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GARRETT WADE LINDERMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ELDON VAIL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-35684
59 Fed. Appx. 180
October 11, 2002 **,
Submitted, Seattle, Washington
February 3, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: RULES OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE
REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
Before: BROWNING, FISHER,
and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Washington
state prisoner Garrett Wade Linderman ("Linderman") appeals pro se
the district court's order granting the Washington State Penitentiary's
("WSP") motion for summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, they
are not recited here.
[*182] We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. Whether the prison's actions
violate the Eighth Amendment is a mixed question of law and fact. Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th
Cir. 2002). We review the district court's factual findings for clear error.
Id. We review the district court's legal conclusion that the facts do not
demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation de novo. Id. We affirm in part and
reverse in part.
To
establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show that he suffered from
the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
"Under traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, we first consider whether
there is an 'infliction of pain,' and, if so, whether that infliction is
'unnecessary and wanton.'" Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525 (9th
Cir. 1993) (en banc). To determine if the policy is "necessary," we
consider the prison's security interests. See id. at 1526-27. To determine if
the infliction of pain is "wanton," we look to see if prison
officials acted with "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's
serious medical needs. Id. at 1527.
A finding
of deliberate indifference requires something more than negligence, but is satisfied with something
less than purposefully causing the harm alleged. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835, 128 L.
Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). It is not enough that a prison official
should have known about a risk of harm; rather, the official must actually be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn, actually draw the
inference, and nonetheless disregard the risk to the inmate's health. Id. at 837. Knowledge may be inferred from
evidence establishing an obvious risk of harm. Id. at 842.
The
district court properly granted summary judgment on Linderman's claim regarding
the provision of alternative medical modalities while he was housed in
higher-security areas of the prison. Linderman's claim does not allege facts
sufficient to support a finding that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. Rather, Linderman's claim merely
raises a difference of opinion about the proper course of his medical
treatment. See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90
F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).
The district court, however, erred in granting summary judgment
as to potential declaratory or injunctive relief on Linderman's challenges to
WSP's policies prohibiting pillows in higher-security areas of the prison and
requiring inmates to reestablish medical treatment upon transfer between units.
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on the analysis set forth
in Turner v. Safley, requiring courts to balance the rights of the inmate
against the legitimate penological interests of the prison. 482 U.S. 78, 96 L.
Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Under
Turner, "a lesser standard of scrutiny" is applied to determine the
constitutionality of prison rules. Id.
at 81. But the Turner analysis does not apply to Eighth Amendment claims. Hallett, 296 F.3d at 747 n.7; Jordan, 986
F.2d at 1530. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the facts
under the traditional Eighth Amendment "unnecessary and wanton"
analysis.
The
district court also erred in granting summary judgment on Linderman's claim
that he suffered the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as a result of
delays he incurred in receiving medical modalities when he was transferred into
higher-security areas of the prison. "Prison officials are deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs when they deny, delay, or
intentionally [*183] interfere with medical treatment." Hallett, 296 F.3d
at 744 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Linderman raised a
triable issue of fact regarding whether the repeated, foreseeable, and lengthy
delays he experienced in getting his substitute blankets upon transfer to
higher-security units of the prison rises to the level of deliberate
indifference.
The district court also erred in its causation analysis. The
district court found that Linderman could not show the individualized causation
required to prevail on a section 1983 claim alleging a constitutional deprivation.
See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). But when a prisoner seeks
injunctive or declaratory relief against prison officials, his inquiry into
causation is "broader and more generalized." Id. Because Linderman
seeks injunctive or declaratory relief, the district court should have
considered "the combined acts or omissions of the state officials
responsible for operating" the WSP. Id.
Upon remand, the district court should appoint pro bono counsel
to represent Linderman. The Court expresses no opinion as to the merits of
Linderman's claims. Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
** The panel unanimously finds this case
suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).