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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY, LOUISVILLE DIVISION
KATHERINE REYNOLDS,
PLAINTIFF
v.
CITY OF ANCHORAGE, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:97CV-446-H
225 F. Supp. 2d 754
October 4, 2002, Decided
Plaintiff,
Katherine Reynolds, filed suit against, Defendant, Officer Leslie Watson, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendant and others violated her constitutional
rights during a 1997 warrantless strip search of Plaintiff and four other
juveniles at the Bellewood Presbyterian Home for Children
("Bellewood"). All other Defendants have settled and only the claims
against Watson remain. The basic underlying facts are undisputed and the
parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. After having considered the issues, the Court determines that
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
I.
In August
1996, the Fayette County, Kentucky Juvenile Court found Plaintiff guilty of
possession of marijuana, second degree forgery, and fraudulent use of a credit
card. As a result, the Juvenile Court ordered Plaintiff removed from her parents' custody and turned over to
the [*756] Kentucky Cabinet for Human Resources as a public offender. The
State subsequently placed Plaintiff in Bellewood, a facility approved by the
State to provide care and treatment to juveniles. Plaintiff resided in Haney
Cottage while at Bellewood. Haney Cottage residents, including Plaintiff,
admitted having previously used drugs while living at the cottage.
On the
evening of June 8, 1997, Plaintiff and two other Haney Cottage residents went
for a walk around the Bellewood grounds. Upon the girls' return, two on-duty
staff persons observed the girls acting strangely and suspected that drugs
might be the reason. Around this same time, Anchorage Police Officer Toby Lewis
telephoned the staff members at the cottage to make sure everything was
alright. The staff members shared their concern that some of the girls might be under the influence of drugs and
might have drugs in their possession. Officer Lewis proceeded to Haney Cottage
to assess the situation. He was joined by Officer James Ennis. Thereafter, they
decided to search the residents' rooms for the presence of drugs. With the
assistance of the staff members, the two officers placed the five residents in
the living room of the cottage. The girls were instructed to remain in the
living room with one staff member, while the two officers and the other staff
member searched the girls'
rooms. During the search, a third Anchorage police officer, Timothy Young,
arrived on the scene. Although the room searches did not reveal the presence of
actual drugs, the officers did locate several items they believed to be
associated with drug use -- 1) a plastic baggy was located in Plaintiff's room
which the officers believed may have contained drugs; 2) prescription pills
were found in another resident's garbage can; 3) a baggy with a plant substance
residue the officers thought might be marijuana; and 4) a glass vial which the
officers believed may have been used as a pipe were located in a third
resident's room.
At some point, Plaintiff insinuated to the staff members
and the officers that she might have drugs hidden in her undergarments.
Plaintiff's statements coupled with the suspicious items located in the girls'
rooms and their strange behavior convinced the officers that the girls needed
to be searched to ensure that there were no drugs in the cottage. The male
officers did not want to perform the searches themselves and decided to request
the Jefferson County Police Department to dispatch a female officer to Haney
Cottage for the purpose of searching the girls for drugs. Defendant was the
female officer selected. Upon her arrival, Defendant observed the girls running
throughout the cottage, playing loud music, and yelling. The Anchorage officers
said that they had searched the girls' rooms and located what they believed to
be drug paraphernalia. She was also informed that the officers suspected that
the girls might be harboring drugs in their undergarments or other clothing.
Defendant indicated that she could not perform a body cavity search without a
warrant, but that she would perform a visual strip search of the girls to look
for drugs.
Defendant
conducted the searches one at a time. Each girl was searched in her own room with a female staff member present.
Defendant instructed each girl to first to remove her blouse and bra, put them
back on, and then to remove her bottom clothing and underwear and bend over to
allow a visual inspection of her rectal area. Defendant never physically
touched any of the girls during the searches. No drugs were located on any of
the girls during the strip searches.
II.
Whether qualified immunity applies to a particular public
official is a question [*757] of law for the court to determine. See Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780, 783
(6th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit has developed a three- part analysis to
evaluate claims of qualified immunity:
First, we determine whether
a constitutional violation occurred n1; second, we determine whether the right
that was violated was a clearly established right of which a reasonable person
would have known; finally, we determine whether the plaintiff has alleged
sufficient facts, and supported the allegations by sufficient evidence, to
indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in
light of the clearly established constitutional rights.
Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d
685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999).
"The rationale for the qualified immunity historically
granted to the police rests on the difficult and delicate judgments these
officers must often make." Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 299, 55 L. Ed.
2d 287, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978). "A public official is entitled to qualified
immunity for conduct in performing discretionary functions so long as that
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable officer would have known." Wegener v. City of
Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1991). "If the law was not clearly
established, it is impossible to find that the defendant knew that the law
forbade his or her conduct." Daugherty, 935 F.2d at 783. Thus, the Court
must determine whether the law was clearly established in 1997 that a police
officer must obtain a warrant before performing a visual strip search of a
juvenile residing in a state detention center where the officer had reason to
suspect that the juvenile might be hiding drugs on her person. To make this
determination, this Court must consult the decisions of the Supreme Court, then
the decisions of the Sixth Circuit and other courts within the Sixth Circuit,
and finally the decisions of other circuits. See id. at 784.
The Court begins its
analysis with the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched." U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment, applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, protects individuals against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials. All warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable. See Daughenbaugh v.
City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 1998). However, the Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions
to the warrant requirement. The leading exceptions are: "searches incident
to a valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances,
consent searches, vehicle searches,
container searches, inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea,
administrative searches, and searches in which the special needs of law
enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements
impracticable." U.S. v. Haddix 239 F.3d 766, 767 n.2 (6th Cir. 2001).
Here, Defendant relies upon the "special needs of law enforcement"
exception.
Plaintiff relies primarily on an unpublished Sixth Circuit
opinion, Toles v. Friedman, 238 F.3d 424, 2000 WL 1871683 (6th Cir., 2000), for
the proposition that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. [*758]
However, even if an officer had access to that opinion, she would be
hard pressed to apply it directly in our circumstances. n2 In Toles three
female juveniles were detained by mall security guards after trying on several
bathing suits. 238 F.3d 424, [WL]Id. at
*1. The store clerk and the security guard suspected the girls of attempting to shoplift one of the bathing
suits. Id. As a result, the juveniles were taken to the mall security office
where the security guard questioned them about his suspicions. 238 F.3d 424, [WL] Id. at *2. When the girls
refused to admit that they attempted to steal a bathing suit, the guard
requested assistance from a female security guard and a male city police
officer. Id. The female security guard conducted a warrantless visual strip
search of the juveniles for the purpose of discovering whether the girls were
hiding the bathing suit underneath their clothing. Id. No bathing suit was
found on the girls. Id. In holding that the defendants were not entitled to rely
on the doctrine of qualified immunity the court stated that "a reasonable
law enforcement officer, in the circumstances presented, could not believe that
exigent circumstances justified the warrantless strip searches of the young
women." 238 F.3d 424, [WL] Id. at *4.
The circumstances here are significantly different from those in
Toles. In Toles, the officers relied upon the exigent circumstances exception
rather than the special need or circumstance exception. The special
circumstances exception permits a state actor to constitutionally conduct a
warrantless search in certain situations on less than probable cause "when
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable." Vernonia School District v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995). It
recognizes that the basic commandment of the Fourth Amendment is that searches
and seizures be reasonable, and that in certain circumstances and contexts
warrantless searches are constitutionally permissible. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336,
83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). Defendant contends that the special
circumstances exception is applicable here because Plaintiff was a juvenile
ward of the State living in a detention center who might have drugs on her
person.
While these
general circumstances appear to be those which might qualify for the exception,
neither the parties, nor the Court, have located any persuasive case law
dealing with this exact issue from the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court, or any
other court. Nevertheless, some decisions could act as a guide for Defendant. From an analysis of
those cases the Court concludes that even an officer with perfect knowledge of
the law might reasonably conclude that a warrantless strip search was permissible
in these special circumstances.
For some time, warrantless searches of juveniles in school
settings have been permissible under the special circumstances exception. In
New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Supreme Court held that a school administrator or teacher
may conduct a warrantless search of a student so long as there are reasonable
grounds to suspect that the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341. The
Court determined that this exception to the warrant requirement is necessary
because "requiring a warrant before
[*759] searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools." Id. at 340.
In Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1984), the Sixth
Circuit found that school administrators did not violate the Fourth Amendment
even when they performed a warrantless partial visual strip search of a male
student, where they had reasonable cause to suspect that he might be hiding
drugs on his person. The court held that: "a school official or teacher's
reasonable search of a student's person does not violate the student's fourth
amendment rights, if the school official has reasonable cause to believe the
search is necessary in the furtherance of maintaining school discipline and
order, or his duty to maintain a safe environment conducive to education."
Id. at 982. Furthermore, in Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881 (6th Cir.
1991), the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of several school
administrators in a § 1983 action seeking damages from a warrantless strip
search of a student. The Sixth Circuit concluded that based on the Supreme
Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O, it was not unreasonable for the principal to believe that the search was
constitutional and that the defendants "were not unreasonable, in light of
the item sought (a small vial containing suspected narcotics), in conducting a
search so personally intrusive in nature." Id. at 887.
Plaintiff,
being a ward of the state and in protective custody, would seem to have less
expectation of privacy than a high school student. Indeed, numerous cases,
recognizing the special circumstances of prisoners, detainees, and
probationers, have permitted warrantless searches under the special
circumstances exception. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99
S. Ct. 1861 (1979), the Supreme Court considered whether it was permissible to
conduct warrantless strip and body cavity searches of prisoners and pretrial
detainees on less than probable cause after contact with outsiders. The Court
concluded that the searches, including the full body cavity searches, were
permissible so long as they were conducted in a reasonable manner. The Court
rationalized that while such searches would normally not be allowed without a
warrant supported by probable cause, the environment in which they occurred permitted
some deviation from the general warrant requirement. The Court specifically
pointed out that "a detention facility is a unique place fraught with
serious security dangers," where the "smuggling of money, drugs,
weapons, and other contraband is all too common an occurrence." Id. at
559.
A few years later, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 709, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987), the Supreme Court considered whether
probation officers could constitutionally conduct a warrantless search of a
probationer's home. In justifying the need for such warrantless searches the
Court reasoned that: "A state's
operation of a probation system, like a school, government office or prison, or
its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs'
beyond mere law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable-cause requirements." Id. at 874. The Court concluded that in
the probation setting it was reasonable to dispense with the warrant
requirement because "the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make
it more difficult for probation officers to respond quickly to evidence of
misconduct, and would reduce the
deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise
create." Id. at 877. In so holding, however, the Court specifically [*760]
pointed out that a probation officer is not "the police officer who
normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen . . . he is an employee
of the State Department of Health and Social Services who, while assuredly
charged with protecting the public interest, is also supposed to have in mind
the welfare of the probationer." Id.
The Sixth Circuit also recognized the right of prison
authorities to conduct warrantless searches of prisoners and detainees. In Dobrowolskyj
v. Jefferson County, 823 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1987), the Sixth Circuit held that
a pretrial detainee's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when he was
searched immediately before being transferred to a situation where he would
have contact with the general prison population. The Debrowolskyj court
rationalized: "The security interests of the jail in conducting a search
at this point were strong. . . . the jail had legitimate interests in
preventing the flow of contraband into other sections of the jail. " Id. at 959.
None of
these cases would decide our question on the merits because adult prisoners are
a different environment than teenagers in a juvenile facility. However, these
cases do suggest the reasonable possibility that warrantless strip searches of
certain classes of detainees are permissible in special circumstances such as
ours. Notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment requirement that law enforcement
officers obtain warrants supported by probable cause to conduct searches, the
case law in these cases allow state actors leeway to conduct warrantless
searches on less than probable cause, for purposes other than general law enforcement, where
special circumstances justify it. In particular, warrantless searches,
including strip searches, were permissible in school and prison settings where
there was some reason to suspect that drugs might be located during the search.
A reasonable officer would know the general thrust of this case law.
Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity so long as she acted
reasonably in determining that under these circumstances the law permitted her
to perform the search in question without a warrant. Police officers are
entitled to immunity even if their
ultimate conclusion turns out to be mistaken, so long as it was reasonable.
See Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49
F.3d 1154, 1158 (6th Cir. 1995). "The standard is one of objective
reasonableness, analyzing claims of immunity on a fact-specific, case-by-case
basis to determine whether a reasonable official in the defendants' position
could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of the clearly
established case law and the information he possessed." Id. "If
officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should
be recognized." Id.
In this
case, the Court finds it particularly relevant that Officer Watson faced the
need to search wards of the state at Bellewood, a juvenile facility. A juvenile
detention center or home, like Bellewood, falls somewhere on the spectrum
between a school and a prison. Plaintiff was classified as a juvenile offender. Though she enjoyed substantially
more freedom of movement and autonomy than an incarcerated adult, her liberty
was still substantially impeded. She was not free to come and go as she
pleased. Significant limitations and rules governed her daily activities at
Bellewood, including a strict
prohibition against drug use and drug possession. While these facts certainly
do not mean that Plaintiff "shed her constitutional rights" at the
cottage door, they do lessen Plaintiff's reasonable expectations of
privacy [*761] under the circumstances. Also, unlike the officer
in Toles, Defendant was looking for drugs not stolen merchandise. Illicit drug
use is a significant concern of and problem for juvenile facilities. The State
has a unique interest in protecting their residents from the dangers of illicit
drug use.
Moreover,
certain specific facts reasonably heightened Officer Watson's concerns about
hidden drugs. Plaintiff indicated that she might have drugs hidden on her
person. Staff members had observed her acting strangely earlier that evening.
The search of Haney Cottage revealed several items suspected of being drug
paraphernalia. Drugs are generally small and easily concealed inside an
individual's inner clothing. From these facts, it was not unreasonable for
Defendant to conclude that a search was necessary both to ensure Plaintiff's
safety and the safety of the other residents. Thus, it was objectively
reasonable for Defendant to conclude that interests apart from those of
ordinary law enforcement permitted her to conduct a warrantless strip search of
Plaintiff. Finally, the type and manner of the search were objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant, a female officer, searched each
girl one at a time in the privacy of the girl's own room with a female staff
member present. Defendant never physically touched any of the girls during the
search. She declined to perform a cavity search because it was too invasive.
The Court
concludes that in 1997 it was not clearly established that a search warrant
supported by probable cause was required to constitutionally conduct a strip
search of a minor suspected of possessing drugs in a juvenile home or detention
center. Based on the particular facts, and in light of the then existing case
law to guide Defendant, the Court concludes that the type and scope of the
search preformed on Plaintiff were objectively reasonable. Therefore, Defendant
is qualifiedly immune
from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Johnson v. Laccheo, 935 F.2d 109, 111
(6th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity
because they did not violate a clearly
established right, and even if they did actually violate the law a reasonable
police officer in like circumstances could have believed the conduct to be
lawful).
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion.
JOHN G. HEYBURN II
CHIEF JUDGE, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
ORDER
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
Court has reviewed the evidence and has filed a Memorandum Opinion. Being
otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary
judgment is SUSTAINED on the basis of qualified immunity and Plaintiff's motion
for partial summary judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff's Complaint against defendant is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This is a final and appealable order.
This 4 day of October, 2002.
JOHN G. HEYBURN II
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Because steps two and three of the
analysis are dispositive of this case, the Court need not decide the difficult
issue of whether Defendant's warrantless strip search actually violated
Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
n2 Toles was not even decided until some
three years after the search at issue in this case took place.