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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
SHERMAN TAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STEPHEN LITTLE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 01-5651
58 Fed. Appx. 66;
January 6, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
PER CURIAM: Plaintiff Sherman Taylor appeals from an order granting
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Taylor brought this action against
Defendants Stephen Little, Darrell Curtis, and Ohio County, Kentucky, pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Taylor also sued the defendants for negligence, asserting various
theories of liability under Kentucky tort law. For the reasons set forth below,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I.
On December
5, 1998, Sherman Taylor was viciously beaten by Charles Allen. At the time,
both Taylor and Allen were detained at the Ohio County (Kentucky) Detention
Center. The two men were housed in adjoining cells. Taylor was incarcerated as
a result of alcohol-related offenses, while Allen was awaiting trial on a
charge of capital murder.
The assault occurred after
Deputy Jailer Stephen Little opened the doors to both cells for a visitation
period. Allen immediately entered Taylor's cell and attacked him. According to
witnesses, Allen beat Taylor about the head and chest with his fists and feet
and rammed his head into the corner of a steel bench. During the attack, Allen
bit off part of Taylor's ear. Taylor was rendered unconscious during[*67] the
attack and has no memory of the incident.
The night before the assault,
Taylor and Allen had a verbal disagreement, during which Allen told Taylor that
"when the doors open tomorrow I'm coming in there and whipping your
ass." There is no evidence that any jail employee was aware of this
threat.
Approximately two weeks
before Allen's attack on Taylor, Allen had attacked another inmate, Charles
Jones. Jones was to testify against Allen in his upcoming murder trial.
II.
In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the
district court found that there was no evidence in the record from which a
reasonable juror could find that the defendants either acted with deliberate
indifference to Taylor's safety or could have reasonably anticipated the
assault. We review a district court's
grant of summary judgment de novo. Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 772 (6th
Cir. 2000).
A. Plaintiff's Section 1983
Claim
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of rights
secured by the Constitution, including violations of the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924, 73 L. Ed. 2d 482,
102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982). In the prison context, the Eighth Amendment imposes a
duty on prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of
the inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S.
Ct. 1970 (1994). The Amendment forbids prison officials from acting with
"deliberate indifference" to the serious needs of prisoners. Walker
v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990). "Deliberate indifference
of a constitutional magnitude may occur when prison guards fail to protect one
inmate from an attack by another." Walker, 917 F.2d at 1453.
The Supreme Court has held that
"a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety".
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To prevail on a claim of deliberate
indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant: (1) had actual
knowledge of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm existed; and (2) actually drew the inference. Id. at 837.
Taylor
bases his Eighth Amendment claim on the failure of Ohio County and Curtis n1 to
segregate violent prisoners from nonviolent ones; the failure of Ohio County
and Curtis to prevent overcrowding at the prison or provide adequate staffing;
and Little's failure to intervene in the assault. The district court rejected
each of these bases for Taylor's claim. First, the district court found that
the prison officials were not aware that Allen posed a risk to Taylor's safety.
Second, the district court found that there was no proof that the overcrowding
of the facility or the lack of adequate security proximately caused his
injuries. Third, the district court concluded that Deputy Little reacted
reasonably to the incident by ordering Allen to stop, attempting to obtain a
stun gun, and requesting that another deputy call 9-1-1.
We agree
with the district court. With regard to Taylor's first claim, there was no
evidence that the defendants knew of Allen's[*68] threat on December 4. The
only indication of Allen's propensity for violence toward fellow prisoners was
his attack on Jones, who was scheduled to testify against Allen at his murder
trial. This lone incident was insufficient to put prison officials on notice
that Allen might attack Taylor. One can easily understand why Allen might want
to hurt or intimidate a witness scheduled to testify against him. In contrast, prison officials
had no reason to suspect that Allen might harm someone like Taylor, to whom
Allen had no apparent connection. Taylor also cites evidence that Allen had
been hostile to the staff of another correctional facility, had complained
about his nerves and emotional state, and had been incarcerated for violent
felonies before. At most, this evidence merely suggests that Allen, not unlike
many inmates in our prison system, is prone to antisocial and sometimes violent
behavior. It does not suggest that prison officials should have been aware that
he might randomly attack a fellow inmate.
With respect to Taylor's
second claim, he has not explained how the overcrowded facility n2 and lack of
adequate security caused or even contributed to his injuries. Nor does Taylor
cite any authority for his apparent contention that the Constitution requires
security cameras in prison cells and forbids prison officials from opening two
cell doors at the same time.
Finally, it
does not appear that Deputy Little failed to intervene or otherwise act to
prevent an assault. Rather, his response to the situation was reasonable under
the circumstances. The entire incident lasted less than one minute. During that
time, Little ordered Allen to stop, attempted to obtain a stun gun, and told another
deputy to call 911. "Prison
officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even
if the harm ultimately was not averted." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844.
B. Plaintiff's State Law
Claim
The district court noted that
under Kentucky law, prison officials cannot be held liable for inmate
injuries unless, in the exercise of ordinary care, the injury could have been
reasonably anticipated. Ratliff v. Stanley, 224 Ky. 819, 7 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Ky.
1928). As discussed above, the district court found no evidence to support a
finding that the defendants could have reasonably anticipated Allen's attack on
Taylor.
Taylor relies on Glover v. Hazelwood, 387 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1964),
in which the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a jury issue was created in a
case alleging jailer liability for inmate-on-inmate violence, where there was
evidence that the same inmate had attacked other prisoners in the past.
However, Glover is factually distinguishable from the present case. The
attacker in Glover had apparently assaulted fellow inmates on numerous
occasions in the nearly twelve months leading up to the attack on Glover. In
contrast, Allen had attacked only one other prisoner prior to his assault on
Taylor, and that previous attack was readily explained by the victim's
impending testimony in Allen's murder trial.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Darrell Curtis was Ohio
County Jailer at the time of the assault.
n2 The prison was five inmates
over its capacity of 50.