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UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DANNY RAY THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LINDA ROCHELL, Asst. Warden of CCA, SCCF, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-5189
47 Fed. Appx. 315
NOTICE:
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT
PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS.
PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH
CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS
NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
Before: GUY and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges; QUIST, District Judge. *
Danny
Ray Thomas, a pro se Tennessee prisoner, appeals a district court order
dismissing his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules
of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral
argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking monetary and injunctive
relief, Thomas sued the assistant warden of the prison, Linda Rochell, and the
owner of the prison, Corrections Corporation of America, contending that his
First Amendment right of access to the courts had been violated. Upon de novo
review of a magistrate's judge's report, the district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants.
In his timely appeal, Thomas
argues that he did suffer an actual injury and that the district court
misapplied the law. He [*317] also continues to raise the same issues that he
presented in the district court.
We
review the district court's order de novo. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001).
Upon review of the undisputed
facts, we conclude that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law. Inmates have a constitutionally protected right of access to the
courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430
U.S. 817, 828, 52 L. Ed. 2d 72, 97 S. Ct. 1491 (1977). However, the right of
access to the courts is not unrestricted and does not mean that an inmate must
be afforded unlimited litigation resources. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352-55, 135
L. Ed. 2d 606, 116 S. Ct. 2174 (1996). There is no generalized "right to litigate"
which is protected by the First Amendment. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378,
391 (6th Cir. 1999). In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that an inmate claiming
that he was denied access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual
litigation related injury or legal prejudice because of the actions of the
defendants. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349-51;
Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, not every
infringement or inconvenience suffered by the litigating prisoner implicates
this constitutional right.
Further, not every actual legal
injury or prejudice suffered by a prisoner triggers constitutional concerns.
The Court noted in Lewis that the First Amendment only protects a prisoner's
access to the courts as it relates to cases which attack his convictions and
sentences and to cases which challenge the conditions of his confinement. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. The Supreme Court noted that the latter
category of cases arose from Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d
935, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 71 Ohio Op. 2d 336 (1974), which extended the right of
access to the courts to civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. In
Thaddeus-X, this court noted that the right of access to the courts extends
only to "direct appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights
claims." Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 391.
Thomas has identified four cases
which he contends were impacted by the defendants' actions: 1) a Tennessee
Claims Commission case based on allegations of medical malpractice, Case No.
2000574; 2) a Davidson County (Tennessee) Circuit Court case based on
allegations of medical malpractice, Case No. 00C-2532; 3) a case in the Middle
District of Tennessee, Thomas v. Campbell, et al., No. 1:00-0116, concerning
the adequacy of the prison library; and 4) a case in the Middle District of
Tennessee, Thomas v. Webb, et al., 39 Fed. Appx. 255, No. 3:99-1175, based on
allegations of the denial of adequate medical care.
The first two cases involve
state tort claims and medical malpractice claims against two prison doctors and
the State of Tennessee. A prisoner has no remedy under § 1983 to pursue tort
claims against prison officials.
Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1454 (6th Cir. 1990). Under Lewis and
Thaddeus-X, any alleged prejudice regarding these two cases will not support a
claim that Thomas was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts.
Thus, Thomas's two state actions do not establish an injury.
The third and fourth cases are §
1983 actions which involve Thomas's civil rights. Thus, they would appear to
implicate First Amendment protection. However, the third lawsuit was dismissed
by the district court prior to service of process under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
See Thomas v. Campbell, 12 Fed. Appx. 295,
No. 00-6377, 2001 WL 7000839, at *1-2 (6th Cir. June 11, 2001). A frivolous lawsuit, even if it is
a civil rights lawsuit, fails to satisfy [*318]the standards set forth in Lewis
and Thaddeus-X. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 n.3. Accordingly, this action cannot
be found to support Thomas's First Amendment claims.
Thus, of the four cases
identified by Thomas, only his civil rights lawsuit in Thomas v. Webb, 39 Fed.
Appx. 255, No. 3:99-1175, triggers First Amendment protection. However, the
evidence shows that Thomas suffered no prejudice or injury to this case because
of the defendants' alleged actions.
In
the Webb case, Thomas sought notary service and a copy of his trust fund
account in conjunction with his application to proceed in forma pauperis. The
application was granted by the district court in an order entered on October
30, 2000. Thus, Thomas suffered no actual prejudice or legal injury because of
his inability to obtain notary service or a copy of his trust fund account.
Thomas also did not show how the denial of his request for postage on October
4, 2000, caused him to suffer actual legal injury or prejudice. In his
deposition, Thomas admitted that he had suffered no legal injury because of the
denial of postage. As to his allegation about the denial of photocopies, Thomas
was provided with copies of the material he wanted to file in the case and did
mail the copies to the district court. Thomas did not provide any evidence that the delay in his
obtaining copies of documents for the case caused him any prejudice or injury.
Thus, Thomas failed to establish that the defendants denied him access to the
courts.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
order. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
* The Honorable Gordon J.
Quist, United States District Judge for the Western District of Michigan,
sitting by designation.