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UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RUFUS
WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KENNETH L. MCGINNIS,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 02-1336/ 02-1837
2003 U.S. App. Lexis 1879
January 31, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; MERRITT and LAY, * Circuit Judges.
Rufus
Williams, a Michigan state prisoner, appeals pro se the final judgment for
defendants in a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has also
filed a notice of appeal from an order taxing costs of $28.70 against him.
These consolidated cases have been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to
Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously
agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking
declaratory and monetary relief, Williams filed this complaint against the
Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections, a prison warden, a prison
hearing officer, and a corrections officer. Williams alleged that the hearing
officer had identified Williams as an informant in a disciplinary hearing
involving his cell mate. Williams also alleged that he asked the corrections
officer to move him to segregation because his life was endangered based on the
hearing officer's action, but the corrections officer ignored his request. He
was stabbed by other inmates shortly following the denial of his request.
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or for summary
judgment. A magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted to
the Director and the warden because they could not be held liable on a theory
of respondeat superior, and to the hearing officer, who was entitled to
absolute immunity, but that the motion be denied as to the corrections officer.
Both the corrections officer and Williams filed objections to this
recommendation, but they were overruled by the district court, which adopted
the magistrate judge's report. Both the corrections officer and Williams then
moved for reconsideration. The district court denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Williams, but granted the motion filed by the
corrections officer, concluding that he was entitled to summary judgment
because Williams had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration of this decision was denied, and
defendants' motion to tax costs was granted.
Williams filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment and
from the order taxing costs. His motion to consolidate the appeals for briefing
was granted. However, his brief fails to address the order taxing costs. His
response to the motion for costs below was restricted to the argument that
costs were not in order because his motion for reconsideration on the merits
should be granted. Presumably, he seeks vacation of the order taxing costs on
appeal on the ground that the underlying judgment should be overturned. He
argues in his brief that the district court's conclusions regarding the
exhaustion of administrative remedies and immunity of the hearing officer were
erroneous, and that his motion for the appointment of counsel should have been
granted. He raises no argument regarding the judgment in favor of the Director
or the warden. Defendants argue that Williams has abandoned some of his claims,
that all of the defendants were entitled to judgment on the ground that
Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that the hearing
officer was properly found entitled to absolute immunity.
Williams has abandoned his claims against the Director and the
warden on appeal, as well as any issue regarding the imposition of costs, and
we will therefore not address these issues.
McMurphy v. City of Flushing, 802 F.2d 191, 198-99 (6th Cir. 1986). Upon
review, we conclude that the remaining two defendants were properly granted
summary judgment, as there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322-23, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Williams was required to exhaust
his administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint. This court has held
that a prisoner must attach copies of the results of his administrative
grievances to the complaint, or describe with specificity the exhaustion of his
administrative remedies. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998).
Defendants pointed out that Williams had not filed a step three appeal of any
grievance regarding the claims raised in his complaint. Williams did not submit
any step three grievance forms to contradict this allegation. He does appear to
argue that he was prevented from filing a step three grievance by the failure
to receive responses to his lower level grievances. However, this court has
held that grievances must be pursued through the final level even where no
response is received to the initial grievance or appeal. Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th
Cir. 1999). Williams also argues that he should have been permitted to pursue
further discovery to substantiate his claim that he exhausted his
administrative remedies. However, this court has recently held that prisoners
may not amend their complaint to show exhaustion, but must submit all the
necessary documentation with the original complaint. Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 2002).
Because
Williams failed to establish the exhaustion of administrative remedies with
regard to any of his claims, we need not address his alternative argument that
the district court erroneously concluded that the hearing officer was entitled
to absolute immunity. However,
this argument is also without merit. This court has held that hearing officers in Michigan state prisons
are absolutely immune for discretionary actions taken in their capacity as
hearing officers. Shelly v. Johnson,
849 F.2d 228, 229-30 (6th Cir. 1988). Although Williams argues that the
defendant hearing officer in this case exceeded her authority by disclosing his
identity as a confidential informant without first consulting the warden, judicial
immunity is not lost where an action is taken in error or in excess of
authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 356, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331, 98 S. Ct. 1099 (1978).
Finally, the argument that the motion for the appointment of
counsel was erroneously denied is without merit. The appointment of counsel
would not have altered the fact that Williams failed to establish exhaustion of
administrative remedies with the initial filing of his complaint.
For
all of the above reasons, the district court's judgment, as well as the order
taxing costs, are affirmed. Rule 34(j)(2)(C), Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
* The
Honorable Donald P. Lay, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit,
sitting by designation.