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MATSURALLA FORD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF OAKLAND, and JOHN
NICHOLS, Oakland County Sheriff, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 00-2140
UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
May 13, 2002, Filed
NOTICE:
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge.
This action stems from the alleged rape of a nineteen year-old female prisoner
incarcerated in a county jail by the police deputy who was supervising her. The
prisoner, Plaintiff-Appellant Matsuralla Ford, argues that Defendant-Appellee
Oakland County is liable as a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
maintaining a custom and policy of ignoring sexual harassment and assault
claims and creating an atmosphere that facilitated her [*394] rape. Ford
now appeals from the district court's grant of Oakland County's motion for
summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56 on her § 1983 municipal liability
claim.
This appeal presents one issue for our review: (1) Whether the district
court properly granted summary judgment to Oakland County on the ground that
Ford failed to satisfy the elements of her claim for municipal liability under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. We conclude that the district court properly granted summary
judgment and, accordingly, we AFFIRM that judgment.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Factual Background
Matsuralla Ford was incarcerated
at the Oakland County Jail n1 on August 18, 1997 for possession of a controlled
substance. She has a severe mental impairment and a history of mental illness,
and was placed into a secure section of the facility after a suicide attempt on
August 20, 1997. In late September, 1997, Ford alleges that Mark Miles, n2 an
Oakland County deputy sheriff and a supervisor of the jail, initiated a pattern
of sexual harassment and assault. On September 24, 1997, Miles began harassing
Ford, flirting and commenting on her body. On September 25, 1997, Miles returned
to Ford's cell, radioed another deputy to open the cell, and digitally
penetrated Ford. Miles returned yet again the next day, on September 26, 1997,
relieved another deputy for a dinner break, and ordered a lock-down of all
cells except that of Ford. Miles then
entered Ford's cell, ordered her to face the wall, and had vaginal intercourse
with her. He ejaculated
on her buttocks and forced Ford to clean it up. After Miles left the cell, Ford
wiped the semen with a napkin, put it into a plastic bag, and gave it to
Felicia Davis, a fellow inmate, for safe-keeping.
Ford did not report the assault
until October 8, 1997, when she relayed the circumstances of the rape to Deputy
Leudith Perkins, a female corrections officer at the jail. Perkins wrote an
incident report detailing Ford's allegations, and Oakland County began an
investigation into the alleged assault. n3 The record is not clear to what
degree this was a serious investigation -- Ford alleges that the Sheriff's
Office initiated a cover-up of the assault, and interviewed only those officers
who were not near Ford's cell when the assault occurred. She also alleges that
the Sheriff's Office never followed up with her regarding the assault during
the investigation. The Sheriff's Office report ultimately exonerated Miles and
recommended the [*395] prosecution of Ford and two other inmates for filing a
false felony police report.
The Michigan State Police
launched an investigation into the rape incident on October 24, 1997 after the
sister of another inmate lodged a complaint. Several of the inmates offered
competing stories regarding the origin of the sperm sample in the plastic bag,
but DNA testing of the sperm sample ultimately
confirmed that it belonged to Miles, with some of Ford's DNA also present.
n4 Ford also passed a polygraph test regarding the alleged assault. The report
that followed this investigation confirmed in large part Ford's claim of
assault.
As a result of the Michigan State Police
investigation, Miles was suspended without pay on August 20, 1998 pending the
resolution of criminal charges that were brought against him by the Oakland
County Prosecutor's Office. Miles ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser
included offense.
Ford filed her § 1983 civil rights lawsuit on October 20, 1998. During
the discovery phase of the suit, one inmate, Helen Alexander, claimed that it
was commonplace at the Oakland County Jail for deputies to have sex with
inmates. In response, the Oakland County Sheriff's Office turned over four
complaints of alleged sexual misconduct on the part of deputy sheriffs for the
three years prior to the incident at issue here. Of these cases, three of the
deputy sheriffs received disciplinary action after an internal investigation,
and one allegation was determined to be unfounded. Oakland County also alleges
that it has a strict policy against sexual harassment and sexual misconduct on
the part of any deputy sheriff.
B.
Procedural History
Ford filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging that Oakland County, Oakland
County Sheriff John Nichols, and Oakland County Deputy Mark Miles violated her
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution. Oakland County and Sheriff Nichols sought summary judgment on May
1, 2000. After oral argument on June 20, 2000, the district court granted
summary judgment on August 23, 2000. Miles subsequently agreed to a monetary settlement with Ford for
dismissal of the claim against him; the district court dismissed Miles from the
§ 1983 suit on October 30, 2000. Ford then filed a timely appeal of the
district court's grant of summary judgment.
II.
DISCUSSION
1.
Standard of Review
Dismissal of a suit for failure to state a claim under a Rule 56 motion
for summary judgment is subject to de novo review. E.E.O.C. v. Univ. of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 1990).
The district court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed unless there
was a genuine issue for trial, such that enough evidence exists for a
reasonable juror to rely on in finding for plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 91 L. Ed. 2d
202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). This standard is met if: (1) the district court
applied proper law; (2) the district court made no errors applying the law
to the facts; and (3) there are no
genuine issues of material fact.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S. v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013, 1016
(6th Cir. 1998).
[*396] 2. Analysis
Ford submits that she has
satisfied the elements of her claim for municipal liability against Oakland
County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the district court improperly granted
Oakland County's motion for summary judgment. A municipality or county may be
sued for § 1983 liability for a constitutional violation. Fox v. Van Oosterum,
176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir. 1999). It is a separate inquiry to establish
whether a constitutional violation occurred, and whether a municipality bears
responsibility. See Collins v. City
of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 121, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261, 112 S. Ct. 1061
(1992). The easier question is whether a constitutional violation occurred. Our
precedent recognizes a clearly established fundamental substantive due process
right "to personal security and to bodily integrity," extending
specifically to the right to be free from sexual abuse. Doe v. Clairborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d
495, 506 (6th Cir. 1996). Moreover, where the state imposes a special
relationship upon a person, such as when that person is held in custody, then
the state owes a special duty of protection against violation of her due
process rights. See L.W. v. Grubbs,
974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
314-25, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982)).
The second and more difficult element to
establish is whether Oakland County bears responsibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for Miles's sexual assault on Ford. See
Collins, 503 U.S. at 121. A respondeat superior argument, based solely
on an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor, is not enough to hold
the county or municipality liable. See
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611,
98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). The plaintiff must be able to "identify a
government 'policy' or 'custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury," and
the municipality through this policy must have been the "'moving force'
behind the injury alleged." Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,
403-404, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997). The violation may be
visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not
received formal approval through the body's official decision-making
channels. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
However, the custom must be "permanent and well settled [so] as to
constitute a custom or usage with the force of law." Claiborne County, 103
F.3d at 507. The notion of law must include "deeply embedded traditional
ways of carrying out state policy," and reflect a course of action
deliberately chosen from among various alternatives. Id. at 507-08 (quoting Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry.
Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 369, 84 L. Ed. 1254, 60 S. Ct. 968 (1940), and
citing City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle , 471 U.S. 808, 823, 85 L. Ed. 2d 791, 105 S.
Ct. 2427 (1985)).
Ford fails
to satisfy all the elements necessary to establish municipal liability under §
1983 against Oakland County. Ford has little difficulty establishing that her
constitutional rights were violated as a result of the sexual assault. See Doe, 103 F.3d at 506. Not only was her
fundamental substantive due process right "to personal security and to
bodily integrity" violated, but she was owed a special duty to be
protected from constitutional harm because she was in custody. Id.; see also
Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121.
It
is under the second element that Ford falls short, particularly given the high standard for establishing municipal
liability under § 1983. Ford simply does not present enough evidence in her
complaint or memorandum in opposition to summary judgment to create a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Oakland [*397] County has a "custom
or usage with the force of law" of creating an atmosphere that facilitated
the violation of her constitutional rights. See Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 507. Oakland County did have a policy against sexual
harassment, it did discipline Miles after the results of the Michigan State
Police report became available, and it did proffer evidence of three other
cases in which officers were disciplined for sexual harassment and assault in
the Oakland County Jail. Ford makes a number of accusations about a cover-up in
Oakland County's investigation of the sexual assault, but offers no evidence to
this effect other than the fact that Miles was not suspended from duty after
the Oakland County Sheriff's Office had completed its investigation, and that
further action did not take place until the Michigan State Police's report was
finalized. Ford may not be responsible for the fact that other inmates gave
alternate accounts of assault that conflicted with Ford's version in order to
garner their own settlement with Oakland County, but this did make Oakland
County's investigation much more difficult and less likely a cover-up. Finally,
the comments Deputy Perkins received after filing her initial report of the
assault do not support an inference of a policy of harassment on the part of
the Oakland County Sheriff's Office.
Ford cites to the Ninth Circuit's L.W. v. Grubbs, which allows for §
1983 liability where an officer affirmatively creates the particular danger
that exposed a party to violence. 974
F.2d at 121-22. Grubbs involved a registered nurse who was raped and terrorized
by an inmate at a medium security custodial institution after her supervisors
created the dangerous situation that resulted in her assault. Id. This case is
more on point to the present situation than the district court concedes; the
fact that an inmate was the tortfeasor rather than a prison guard as in this
case does not make the precedent inapposite. See Slayton v. Ohio Dep't of Youth
Servs., 206 F.3d 669, 678 (6th Cir. 2000). In both Grubbs and the case before
us, an officer potentially created the particular danger that exposed the
victim to the assault. Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121. However, the key distinction
between Grubbs and this case is that Ford has simply not documented the
policies and customs of the Oakland County Jail that support an atmosphere that
facilitated her rape. See Claiborne County, 103 F.3d at 507. Absent this, or
any affidavits or evidence showing that Miles was improperly trained, that
Oakland Country disregarded a known risk, acted with deliberate indifference,
or failed to investigate allegations of abuse, Ford falls far short of the
standard necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
survive a motion for summary judgment. See
Poe, 143 F.3d at 1016.
III. CONCLUSION
For
the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the district court.
FOOTNOTES:
n1 The Oakland County Jail
is operated by the Oakland County Sheriff's Office.
n2 Mark Miles was a
defendant in this action before the district court. However, Ford settled her
claim against Miles in his individual capacity. Accordingly, the August 23,
2000 order of the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants Oakland County and John Nichols -- not Miles. A show cause order was
issued on October 11, 2000 that questioned whether we have jurisdiction to
resolve the appeal since the district court had not entered a final judgment
against Miles. Ford then informed the district court of her settlement with
Miles, and on October 30, 2000 the district court entered an order dismissing
with prejudice the claims against Miles. On November 15, 2000, this Court noted
that it had jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal and withdrew the show cause
order.
n3 Deputy Perkins testified that after filing her initial report
of the incident, she received harassing phone calls at home and, while on duty,
was harassed over the jail's radio system, ostracized from her co-workers,
accused of having oral sex with Miles, and physically assaulted by her fellow
deputies.
n4 During the Oakland County
investigation, Felicia Davis claimed that the sperm sample in the plastic bag
belonged to her, and that it was the product of an assault by Miles on her and
not Ford. This account was later determined to be false.