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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOYCE ROBINSON,
as Successor in interest and
surviving heir to decedent,
VERNON MILLER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
UNITED STATES BUREAU OF PRISONS; et al,
Defendants.
02-CV-0190
244 F. Supp. 2d 57
February 7, 2003, Decided
MEMORANDUM-DECISION and
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff
Joyce Robinson commenced the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1988, the Federal Tort [*60] Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674, and the
Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution arising out of the death of her son, Vernon Miller
("Miller"), while he was incarcerated at the Ray Brook Federal
Correctional Institution in Ray Brook, New York ("FCI Ray Brook").
Defendants now move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or in the
alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiff
opposes. The motion was taken on submit without oral argument.
II. FACTS
At all
times relevant hereto, Miller was in the custody of the United States Bureau of
Prisons at the FCI Ray Brook. (Pl.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 1.) In the
evening of May 30, 1999, he was playing chess with another inmate, Isa Gray ("Gray"), in the Genesee
Housing Unit ("GHU"). (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 2.) The chess
game escalated into a physical altercation between Miller and Gray. (Pl.'s
Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 8; Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 4.) Gray
ultimately stabbed Miller in the chest with a sharpened metal shank. (Def.'s
Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 4. ) n1Defendant Corrections Officer Daniel Mercado
("Mercado"), the only officer supervising the inmates in the unit,
did not witness the fight. (Pl.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at PP 7, 9.)
At 8:30
p.m., prison officials scheduled a facility-wide move whereby inmates were
moved from one area within the prison to another. (Id. at P 11.) During the
move, Mercado was positioned in front of the GHU where he could observe the
common area of the prison yard and open the door of the unit. (Id. at PP
12-13.) Miller ran out of the unit, stated that he had been stabbed, and that
he thought he was going to die. (Id. at P 14.) Mercado reached out for Miller
and activated his body alarm. (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 8.) Miller
pulled away from Mercado and headed toward the Health Services Unit
("HSU"). (Pl.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 15.) While walking toward
the HSU, Senior Officer Davis arrived and attempted to assist Miller to the
HSU. (Def.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 9.; Pl's Mem. of Law, Ex. A at pp. 4-5.
) n2 On the way to the HSU, Miller collapsed. (Pl.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P
15.)
Shortly
after Mercado radioed for assistance, FCI Ray Brook Emergency Medical
Technician Steven Orman ("Orman") responded to the scene. (Pl.'s Ex.
A, p. 14.; Def.'s Ex. 2; Def.'s Ex. 5.) Orman observed that Miller had lost a
significant amount of blood (at least one liter) and continued to bleed heavily.
(Def.'s Exs. 2, 5.) Prison officials requested an ambulance. (Id.; Pl.'s Ex.
D.) Although the records submitted are difficult to discern, it appears that
prison officials called for an ambulance shortly after Mercado learned of
Miller's injury. (Pl.'s Ex. D; Def.'s Ex. 2. ) n3 According to prison medical
records, [*61]Miller was alert and fully oriented when Orman arrived. (Def.'s
Ex. 2, 5.) Orman proceeded to render first aid to Miller which consisted of
applying direct pressure to the wound and providing oxygen and intravenous
fluids. (Def.'s Ex. 2, 5; Pl.'s Ex. A,
p. 14-15.) Orman's records provide that Miller's heart sounded clear and regular/ rapid. Pt
complained of being cold and was very restless. Pt moved to ambulance stretcher
and removed from institution for hospital treatment. Pt. remained alert and
lucid throughout the time and was being cared for by HSU staff.
(Def.'s Ex. 2.)
During the
time Miller was receiving treatment, prison officials also were investigating
the incident. Prison officials questioned Miller about who was responsible for
the stabbing. (Pl.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at P 17; Pl.'s Ex. A, p. 9.) Miller
allegedly responded that Gray did it. (Pl.'s Ex. A, p. 9.) Another officer
displayed a picture of an inmate to Miller and asked whether the picture was of
the perpetrator. (Id.) Miller responded that the inmate in the picture, Gray,
stabbed him. (Id.)
The ambulance took Miller to the Adirondack
Medical Center Emergency Room. According to hospital records, he arrived in the
emergency room at 9:24 p.m. (Def.'s Ex. 2.) Miller died at 10:49 p.m. as he was
being prepared for the operating room. (Id.) Miller's death certificate states
that the immediate cause of death was internal and external exsanguination
(i.e., he bled to death).
Joyce Robinson was appointed
by the Illinois state courts as the representative of her son's estate. The
instant action was commenced on February 13, 2002.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because defendants moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56,
plaintiff is on notice that defendants
seek summary judgment. Plaintiff and defendants submitted materials outside the
pleadings. Further, plaintiff does not claim that she has not had sufficient
opportunity to develop the facts necessary to oppose defendants' motion for
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc. v. Department of the Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989) (party seeking additional discovery prior
to disposition of summary judgment motion must file affidavit with district
court stating (i) what facts are sought; (ii) how they create genuine issue;
(iii) what effort has been made to obtain them; and (iv) why efforts have been
unsuccessful). Accordingly, the instant motion will be treated as one made
pursuant to Rule 56.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The ultimate [*62] inquiry is
whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party based on the
evidence presented, the legitimate inferences that could be drawn from that
evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, and the applicable burden of proof.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 252, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). In determining a
motion for summary judgment, all inferences to be drawn from the facts
contained in the exhibits and depositions "must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962);
Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, "the litigant opposing summary judgment
'may not rest upon mere conclusory allegations or denials' as a vehicle for
obtaining a trial." Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neighborhood Corp., 613 F.2d
438, 445 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31,
33 (2d Cir. 1978)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Eighth Amendment Claims
1. Proper Basis for
Claims
Plaintiff brings the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Section 1983 does not provide a
cause of action against federal agencies or employees. Accordingly, plaintiff's
claims will be treated as ones brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397, 29 L. Ed. 2d 619, 91 S. Ct.
1999 (1971). See Robinson v. Overseas
Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994); Daloia v. Rose, 849 F.2d
74, 75 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (construing pro se section 1983 claims against
federal defendants as Bivens claims), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898, 102 L. Ed. 2d
231, 109 S. Ct. 242 (1988).
2. Qualified Immunity
The individual defendants first contend that plaintiff's
constitutional claims should be dismissed because they are entitled to
qualified immunity.
Government officials
performing discretionary functions generally are granted a qualified immunity
and are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
What this means in practice is that whether an official protected by qualified
immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official
action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time
it was taken.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 614, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity if either (a) the defendant's action did not violate clearly
established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to
believe that his action did not violate such law. A right is clearly
established if (1) the law is defined with reasonable clarity, (2) the Supreme
Court or the Second Circuit has recognized the right, and (3) a reasonable
defendant would have understood from the existing law that [his] conduct was
unlawful. The question is not what a lawyer would learn or intuit from
researching case law, but what a reasonable person in the defendant's position
should know about the constitutionality of the conduct.
Anderson v. Recore, F.3d
, , 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 550,
2002 WL 122221, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2003) (internal citations, quotations
and alterations omitted).
[*63] a. Did Defendants' Actions Violate A Clearly Established
Right
It is
plaintiff's position that: (1) prison officials failed to provide Miller with
proper medical treatment; and (2) "allowing 219 inmates, who have violent
proclivities, to move about between two separate, but connected, housing units, freely and
unguarded or inadequately guarded posed a substantial risk to [Miller]".
(Pl. Mem. of Law at 8.)
(1) Inadequate Medical Treatment Claim
"In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim arising out
of inadequate medical care, a prisoner must prove 'deliberate indifference to
[his] serious medical needs.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d
Cir. 1998) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97
S. Ct. 285 (1976)). This standard incorporates both objective and subjective
elements. The objective "medical need" element measures the severity
of the alleged deprivation, while the subjective "deliberate
indifference" element ensures that the defendant prison official acted
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See id.; Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99
F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir.1996).
Smith v. Carpenter, F.3d
, , 2003 U.S. App. Lexis 503,
2003 WL 115223, at *3 (2d Cir. Jan. 14, 2003).
"Not every lapse in prison medical care will rise to the level of a
constitutional violation." Id. "[A] prisoner must demonstrate more
than 'an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care' by prison
officials to successfully establish Eighth Amendment liability." Id.
"An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,
a state of mind equivalent to the familiar standard of recklessness as used in
criminal law." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Defendants
concede that Miller suffered from a serious medical condition. They contend,
however, that they were not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The
undisputed evidence in the record reveals that upon learning of Miller's
injury, Mercado immediately radioed for assistance. Mercado attempted to assist
Miller, but Miller pulled away and headed toward the HSU. At that time, another
corrections officer, Senior Officer Davis, arrived to assist Miller to the HSU.
Mercado left to assist in securing the other inmates. The other corrections
officer attempted to assist Miller to the HSU when Miller collapsed to the
floor. An Emergency Medical Technician ("EMT") arrived and began to
perform first aid. An ambulance also was summoned to take Miller to the
emergency room. The EMT, together with the assistance of other corrections
officers, continued to provide medical assistance to Miller until the ambulance
arrived. Plaintiff offers no evidence that Mercado delayed treatment, delayed
the departure of the ambulance for the hospital, or otherwise disregarded
Miller's serious medical condition. Because Mercado immediately summoned help
for Miller, and such help, including an EMT and other corrections officers,
arrived quickly and began performing first aid on Miller, it cannot be said
that Mercado acted with deliberate indifference to Miller's serious medical
condition. See Mays v. Rhodes, 255
F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2001). Even assuming that Mercado's actions did amount
to a constitutional violation, they were objectively reasonable under the
circumstances presented. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish a
constitutional violation, and in any event, Mercado is entitled to qualified
immunity.
The same
reasoning applies with respect to defendant John Nash. First, there was no
Eighth Amendment violation. [*64] Second, prison officials acted reasonably
under the circumstances. Third, Nash was neither the warden of FCI Ray Brook
nor present at the facility on May 30, 1999, and therefore, had no personal
involvement in the incident. n4 See, e.g.,
Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir. 2001) (personal involvement is a prerequisite for
an award of damages for an alleged constitutional deprivation).
(2) Inadequate Supervision of Inmates Claim
The Eighth
Amendment imposes a duty upon prison officials "to protect prisoners from
violence at the hands of other prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 833, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To succeed on the inadequate
supervision of inmates claim, plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants acted
with deliberate indifference towards Miller's safety. See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 217 F.3d 77,
79 (2d Cir. 2000). Thus, plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that
defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Miller's safety. Id.
There is no
evidence-expert or otherwise-in the record suggesting that defendants should
have been aware of an excessive risk to Miller's safety or that the staffing at FCI Ray Brook rises to
the level of a constitutional violation. See
Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2002). The mere
allegation that having one corrections officer supervise 219 inmates with
violent proclivities, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which a fair
minded trier of fact could reasonably conclude that defendants were aware of an
excessive risk to Miller's safety or the FCI Ray Brook prison population in
general. See id; compare Smith v. Ark.
Dep't of Correction, 103 F.3d 637, 644 (8th Cir. 1996). It, therefore, cannot
be said that defendants were aware of and disregarded any such risks. Further,
there is no evidence-expert or otherwise-that any alleged failure to supervise
was a proximate cause of the attack and the resulting injuries and death.
Accordingly, this claim must be dismissed.
B. Federal Tort Claims Act
Plaintiff also seeks to hold defendants liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et. seq. The FTCA waives
the United States' sovereign immunity for claims against the United States, for
money damages ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to
the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Under
the FTCA, courts apply the law of the state where the accident occurred. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 114
(2d Cir. 2000). Here, New York law applies.
Under New York law, the elements of a negligence claim are: (i)
a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (ii) a breach of that duty; and
(iii) injury substantially caused by that breach. Lombard v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 280 F.3d 209, 214 (2d
Cir. 2002). Because defendants
incarcerated Miller and held him [*65] against his will, they owed him a duty
of care. 18 U.S.C. § 4042; United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 10 L. Ed. 2d
805, 83 S. Ct. 1850 (1963); see also
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970
(1994); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
199-200, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982); Sanchez v. State of New York, 97
N.Y.2d 611, 2002 WL 31619048 (2002). Plaintiff offers no evidence, however,
that defendants breached that duty of care or that, assuming they did breach
their duty of care, Miller's injuries and resulting death were substantially
caused by that breach. See Sanchez,
97 N.Y.2d at 611 .
Again,
plaintiff proffers no evidence-expert or otherwise-or law from which a fair
minded trier of fact could reasonably conclude that it is a departure from the
ordinary standard of care to have one corrections officer supervise 219 inmates.
See id. In Sanchez, the New York Court of Appeals found issues of triable fact
regarding the foreseeability of inmate-on-inmate violence based upon evidence
including staffing levels, the ability of staff to monitor the inmates, past
behavior of inmates and prison staff, state regulations regarding the staffing
of correctional facilities and the monitoring of inmates, and expert testimony
regarding the staffing levels at issue. In this case, there is no evidence or expert testimony about rules and
regulations relevant to the foreseeability of such violence (e.g. rules and
regulations regarding proper staffing levels, proper positioning of corrections
officers, proper monitoring procedures, etc.), the risk of inmate-on-inmate
attacks during periods of open movement in and out of the housing unit, the
corrections officers' past behavior with respect to monitoring inmate activity,
or the corrections officers' ability to monitor the inmates from their assigned
posts. See id. As the New York State Court of Appeals stated in Sanchez, "the mere occurrence of an inmate
assault, without credible evidence that the assault was reasonably foreseeable,
cannot establish the negligence of the State." Id. Even assuming there was
a breach of the duty of care, plaintiff also fails to present evidence-expert
or otherwise-that Miller's stab wound was the result of any such breach.
Similarly,
plaintiff presents no evidence-expert or otherwise-that defendants deviated
from the proper standard of care in rendering medical treatment to Miller. The
evidence in the record demonstrates that defendants promptly attended to
Miller's medical needs by applying pressure to the wound, giving him an IV and
oxygen, and summoning an ambulance. He was awake and alert when he left FCI Ray
Brook and upon arrival at the emergency room. He then went into cardiac arrest
upon being transferred from the emergency room to the operating room. He died
at 10:48 p.m. (approximately two hours and twenty minutes after he was stabbed)
after efforts to resuscitate him failed. (Def. Ex. 2; Pl. Exs. H, I.) Other
than questioning defendants' efforts, plaintiff provides no evidence-expert or
otherwise-from which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that such
efforts constituted a breach of the applicable standard of care.
C. Liability of the United States
The United States, the real party in interest when a federal
agency is named as a defendant, cannot be held liable for plaintiff's causes of
action because: (1) constitutional
claims are not actionable under the FTCA, Washington v. Drug Enforcement
Administration, 183 F.3d 868, 873 [*66] (8th Cir. 1999); Broady v. City of New
York, No. 01 Civ. 0724, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8514, 2001 WL 720582, at * 1
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2001); (2) a Bivens
action may not be maintained against the United States, Washington, 183 F.3d at
872 n.8; and (3) for the reasons previously discussed, plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate any constitutional violations or negligence.
V. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff
has failed to demonstrate that defendants' actions violated Miller's
constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment. Defendants did not act with
deliberate indifference towards Miller's safety or serious medical condition.
Plaintiff has failed to proffer any evidence from which a fair minded trier of
fact could reasonably conclude that defendants breached their duty of care to
Miller by failing to provide adequate supervision of inmates or failing to
provide him with proper medical care. Alternatively, there is no evidence that
any alleged breach of the duty of care was the proximate cause of Miller's
injuries and resulting death. Plaintiff has failed to identify the "John
Doe" defendants or any other individuals against whom liability may be
imposed under the Eighth Amendment or the FTCA. Finally, Mercado is entitled to
qualified immunity and Nash to dismissal for lack of any personal involvement.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;
2. The complaint is
DISMISSED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment
accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/David N. Hurd
United States District Judge
Dated: February 7, 2003.
FOOTNOTES:
n1 As a
result of this incident, Gray was convicted of manslaughter in the second
degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree and promoting
prison contraband in the first degree. See
People v. Gray, A.D.2d , 751 N.Y.S.2d 652 (3d Dep't 2002).
n2 The
exhibits attached to plaintiff's Memorandum of Law will be referenced as
"Pl.'s Ex." followed by the exhibit number. Similarly, the exhibits
attached to defendant's Memorandum of Law will be referenced as "Def.'s
Ex." followed by the exhibit number.
n3
Ambulance records provide that the ambulance was called between 8:20 and 8:30
p.m. (Pl.'s Ex. D.) This is impossible because all parties agree that Mercado
did not learn of Miller's injuries until 8:30 p.m. or shortly thereafter.
(Pl.'s Stmnt. of Mat. Facts at PP 11, 13, 14.) Ambulance records further
provide that the ambulance left for FCI Ray Brook at 8:36 p.m., arrived at FCI
Ray Brook at approximately 8:42 p.m., left for the hospital at approximately
9:00 p.m., and arrived at the hospital at approximately 9:10 p.m. (Pl.'s. Ex.
D; Def.'s Ex. 2.) The New York State Police's interview of Lieutenant Robert
Charles Thompson at FCI Ray Brook indicates that the ambulance arrived
somewhere between 8:50 and 8:55 p.m. (Pl.'s Ex. A, p. 11.) Hospital records
indicate that Miller was admitted to the emergency room at approximately 9:24
p.m.; not 9:10 as indicated in the ambulance records. (Def. Ex. 2.) It, thus,
appears, although it is uncertain and cannot now be resolved, that the times
recorded in the ambulance records are approximately ten to fifteen minutes
behind all other times recorded in medical records or testified to by witnesses.
n4 The
undisputed evidence in the record is that Nash did not become warden at FCI Ray
Brook until August 1999.