. 1990) ("A pleading that
has been amended ... supersedes the pleading it modifies .... Once an amended
pleading is interposed, the original pleading no longer performs any function
in the case."). The Court will thus deny as moot the State and County
Defendants' respective first motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for
summary judgment. Instead, the Court will consider the Plaintiff's amended
complaint, and the State and County
Defendants' second motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary
judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Motion to Dismiss
It
is well established that a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be denied unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim
which would entitle it to relief. See
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99
(1957). In determining whether to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must view the well-pleaded
material allegations in a [*398] light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true. See Flood v. New Hanover County, 125 F.3d 249,
251 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co.,
Inc., 14 F.3d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1994)); Chisolm v. TranSouth Finan. Corp.,
95 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 1996); J.C. Driskill, Inc. v. Abdnor, 901 F.2d 383
(4th Cir. 1990).
The
Court, however, is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation." See
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209, 106 S. Ct. 2932
(1986) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981)). Nor is the
Court "bound to accept [Plaintiff's] conclusory allegations regarding the
legal effect of the facts alleged." United Mine Workers of Am. v. Wellmore
Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1979). As the Fourth Circuit
explained, the purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to provide a defendant with a
mechanism for testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and not the facts
that support it. See Randall v. United
States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
326-27, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338, 109 S. Ct. 1827 (1989); United Mine Workers, 609
F.2d at 1085. Thus, a complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law if it lacks
a cognizable legal theory or if it alleges insufficient facts under a
cognizable legal theory. See Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d
530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing 2A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
P12.08 at 2271 (2d ed. 1982)).
2. Motion for Summary Judgment
A
motion for summary judgment will be granted only if "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). In other words, if
there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by
a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.In assessing a motion for summary
judgment, all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587-88, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). A party who bears the burden
of proof on a particular claim must factually support each element of his or
her claim. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element
. . . necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 323. At the same time, "Rule 56(e) itself provides that a party
opposing a properly supported motion
for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his
pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.
ANALYSIS
42
U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress...
[*399]
42
U.S.C. § 1983. To prevail under this statute, Plaintiff must show that she was
"deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state
law." Am. Mfs. Mut. Insur. Co v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, 143 L. Ed.
2d 130, 119 S. Ct. 977(1999); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715
(4th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff bases her section 1983 claims on contentions that Defendants
violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court will
address Plaintiff's claims in turn.
1. Supervisory Liability
a.
State Defendants
In
the first five Counts, n1 Plaintiff asserts claims of respondeat superior
liability of supervisor Defendants Kight, Sherman, R. Brown, Kane, and Lewis.
Plaintiff contends that the other State employees "acted pursuant to
policies, directives and training instituted, condoned, ratified and
authorized" by these Defendants and that they were "deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff's Constitutional rights." Pl.'s Am. Compl. PP54,
55.
Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate supervisory liability, the
Court will grant summary judgment for the defendants on Counts I, II, III, IV,
and V. Section 1983 does not provide for respondeat superior liability; rather,
liability is premised "on a recognition that supervisory indifference or
tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in
the constitutional injuries they
inflict on those committed to their care." Slakan v. Porter, et al., 737
F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984); see also
Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999).In order to
establish such a claim, "[a] plaintiff must show actual or constructive
knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury, deliberate indifference to that
risk, and 'an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's
inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.'" Carter, 164 F.3d at 221 (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791
(4th Cir. 1994)).
In Plaintiff Turner's Amended
Complaint, she fails to allege any facts that indicate actual or constructive
knowledge of a risk of constitutional injury by Defendants Kight, Sherman, R.
Brown, or Kane. As noted in Slakan v. Porter, et al., knowledge of risk of
constitutional injury is not normally based on "a single incident or
isolated incidents," but more likely is based on "continued action in
the face of documented widespread abuses." Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373. Here,
not only is the alleged constitutional injury a single event, but Plaintiff's
complaint is completely devoid of facts to support her claims as to Defendants
Kight, Sherman, R. Brown, or Kane. In fact, Defendant R. Brown's only
involvement with Plaintiff was after he was assigned to investigate a complaint
forwarded to the Sheriff's Office. Brown Aff., Ex. A. Likewise, Defendants
Kane's, Kight's, and Sherman's interactions with Plaintiff were limited to the
paperwork involved with Plaintiff's arrest warrant and subsequent complaint.
See Kane Aff., Kight Aff., Sherman Aff., Ex. A.
Plaintiff's claim of supervisory liability for Defendant Lewis must also
fail. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lewis accompanied [*400] Defendant
Pechnick to her home on April 19, 2000, and Defendant Lewis "shouted
orders" to Plaintiff and told Plaintiff "'to stop talking because she
was going to jail and that she 'understood' Plaintiff's game." Pl.'s Am.
Compl. P28. Such language, however, does not rise to the level of a
constitutional injury or deliberate indifference to constitutional injury.
Cf. Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215,
219 n.3 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that a officer's use of racial epithets is
"undeniably deplorable and unprofessional behavior [that] does not by
itself rise to the level of a constitutional violation."). In addition,
other than Defendant Lewis's lawful presence at Plaintiff's home on April 19,
2000, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts demonstrating a causal link between
Lewis's inaction and the alleged constitutional injury; thus, her claim against
Defendant Lewis must fail.
In sum, Plaintiff provides no
factual basis that Defendants Kight, Sherman, R. Brown, Kane, or Lewis did
anything, directed, supervised, ordered, or otherwise acquiesced in any action
taken against her. Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to identify any policy,
directive, or training that caused the alleged violations. Without more, these
bald allegations are insufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability
under section 1983; thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Counts
I through V is granted.
b.
County Defendant
In Count IX, Plaintiff claims
compensatory and punitive damages against County Defendant Wallenstein for his
supervisory role over employees at the Montgomery County Detention Center.
Plaintiff's claims mirror those of the supervisory State Defendants, and like
those claims, she has failed to plead any facts that demonstrate supervisory
liability. Nowhere in her amended complaint does Plaintiff allege that
Defendant Wallenstein had any personal knowledge or involvement in Plaintiff's arrest. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant
Wallenstein had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk of constitutional
injury, that he demonstrated deliberate indifference to that risk, or that his
action was causally like to the injury suffered by Plaintiff. See Carter, 164
F.3d at 221. Given the utter lack of factual support, the Court will dismiss
Count IX for failure to state a claim.
2. Employee Liability
a.
Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S.
Ct. 2727 (1982). In evaluating a qualified immunity defense, the trial court
"'must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation
of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine
whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.'" Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 119 S.
Ct. 1692 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 143 L. Ed. 2d 399, 119
S. Ct. 1292 (1999)); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151,
2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). In determining whether a right is clearly
established, "the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S.
Ct. 3034 (1987). "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining [*401]
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted." Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156.
The
qualified immunity analysis "is designed to 'spare a defendant not only
unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those
defending a long drawn out lawsuit." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. Thus,
"until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not
be allowed." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. By so doing, the court will reduce
the social costs associated with bringing suit against a public official, such
as "expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing
public issues, [] the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office," and the
chilling effect on a public official's pursuit of official duties. Id. at 814; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598,
140 L. Ed. 2d 759, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998) (noting that a court must determine
the threshold question of the immunity defense before permitting discovery);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806
(1985) (same). In this way, qualified immunity serves as an "immunity from
suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526;
see also Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156.
b.
State Defendants
In
Counts VI, VII, and VIII, Plaintiff claims constitutional violations pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to the allegedly unconstitutional behavior of State
Defendants Pechnick, E. Brown, and Phillips during Plaintiff's arrest and
detention. First, Plaintiff contends that Defendants had knowledge of
Plaintiff's medical condition and information about her request for another hearing. Pl.'s Am. Compl. PP83, 90, 96.
Plaintiff next claims that Defendants knew or should have known that the state
court granted Plaintiff's motion for a hearing and that with callous and
deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendants
nonetheless arrested her and denied her medical attention and accommodation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at PP84-86, 91-93, 97-99.
Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendants' actions caused her to suffer
excruciating pain, an unnecessary worsening of her condition, life threatening
complications, and severe emotional distress, and that Defendants engaged in
actual malice and deliberate indifference and disregard to Plaintiff's
constitutional rights. Id. at PP80-81, 87-88, 100-01.
Defendants Pechnick, E. Brown, and Phillips raise qualified immunity as
a defense to Plaintiff's claims of Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
violations while she was a pretrial detainee. As discussed in Young v. City of
Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 (4th Cir. 2001), "the substantive due process
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against egregious, arbitrary
governmental conduct." Id. at 574 (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 845-46, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998)). Normally,
"only governmental conduct that 'shocks the conscience' is actionable as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. However, action "'falling within the
middle range' of culpability--that is, conduct that is more than negligent but
less than intentional--can give rise to liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id.
In
Young, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were "deliberately
indifferent" to their son's medical needs and that they "failed to
protect" their son "from a known and substantial risk of [*402] harm
while he was in their custody." Id. In that case, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiffs' claims fell within the limited "middle
range" of culpability because deliberate indifference "is viewed as
sufficiently shocking to the conscience that it can support a Fourteenth
Amendment claim." Id. The Young court found that pretrial detainees are
afforded the same constitutional protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as
are convicted prisoners under the Eighth Amendment, id. (citing City of Revere
v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 77 L. Ed. 2d 605, 103 S. Ct. 2979
(1983)), and that thus, "deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of a pretrial detainee violates the due process clause." Id. ; see
also Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692,
695 (4th Cir. 1999); Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1990).
Like the situation in Young, Plaintiff's due process claims can be
analyzed under the Eighth Amendment standard. See Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829, 834 (4th Cir. 2001); Grayson,
195 F.3d at 695; Mitchell v. Aluisi, et al, 872 F.2d 577, 581 (4th Cir. 1989).
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976), the
Supreme Court outlined the parameters of an Eighth Amendment violation, i.e.,
"deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id. at 104 (citing Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976) (joint
opinion). The Supreme Court has articulated the test for deliberate
indifference to be that "the official must both be aware of the facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994); see also Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695 ("In order to
establish a claim of deliberate indifference to medical need, the need must be
both apparent and serious, and the denial of
attention must be both deliberate and without legitimate penological
objective."); White, et al. v. Chambliss, et al., 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("A claim of deliberate indifference ... implies that at a
minimum that defendants were plainly placed on notice of a danger and chose to
ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice").
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a constitutional violation
under the Eighth Amendment, the Court must grant summary judgment to Defendants
Pechnick, E. Brown, and Phillips. First, the pain described in Plaintiff's
amended complaint does not rise to the level of a serious medical need. Second,
even if Plaintiff had shown such a need, she has not alleged that Defendants
actually knew of and ignored her serious need for medical care. White, et al., 112 F.3d at 737. Although
Plaintiff walked with a cane and carried a neck brace, it does not follow that
Defendants drew the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. In fact,
Plaintiff told Defendants that there was "something wrong with her
hip," but while at her home and in the presence of Defendants Lewis and
Pechnick, she walked without a cane and without a noticeable limp. Incident
Report, Ex. 3. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff posits that she had
disability papers documenting her medical condition. Pl.'s Am. Comp. P33.
However, it does not follow that during the officers' routine booking of
Plaintiff they would have reviewed those materials and thereby become aware of
a risk of serious medical need--especially when there is no indication that
Plaintiff notified the Defendants of the documentation. [*403]
In
her amended complaint Plaintiff claims that during the arrest, Defendant
Pechnick noted Plaintiff's three scars and said that they were "nothing,
they will go away." Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff contends that she told
Defendant Pechnick that "she needed her neck brace and medication to
alleviate pain and muscle spasms" but that Defendant Pechnick refused to
return those items to her. Pl.'s Am. Compl. PP33, 35. Plaintiff's complaints to
Defendant Pechnick of pain and muscle spasms do not provide objective evidence
from which he would infer that a serious medical need existed. Pechnick Aff.,
Ex. B; see also Off. of the County Sheriff, General Operational Procedures, Ex.
5 at 10-11 (allowing administering of only medicine packaged by the Montgomery
County Detention Center Medical Personnel).
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendants E. Brown and
Phillips were aware of a serious medical need. Plaintiff again contends that
she was refused her medication and neck brace after being arrested, and that
she was forced to limp painfully through the building while suffering back
spasms. Pl.'s Am. Comp. P36. As with Defendant Pechnick, Plaintiff fails to
state how Defendants E. Brown and Phillips could and did infer that a serious
medical need was present.
Although not explicit in her amended complaint, Plaintiff also appears
to argue that Defendants unlawfully arrested her because the state court had
scheduled a hearing on her arrest warrant the day before she turned herself in
to the Sheriff's Office. Because there was no deprivation of a constitutional
right under the Fourth Amendment, Defendants' qualified immunity defense
prevails as to these claims.
The
Fourth Circuit has held that where a judge failed to recall an arrest warrant
and a plaintiff was nonetheless arrested pursuant to the facially valid
warrant, no constitutional violation occurred. See Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872
F.2d 577, 578 (4th Cir. 1989); cf.
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144-45, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433, 99 S. Ct.
2689 (1979) (holding that absent an attack on a facially valid arrest warrant,
a plaintiff has no constitutional claim if he was arrested despite protests of
mistaken identity). At most, the Mitchell court found that the oversight was
"nothing more than an act of negligence" and that "defendants'
conduct demonstrates at most a lack of due care." Mitchell, 872 F.2d at
578; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
In
the case at hand, Plaintiff does not contest that the arrest was pursuant to a
invalid arrest warrant. Rather, she contends that Defendants "knew or should
have known that the District Court of Maryland for Montgomery County had
indeed, on April 20, 2000, granted Plaintiff said opportunity to be
heard." Pl.'s Am. Compl. P84-85, 91-92, 97-98. This oversight alone,
however, does not rise to a level of constitutional violation. From all
accounts, Defendants Lewis and Pechnick arrived at Plaintiff's home on April
19, 2000, pursuant to the outstanding valid arrest warrant. Plaintiff then came
to the Sheriff's Office on April 21, 2000, and was arrested based on that same
warrant. Even taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she
has stated no constitutional violation, Defendants' qualified immunity defense
as to these claims is properly evoked.
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment to State
Defendants Pechnick, E. Brown, and Phillips on Counts VI through VIII. As noted
by the Fourth Circuit, "the Constitution is designed to deal with
deprivations of rights, not errors in judgment, even though such errors may
have unfortunate [*404] consequences." Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695-96.
Because the Court finds that no constitutional right was violated, it is
unnecessary to analyze the second step of the qualified immunity analysis,
i.e., whether the constitutional right was clearly established. This brings me
to the federal claims against the County Defendants.
c.
County Defendants
Plaintiff claims that Defendant
Hicks violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because
Defendant Hicks had knowledge of Plaintiff's medical condition and information
about her request for another hearing. Pl.'s Am. Compl. P109. Plaintiff
next claims that Defendant Hicks knew or should have known that the state court
granted Plaintiff's request for a hearing and knew that Plaintiff had been
searched while in the custody of the Sheriff's office. Id. P110. Plaintiff
contends that despite Defendant Hicks's knowledge, that Defendant Hicks
"with callous and deliberate indifference ... seized Plaintiff,"
unreasonably strip searched Plaintiff, and denied Plaintiff medical attention
and accommodation. Id. P111. Finally, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hicks's
actions caused her to suffer excruciating pain, an unnecessary worsening of her
condition, life threatening complications, and severe emotional distress, and
that Defendant Hicks engaged in actual malice and deliberate indifference and
disregard to Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. PP113-14. With the
exception of the unreasonable strip search, Plaintiff alleges the same claims
against Defendant Andrews in his violation of Plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. PP116-21. As with the State Defendants, a qualified
immunity defense is appropriate, and the Court therefore will grant summary
judgment to Defendants Hicks and Andrews on Counts X and XI.
Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by Defendant Hicks. As discussed
above, the State Defendants' arrest of Plaintiff did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Regardless, as an employee of the Montgomery County Detention Center (MCDC),
Defendant Hicks was not responsible for Plaintiff's arrest, but was required to
process Plaintiff as a pretrial detainee at the MCDC. County Defs.'s Mot. to
Dismiss at 19. In addition, Plaintiff fails to allege how Defendant Hicks's
handcuffing Plaintiff during the booking procedure led to injury, let alone
constitutional violation. In short, Plaintiff's arguments that Defendant Hicks
denied Plaintiff her right to be heard and brutally handcuffed her amount to
nothing more than bald allegations.
Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that
the strip search administered by Defendant Hicks was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. In the Fourth Circuit, "strip searches of detainees are
constitutionally constrained by due process requirements of reasonableness
under the circumstances .... Courts must consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted." Logan v. Shealy,
et al., 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979)); see also Amaechi v. West, et al., 237 F.3d 356, 363
(4th Cir. 2001).
Defendant Hicks and Plaintiff differ as to
whether a strip search occurred. See Hicks Aff., County Defs.'s Ex. 1, at P4;
Turner Aff. P31. Defendant Hicks claims that she did not search Plaintiff at
all, while Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hicks required Plaintiff to show
Defendant Hicks her breasts and bottoms of her feet and to remove her underwire
bra. See Hicks [*405] Aff., County Defs.'s Ex. 1, at P4; Turner Aff. P31. Even
taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assuming a strip
search did occur, Plaintiff's allegations do not amount to a constitutional
violation. Defendant Hicks and Plaintiff are of the same gender, the search was
in private and preceded Plaintiff's mandatory shower, and there was no physical
contact between Hicks and Plaintiff. See Turner Aff. P31. In sum, it appears
that Defendant Hicks acted reasonably under the circumstances and in accordance
with the MCDC procedures for booking pretrial detainees. See MCDC Policy and
Proc. Manual, at 6-7.
Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Hicks
and Andrews violated her constitutional rights by exhibiting deliberate
indifference to her medical needs. However, the facts presented show no serious
medical need, nor deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants Hicks and
Andrews. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 837, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). Rather, as with the State
Defendants, Plaintiff complained about her pain and requested her medication,
but "she did not have any problems walking or moving about." Hicks
Aff., Ex. 1 at P7; Andrews Aff., Ex. 2 at P5 ("Ms. Turner did not appear
to be suffering from any life-threatening medical condition which would have
warranted medical personnel to respond immediately."). As corrections
officers, Defendants Hicks and Andrews are not permitted to dispense
medication, as such determinations are made by medical personnel pursuant to
MCDC policy. However, in response to Plaintiff's complaints, Defendant Hicks called the MCDC medical staff to
advise them of Plaintiff's situation. Id. at P7. Because the situation was not
an emergency, the medical staff did not respond immediately. Id. at P7;
cf. Williams v. Dehay, 81 F.3d 153
(4th Cir. 1996) (finding no deliberate indifference where nurse complied with
policy, consulted with warden about Plaintiff's request for narcotics, and
refused to dispense narcotics without the required court order). Plaintiff was
detained at MCDC for less than six
hours, and she did not receive medical attention in the meantime. See Kane v.
Hargis et al., 987 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding no unconstitutional
denial of medical treatment for pretrial detainee who was in custody only for
four hours and suffered cracked teeth, a cut nose, and a bruised face); Martin
v. Gentile, et al., 849 F.2d 863, 871 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding "no serious
medical needs," and hence no constitutional violation, of pretrial
detainee who had cut over one eye, a quarter-inch piece of glass in palm, and
bruises on shoulders and elbows for fourteen hours before given treatment).
Contrary to Plaintiff's arguments, Defendants Hicks and Andrews did not
demonstrate deliberate indifference to her medical needs. Not only did
Plaintiff not have a serious medical need, but Defendants did not exhibit
deliberate indifference to her situation. On the contrary, Defendant Hicks
alerted the appropriate medical personnel of Plaintiff's situation and handled
the short-term pretrial detainee appropriately.
Based on the above, summary judgment is granted to Defendants Pechnick,
E. Brown, Phillips, Hicks, and Andrews on Counts VI, VII, VII, X, and XI.
3. County Liability
In
Count XII, Plaintiff also claims liability on the part of Montgomery County.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a county cannot be held liable under respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). Thus,
Plaintiff must allege that the County was a [*406] participant in the alleged
constitutional violations. However, Plaintiff has utterly failed to allege
facts--e.g., related to County customs, policies, etc.--supporting this claim
against Defendant County. The County cannot be held liable, and this Count must
be dismissed.
4. State Claims
In
light of the Court's ruling on the federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Court will decline to exercise its pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
remaining state claims in Counts XIII to XIX. A court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if all claims over which it has original jurisdiction
have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d
106, 109 (4th Cir. 1995).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant Defendants motions for
summary judgment as to Counts I through VIII, and Counts X and XII. In
addition, the Court will grant Defendants motions to dismiss as to Counts IX
and XII, and will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining counts
(Counts XIII through XIX). In addition, the Court will grant Plaintiff's Motion
to Excuse Late Filing, but will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance to
Permit Discovery. The Court will request that the Clerk of the Court close this
case. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
March 25, 2002
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
ORDER
For
the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, IT IS this 25th day
of March, 2002, by the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, ORDERED:
1. That State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
[7-1], or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment [7-2] be, and the same
hereby is, DENIED AS MOOT;
2. That County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
[8-1] and/or for Summary Judgment [8-2] be, and the same hereby is, DENIED AS
MOOT;
3. That State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint [12-1] be, and the same hereby is, DENIED AS MOOT, and State
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [12-2] be, and the same hereby is,
GRANTED as to Counts I through VIII;
4. That State Defendants' Motion to Strike
[12-3] is DENIED;
5. That County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint [13-1] be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to Counts IX
and XII, and County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [13-2] be, and the
same hereby is, GRANTED as to Counts X and XI;
6. That Plaintiff's remaining state claims in
Counts XIII to XIX are DISMISSED;
7. That Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance to
Permit Discovery [14-1] be, and the same hereby is, DENIED, while Plaintiff's
Motion to Excuse Late Filing [17-1] be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;
8. That the Clerk of the Court CLOSE this
case; and
9. That the Clerk of the Court mail copies of
this Memorandum Opinion and Order to all counsel of record.
Alexander Williams, Jr.
United States District Judge
FOOTNOTE:
n1 As a preliminary matter, State Defendants
argue that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed as it an attempt to sue
the state officials in their official capacities, contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive, as Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
states that Defendants are being sued "as individuals." Pl.'s Am.
Compl. P1.