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UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOSEPH WEBSTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. CROWLEY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-1998
62 Fed. Appx. 598
April 1, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
ORDER
Before: BATCHELDER and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; BARZILAY, Judge.
*
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* The
Honorable Judith M. Barzilay, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
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Joseph
Webster, a pro se Michigan prisoner, appeals a district court judgment
dismissing his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules
of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral
argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking
monetary relief, Webster sued Michael J. Crowley, warden of the Baraga Maximum
Correctional Facility; parole board member Margie McNutt; and inspector Ezrow.
Webster alleged that his food was being poisoned and that he was being
assaulted by other prisoners. Webster contends that he requested protection
from prison officials as a result of the assaults. The district court dismissed
McNutt as a defendant as the parole board had no jurisdiction regarding a
prisoner's safety. Crowley was dismissed as a defendant because he was not
served with the summons and the complaint. Inspector Ezrow subsequently moved
for summary judgment. Upon de novo review of a magistrate judge's report, the
district court granted judgment to Ezrow.
In his
timely appeal, Webster argues that the district court erred by concluding that
Ezrow had no knowledge that he sought protective custody from other inmates.
Webster contends that there is no evidence to establish that Ezrow lacked
knowledge of Webster's request for protection.
The district court's
judgment is reviewed do novo, See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286,
289 (6th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment
is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) .
Ezrow was
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Webster alleged that he was
twice assaulted by other inmates on June 6, 2000. He claimed that he made
written letters of complaint on January 27, 2002, April 29, 2002, and May 1,
2002, to request protection from specific prisoners. Webster contends that the
defendants [*600] were deliberately indifferent to the serious threat of
assault. Webster claimed that the first incident occurred on June 6, 2000,
after prison employees directed prison kitchen workers to poison his lunch.
Webster claimed that after he ate the lunch, he became dizzy and nauseated.
Webster stated that he left the dining hall, only to be followed back to his
housing unit by three prisoners who worked in the kitchen. Webster alleged that
one of the kitchen workers struck him in the face with a sharp object while the
other two prisoners watched. Webster claimed that he went to the bubble area of
the prison and requested protection from custodial staff. Webster identified
his attackers, who were gang members, by name and number. Not one of the named
defendants was in the bubble area.
Webster
alleged that the second assault occurred during dinner. Webster again claimed
that he felt nauseated and dizzy after consuming his food. Webster stated that
he was struck from behind by a kitchen worker before losing consciousness.
Webster claimed that he regained consciousness only to find two prisoners still
attacking him with a sharp object. Prison staff then arrived to break up the
fight. Webster claimed that he again requested protection.
In his
motion for summary judgment, Ezrow presented evidence that Webster had not
given him prior notice of a specific threat from other prisoners. Although
Webster contends that he was assaulted and poisoned, he never indicated to
Ezrow that he needed protection from other prisoners prior to either assault.
Ezrow met with Webster in May
2000 regarding a letter of complaint that Webster had written to Crowley. The
letter did not seek protection from other inmates. Instead, Webster alleged
that prison staff had sexually assaulted him by putting human waste in his
food. Webster further complained that the staff was putting human waste
everywhere in his cell and shower, that they were yelling at him in his cell
through an intercom twenty-four hours a day, that they were threatening to
assault him, and that they were forcing him to cause a disturbance. After his
investigation, Ezrow concluded that Webster's allegations were unfounded and
recommended that Webster be referred to medical services for psychological
intervention. Webster had made similar allegations in the past. Those
allegations were investigated by the Michigan state police and were determined
to be unfounded.
Webster
contends that Ezrow's failure to provide him protection violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. In order to
constitute a claim under the Eighth Amendment, the offending conduct must
reflect an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670, 51 L. Ed. 2d 711, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977). Such a
claim has both an objective and subjective component. Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 297-303, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271, 111 S. Ct. 2321 (1991). The objective
component of an Eighth Amendment claim requires that the pain be serious. Id.
at 298. The Supreme Court addressed the objective component in Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346-49, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981). The
subjective component, in contrast, constitutes the deliberate indifference
standard of Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101-04, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct.
285 (1976). See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302. The subjective component provides that
the offending conduct be wanton.
The record
establishes that Ezrow was not involved in investigating Webster's complaint
regarding the assaults. Ezrow's [*601] responsibility concerned investigating
Webster's allegation of poisoning. Webster did not inform Ezrow that he feared
physical attacks from inmates and Webster fails to show how Ezrow had any prior
knowledge that he needed protection from specific inmates. As Webster failed to
present evidence that Ezrow even knew about the assaults, Webster failed to
establish that Ezrow's conduct was wanton.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. Rule
34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.