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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
REVEREND WILLIE B. YOUNG,
as Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF ROSCOE YOUNG, Decedent,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
BILL MARTIN, et al.,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 02-1036
51 Fed. Appx. 509
October 21, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED
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CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Bill Martin, former director of the
Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"), appeals the district
court's (1) order denying his motion for summary judgment, and (2) order
denying his motion for rehearing and reconsideration. n1 In his summary
judgment motion, Defendant Martin sought qualified immunity as to claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff, Reverend Willie B. Young, as
personal representative of the Estate
of Roscoe Young ("decedent"). Plaintiff, decedent's father, alleges
that Defendant Martin implemented a policy that denied necessary and
life-saving medical care to prisoners such as decedent. Defendant Martin
contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM
the orders of the district court.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff
filed the instant action on July 9, 2001 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. n2
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Defendant Martin, as well as David Jamrog, warden of the Adrian Temporary
Correctional Facility, and two John Does (collectively "Defendants"),
violated decedent's Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual
punishment by demonstrating indifference to decedent's serious medical needs.
The complaint requested compensatory, exemplary, and punitive damages. Defendants
subsequently moved for summary judgment, in part on the basis that Defendant
Martin was entitled to qualified immunity. Defendants also moved to stay
discovery pending a ruling on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs opposed both
motions.
The
district court entered a memorandum opinion and order on October 25, 2001,
denying in part and granting in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
It dismissed claims against Defendant Jamrog, who undisputedly was not warden
at the relevant time. However, because the complaint alleges that Defendant
Martin "adopted a policy regarding the authorization request procedure
utilized by the correctional medical services department which discouraged the
administration of necessary life saving health care to inmates," the
district court allowed the Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Martin to
proceed, despite the complaint's lack of allegations of Defendant Martin's personal involvement. (J.A. at 263.) In so
doing, the court ruled that the complaint stated a policy claim against Martin
in his supervisory capacity. The court further granted limited discovery as to
"what the policy at issue is, whether said policy violated [decedent's]
constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment, and whether Defendant Martin
had knowledge that the policy had a substantial risk of serious harm."
(J.A. at 266.) The district court further ordered that discovery be stayed
pending any appeal. Defendant Martin
filed a motion for reconsideration,
[*511] which the district court
denied. Thereafter, this timely appeal followed.
Facts
According
to the complaint, decedent was sentenced to an eight-to-fifteen year-period of
imprisonment, and was incarcerated under the jurisdiction of the MDOC at the
Adrian Temporary Facility ("AFT") in Adrian, Michigan, from March
1999 to November 1999. On numerous occasions decedent, who was diabetic and
suffered from other maladies, went to the medical clinic at the ATF complaining
of nose bleeds, dizziness, elevated blood sugar, and ulcerations on his feet
and legs. Decedent's untreated ulcerations led to a staph infection, which also
was not properly treated. Plaintiff also contends that decedent was denied
proper administration and dosage of his insulin required to control his
diabetes.
In his
affidavit, Plaintiff contends that decedent contacted him once a week to
complain about not getting his medications. Plaintiff states that he also
informed officials at the MDOC and spoke with the warden about his son not
getting the proper medical care for his condition. Despite these efforts,
Plaintiff avers that decedent still called to complain about his lack of medical care and the
withholding of insulin.
Decedent's
medical condition worsened, and he was transferred to Dwayne Waters Hospital, a
Department of Corrections facility, where he suffered acute renal failure and
sepsis. An emergency nephrology consult was requested on October 14, 1999,
which John Doe # 2,
director of the Correctional
Medical Services, denied on October 18, 1999. Defendant Martin and John Doe # 2
later approved the consult but scheduled an appointment for several weeks
later, on November 12, 1999.
With his condition worsening,
decedent was admitted to Foote Hospital in Jackson, Michigan on October 21,
1999, with multiple organ system failure and septic shock. During decedent's
stay there, he underwent surgery, eventually lapsed into a coma and died on November
10, 1999, after suffering a stroke.
Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Martin adopted Policy Directive 03.04.100, which
established and maintains a chronic disease data base. The policy provides that
chronic care clinics will be established so that patients with chronic diseases
can receive continuous health care treatment. Plaintiff contends that Defendant
Martin implemented this policy to minimize the expenses of medical care
provided to prisoners, knowing that there was a substantial risk that its
implementation would cause serious harm to inmates. He points to Policy
Directive 03.04.100, which provides in pertinent part:
CHRONIC CARE CLINICS
FF. Chronic care clinics shall be established to ensure that prisoners
with specified chronic diseases or disorders receive continuous health
care services. Prisoners who are seen
in chronic care clinics shall be identified on the Chronic Disease Index (CDI).
GG The CDI is a computerized health care tracking system which
identifies prisoners with chronic disease. The CDI shall be used with
guidelines developed by the Chief Medical Officer and the Medical Advisory
Committee to provide minimum standards of care. A prisoner shall be placed on
the CDI based upon chronic disease diagnosis.
(J.A. at 248.) (emphasis
added). Plaintiff alleges that this policy resulted in decedent's death.
[*512] DISCUSSION
A denial of qualified immunity as to a § 1983 action is
reviewed de novo. Klein v. Long, 275
F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2001). However, "[a] defendant who is denied
qualified immunity may file an
interlocutory appeal with this Court only if that appeal involves the abstract
or pure legal issue of whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff constitute a
violation of clearly established law." Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295,
299 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). "Thus, in order for an
interlocutory appeal to be appropriate, a defendant seeking qualified immunity
must be willing to concede to the facts as alleged by the plaintiff and discuss
only the legal issues raised by the case." Id. Therefore, for the purposes
of this appeal, we accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and proceed to
examine the legal issues.
Defendant Martin contends that he is entitled to summary judgment
on the basis of qualified immunity because (1) Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim alleges no personal involvement in decedent's
care or death on Defendant's part, and (2) to the extent that Plaintiff asserts
a policy and custom claim, such claims are limited to municipalities, inasmuch
as no clearly established law provides that a policy or custom claim may be
asserted against a state official acting in his individual capacity.
Plaintiff counters that fact questions exist which preclude a
grant of summary judgment for Defendant Martin on the ground of qualified
immunity. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to discovery on his claim that
Defendant Martin adopted and/ or oversaw a policy that essentially discouraged
the administration of necessary life-saving health care to inmates. Citing Taylor
v. Michigan Dep't of Corrs., 69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995), Plaintiff further
claims that our Circuit's precedent has held a state official liable for
implementing or overseeing an unconstitutional policy, even without specific
knowledge that the policy will cause harm to a particular plaintiff. We agree
that Plaintiff, at this stage, should be allowed to proceed with his
claim.
1. Personal Capacity or Official Capacity Suit
As an initial matter, Defendant Martin points out that
Plaintiff's complaint does not indicate whether he is being sued in his
official or personal capacity. This is relevant because the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar the action where a state official is sued in a personal capacity, Hardin
v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1992). Moreover, a defendant's defense
of qualified immunity only applies to bar a claim in a personal capacity suit.
See Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 n.1 (6th Cir. 2001) (en
banc).
We believe
that Plaintiff attempts to hold Defendant Martin personally liable for
decedent's death. Although the complaint does not specify whether it is
attempting to hold Defendant personally liable, we have adopted a "course
of proceedings" test to determine whether a § 1983 defendant has received
notice that a plaintiff intends to hold the defendant personally liable for a
constitutional violation. See Moore,
272 F.3d at 772. This "test considers such factors as the nature of the
plaintiff's claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the
nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint ...." Id. at
772 n.1. Here, Plaintiff sought money damages in his complaint. Because state
officials cannot be sued for money damages in their official capacities, Lapides
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 152 L. Ed. 2d 806, 122 S. Ct. 1640,
1643 (2002), the request for money
[*513] damages indicates a
personal capacity suit. Therefore, we believe that Defendant Martin clearly was
on notice that Plaintiff intended to maintain a personal capacity suit against
him.
2. Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d
396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); see also
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 701 (6th Cir. 2001).
In determining the qualified immunity issue, we first must
consider the threshold question of whether "the facts alleged show the
officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001) (citing Siegert v.
Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277, 111 S. Ct. 1789 (1991)). Second,
we must determine whether the rights at issue have been "clearly
established" not just in an abstract sense, but in a particularized
sense. Cope v. Heltsley, 128 F.3d 452,
458 (6th Cir. 1997). "If the right
at issue was clearly established at the time the governmental actor committed
the violation in question, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a
reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. Plaintiff bears the burden to allege
and prove that the defendant violated a clearly established right. Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005
(6th Cir. 1999) (citing Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir. 1994)). To
determine whether a right is clearly established, we have instructed district
courts to look at binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court, the
Sixth Circuit, or its own court. Cope,
128 F.3d at 459 n.4.
Further, "in examining a claim for qualified immunity, we
must balance the need for public officials to be free from the constant fear of
lawsuits brought while performing their official duties, with the recognition
that 'in situations of abuse of office, an action for damages may offer the
only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.'" Spurlock,
167 F.3d at 1005 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814)).
The Eighth
Amendment imposes a duty on officials to provide "humane conditions of
confinement," including insuring, among other things, that prisoners receive
adequate clothing, food and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832,
128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994). In order to find an Eighth Amendment
violation, two conditions must be met: (1) the
alleged deprivation must be objectively sufficiently serious, and (2)
the prison official must have been deliberately indifferent, which encompasses
the mens rea component of the claim. Id.
at 834. Specifically, the prison official "must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837.
In a § 1983 action, liability cannot be premised on the doctrine
of respondeat superior. Taylor, 69 F.3d
at 80-81 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, a "mere failure to act" or
"simple negligence" is insufficient.
Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must
show the supervisor either (1) personally engaged in the alleged constitutional
violation or (2) encouraged or condoned the alleged violation of the offending
subordinates. Id.; see also Comstock,
273 F.3d at 712-13.
[*514] Here, Plaintiff
claims that Defendant Martin knowingly implemented a policy of minimizing
medical care and withholding necessary care which caused Plaintiff's early
demise. Therefore, Plaintiff must show that Defendant Martin either
participated in the offending conduct or "at least implicitly authorized,
approved, or knowingly acquiesced" in the conduct of his subordinates. Comstock,
273 F.3d at 713.
Plaintiff's
complaint is devoid of any allegation of personal involvement by Defendant in
the actual delivery of health care to decedent. Likewise, Defendant Martin
submitted an affidavit, stating that he played no role in the day-to-day operation
of the department's health service areas, and had no actual knowledge of the
events described relative to Plaintiff's claims. However, the complaint does
allege that Defendant Martin adopted a policy regarding the authorization
request procedure used by the correctional medical services department which
discouraged the administration of necessary life-saving health care to inmates.
On this basis we believe that Plaintiff should proceed.
Plaintiff
acknowledges his burden of showing, pursuant to Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, that
Defendant Martin was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that
his conduct created a substantial risk of serious harm to decedent and that
Defendant Martin drew the inference. Plaintiff points to the implementation of
Policy Directive 03.04.100 as evidence that Defendant Martin was aware that
prisoners such as decedent were exposed to excessive risks of harm to their
health. Plaintiff then claims that Defendant Martin disregarded the excessive
risk by implementing the policy which requires that prisoners receive minimal
care, limits referrals, and charges prisoners for the costs of their own health
care.
Plaintiff relies on two cases, Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209
(6th Cir. 1992), and Taylor, 69 F.3d 76, for support. In Hill, a prisoner sued
the former deputy superintendent of treatment at a correctional facility, after
the plaintiff complained that his medication was confiscated and that he was
repeatedly denied medication. 962 F.2d
at 1211. In holding that the official could be held liable in his supervisory
capacity, we noted that the plaintiff did allege that defendant personally
ignored the plaintiff's complaint that he was not receiving his medication, and
that the defendant was charged with "abandoning the specific duties of his
position ...." Id. at 1213. In contrast, Plaintiff here attempts to hold
Defendant Martin liable for decedent's death, but fails to show at all that he
in any way was personally involved with decedent's care. While it is true, as
Plaintiff contends that a prison
official may be held personally liable for actions he took in the course
of his office, this does not mean that Plaintiff may prevail absent allegations
or proof of personal involvement or implicit condonation of subordinates'
actions. Therefore, we do not find this case dispositive of the issue.
However, we
do believe that Taylor supports Plaintiff's position. In Taylor, a plaintiff
sued a warden of a penal camp, where the prisoner had been raped. 69 F.3d at
77. The prisoner contended, among other things, that the warden knew about the
risk of sexual assault at the camp but
failed to implement a policy to identify and screen out transferees to the
camp, such as the plaintiff, who would not be safe at the camp. We held that
the plaintiff had submitted sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of
fact as to "whether Warden Foltz knew that conditions [at the camp] posed
a substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners like plaintiff" and
"whether in the face of this knowledge he acted with deliberate
indifference--that [*515] is, disregarded a risk of harm of which he
was aware--by failing to adopt reasonable policies to protect inmates like
Taylor." Id. Warden Foltz contended that he could not be held personally
liable for the plaintiff's rape because he had no personal involvement in the
decision to transfer him to the camp but had delegated that task to his
subordinates. Id. at 78-79. We disagreed, finding that Foltz was directly responsible
for approving transfers and adopting reasonable transfer procedures; he also
could delegate the authority to sign his name on transfers, a duty he delegated
to deputy wardens. Id. at 80, 81. We noted that Foltz's own deposition
testimony revealed that his deputy wardens were redelegating the authority over transfers to lower
level staff without any explicit authorization to do so. Id. at 80. Further, Foltz was not sure of
the procedures for approving transfers and had not reviewed procedures to
determine whether his authority was being abused. Id. We found that, similar to
Hill, a jury could find that Foltz had a job to do and did not do it. Id. at 81.
Although Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Martin was
personally involved with his actual care, he does contend that Defendant Martin
implemented a policy which only granted minimal care to inmates with chronic
illnesses. As in Taylor, it does not matter that Defendant Martin did not know
of the substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff in particular; rather, the inquiry
is whether he was aware that his conduct would result in a substantial risk of
harm to a particular class of persons. Therefore, in accordance with our
precedent, we hold that qualified immunity is not warranted here. If Plaintiff
can prove that Defendant, who was responsible for implementing policy for the
MDOC, implemented a policy that set forth only minimal standards of health care
for inmates with chronic or long-term serious illnesses knowing that in doing
so he was creating a substantial risk of harm to inmates, then this would tend
to show that Defendant Martin at least implicitly approved unconstitutional
conduct of his subordinates, who provided the actual health care. Id.
We note
that Plaintiff will have to come forward with proof to support his claim, and
definitive proof thus far has not been forthcoming. For instance, Plaintiff
points to deposition testimony of decedent's sister in which she contends that
decedent told her in phone conversations before his death that unless decedent
had his own money to pay for insulin, such insulin would be withheld from him
by his medical caretakers at the prison facility. According to decedent's
sister, when decedent's family sent him money, that money was used to buy the
insulin, and when the money ran out, the insulin was unavailable. Plaintiff attributes this to the policy
Defendant Martin implemented, but Plaintiff fails to point out where the policy
requires an inmate to pay for his own medication. He merely states that the
policy so required. Further, although the policy does appear to provide
for "minimum standards of
care" for prisoners with chronic diseases, there is no indication as to
what this means. However, in light of the dearth of discovery conducted thus
far, we recognize that more supporting evidence may be forthcoming.
Therefore,
we believe the denial of qualified immunity was proper, and we will allow
Plaintiff to proceed with his claim.
CONCLUSION
For
the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.
n1 David Jamrog and two John Does were also
named as Defendants in this case, but claims on their behalf are not at issue
in this appeal.
n2 The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42
U.S.C. § 1983.