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DEJUAN SAMPSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
CECIL DAVIS,
Respondent-Appellee.
58 Fed. Appx. 217
December 18, 2002 *,
Submitted
January 10, 2003, Decided
NOTICE: RULES OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE
REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
A conduct
adjustment board (CAB) at Otter Creek Correctional Facility found Indiana
prisoner DeJuan Sampson guilty of participating in a riot, sanctioned him with
365 days disciplinary segregation, and revoked 180 days of earned-credit time.
Mr. Sampson exhausted his administrative remedies and then sought relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied his petition, and we affirm.
Mr. Sampson
is currently incarcerated at Indiana State Prison, but this lawsuit arises out
of events that occurred at Otter Creek, a private, contract prison in Kentucky.
A riot occurred at Otter Creek on July 5, 2001, during which inmates broke
dormitory walls and bathroom fixtures and threw televisions out of windows.
After prison officials conducted an investigation, they charged Mr. Sampson
with being an active participant in the riot. On July 26 Mr. Sampson received a
copy of the conduct report detailing this charge and a notice of his upcoming
disciplinary hearing. He requested fourteen
witnesses--eight of whom provided testimony--but did not request
Warden William Wolford as one of his witnesses.
At the
disciplinary hearing on July 31, Mr. Sampson pleaded not guilty. During the
hearing the CAB considered the prison investigator's report, but neither Mr.
Sampson nor his lay advocate, another prisoner, were permitted to view this
evidence. The CAB found Mr. Sampson guilty of the charge and sanctioned him
with 365 days' disciplinary segregation, the loss of 365 days' earned-credit
time, a demotion from credit class I to credit class III, and a recommendation
that he be transferred to a higher security facility. On appeal the Department
of Corrections' final reviewing authority affirmed Mr. Sampson's conviction but
reduced the loss of earned-credit time to 180 days, finding that this was a
more appropriate punishment.
In his §
2254 petition Mr. Sampson alleges that he received inadequate process in that
the composition of the CAB was improper, he did not receive sufficient notice
of the charges against him, he was denied the opportunity to call certain
witnesses and review certain evidence, and he was convicted based on
information gathered from unreliable sources including confidential informants.
After examining the evidence presented against Mr. Sampson, including the
prison investigator's reports, the district court found that Mr. Sampson had
received adequate process and denied his petition. We review the findings of the district court de novo. See Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499, 502 (7th
Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
Since Indiana prisoners have a protected liberty interest in
earned good-time credits[*219] and in credit-earning class, Mr. Sampson was
entitled to due process before those credits were taken away. See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 924(7th
Cir. 2002)(per curiam). Due process requires that a prisoner must
receive certain rudimentary protections, see
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct.
2963(1974), including advance written notice of the charges, see 418 U.S. at 563-64, the right to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence, see id. at 566, and an opportunity to present a defense to an
impartial decisionmaker, see id. at
570-71; Gaither v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 817, 820(7th Cir. 2000)(per curiam). Due
process also demands that the CAB's determination of guilt must be supported by
"some evidence in the record." Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst.,
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356, 105 S. Ct. 2768(1985);
see Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652(7th Cir. 2000).
Mr.
Sampson's disciplinary hearing was constitutionally sufficient. Mr. Sampson
alleges that because the conduct report and the disciplinary hearing notice he
received did not specify a conduct violation, he did not receive adequate
notice of the charges against him. Adequate
notice need only include "'the number of the rule violated ... and a
summary of the facts underlying the charge.'" Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d
527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam)(quoting Adams v. Carlson, 375 F. Supp.
1228, 1237(E.D. Ill. 1974)). The documents Mr. Sampson received informed him
that he was being charged with rioting, code violation 103, and expressly
stated the conduct giving rise to the violation:
On July 5, 2001[,] at approximately 9:30 p.m., a large group of inmates
began a disturbance on the Otter Creek yard which eventually spilled over into
the dormitory units. During this disturbance, the dormitory units suffered
major damage which included but was not limited to: busting block walls,
busting bathroom fixtures and throwing
institutional televisions out of the windows. Upon completion of an
investigation on July 20, 2001, Inmate Dejuan Sampson # 951830 has been
identified as an active participant in this disturbance.
Mr. Sampson does not challenge the appellee's contention that he
received these documents before the hearing, and these documents provided him
with adequate notice of the charges against him.
Mr. Sampson also asserts that
the composition of the CAB was inadequate in that it was composed of employees
of the Indiana Department of Corrections rather than employees of the
Corrections Corporation of America, the private company managing Otter Creek,
in violation of established prison policy. But
a prisoner only has a right to a disciplinary hearing conducted by an
impartial decisionmaker, see Pannell,
306 F.3d at 502, and Mr. Sampson does not argue that the CAB was biased.
Moreover, breaches of prison policy not implicating due process are strictly matters of state law and cannot be the basis of
relief under § 2254. See Estelle
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991); Holman
v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 884 (7th Cir. 1997).
Similarly
Mr. Sampson's argument that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses and
review confidential information provided by prison authorities is also without
merit. An inmate has the right to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence at a disciplinary hearing that
results in an extension of the inmate's incarceration time by revoking
earned-time credits or credit-earning class. See Pannell, 306 F.3d at 502-03. Mr. Sampson claims that he was
denied the right to call Warden William Wolford as a witness at[*220] his
disciplinary hearing. Although the screening report shows that Mr. Sampson
requested fourteen witnesses, Warden Wolford's name is not included in that
list. Because Mr. Sampson failed to request the warden's presence at a hearing,
the warden's absence did not deny Mr. Sampson due process. See Piggie, 277 F.3d at 925.
Mr. Sampson
also claims that prison officials denied him due process by refusing to permit
him access to the prison investigator's report on the riot. But the right to
call witnesses and present documentary evidence is limited by prison officials'
need to exclude evidence from an inmate's hearing to ensure institutional
safety or correctional goals. See Wolff,
418 U.S. at 566; Pannell, 306 F.3d at 503. This limit is necessary because
leaving the right unrestricted would carry "obvious potential for
disruption and for interference with the swift punishment that in individual
cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional program of the
institution." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566. The prison investigator's report was
filed under seal, because its disclosure could threaten the safety of other
Otter Creek inmates and the security of that facility. After in camera review
of these documents, we agree that providing Mr. Sampson access to them could
threaten the safety of those inmates whose testimony about the riot was used in
disciplinary proceedings against him. See Whitford, 63 F.3d at 535. Thus, the CAB's refusal to allow Mr.
Sampson access to the documents did not violate due process. See Pannell, 306 F.3d at 503.
Mr. Sampson argues that
even if the CAB appropriately refused him access to the report, the CAB
nevertheless denied him due process by failing to establish the reliability and
credibility of the information contained in the report. If a CAB declines to
allow a prisoner access to certain evidence, due process requires that the CAB provide the prisoner with some
indication that the evidence is reliable. See
Whitford, 63 F.3d at 535. When the evidence includes testimony given by
confidential informants, the "'oath of the investigating officer as to the
truth of his report containing confidential information and his appearance
before the disciplinary committee" is adequate to show reliability. Id. at
535-36(quoting Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293(7th Cir. 1985)). Here the
report was based entirely on the testimony of confidential informants. But
because the prison investigator testified to the truth of his report both by an
oath contained in the report and directly to the disciplinary committee, the
report was sufficiently reliable to satisfy due process.
Mr. Sampson's final claim--that prison officials did not have
enough information to support his conviction--also fails. Since the CAB's
decision was supported by "some evidence," Mr. Sampson received
adequate process. The "some evidence" standard is a
lenient one, requiring only that there must be some factual basis supporting a
prison disciplinary board's decision to revoke good-time credits. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th
Cir. 1999). The CAB relied on the prison investigator's report detailing his
findings regarding the July 2001 riot. After in camera review of these
documents, we agree with the district court that this evidence was sufficient
to meet the "some evidence" standard. See id.
AFFIRMED.
* After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P 34(a)(2).