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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RICHARD H. CLEMONS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
COOK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-1724
52 Fed. Appx. 762
December 11, 2002, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
ORDER
Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge; and
O'MALLEY, District Judge. *
Richard H.
Clemons, proceeding pro se, appeals a district court judgment dismissing his
civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been
referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth
Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is
not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).
Seeking monetary and equitable relief, Clemons
sued a Resident Unit Officer (Cook) of the Standish Correctional Facility
(SCF), and several SCF hearing officers. Clemons claimed that: 1) Cook filed a
major misconduct charge against him in retaliation for Clemons's filing a
lawsuit against her; and 2) a hearing officer (Perrin) improperly found him
guilty of sexual misconduct. In a motion to supplement his complaint, Clemons
claimed that: 3) another hearing officer (Mohrman) improperly found him guilty
of an unrelated misconduct charge for substance abuse.
Although
the district court noted that Clemons did not appear to have exhausted his
available administrative remedies, the court did not rely on that doctrine to
dismiss [*763] the complaint. Rather, the court concluded
that Clemons's claim against Cook was barred by the doctrine announced in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), and
that the hearing officers were entitled to judicial immunity. Hence, the court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Thereafter, Clemons sought leave to add additional hearing officers as
defendants. The district court denied the motion because the new claims were unrelated
to the original complaint and because the additional defendants were also
entitled to judicial immunity.
Clemons has filed a timely appeal, essentially reasserting his
claims. He also maintains that he did exhaust his administrative remedies. He
also appears to argue that the district court improperly denied his request to
amend his complaint.
Initially,
we note that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not dispositive in this
case. The district court properly noted that exhaustion does not need to be
considered where a plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or where the plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2); Brown
v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998). Hence, it proceeded to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Thus, we need
not address the question of exhaustion asserted by the appellant.
Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly
dismissed Clemons's complaint. McGore
v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997). In determining whether
Clemons's complaint fails to state a claim, the court must construe the
complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all the factual
allegations as true, and determine whether Clemons undoubtedly can prove no set
of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief. See Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998). The district court may dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted only if "it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support
of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d
863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).
The
district court properly dismissed Clemons's complaint against Cook for
allegedly filing a false misconduct charge against him. It is well-settled that
a prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing cannot use § 1983
to collaterally attack the hearing's validity or the conduct underlying the
disciplinary conviction unless the conviction or sentence is reversed on
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or
has otherwise been called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus. See Edwards
v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 647-48, 137
L. Ed. 2d 906, 117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997); Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Huey v. Stine,
230 F.3d 226, 230-31 (6th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, to the extent that Clemons has asserted a
pure retaliation claim, he still fails to state a claim against Cook because he
was convicted of the sexual misconduct charge. A finding of guilt based upon
some evidence of a violation of prison rules "essentially checkmates [a]
retaliation claim." See Henderson
v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994).
The
district court also properly dismissed Clemons's complaint against the hearing
officers because they are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from inmates'
§ 1983 civil rights suits for actions taken in their capacities as hearing
officers. See Shelly v. Johnson, 849
F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1988). Moreover, as stated [*764] above, Clemons
cannot collaterally challenge his misconduct convictions. See Heck, 512 at
486-87. For these same reasons, the district court did not err when it denied
Clemons's request to amend his complaint and add additional hearing officers as
defendants.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. Rule 34(j)(2)(C),
Rules of the Sixth Circuit.
* The
Honorable Kathleen M. O'Malley, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Ohio, sitting by designation.