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ANTHONY LYNCH-BEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAN BOLDEN, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-1240
44 Fed. Appx. 696
August 13, 2002, Filed
NOTICE:
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT
PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS.
PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS
NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
Before: KENNEDY, SUHRHEINRICH, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Lynch-Bey, a Michigan prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court order dismissing his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to
Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel
unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking monetary and declaratory
relief, Lynch-Bey sued Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Deputy Director Dan Bolden, Transfer
Coordinator Nick Ludwick, and Assistant Deputy Warden C. Acker. Lynch-Bey
alleged that Ludwick and Acker violated his rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, state law, and MDOC policy when they increased his
security classification and placed him in administrative segregation because of
a misconduct charge from another prison, and that Bolden failed to intervene on
Lynch-Bey's behalf. The MDOC eventually expunged the charge and restored
Lynch-Bey's disciplinary credits after learning that the other prison had
reversed Lynch-Bey's misconduct charge. The district court granted Lynch-Bey in
forma pauperis status, screened the complaint, and dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(c).
In his timely appeal, Lynch-Bey
argues that the district court erred by finding that the MDOC was not required
to give him a due process hearing on the misconduct charge.
This court reviews de novo a district court's decision to dismiss under
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed
Lynch-Bey's complaint for failure to state a claim. Pursuant to an agreement
between Michigan and Virginia, Lynch-Bey served time in a Virginia prison for a
Michigan conviction. While Lynch-Bey was in the Virginia prison, the Virginia
Department of Corrections (VDOC) charged him with a major misconduct violation
for participating [*698] in a group demonstration. Lynch-Bey appealed, but was
transferred back to Michigan the day after the misconduct charge was
overturned. Neither Lynch-Bey nor the MDOC learned for many months that the
misconduct charge had been reversed. The MDOC treated Lynch-Bey's VDOC
conviction as a MDOC charge of inciting to riot. The Michigan prison increased
his security classification and placed him in administrative segregation. The
discipline also affected Lynch-Bey's sentence because Michigan prisoners do not
accrue good-time credits for any month in which they are found guilty of a
major misconduct violation. See MDOC Policy Directive 03.01.100. The MDOC later
expunged the misconduct charge and restored Lynch-Bey's disciplinary credits.
Lynch-Bey had no due process claim
against Ludwick and Acker because the administrative segregation imposed upon
him as a result of the disciplinary charge did not constitute an atypical and
significant hardship. See
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293
(1995); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown,
62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, because the MDOC restored his disciplinary credits, the
disciplinary charge did not affect the duration of his confinement.
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487.
The district court also properly
held that Lynch-Bey had no claim against Bolden for failing to intervene.
Lynch-Bey alleged that he notified Bolden that his administrative segregation
was improper but Bolden failed to act. The general rule is that § 1983
liability will not be imposed solely upon the basis of respondeat superior.
See Taylor v. Michigan Dep't of
Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995). Lynch-Bey did not allege that Bolden
directly participated in the alleged misconduct. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Thus,
his allegations that Bolden did not intervene on his behalf are insufficient to
state a § 1983 claim.
Having found no basis for federal jurisdiction, the district court
properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over Lynch-Bey's supplemental state
law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 726, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
Accepting Lynch-Bey's factual allegations as true, he can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. See Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d
389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's order. Rule
34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.