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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA
Susan Jinks,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of Carl H. Jinks, Respondent,
v.
Richland County et al.,
Appellant.
Opinion No. 25690
585 S.E.2d 281 (S.C. 2003)
May 8, 2003, Submitted
August 11, 2003, Filed
PER CURIAM: Respondent Susan Jinks brought this wrongful death and
survival action on behalf of her husband, Carl H. Jinks (Jinks), who died while
incarcerated at Appellant Richland County's (County's) Detention Center. The
jury returned a verdict in Jinks' favor. n1 County appeals. n2 We affirm.
ISSUES
I. Did the trial judge err by denying County's motions for a
directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the basis Jinks
failed to present evidence of gross negligence and proximate cause?
[*283]
II. Did the trial judge err by failing to hold collateral
estoppel barred relitigation of certain issues? n3
DISCUSSION
I.
County asserts the trial court erred by denying its directed
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) motions because Jinks
failed to establish that its correctional officers acted in a grossly negligent
manner or that their alleged negligence proximately caused Jinks' death. We
disagree.
The South
Carolina Tort Claims Act provides that the State, its agencies, political
subdivisions, and other governmental entities are "liable for their torts
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances," subject to certain limitations and exemptions with the
Act. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-40 (Supp. 2002). Section 15-78-60 sets out
"exceptions" to this waiver of sovereign immunity. These exceptions
act as limitations on the liability of a governmental entity. One exception
provides:
The
governmental entity is not liable for loss resulting from:
responsibility or duty
including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement or
custody of any ... prisoner, inmate... of any governmental entity, except when
the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (Supp. 2002).
Gross negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do
something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing
intentionally that one ought not to do. Etheredge v. Richland County School
Dist. 1, 341 S.C. 307, 534 S.E.2d 275 (2000). It is the failure to exercise
slight care. Id. Gross negligence has also been defined as a relative term and
means the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances. Hollins v.
Richland County School Dist. 1, 310 S.C. 486, 427 S.E.2d 654 (1993). Gross
negligence is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact. Clyburn v. Sumter
County School Dist. 17, 317 S.C. 50, 451 S.E.2d 885 (1994).
"In ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV, the
trial court is required to view the evidence and the inferences that reasonably
can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motions and to deny the motions where either the evidence yields more than one
inference or its inference is in doubt." Strange v. South Carolina Dep't
of Highways & Pub. Transp., 314
S.C. 427, 429-30, 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994). "The trial court can only be
reversed by this Court when there is no evidence to support the ruling
below." Id. at 430, 445 S.E.2d at 440.
In his
complaint, Jinks alleged County's correctional officers were grossly negligent
in various ways. In particular, Jinks asserted County's employees failed to
properly monitor inmates, failed to call for medical attention, and failed to
provide adequate and proper medical care. At trial, Jinks argued the
correctional officers' failure to properly monitor his medical condition
proximately caused his death.
Viewing the
evidence and its inferences in the light most favorable to Jinks, there was
evidence that County was grossly negligent by failing to properly monitor
Jinks' medical condition. The trial record establishes Jinks was arrested and
booked on Friday, October 14, 1994, for failure to pay child support and spent
the weekend at County's detention facility. On Monday morning, Officer
Williams, a first shift correctional officer, and Walter Carlo, a detention
center paramedic, observed Jinks shaking, sweating, laughing, and gripping the
cell bars; Jinks did not respond to conversation. Officer Williams and
Paramedic Carlo determined Jinks [*284] should be seen by the detention center
physician.
The
detention center physician saw Jinks at noon. The medical assessment form notes
Jinks' complaint as "? D.T.'s." n4 The physician diagnosed Jinks as
suffering from alcohol withdrawal, prescribed Librium, and ordered that Jinks
be re-evaluated in two days.
Officer
Williams testified he placed Jinks in "tank one" for medical
observation as directed by the paramedic. Officer Williams stated he was not
instructed what symptoms or behavior to monitor. Jinks was alone in the cell.
Officer Williams testified he checked on Jinks every fifteen to thirty minutes until he left work at
2:30 p.m. He did not recall speaking with Jinks. At 2:30 p.m., Jinks was still
shaking, sweating, and laughing.
Officer Williams testified he
returned to the jail at 6:00 the following morning. He saw Jinks lying on the
cell floor at 6:30 a.m. Jinks appeared to be sleeping. Officer Williams looked
in on Jinks every thirty minutes. At 9:30 a.m., he asked Jinks to get up off
the floor; Jinks did so and sat on a bench. n5 Officer Williams testified,
because Jinks "appeared to be okay," two other detainees were placed
in his cell. When Officer Williams
looked in on Jinks after 10:00 a.m., Jinks was slumped over on the cell
bench and appeared to be asleep. Shortly thereafter, Jinks' cellmates notified
jail attendees that Jinks needed attention. Officer Williams entered the cell.
According to the officer, Jinks' skin had darkened and he appeared to be dead.
Officer Peay testified he
observed Jinks in the "holding tank" on October 17th. Jinks was
sweating and pale. Officer Peay testified, when he first saw Jinks the
following morning, Jinks was lying on the cell floor and appeared to be
sleeping. Officer Peay did not speak to Jinks. Officer Peay stated he found
Jinks dead on the cell bench at 10:30 a.m. n6
The
paramedic testified, when he entered Jinks' cell at 10:33 a.m., Jinks "had
passed away for a sufficient amount of time."
The autopsy report stated Jinks'
death resulted from complications from alcohol withdrawal.
Retired Richland County
Detention Training Director James Haley testified that detention center
officers receive instruction on alcohol and drug abuse. Part of this
instruction addresses alcohol withdrawal syndrome and the progressive nature of
its medical symptoms. Training materials state officers should observe all
alcohol abuse admissions closely.
An expert
in jail supervision and management procedure testified the Richland County Detention
Center's established procedures require those
inmates on medical observation to be observed every fifteen minutes for
any change in condition. In addition, medical observation requires the inmate
be aroused every hour to make certain his condition is not deteriorating. The
expert testified, according to Officers Williams' and Peay's deposition
testimony, they did not know Jinks' medical condition and, therefore, could not
determine whether his condition was improving or deteriorating.
Expert witness
Peter Bower, M.D., testified people suffering from alcohol withdrawal need to
be observed intensively and methodically. Dr. Bower stated it was his opinion
that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Jinks would have survived
alcohol withdrawal if he had been properly monitored. n7
The trial judge did not err
by denying County's directed verdict and JNOV motions. [*285] The evidence
indicates, even though the correctional officers were aware Jinks was not well,
they were not apprised of the nature of his medical condition as diagnosed by
the infirmary physician, but were simply told Jinks was to be placed on medical
observation. Without knowledge of Jinks' diagnosis, the officers could not have
adequately monitored his condition. Failure of medical personnel to advise or
the officers to inquire as to Jinks' medical condition constitutes evidence of
an absence of care necessary under the circumstances amounting to gross
negligence.
Assuming
the officers were aware that Jinks was suffering from alcohol withdrawal, the
evidence indicates the officers' monitoring of his medical condition was
inadequate. Although the officers may have observed Jinks on a periodic basis, on
the morning of October 18, Officers Williams and Peay neither spoke to nor
aroused Jinks on an hourly basis to ensure that his condition was not
deteriorating. n8 This failure was contrary to County's established detention
center policies. Moreover, it was contrary to the medical expert's opinion that
individuals suffering from alcohol withdrawal be observed "intensively and
methodically."
Additionally, there is
evidence that the correctional officers failed to observe Jinks every fifteen
minutes as required by the detention center's own policies concerning medical
observation. The trial record contains evidence which supports the conclusion
the officers' failure to properly monitor an inmate known to be suffering from
alcohol withdrawal constitutes gross negligence.
Finally,
Jinks offered expert testimony that, to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty, he would have survived if he had been properly monitored.
Accordingly, Jinks presented evidence that failure to properly monitor his
medical condition proximately caused his death.
In our
capacity as an appellate court, we are bound by the applicable standard of
review. Since there is evidence which supports the trial judge's ruling denying
County's motions for a directed verdict and JNOV, we must affirm. Id.
II.
Initially, Jinks brought this action in the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina. Among other claims, Jinks
alleged County and other defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court
granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the Section 1983 claim.
County claims that three specific rulings by the district court
judge in his order granting summary judgment on Jinks' Section 1983 claim
collaterally estop Jinks from recovering in this state court action.
Specifically, County contends the federal court's rulings -- that neither
County's failure to adopt certain policies concerning medical observation nor
the arrival of Jinks' medication after his death proximately caused Jinks' death
-- bar his present negligence claim. Additionally, County claims the district
judge's finding that correctional officers did observe Jinks and followed the
infirmary physician's instructions bar relitigation of this issue. We disagree.
Collateral estoppel prevents a party from relitigating in a
subsequent suit an issue actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a
prior action. Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 481 S.E.2d 706
(1997).
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether the federal court's
findings concerning the sufficiency of County's medical observation policies
and the arrival of Jinks' prescription after his death collaterally estopped
Jinks' current negligence claim as Jinks presented other evidence of gross negligence.
n9
Finally, the federal court's finding that correctional [*286]
officers observed Jinks and followed the physician's instructions is not
preclusive on the issue of whether the officers properly observed Jinks. Accordingly,
collateral estoppel did not bar relitigation of this issue. Id.
AFFIRMED.
TOAL, C.J., MOORE, WALLER, BURNETT and PLEICONES, JJ., concur.
FOOTNOTES:
n1 The
jury returned a defense verdict in Jinks' medical malpractice action against
the detention center's physician.
n2
Originally, the Court issued an opinion in this matter addressing County's
claim that Jinks failed to file this action within the statute of limitations.
The Court held the federal statute tolling the applicable state statute of
limitations violated the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Jinks v. Richland County, 349 S.C. 298, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002). The United
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter to the Court for further
proceedings. Jinks v. Richland County, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 1667, 155 L.
Ed. 2d 631 (2003). Accordingly, this opinion addresses County's remaining
issues.
n3 In
its Statement of Issues on Appeal, County also asserts the lower court erred by
failing to grant its motions for a directed verdict and judgment
notwithstanding the verdict on the basis of sovereign immunity. See S.C. Code
Ann. § 15-78-60(4) (Supp. 2002). Since County failed to argue this issue
in the body of its brief, the issue is
deemed abandoned. First Savings Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361, 444 S.E.2d 513
(1994) (issues not argued in the brief are deemed abandoned and will not be
considered on appeal); Fields v. Fields, 342 S.C. 182, 536 S.E.2d 684 (Ct. App.
2000) (same).
n4 It is
undisputed Jinks did not verbally convey this complaint to the detention center
staff, but rather the staff interpreted Jinks' symptoms as possible delirium
tremens.
n5
Officer Williams admitted his incident report, transcribed the day of Jinks'
death, does not indicate he asked Jinks to get off the floor. Similarly,
Officer Williams' deposition testimony does not state he asked Jinks to get off
the floor.
n6
Jinks' prescription, filled by an outside pharmacy, arrived after he had passed
away.
n7 Dr.
Bower suggested, when the officers saw Jinks on the cell floor hours before his
death, he could have been recovering from a seizure rather than sleeping.
n8
County argues Jinks offered no testimony as to the actions of its employees
between 2:30 p.m. on October 17 and 6:00 a.m. on October 18. Officer Williams
testified the officers on other shifts had his same duties and would have been aware Jinks was under medical
observation. The inference from his testimony suggests that from 2:30 p.m. on
October 17 to 6:00 a.m. on October 18, Jinks received the same degree of
attention that he received from Officer Williams.
n9 See
Discussion I.