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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
LUIS REYES,
Appellant
v.
CORRECTIONS OFFICER JOHN CHINNICI
54 Fed. Appx. 44
October 29, 2002, Argued
November 18, 2002, Opinion Filed
NOTICE: RULES OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
OPINION OF THE COURT
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
Luis Reyes
("Reyes") appeals an order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment, pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), to Defendant Corrections Officer John
Chinnici ("Chinnici"). Reyes contends that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment on his
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by focusing on his de minimis injuries and failing
to permit a jury to decide the matter. Because we agree that no reasonable jury
could find for Reyes based on the facts of this case, we affirm the Order of
the District Court.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Because we
write solely for the parties, our review of the factual background is limited
to that which is necessary to inform our opinion today. At the time of the
incident at issue, Reyes was a prisoner in the Behavioral Adjustment Unit
("BAU") in the disciplinary block of the Berks County Jail, the most
restricted unit in the jail. Prisoners in the BAU spend 23 hours a day in single
occupancy cells and exercise for one hour a day in the prison yard. For the
safety of corrections officers and prisoners, BAU prisoners are handcuffed
[*46] from behind whenever corrections
officers move them outside of their cells.
In addition
to being housed in the BAU, Reyes was classified as "security status"
because he and his brother, another prisoner in the jail, had assaulted a
corrections officer as part of an escape attempt. Due to his security status,
prison officials required Reyes to exercise alone and prevented him from having
any "sharps," including pens. In addition, two corrections officers
accompanied Reyes whenever he went out of his cell, and corrections officers
searched his cell daily for weapons. On the day of the incident at issue, Chinnici and
Corrections Officers Jason Bao ("Bao") and Edwin Cordero
("Cordero") conducted a search of Reyes' cell. Cordero performed a
strip search of Reyes in a shower stall, while Bao and Chinnici checked his
cell.
After the search, the corrections
officers accompanied Reyes back to his cell. For reasons that remain disputed,
Chinnici previously had told Reyes that, if Reyes spit on him, he was
"going down." Upon arrival at his cell, Reyes turned toward Chinnici
and pursed his lips as if to spit on him. In response, Chinnici struck Reyes'
right shoulder. Reyes claims that Chinnici punched him, while Chinnici and Bao
claim that Chinnici made contact with an open hand. Reyes never actually spit
on Chinnici.
After the
incident, Cordero grabbed Reyes and put him back in his cell. Reyes' shoulder swelled as a result of the blow. He
requested medical attention and saw the prison nurse. The nurse looked at his
shoulder, told him it would be sore for a few days, and gave him two pills to
take.
Reyes later
commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging the Chinnici used
excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights.
On April 12, 2001, the District Court granted summary judgment to Chinnici,
concluding that he did not violate Reyes' Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1343. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a final
decision of a district court.
We exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of
summary judgment and review the facts in the light most favorable to the party
against whom summary judgment was
entered. See Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d Cir. 2000). Summary
judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 91
L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). At the summary judgment stage, the
judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the
matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986).
III. Discussion
Reyes
alleges that he was deprived of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment when Chinnici, acting under color of state law,
punched him on the shoulder and neck area while he was handcuffed. He claims
that the District Court improperly imposed its own judgment regarding the
merits of his case, rather than allowing a jury to decide the issues. He argues
that the District Court erred in two respects. [*47] First, Reyes
claims the District Court erred in ruling that Chinnici's punch was an
"understandable reaction" to Reyes' conduct. Second, Reyes claims
that the District Court erred in focusing on the injury he suffered and by
concluding that the injury was so
"minor and temporary" that Chinnici could not have acted maliciously
and sadistically.
A. "Understandable
Reaction"
"In an
excessive force claim, the central question is 'whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.'" Brooks, 204 F.3d at 106 (quoting Hudson v. McMillian,
503 U.S. 1, 7, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992)). Courts looks to
several factors in making this determination including: "(1) the need for
the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount
of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted; (4) the extent
of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by
responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any
efforts made to temper the severity of the response." Id. (quoting Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321, 89 L. Ed. 2d 251, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986)).
Contrary to
Reyes' claim that the District Court avoided a material dispute on the degree
of force used, the District Court viewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to Reyes, stating that "plaintiff alleges that ... Defendant ...
punched him on the shoulder and neck area while he was handcuffed."
Opinion at 5. The Court then applied the above factors and concluded that
Chinnici was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court noted
that: Reyes was a "security status" inmate; Reyes admitted to
attempting to spit on Chinnici and provoked Chinnici by attempting to do so;
Chinnici struck Reyes once, and not in the head or face; the purpose of
Chinnici's reaction was to avoid being spit on; and the resulting injury was
minor and temporary. While the District Court did not note this fact, the
corrections officers then immediately placed Reyes back in his cell without
further incident.
Reyes
claims that he did not actually spit on Chinnici and a reasonable jury could
conclude that he did not present a threat or security risk to Chinnici or the
other officers; however, the District Court specifically stated that "Plaintiff does not suggest what
appropriate alternative response was available to Defendant under the
circumstances." Opinion at 8. The Court added that "it certainly is
unreasonable and would undermine institutional discipline to expect a
corrections officer to simply allow himself to be spit upon." Id.
Reyes
further focuses on the fact that each of the three officers deposed in this
case admitted that punching a handcuffed prisoner can never be an acceptable use
of force. This argument is not persuasive, as the District Court correctly
noted, because regardless of whether Chinnici's action was appropriate,
"there is no constitutional violation for 'de minimis uses of physical
force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.'" Brooks, 204 F.3d at 107 (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 9-10). A single punch to avoid being spit upon is not the sort of action
that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."
B. Injury
Reyes also
claims that the District Court erred by taking into account the degree of his
injury in granting summary judgment. The District Court noted, after analyzing
the relevant five factors noted in Brooks, which include the extent of injury [*48]
inflicted, that "we recognize that the de minimis nature of
Plaintiff's does not itself foreclose this claim. However, Plaintiff has
offered no evidence that would support a reasonable inference that Defendant
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain on him or that Defendant acted maliciously or
sadistically to cause him harm." Opinion at 7.
Reyes relies on a recent case authored by this Court, Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002), as support for his position that while
the extent of injuries can be considered in evaluating the force used, the
appropriateness of that force is a factual question for a jury to decide.
Specifically, this Court stated:
We do not, of course,
suggest that a fact finder could not consider the de minimis nature of injuries
along with all of the other circumstances in concluding that the force that was
employed could not have risen to the level required for an Eighth Amendment
violation. A properly instructed fact finder could, after considering all of the
evidence, conclude that Smith's injuries were so minor that the defendants'
account of the incident is more credible than Smith's, and/or that the force
used was not of constitutional dimension. That may have been exactly what the
district court did here. However, that is an issue of fact to be resolved by
the fact finder based upon the totality of the evidence; it is not an issue of law a court can
decide.
Id. at 649. Smith involved
allegations by a prisoner that he was handcuffed, brought to a Unit Manager's
Office, and then beaten by numerous corrections officers. Smith alleged that
the officers rammed his head into walls and cabinets, knocked him to the floor,
and then kicked and punched him while he lay on the floor. One officer
allegedly then dragged Smith to his feet, pushed him against a wall, punched
him in the stomach, and choked him. Smith claimed he was subjected to a further
beating on a bench located in his cell block. He alleged that, as a result of
the beatings, his head was bleeding and he had pain in his ribs, ears, and
right eye. Id. at 644.
In contrast
to the terrible beating alleged by Smith, Reyes alleges that Chinnici punched
him once. While this Court determined in the Smith opinion that a fact finder must decide whether the
degree of force used in that case reached constitutional dimensions, the basis
for the grant of summary judgment in that case differed from the reasoning of
the District Court in this case. In Smith, the district court "focused
exclusively on the severity of Smith's injuries in denying his claim,"
despite the plaintiff's allegations of a vicious beating. Id. at 647. In this
case, the District Court considered Reyes' allegation that he was punched and
the severity of his injuries, as well as all of the other relevant factors
required under Brooks and Hudson, in reaching its conclusion. In Smith, this
Court indicated that the district court could not discount the plaintiff's
allegations of the beatings he suffered by focusing on his injuries, and
concluded that only a jury could determine whether the plaintiff's allegations
were credible given the apparent lack of injuries. The District Court in this case
concluded that even if a jury found Reyes' allegations to be credible, given
the totality of the circumstances, no jury could find that the force used rose
to the level of a constitutional dimension.
There
exists some point at which the degree of force used is so minor that a court
can safely assume that no reasonable person could conclude that a corrections
officer acted maliciously and sadistically. According to the Supreme
Court, "that is not to say that every malevolent touch by a prison guard
gives rise to a federal cause
[*49] of action." Hudson v. McMillian 503 U.S. 1,
10, 117 L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1973) ("Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem
unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's
constitutional rights")). We decline to establish a rigid rule establishing at what point the force used by a
corrections officer rises to constitutional dimensions; however, we hold that,
given the facts of this case, Chinnici's actions were not "repugnant to
the conscience of mankind" and did not violate Reyes' Eighth Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the
judgment of the District Court.
/s/ Julio M. Fuentes
Circuit Judge