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CYNTHIA RAPIER, Individually and as Special Administrator of the ESTATE
OF KEVIN RAPIER, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. KANKAKEE COUNTY, Defendant.
Case No. 00-CV-2089
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, URBANA DIVISION
May 30, 2002, Decided
May 30, 2002, Opinion Filed
ORDER
This case is before this court for ruling on the Motion for Summary
Judgment (# 19) filed by Defendant Kankakee County (County). Following this
court's careful and thorough review of the documents filed and the arguments of
the parties, the County's Motion (# 19) is GRANTED.
FACTS
Kevin Rapier was arrested on
March 20, 1999, based upon charges of predatory sexual assault of a child and
criminal sexual assault. The charges stemmed from Rapier's alleged sexual
assault of his two stepdaughters. [*980] He was taken to the Kankakee County
Detention Center (jail). An inmate medical screening form was completed. This
form stated that Rapier was suicidal. According to Mike Downey, chief of
corrections with the Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, Rapier informed the
intake officer that he had previously attempted suicide. Rapier was placed in
the special needs cell at the jail. This cell had previously been used as the
"drunk tank" and was near the booking area of the jail.
Sheriff Timothy Bukowski, who
was responsible for the operation of the jail, testified that sex offenders,
inmates who may not be able to defend themselves and inmates who were
considered at risk of suicide were considered "special needs" inmates
and were placed in the special needs cell. The special needs cell was located
in a corridor which had a lot of guard traffic and staff passing by the cell.
There was a small observation window in the steel door to the special needs
cell through which a guard could see into the cell. The door and window were
not visible from the booking area. However, there was a narrow gap on the side
of the door which allowed guards to visually observe a small portion of the
special needs cell from the booking area. Bukowski and Downey testified that it
was the policy at the jail to check on inmates in the special needs cell every
15 minutes. At the time Rapier was being held in the special needs cell, there
was no log which documented the checks made on the inmates in the special needs
cell.
On
March 22, 1999, Rapier was seen by Nurse Kim Gartner. Gartner made a note of
her visit with Rapier on his Medical Record. Gartner recorded that Rapier
stated that he attempted suicide in 1998. She noted that Rapier still felt
"depressed/suicidal." She stated that he needed continued monitoring
and that she would call the Helen Wheeler Mental Health Center to make an
appointment for Rapier. Based upon Gartner's recommendation, Rapier remained in
the special needs cell. Gartner called the Helen Wheeler Center the morning of
March 26, 1999, regarding setting up an appointment for Rapier.
In 1973, when the jail was
built, it had a capacity of 106 inmates. However, on March 26, 1999, because of
the double bunking of cells and the use of other rooms at the jail to hold
inmates, the inmate capacity of the jail was 217. On March 26, 1999, the total
number of inmates at the jail was 129. Seven officers were on duty that day.
Kent Smith, a correctional officer, testified that he was working at the
booking area of the jail on that day. He was the supervisor and was not
assigned to any particular area of the jail. However, his primary
location in the jail was in the booking area. Officer Carnahan was the
correctional officer assigned to the ground floor of the jail, which included
the special needs cell. Carnahan left the floor around 1:30 p.m. to conduct
video court on another floor of the jail. At approximately 1:30 p.m., Smith spoke to Rapier. Rapier
asked Smith if he could have a shower and Smith told Rapier he was too busy.
Smith stated that he could see Rapier's eyes and face through the gap on the
side of the door to the special needs cell. Rapier was the only inmate in the
special needs cell at that time. Smith testified that, approximately 15 to 20
minutes later, he went to the special needs cell because an investigator with
the public defender's office was there to see Rapier. Smith testified that he found
Rapier hanging in his cell. Rapier had braided a rope using stuffing from his
mattress and had secured it in the ceiling with a "stick" which
looked like a piece of a wooden handle. Smith called for help and Randal
Walling, the assistant chief of corrections, responded. Rapier did not have a
pulse and was not breathing. [*981] Smith called the fire department.
Paramedics from the fire department arrived within a short time and attempted
to revive Rapier. Rapier was pronounced dead at 2:23 p.m. Rapier had used soap
to write an apology to his family in his cell. Jail officials were unable to
determine how Rapier obtained the stick he used to hang himself.
On
March 24, 2000, Plaintiff, Cynthia Rapier (Rapier's wife), individually and as
special administrator of Rapier's estate, filed her Complaint (# 1) against
Defendants, the County, Bukowski, Downey, Walling and Smith. Plaintiff alleged
that the Defendants were liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of
Rapier's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the risk of suicide by Rapier. On January 3, 2002, the parties
filed a Stipulation (# 22) which stated that Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Defendants
Bukowski, Downey, Walling and Smith. These Defendants were therefore terminated
as parties to this case.
On
January 2, 2002, the County, the only remaining Defendant, filed its Motion for
Summary Judgment (# 19), Memorandum of Law in Support (# 20) and Statement of
Undisputed Facts (# 21) with attached documentation. The County argued that Plaintiff failed to
establish an unconstitutional policy or practice on behalf of the County which
can be said to be the proximate cause of Rapier's suicide. The County also
argued that Plaintiff failed to establish that the County was deliberately
indifferent to the risk of suicide by detainees through the implementation of any such policy or custom. The
County argued that the jail's policy of checking on inmates in the special
needs cell every 15 minutes was more stringent than the Illinois County Jail
Standards, which required that inmates be visually observed at least every 30
minutes. The County noted that there was no evidence that the County had experienced
a prior suicide in the special needs cell. The County also noted that
the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint were inconsistent with her deposition
testimony. n1 Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment (#
23), a Response to the County's Statement of Undisputed Facts (# 24) and
numerous exhibits. Plaintiff argued that the County was well aware that the
jail was overcrowded, understaffed and that the special needs cell was
improperly designed because it did not allow for constant visual monitoring of
inmates. Plaintiff also argued that previous suicides by hanging had occurred
at the jail. Plaintiff contended that, because the County did not act to
correct its staffing problems, it acted with deliberate indifference to the
risk of suicide by detainees. Plaintiff relied on the deposition testimony of
Sheriff Bukowski in which he stated that he repeatedly advised the County Board
that jail staff and detainees were at risk because of inadequate staffing
levels, overcrowding and the poor design of the jail. Plaintiff also relied on
various newspaper articles regarding conditions at the jail. In one newspaper
article, Bukowski was quoted as stating he believed that having more staff at
the jail could have prevented Rapier's suicide. In addition, Plaintiff relied
on inspection reports prepared by the Illinois Department of Corrections. The
reports from 1997 and 1998 stated that the level of staffing at the jail should
be reviewed and increased if necessary. The report dated April 8, 1999, which
was based upon an inspection [*982]which occurred on March 26, 1999, stated
that the jail had insufficient personnel. Plaintiff also relied upon
statements made by Richard Wade
regarding conditions in the special needs cell. Wade was an inmate at the jail
until February 1999 and was housed in the special needs cell for one month
during his incarceration, beginning on July 14, 1998. On August 29, 1998, Wade
sent a letter to Downey. In his letter to Downey, Wade complained about
conditions in the special needs cell including the lack of regular monitoring
of the inmates in the cell. Wade stated that there were usually periods of at
least four hours when no one checked on the inmates in the special needs cell.
The
County filed a Reply Memorandum (# 25) and a Reply to Plaintiff's Statement of
Additional Facts (# 26) with additional documents. The County argued that the
use of the special needs cell was a reasonable and effective way to prevent detainee suicides,
and such use alone cannot constitute deliberate indifference. The County also
argued that there was no evidence to show that the jail was understaffed on
March 26, 1999, when there were seven officers on duty and the total number of
inmates was 129. The County noted that the Illinois County Jail Standards do
not require constant visual monitoring of inmates, including those determined
to have special needs. The County attached a copy of the Illinois County Jail Standards which were in effect
in March 1999. These standards state that a "jail officer shall provide
personal observation, not including observation by a monitoring device, at
least once every 30 minutes." The County argued that Wade's letter was not
evidence of any deliberate indifference on the part of the County. In support
of this argument, the County attached a copy of a portion of the deposition of
Richard Wade. Wade stated that he had no knowledge of conditions at the jail
after he left the jail on February 10, 1999. The County also contended that the
newspaper articles relied on by Plaintiff were inadmissible hearsay. The County
further noted that, at his deposition, Bukowski testified that the quote
attributed to him was taken out of context and that there is no legal
requirement to have a guard positioned in every cellblock every minute of every
day. Bukowski also testified that, as far as Rapier's suicide, they had seven
people working that day and the census was lower than usual and he did not
"think that having additional staff may have made a tremendous difference."
ANALYSIS
I.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S.
Ct. 2548 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court
has one task and one task only: to decide, based upon the evidence of record,
whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d
918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Because the purpose of summary judgment is to isolate
and dispose of factually unsupported claims, a plaintiff must respond to the
defendant's motion with evidence setting forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001). A
genuine issue for trial "exists only when a reasonable jury could find for
the party opposing the motion based on the record as a whole." Michas v.
Health Cost Controls [*983] of Ill., Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2000),
quoting Pipitone v. United States, 180 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1999). In making
this determination, the court must consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142, 90 S. Ct. 1598 (1970). However, to
successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more
than raise a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts, and
instead must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. Michael, 259 F.3d at 845. To survive summary
judgment, the nonmovant must make a showing sufficient to establish any
essential element for which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23; see
also Shank v. William R. Hague,
Inc., 192 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 1999).
II.
COUNTY'S MOTION
In
this case, Plaintiff alleges that the County is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
because the County was deliberately indifferent to the risk of Rapier's suicide
and so deprived him of his life without due process of law. See Boncher v.
Brown County, 272 F.3d 484, 485 (7th Cir. 2001). For liability to attach
against a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that "deliberate action attributable to
the municipality directly caused a deprivation of federal rights." Frake
v. City of Chicago, 210 F.3d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997). Because Rapier was a
pretrial detainee and had not yet been convicted of a crime, his § 1983 claim
is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than
under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605 (7th
Cir. 2002). But, like the protection afforded a convicted prisoner under the
Eighth Amendment, a pretrial detainee is protected from the "deliberate
indifference" of officials. Frake,
210 F.3d at 781, citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 140 L. Ed.
2d 1043, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998), see also
Anderson v. Templeton, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2329, 2002 WL 226882, at *2
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
Deliberate indifference is more
than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing. Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982,
988 (7th Cir. 1998). A finding of deliberate indifference requires a showing
that the County was aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to the
detainee but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from
a known danger. Butera v. Cottey, 285
F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2002); Frake, 210 F.3d at 782; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 128
L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). "A municipality may be liable for
harm to persons incarcerated under its authority 'if it maintains a policy that
sanctions the maintenance of prison conditions that infringe upon the
constitutional rights of the prisoners.'" Estate of Novack v. County of
Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 2000), quoting Payne v. Churchich, 161 F.3d
1030, 1043 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1004, 144 L. Ed. 2d 236, 119
S. Ct. 2339 (1999). "A defendant is not, however, required to guarantee
the detainee's safety. The existence or possibility of other better policies which
might have been used does not necessarily mean that the defendant was being
deliberately indifferent." Frake, 210 F.3d at 782; see also Butera, 285 F.3d at 605. In order to
prevail on her claim, Plaintiff must show that the County "made a
deliberate choice among various alternatives and that the injury was caused by
the policy." Butera, 285 F.3d at 605; see also Frake, 210 F.3d at 781,
citing Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483, 89 L. Ed. 2d 452, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
Plaintiff [*984] must show that the policy was the "direct cause" of
or "moving force" behind that constitutional violation. Butera, 285 F.3d at 609, citing Estate of Novack, 226 F.3d at 530-31.
As noted previously, the County
argues that Plaintiff cannot establish that any general allegations of
overcrowding, improper design of the jail or inadequate staffing were
sufficient to show deliberate indifference on the part of the County. The
County also argues that Plaintiff cannot show that overcrowding, improper design
or inadequate staffing were the direct cause of Rapier's suicide. In response,
Plaintiff argues that Rapier reported that he had a history of a prior suicide
attempt and that he might still be suicidal. Plaintiff contends that the County
was deliberately indifferent to this known risk because the "jail lacked
the staff or facilities to place Mr. Rapier under direct visual
observation."
When a state actor such as the County deprives a person of his ability
to care for himself by incarcerating him or detaining him, it assumes an
obligation to provide some minimum level of well-being and safety. See Collignon, 163 F.3d at 987. Therefore,
case law has held that jailers must make efforts to prevent obviously suicidal
detainees from committing suicide. See
Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2002), citing Jutzi-Johnson v. United States, 263 F.3d
753, 756 (7th Cir. 2001). "Jail managers who decided to take no
precautions against the possibility of inmate suicide--to have no policy, for
example no suicide-watch option--would be guilty of deliberate indifference in
the relevant sense." Boncher, 272 F.3d at 486.
In this case, it is not disputed
that it was the policy at the jail to place potentially suicidal detainees in
the special needs cell. Also, it was the policy at the jail to require checks
of detainees in the special needs cell every 15 minutes. This evidence
therefore shows that the County had implemented precautionary measures to
prevent suicide by detainees. See
Butera, 285 F.3d at 609. Plaintiff argues that the use of the special
needs cell was inadequate because inmates in the cell could not be observed
from the booking area and could only be seen by walking to the door of the cell
and looking in the window on the door. However, there is no evidence that any
detainee housed in the special needs cell had ever committed
suicide prior to Rapier's suicide. n2 Moreover, while Plaintiff has discussed a
prior suicide at the jail in 1991, Plaintiff presented no statistical evidence to
support her conclusory argument that a suicide problem existed at the jail
prior to March 26, 1999. See Boncher, 272 F.3d at 486-87. This court concludes
that the County could reasonably believe that its policy of placing potentially
suicidal detainees in the special needs cell, along with its policy to require
checks of these inmates every 15 minutes, was an effective way to prevent
suicide by detainees. This court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has not
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the County's policy
of placing potentially suicidal detainees in the special needs cell showed
deliberate indifference on the part of the County.
Plaintiff also argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists
regarding whether understaffing at the jail, of which County officials were
well aware, caused Rapier's suicide. Plaintiff relies heavily on newspaper
articles in which various jail officials, including Sheriff Bukowski, were
quoted as stating that the jail was understaffed [*985] and that this could
have contributed to Rapier's suicide. This court notes that the County may well
be correct that many of the articles relied on have not been authenticated and
are, therefore, inadmissible hearsay. See
Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 742-43 (7th Cir. 1997). In any
case, in all of the articles, the speaker was expressing an opinion which could
only be based upon speculation. In fact, Sheriff Bukowski stated at his
deposition that, as far as Rapier's suicide, they had seven people working that
day and the census was lower than usual and he did not "think that having
additional staff may have made a tremendous difference."
The
undisputed evidence in this case shows that Smith spoke to and saw Rapier 15 to
20 minutes prior to the time he was found hanging in the special needs cell.
This court must conclude that Plaintiff's argument that additional staff at the
jail could have prevented Rapier's suicide is couched in terms of rather remote possibility, not substantial
probability. See Anderson, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2329, 2002 WL 226882, at *3.
The causal link between an alleged constitutional deprivation and official
action must be more concrete. Anderson,
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2329, 2002 WL 226882, at *3; citing Jutzi-Johnson, 263
F.3d at 756-58. The relevant causation inquiry is whether Rapier's suicide was
a foreseeable consequence of the failure of the County to adequately deal with
the problem of understaffing at the jail. See Jutzi-Johnson, 263 F.3d at 756.
This court concludes that it would have to engage in speculation to determine
that additional staff at the jail would have resulted in Rapier being checked
more often when the undisputed evidence showed that he had been observed by
Smith, at most, 20 minutes prior to the time he was found hanging in the
special needs cell. Accordingly, this court concludes that Plaintiff has not
raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether understaffing at the
jail was the "direct cause" of Rapier's suicide.
This court therefore concludes that the County is entitled to summary
judgment. Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of material fact which might
lead to a conclusion that the County maintained a policy which was deliberately
indifferent to the risk to suicidal detainees such as Rapier. See Frake, 210
F.3d at 782. The death of Rapier was clearly a tragedy. However, the record
shows as a matter of law that the County was not deliberately indifferent to
his welfare. Accordingly, the County's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 19) is
GRANTED.
IT
IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1)
The County's Motion for Summary Judgment (# 19) is GRANTED. Judgment is entered
in favor of the County and against Plaintiff.
(2)
This case is terminated. The parties shall be responsible for their own court
costs.
ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2002
(Signature on Clerk's Original)
MICHAEL
P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
FOOTNOTES:
n1 At her deposition,
Plaintiff testified that she had talked to Rapier during his incarceration at
the County jail and that it was her opinion that he was not depressed or
suicidal. Plaintiff testified that it was her belief that the guards at the
jail murdered Rapier.
n2 Walling testified that he
successfully prevented a suicide from occurring in the special needs cell at
some time prior to Rapier's suicide.