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For the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania
Michael Knoll,
Plaintiff,
v.
Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority,
Defendant.
Civil Action No. 01-2711
2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17164
September 10, 2002,
Decided
MEMORANDUM AND
ORDER
William
H. Yohn, Jr., Judge
On June 1, 2001, plaintiff, Michael Knoll, filed suit against
defendant, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
("SEPTA"), alleging that defendant discriminated against him on the
basis of a perceived disability in violation of Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") when it terminated his employment as a
transit police officer for failure to meet SEPTA's visual acuity standards.
Pending currently before the court is defendant's motion for summary judgment,
in which it argues that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the
statute, and therefore cannot seek the ADA's protection. Because 1) plaintiff
has provided no record evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding defendant's perception of plaintiff's ability to engage in the major
life activities of seeing and working, and 2) plaintiff has failed to meet his burden
of providing any evidence that defendant's stated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for terminating his employment was pretextual, this
court finds as a matter of law that plaintiff is not disabled and that
defendant's decision to terminate plaintiff's employment did not violate Title
I of the ADA. Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment will be
granted.
BACKGROUND
At the heart of this case are SEPTA's annual
physical examinations and mandatory visual acuity standards for its transit
police officers; consequently, the court begins its discussion of the facts
with a basic overview of these uncontested employment policies and plaintiff's
medical history.
In order to become and continue to be a
transit police officer for SEPTA, an employee must take and pass an annual
physical examination. Included in this examination is a test of the
individual's visual acuity. n1 SEPTA's visual acuity standards require that officers have 20/20
corrected vision in their best eye and no worse than 20/30 corrected vision in
the other. Because the position of transit police officer can be physically
taxing and, occasionally, life-threatening, SEPTA requires that officers meet
these standards to ensure that they are in excellent health. SEPTA
physicians and technicians conduct the examinations and report the results to
SEPTA's medical department. Should an officer fail his annual physical, a
member of the medical department informs him of his employment disqualification
and the officer's employment is then terminated.
In 1983, plaintiff Michael Knoll applied for a job as a transit police
officer for SEPTA. Having had several years of security experience in the
private sector and having graduated from the Philadelphia Police Academy, Knoll
appeared well-qualified for the job. However, he had one drawback: a visual
impairment known as amblyopia, more commonly referred to as "lazy
eye." n2 As a result of this condition, for most of his life, n3 the best
corrected visual acuity of Knoll's left eye was anywhere between 20/60 and
20/80. (Def. Ex. G; Def. Ex. H; Def. Ex. I, p. 2; Def. Ex. K, p. 182). Through his right eye, however,
he could see 20/20 without correction. (Def. Ex. G, Def. Ex. H, Def. Ex. I, p.
2, Def. Ex. K, p. 182). As a consequence of the discrepancy in the visual
acuity of his eyes, from an early age Knoll's brain disregarded his inferior
eye - so that he would not see double or experience substantially blurred images
- thereby resulting in monocular vision, which in turn affected his capacity to
gauge depth. n4
As a result of his impairment, when Knoll first took SEPTA's visual
acuity test, he failed. Despite Knoll's protests that eyeglasses have no effect
on amblyopia, the SEPTA medical technician conducting the examination told
Knoll to visit his own doctor to obtain a prescription. Knoll went to his
regular ophthalmologist, who confirmed Knoll's belief that eyeglasses would in
no way remedy his condition. However, because Knoll believed he would be
unable to obtain employment with SEPTA without glasses, n5 his doctor issued a
prescription for corrective lenses. According to Knoll's deposition testimony,
the effect of these glasses was comparable to "looking through a glass
window." (Def. Ex. K, p. 22). In fact, in the seventeen years since
receiving these glasses,Knoll has not received a new prescription and only
wears the glasses when taking SEPTA's eye examinations. (Def. Ex. K, p. 22-23).
After receiving the
eyeglasses, Knoll returned to SEPTA and, remarkably, passed the eye examination
despite the fact that every doctor cited in the record stated that corrective
lenses do not in any way improve his vision. Indeed, until 1999, Knoll
regularly took and passed SEPTA's required annual physicals. SEPTA technicians
recorded his corrected vision n6 as 20/20 in his left eye in almost every
instance. n7
Thus, from 1983 until 1999, Knoll served as a SEPTA transit police
officer. He received two commendations; one for perfect attendance and the
other for assisting in the capture of two robbers. (Def. Ex. K, p.
76-81). Although two
citations for minor infractions appear in his file, n8 his overall performance
as an officer appears quite good. Additionally, Knoll has stated that he got
along well with his supervisors and that he generally enjoyed his job.
(Def. Ex. K, p. 81).
In 1999, Knoll once again took SEPTA's required annual physical. This
time, however, he failed the eye examination; the test revealed that the
corrected visual acuity in his left eye was 20/60, far below the 20/30
requirement. Unlike previous eye examinations, the 1999 examination required
Knoll to look into a "scope machine" in addition to reading an eye
chart. While the record never satisfactorily details the mechanics of this
instrument, it appears to have contained an eye chart consisting of lines of
letters decreasing in size from one line to the next, which Knoll was required
to read aloud. It was this test that appears to have revealed to SEPTA the poor
vision in his inferior eye.
Knoll's complaint alleges that the 1999 examination was flawed because
the SEPTA technician conducting the examination was belligerent and made
discriminatory comments toward him. Specifically, he claims that the technician
was frustrated by the volume of officers whom he had to examine. (Def.
Ex. K, p. 136). During
Knoll's examination, this technician became so agitated that he began cursing
at Knoll, stating that Knoll was "blind as a [expletive] dog" and that
he "needed a [expletive] dog for the subway." (Def. Ex. K, p.
136). This technician then
recorded Knoll's corrected visual acuity as 20/100 in his inferior eye and
20/50 in his best eye. (Def. Ex. L). According to Knoll, as a result of these
outbursts another SEPTA health care provider, Dr. Kathy Gares, entered the
examination room and essentially re-examined him. (Def. Ex. K, p. 158). After examining Knoll this
second time, Dr. Gares amended his test scores, recording his corrected visual
acuity as 20/60 in his inferior eye and 20/25 in his dominant eye. (Def.
Ex. L).
It should be noted, however, that Knoll does not dispute that the
corrected visual acuity of his inferior eye is no better than 20/60. Soon after
his 1999 examination, Knoll visited Dr. William Sun, who recorded his best
corrected vision as 20/60 in his inferior eye. (Def. Ex. G; Def. Ex. K,
p. 182). In 2001, Knoll's
other ophthalmologist, Dr. Dion Ehrlich, recorded his best corrected vision as
being 20/70 in his inferior eye. (Def. Ex. H). Similarly, in 2002, defendant's ophthalmologist,
Dr. Grant Liu, recorded his best corrected vision in this eye as being 20/80+.
(Def. Ex. I, p.2). Again, Knoll
does not contest the validity of any of these findings.
After failing the visual component of his physical, SEPTA discharged
Knoll from employment as per SEPTA's standard policy. SEPTA's notice of
discharge to Knoll explicitly stated that the reason for his dismissal was
"substandard vision." (Def. Ex. R). Since his discharge, Knoll
has made modest attempts to seek alternative employment, which resulted in an
offer to join the U.N. Peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Knoll, however, did not
accept this job because he hopes to return to his position at SEPTA.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Either party to a lawsuit may file a motion
for summary judgment, and the court will grant it "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Facts that could alter the outcome are
'material,' and disputes are 'genuine' if evidence exists from which a rational
person could conclude that the position of the person with the burden of proof
on the disputed issue is correct." Ideal Dairy Farms, Inc. v. John Labatt,
LTD., 90 F.3d 737, 743 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). When a court
evaluates a motion for summary judgment, "the evidence of the non-movant
is to be believed." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91
L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Additionally, "all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in [the non-movant's] favor." Id. In addition,
"summary judgment may not be granted . . . if there is a disagreement over
what inferences can be reasonably drawn from the facts even if the facts are
undisputed." Ideal Dairy, 90 F.3d at 744 (citation omitted). However,
"an inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a
material factual dispute sufficient to defeat entry of summary judgment."
Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990). The
nonmovant must show more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence" for elements on which he bears the burden of production.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Thus, "where the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no
'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
The Third Circuit has held that "in
order to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADA, a
plaintiff must show '(1) he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and (3) he has
suffered an otherwise adverse employment decision as a result of
discrimination.'" Shaner v. Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir.
2000) (citing Gaul v. Lucent Techs.,
Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) and Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d
138, 142 (3d Cir. 1998)).
The court also has "indicated that the
burden-shifting framework of McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36
L. Ed. 2d 668, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), applies to ADA disparate treatment . . .
claims." Id. This framework contains three distinct steps. First, plaintiff
must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). If plaintiff succeeds in satisfying this prong, the burden
of production then shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" for the unfavorable treatment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Keller
v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997). Finally,
should the defendant produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the
plaintiff can defeat summary judgment only by pointing to some direct or
circumstantial evidence from which a factfinder could either reasonably:
"(1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2)
believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a
motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Simpson v.
Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32
F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)).
It should also be noted that despite the
shifting of intermediate evidentiary burdens, the ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the employer acted with discriminatory intent remains on
the plaintiff. Barber v. CSX Distrib.
Serv., 68 F.3d 694, 698 (3d Cir. 1995).
I.
Pursuant to the McDonnell-Douglas framework
referenced above, the court must first determine whether plaintiff has
successfully established sufficient evidence of a prima facie case of
disability discrimination under the ADA. In order to do so, a plaintiff must
provide evidence that he is a qualified individual with a disability and that a
covered entity n9 discriminated against him because of his disability "in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
The ADA defines a qualified individual as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Under the
act, one suffers from a disability if he has "[1)]a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities
of such an individual, [2)]a record of such an impairment; or [3) has been]
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") defines n10 "substantially limits" as being
"unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform, or significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner, or duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform that same major
life activity." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(1)(i-ii). It further defines
"major life activities" as "functions such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." Id. at § 1630.2 (i).
Plaintiff in this case alleges that he
falls within the statute's third definition of disabled. In support of his
claim, he makes two very similar arguments: 1) that defendant regarded him as
being substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing; and 2) that
defendant regarded him as being substantially limited in the major life
activity of working. The court will examine each argument in turn.
A.
Plaintiff's first argument in support of his claim that he is disabled
is that defendant regarded his impairment as substantially interfering with his
ability to see. n11 Plaintiff's sole evidence supporting this claim is
that defendant fired him, despite seventeen years of satisfactory service, for
failing its eye examination in that his left eye did not meet its 20/30
corrected visual acuity standard. Therefore, the court must determine whether defendant's
decision to terminate plaintiff's employment for failure to meet certain
medical standards demonstrates that it regarded him as being disabled.
The EEOC guidelines define "regarded
as having such an impairment" as having either 1) "a physical or
mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but
is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation" or 2)
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life
activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such an
impairment." 29 CFR § 1630.2(l)(1-2). Based on this definition, our Court of Appeals explicitly
recognizes two circumstances in which an employer regards an employee as being
disabled. The first occurs when an employer makes "an innocent
misperception based on nothing more than a simple mistake of fact as to the
severity, or even the very existence, of an individual's impairment,"
Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); see
also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
an employer's perception of plaintiff's disability could be based on legitimate
yet inaccurate medical information and nonetheless subject the employer to
liability). The second
circumstance occurs when an employer's action is predicated largely on
"society's myths, fears, stereotypes, and prejudices with respect to the
disabled." Deane, 142 F.3d at 144; see also School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 94 L. Ed. 2d 307, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987) (holding that simply because
an individual suffers from a contagious disease does not automatically justify
denying her employment). The court of appeals, however, has also specifically
held that an employer does not fall into either category simply by requiring an
employee to take and pass a physical examination. Tice v. Centre Area Transportation Authority (CATA), 247 F.3d
506, 508-09 (3d Cir. 2001).
In Tice v. Centre Area Transportation
Authority (CATA), the plaintiff, a bus driver for CATA, claimed that the
defendant regarded him as disabled because it required him to take an
independent medical examination prior to returning to work after suffering a
back injury. CATA had never before or since required another employee to meet such
a requirement. The Third Circuit, in upholding the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the defendant, reasoned that since the ADA
"expressly allows examinations or inquires as to whether an employee has a
disability or as to the severity of the disability, if such
examinations/inquiries are job-related and consistent with business
necessity," plaintiff cannot infer from defendant's use of these
examinations that they perceive him as being disabled. Id. at 514-515 (citing
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)). In short, the court held that "an employer's
request for a medical examination, standing alone, is not sufficient to
establish that the employer 'regarded' the employee as disabled, and thus
cannot itself form the basis for establishing membership in the protected class
under the ADA." Id. at 508-09.
In this case, plaintiff has not provided
sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that
defendant based its decision to fire plaintiff on either a mistaken or a stereotypical
understanding of his impairment. The undisputed record clearly indicates that
defendant is correct in its belief that people with amblyopia do not have
identical vision to those without the impairment. Dr. Dion Enrlich, plaintiff's
own ophthalmologist, stated in his deposition that amblyopia affects
stereoscopic vision. n12 See Pl. Ex. E, p.24 ("If you have a person who
suddenly loses their vision in one eye, it greatly affects their stereoscopic
vision because they're not used to the visual clues to determine depth.");
Def. Ex. S, p.35 (stating that while people with amblyopia can develop depth
perception based on visual cues, "it's not the same type of stereoscopic
vision than [sic] a two eyed person would have").
Additionally, the uncontested record reflects the fact that defendant
did not presume that plaintiff's vision was flawed simply by observing his lazy
eye. Rather, defendant tested plaintiff's vision, which revealed that it was in
fact impaired. Moreover, there is no dispute about the extent to which
plaintiff's condition impairs his vision. Dr. Grant Liu evaluated
plaintiff's vision and determined that the corrected visual acuity of his left
eye was 20/80+ and that his impairment affects his stereoscopic vision. n13
(Pl. Ex. I; Def. Ex. I.). Dr. William Sun also examined plaintiff and recorded
his best corrected vision as 20/60 in his inferior eye. (Def. Ex. G; Def. Ex.
K, p.182). Finally, Dr. Dion Ehrlich evaluated plaintiff's best corrected
vision as being 20/70 in his inferior eye. (Def. Ex. H). Plaintiff does not
even allege, much less offer evidence to demonstrate, that this information is
inaccurate.
Moreover, unlike the fact pattern of Tice, there is not even an
inference in the record that defendant was holding plaintiff to a different,
let alone higher, standard than any other SEPTA transit police officer.
Defendant required all transit police officers to take and pass physicals and
eye examinations, (Pl. Ex. A, p.130; Def. Ex. K, p.130), and plaintiff
does not contest defendant's expert testimony that "SEPTA's visual acuity
requirements are entirely consistent with the visual acuity standards for many
other law enforcement agencies." (Def. Ex. E, p.1).
Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff's supervisors
or colleagues thought any less of him or treated him any differently than they
would an unimpaired SEPTA transit police officer. Plaintiff was given
assignments that were identical to those given to his peers. Plaintiff
stated in his deposition that he was assigned a partner for the first few years
of his service, as were all new officers. See Def. Ex. K, p.41-42
(characterizing defendant's "standard policy" as partners generally
patrolling their assigned stations together within the first few years of their
duty). He was responsible for patrolling the same number of stations as were
his peers. See Def. Ex. K, p.44 (discussing his assignments without ever
mentioning any discrepancy). None
of his superiors or fellow officers ever disparaged him because of his
impairment. (Def. Ex. K, p.81-82). Indeed, plaintiff states
unequivocally in his deposition that he got along well with his supervisors and
that he believed he was being disqualified only for failing to meet the visual
acuity standard. (Def. Ex. K, p.217-219). According to plaintiff, his
supervisors were even "upset" by his firing. (Def. Ex. K, p.82). In
short, until terminating his employment, defendant's employees barely seemed to
take notice of plaintiff's impairment, let alone discriminate against him
because of it.
Finally, the court cannot glean from the
record any disagreement between the parties regarding the legitimacy of
defendant's visual acuity standards. Both parties agree that these standards
are generally job-related and serve a business necessity. Defendant states that
"observation, which includes stake-outs, and processing visual information
on routine patrols . . . are highly dependant upon the use [of vision]."
(Def. Ex. C, p.4-6). Furthermore, vision is imperative to "defending one's
self or others from attack, direct pursuit of fleeing felons, subduing
individuals who are resisting arrest, high-speed chases, responding to
emergencies in poorly lit conditions and use of deadly force." (Def. Ex.
C, p.4-6). With regard to stereoscopic vision specifically, defendant claims
(and plaintiff does not contest) that an "officer must be capable of
quickly focusing from near to far and back again," presumably to best
perform those previously listed necessary tasks. (Def. Ex. C, p.4-12). Plaintiff
has offered no evidence to contradict any of these statements. In fact, during
his deposition, plaintiff agreed that defendant "has a legitimate reason
to be able to ensure that their officers see well" and that "seeing
is an important part of the job." (Def. Ex. K, p.132).
Moreover, as defendant's expert witness
explains, "SEPTA officers are faced with a wide variety of visual
conditions, including low lighting, shadows, and cluttered and busy environments.
Pursuit and providing rapid backup support are activities that SEPTA officers
routinely perform under these conditions." (Def. Ex. D, p.2). In his
deposition testimony, plaintiff himself described the average station he
patrolled as being approximately forty to sixty yards in length and containing
"dark areas." (Def. Ex. K, p.50, 51). Furthermore, plaintiff has
offered no evidence to contradict defendant's expert witness' statements that
those who, like plaintiff, suffer from a diminished capacity to sense depth are
at "an increased safety risk during pursuits because stairsteps and uneven
terrains may not be accurately detected visually." (Def. Ex. D, p.3).
In sum, simply requiring plaintiff to take
and pass a visual examination alone in no way demonstrates that defendant
regarded plaintiff's impairment as substantially interfering with his ability
to see.
B.
Plaintiff's second argument in support of
his claim that he is disabled closely parallels his first. Simply, he argues that by firing
him despite seventeen years of satisfactory service, defendant regarded his
amblyopia as substantially interfering with the major life activity of working.
Therefore, the issue for the court to resolve is simply whether defendant's
determination that plaintiff was unqualified to perform his job evidences its
belief that he is disabled.
In examining a strikingly similar claim to
that of plaintiff's, the Supreme Court held that "when the major life
activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase
'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are
unable to work in a broad class of jobs." Sutton v. United Airline, 527
U.S. 471, 491, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999). The Court further ruled
that in order to "be substantially limited in the major life activity of
working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of job,
specialized job, or particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's
skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not
precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different
jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs." Id.
at 492; see also Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 524, 144 L. Ed. 2d 484, 119 S. Ct. 2133
(1999) (holding that "evidence that petitioner is regarded as unable to
meet the DOT regulations is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether petitioner is regarded as unable to perform a class
of jobs utilizing his skills"); Tice, 247 F.3d at 514 ("If the
individual is attempting to establish that the employer believed the individual
to be limited in the life activity of 'working,' then 'working' must encompass
a broad class of jobs.").
In Sutton v. United Airline, two severely
myopic twins applied for positions as global airline pilots with United
Airlines. Although the sisters were capable pilots with experience, United
refused to hire them. The sisters brought suit, alleging, inter alia, that
United's decision violated Title I of the ADA since it was based on United's
misperception that the sisters' visual impairments substantially interfered
with their ability to work. The Court held that "because the position of
global airline pilot is a single job, this allegation does not support the
claim that respondent regards petitioners as having a substantially limiting
impairment." Id. 527 U.S. at 493. In short, the sisters had no claim
because an employer "is free to decide that some limiting, but not
substantially limiting, impairments make individuals less than ideally suited
for a job." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491 (original emphasis).
There can be no doubt that defendant, like United Airlines, believed
that those who fail to meet its visual acuity standards are not fit to be SEPTA
transit police officers. However, the Court has determined that plaintiff must
provide evidence that he is unable to perform (or perceived as unable to
perform) a broad range of jobs. Plaintiff has clearly not done so. Indeed, the
undisputed record reveals that not only can plaintiff obtain other jobs, but
that he currently has a job offer from the United Nations to be a U.N.
Peacekeeper in Kosovo, which he has not accepted only because he hopes that he
will succeed in this lawsuit and be reinstated at SEPTA. (Pl. Ex. A,
p.87 & 88; Def. Ex. K, p.87 & 88). Plaintiff also stated in his
deposition that several local employers believed him to be a qualified
applicant for their offered positions, but they wanted some assurance that he
would not be reinstated with defendant prior to offering him a job. (Def. Ex.
K, p.95 & 99). In fact, it appears from his deposition that he was
explicitly informing these potential employers that he was still employed by
defendant. See Def. Ex. K, p.101 (referring to a potential employer's comment
that his resume stated that he was still so employed). Additionally, as noted
by defendant's vocational expert, there are a host of jobs outside the field of
security and within the local job market for which plaintiff is qualified (Def.
Ex. T, p.3), a fact which plaintiff does not dispute.
In sum, since plaintiff's impairment in no way precludes him from a
broad range of jobs, as a matter of law, it cannot substantially interfere with
the major life activity of working.
II.
Even if plaintiff had successfully
established that defendant regarded him as having a disability and had further
developed the elements of his prima facie case, he has failed to provide any
legally relevant evidence that defendant's legitimate non-discriminatory reason
for terminating his employment was pretextual.
As stated previously, the second prong of
the McDonnell-Douglas framework states that after a plaintiff has
"established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection." Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n. of Southeastern
Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 668 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Defendant
employer may "satisfy its burden of production by introducing evidence
which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that there was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment decision." Fuentes
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993)). Our Court
of Appeals has remarked that this is a "relatively light burden." Id.
As discussed in the prior section,
defendant has articulated several undisputed, legitimate, non-discriminatory,
business reasons for having visual acuity standards and for firing plaintiff as
a result of his failure to satisfy them. See supra Discussion Part IA.
Consequently, pursuant to the third and
final McDonnell-Douglas prong, in order for plaintiff to survive summary
judgment, he must "point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from
which a fact finder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer's action." Id. (citations omitted). In other words, plaintiff can
"survive summary judgment, without direct evidence, by producing sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer's
proffered reasons were not its true reasons for the challenged employment
action." Id. (citing Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d
1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)). The Supreme Court and our Court of
Appeals, however, also have held that while "a firing . . . may be
wrongful in one sense (to purposefully avoid paying benefits, for example),
[it] is not necessarily wrongful under the ADEA (or . . . the ADA) 'unless the
protected trait actually motivates the employer's decision.'" Id. at 669
(citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 611-12, 123 L. Ed. 2d
338, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993)).
In the present case, plaintiff's only argument regarding pretext is
that defendant fired him not because of his inability to pass an eye
examination, but rather to avoid paying his pension. See Pl. Ex. G, p.55
(stating that plaintiff communicated to a SEPTA psychologist his belief that
defendant fired plaintiff in order to avoid giving him his full benefits).
While this may be an inappropriate and arguably immoral reason for firing an
employee if it occurred, his unsubstantiated belief alone is not enough to
raise more than a "scintilla" of evidence that defendant's expressed
reason for firing plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination. In short, it is
not enough to meet plaintiff's burden.
Conclusion
In sum, because plaintiff is not disabled, he has failed to establish a
prima facie case under the ADA. Moreover, even if he had succeeded in that
endeavor, defendant has a legitimate, non-discriminatory, business reason for
firing plaintiff, which plaintiff is unable to rebut with any evidence that
defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. For these reasons,
defendant's summary judgment motion will be granted. An appropriate order
follows.
Order
And now, this 10th day of September, 2002,
upon consideration of the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the
attached appendix (Doc. # 11), the plaintiff's opposition (Doc. # 12), and the
parties' uncontested statements of material fact and responses thereto (Docs.
1, 5) it is hereby ORDERED that the defendant's motion is GRANTED. Judgment is
ENTERED in favor of defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority and against plaintiff Michael Knolls.
William
H. Yohn, Jr., Judge
September
10, 2002
1
Visual acuity is defined as "clarity of central vision." STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 20 (5th ed. 1982).
2
The American Academy of Ophthalmology defines the condition as "poor
vision in an eye that did not develop normal sight during early
childhood." American Academy of Ophthalmology, Amblyopia FAQs, Medem
Medical Library at http://www.medem.com (Aug. 22, 2002). The National Library
of Medicine's on-line medical encyclopedia explains that "amblyopia may be
caused by any condition which causes one eye to be favored and the other
ignored by the brain: Strabismus (crossed eyes), different refractive errors (farsightedness,
nearsightedness, astigmatism) in the two eyes, or childhood cataract are common
causes of amblyopia." Medline Plus Health Information at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001014.htm
(Aug. 29, 2002). Any of these conditions will result in "the
preferred eye becoming dominant . . . . [However,] the non-favored eye is
ignored by the brain, and the visual system in the brain for that eye fails to
develop properly." Id.
3
Knoll indicated in his deposition that he has had this impairment since before
he obtained ten years of age. Def. Ex. K, p. 209.
4
See Medline Plus Health Information at http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001014.htm
(Aug. 29, 2002) (stating that reduced
depth perception is a common consequence of monocular vision).
5
See Def. Ex. K, p. 21 ("I said, doctor, you have to give me glasses or I
don't have the job.").
6
While prescriptive eyewear cannot correct Knoll's condition, the court uses the
term "corrected vision" simply to indicate that Knoll was wearing his
glasses at the time of the referenced examination.
7
The records of Knoll's 1993 examination state that the corrected visual acuity
in Knoll's inferior (left) eye was 20/40. However, the record is unclear as to
when exactly SEPTA instituted its current visual acuity standards of 20/30.
Thus, it is possible that Knoll's recorded corrected vision of 20/40 in his
left eye met the 1993 SEPTA standard.
8
See Def. Ex. K, p. 62-75 (discussing one citation for fighting and one citation
for wearing an improper uniform).
9
The ADA defines the term "covered entity" as "an employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(2). It is undisputed by the parties that defendant
was plaintiff's employer, and is thus a covered entity.
10
Since the statute does not define "substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities," the courts seeks instruction from the EEOC
guidelines, which are entitled to substantial deference. See Deane v. Pocono
Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc) (relying on EEOC
guidelines for similar purposes and according them identical deference pursuant
to the Chevron doctrine).
11
Plaintiff does not claim that he suffers from an actually disability under the
first prong of the ADA definition of disabled. In fact, plaintiff concedes that
his impairment in no way disables him. Consequently, the court notes that,
according to the record established by plaintiff, a claim of actual disability
would lack merit in this particular case.
The Supreme Court has specifically held that monocularity is not a per
se disability. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566, 144 L.
Ed. 2d 518, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999). Like plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in Kirkingburg suffered from
amblyopia and was subsequently fired from his job as a truck driver for failing
to meet Department of Transportation visual acuity standards. In reinstating
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant
employer, the Court began its discussion by stating that the ADA requires the
court "to determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case
basis." Id.
Immediately thereafter, the Court held that "while some impairments may
invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major life activity, we cannot
say that monocularity does." Id. After listing the variables that can affect the serverity
of one's monocularity, the Court concluded that "these variables are not
the stuff of a per se rule" and "monocular individuals, like others
claiming the Act's protection, [must] prove a disability by offering evidence
that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss
of depth perception and visual field, is substantial." Id. at 567.
Plaintiff has expressly stated in his
depositions and responses to interrogatories that his condition in no way
impairs his ability to engage in any daily or work-related activity or hobby.
(Def. Ex. O). Moreover, plaintiff has repeatedly stated that he is not
disabled, a statement which defendant does not refute. (Def. Ex. O; Def. Ex. K,
p.111).
12 Stereoscopic vision is defined as "the perception of two images as one by means of fusing the impressions on both retinas." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1566 (5th ed. 1982).
13
With regard to stereoscopic vision, the report specifically states that
plaintiff was "not able to stereo the fly, animals, or dots." (Pl.
Ex. I; Def. Ex. I). This refers to plaintiff's inability to adequately complete
a standard optical test which evaluates stereoscopic vision or depth
perception.
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