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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
ROBERT C. BEESE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STEVE LIEBE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-1401
November 21, 2002 *, Submitted
November 22, 2002, Decided
NOTICE:RULES
OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THIS CIRCUIT.
ORDER
Robert
Beese sued three county jail employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for opening his
legal mail, not allowing him to seal outgoing personal mail, confining him
during the daytime hours to a general room with inadequate seating, and not
disbursing funds from his jail account. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, and we affirm.
Beese was a
pretrial detainee in the Waupaca County Jail for one month in 1998 and seven
months in 1999. He claims that during a span of approximately two months, Sandy
Bremmer, the jail's former booking officer and one of the defendants, opened
four pieces of legal mail addressed to him outside of his presence. Beese produced four envelopes with return addresses
from a public defender and a district attorney, three of which were marked
"opened in error." In her affidavit, Bremmer states that she
"accidentally opened three examples of legal mail ... [but] on each
occasion, I immediately realized that I had accidentally opened the envelope
and did not remove the contents." Beese claims that he filed written complaints
after receiving each piece of mail with Christ Brogaard, a lieutenant in the
sheriff's office and another defendant, but received no response.
Beese also asserts that he
was not allowed to seal personal mail before sending it. He claims that on several occasions, friends and family received
unsealed letters from him, with only a piece of tape or a tucked flap holding
the envelopes shut. Steven Liebe, the county sheriff and another defendant,
noted in his affidavit that the jail has a policy of requiring prisoners to
leave personal mail unsealed so that jail employees can inspect envelopes for
security risks.
Beese also
complains that from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.
and from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. each day,
[*981] he and other prisoners
were confined to a "day room" in the jail and were not allowed to
return to their cells unless they were ill. Because there was only one table in
the room, some prisoners had to sit or lie on a cold cement floor. Jail
employees permitted prisoners to bring blankets into the day room, but did not allow
prisoners to bring in mattresses. Sheriff Liebe stated that prisoners are
confined to the day room for jail security--due to the jail's layout, staff
"cannot adequately view" prisoners in their cells, but can monitor
them in the day room.
Finally, Beese claims that
Brogaard denied his request to release funds from Beese's jail account to his
sister-in-law. He claims that, as a result, she had to sell family property,
including some of Beese's furniture, to cover moving expenses. In his
affidavit, Beese states that he made this request to Brogaard in writing, but
does not offer the date or amount of this request nor whether he had sufficient
funds in his account to cover it. His sister-in-law's affidavit states that her
husband, who had been arrested with Beese, had tried unsuccessfully to release
$125 to her, but makes no mention of
Beese requesting that any funds be sent to her. In their affidavits, the
defendants state that they have no record or recollection of Beese making a
written request for this disbursement, as jail policy requires, and that in any
case, disbursements are not allowed except in certain circumstances, so that
prisoners are not left indigent and can post bond and pay for medical treatment
and other expenses.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that Beese had produced evidence establishing only a negligence claim
for the opening of his legal mail, that the jail's policy of not allowing prisoners
to seal outgoing personal mail did not infringe on Beese's constitutional
rights, that the jail had "a legitimate, penological interest" in
confining prisoners in the day room, that Beese was not deprived of any
property in his jail account, and that the jail had valid justifications for
limiting disbursements from prisoners' accounts. Beese timely appealed.
We turn
first to Beese's claim that the opening of his legal mail violated his First
Amendment rights. We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Zentmyer v.
Kendall County, Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000). Prison officials may
inspect (but not read) a prisoner's legal mail, but only in the presence of the prisoner. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974). Here,
Bremmer opened three or four pieces of Beese's legal mail outside of his
presence. Negligence, however, does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation actionable under § 1983. Kincaid
v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1992). Beese did not present any evidence
countering Bremmer's claim that she opened his legal mail by accident, and
Beese's speculation as to Bremmer's intent in opening the letters is not enough
to withstand summary judgment, see Packman
v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2001). Although Castillo v.
Cook County Mail Room Dept., 990 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1993) and Antonelli v.
Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996) held that claims that jail
employees repeatedly opened prisoners' legal mail were not legally frivolous,
this does not mean that such claims would necessarily survive summary judgment,
see id. (acknowledging that "at this early stage in the litigation, we cannot determine, of course,
whether the defendants may be able to justify the delays and openings of
outgoing mail"). Because Beese did not present any evidence tending to
show that more than [*982] negligence
resulted in the opening of his legal mail, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment for the defendants on this claim.
Beese
argues that not allowing him to seal his outgoing personal mail also violated
his First Amendment rights. Prisoners have a protected First Amendment interest
in both sending and receiving mail. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 782
(7th Cir. 1999). We have repeatedly held, however, that searches of prisoners' outgoing mail is
permissible for security purposes, such as searching for contraband, escape
plans, and the like. See id. ("prison security is 'a sufficiently
important governmental interest to justify limitations on a prisoner's first
amendment rights'"); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986)
("provisions of this type do not impermissibly intrude on first amendment
rights"); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423, 425 (7th Cir. 1977). Sheriff Liebe
attested in his affidavit that the
Waupaca County Jail had just such a policy of inspecting outgoing and incoming
mail for security risks. Therefore, the district court was also correct in
granting summary judgment on this claim.
Beese challenges next his confinement in the jail's day room and
focuses on his discomfort in lying on the floor and his inability to return to
his cell during the day. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment regulates
a pretrial detainee's treatment while in state custody, and this protection is
at least as great as the protection that the Eighth Amendment affords a
convicted prisoner. Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1040 (7th Cir.
1998). To succeed on a claim that the conditions of confinement violated the
Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must establish that the deprivation was
objectively "sufficiently serious" and that the jail officials acted
with subjective "deliberate indifference." Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d
586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996). Beese cannot even meet one prong of this test,
however, because discomfort is not a "sufficiently serious"
deprivation. See Delaney v. DeTella,
256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001) ("the Constitution does not require that prisons be
comfortable"); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988)
("Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good
hotel."); Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 601 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that restricting prisoners to their cells for all but one hour per day did not
violate the Eighth Amendment). Therefore, Beese's claim regarding jail
conditions fails.
Finally, we address Beese's claim that denying his request to release funds from his jail account violated his due process rights. Beese does not argue that he was actually deprived of the funds in his account; rather, he argues that he was not allowed to use the money in the way he wanted, namely sending it to his sister-in-law. Even assuming that Beese had a constitutionally protected interest in the use of the funds in his jail account, his due process rights were not violated. Prison regulations do not violate due process if they are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). Here, the defendants attested that the jail limited the release of funds from prisoners' accounts to insure that they did not become indigent and could post bond and pay for medical treatment and other expenses. Given this rationale, the policy is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests" and summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate.
AFFIRMED.
* After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument in unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).