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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
GLENN L. DANCY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ARCHIE C. GEE
Defendants.
No. 00-7482
51 Fed. Appx. 906
October 2, 2002,
Submitted
December 2, 2002, Decided
NOTICE: RULES OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
PER CURIAM:
Glenn
Dancy, an inmate at the Patuxent Institution, a maximum security facility
in [*907] Jessup, Maryland, appeals the district court's order awarding
summary judgment on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims in favor of various state
prison officials and health care providers (the "Defendants"). n1 In his
lawsuit, Dancy allegedthat the Defendants had violated § 1983, the Maryland
Constitution, and Maryland common law when they forcibly subjected him to
anti-psychotic medication on twenty-two occasions.
In response
to Dancy's allegations, the Defendants moved for summary judgment, maintaining
that Dancy, who had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was forcibly
medicated only in emergency situations when he exhibited behavior that was
dangerous to himself or others. n2 Specifically, the Defendants, in supporting
their summary judgment request, documented, with affidavits and records, the
circumstances surrounding the various instances of Dancy's involuntary
medication, demonstrating that on various occasions Dancy flooded his cell,
pounded on the walls with his bed frame, rattled loose bolts on the plumbing,
and threw urine and feces at others. They pointed out that, pursuant to the
written policy of the Department of Public Safety and Correction Services,
psychiatric illness could be medicated, over objection, if such treatment was
for the health and safety of the inmate or others and was clinically
appropriate. And each time emergency medication was given to Dancy, it was
deemed medically necessary and ordered by a psychiatrist who was either present
or contacted by phone. Dancy did not dispute the specifics of the factual
underpinnings of his medications, but asserted that he disagreed "with
each and every reason given by the [Defendants] to forcibly inject me without
my consent." Dancy also maintained that he "was never a danger to [himself]
or anyone else."
On the
record before it, the district court concluded that Dancy's general denial of
being dangerous and his conclusory statements failed to establish a genuine
issue of material fact on his § 1983 claims. The court observed that "nowhere in his affidavit does he
contest the factual evidence about particular incidents where his behavior was
abusive, self-injurious, or violent." The court then reviewed the
applicable legal principles and awarded summary judgment to the Defendants on
Dancy's § 1983 claims. n3 Dancy v. Simms, 116 F. Supp. 2d 652,
Memorandum (D. Md. 2000) (the "Opinion"). Dancy has appealed.
Having
carefully considered the submissions of the parties, we are unable to discern
any error in the ruling of the district court. As it observed, the Supreme
Court has held that a state may constitutionally "treat a prison inmate
who has a serious mental illness with
anti-psychotic drugs [*908] against his will, if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
interest." Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990); Dancy, 116 F. Supp. 2d at
654. The court carefully reviewed the applicable precedent in this regard,
including our decision in United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.
1988), and its progeny, concluding that "the decision to administer
anti-psychotic medication over an inmate's objection comports with due process
if . . . made in the exercise of professional medical judgment and [in] an
emergency situation where the inmate posed a danger to himself or others."
Dancy, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 654. The court then concluded that "the
professional judgments of Dancy's health care providers and the emergency medication
policies [of Maryland's] prison officials complied with the [applicable]
standard." Id. at 655. While Dancy made a general denial of being
dangerous, the court properly concluded that such a denial was insufficient to
create an issue of material fact. He presented no medical evidence contradicting
the judgments of the medical
professionals and, in the absence of such evidence, he was unable to create a
triable issue. Id. at 655.
Pursuant to
the foregoing, we are content to affirm the award of summary judgment against
Dancy on the basis of the district court's well reasoned Opinion.
AFFIRMED
n1 The officials awarded summary judgment
include Archie Gee, the Warden at Patuxent; Stuart Simms, the Secretary of
Maryland's Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services; Richard
Lanham, Sr., the Commissioner of its Division of Corrections; Joseph
Henneberry, a Director at Patuxent; Captain Terrence Davis, a Correctional
Officer at Patuxent; and Lieutenant Keith Green, a Correctional Officer at
Patuxent. The health care providers awarded summary judgment were EMSA
Correctional Care, Inc.; Correctional Medical Services, Inc.; and Dr. Ferdinand
Massari. Dancy failed to serve the remaining defendants.
n2 Unlike the others who sought summary
judgment, EMSA Correctional Care, Inc., filed a motion to dismiss Dancy's
lawsuit. Because, in addressing this motion, the court considered materials
outside the pleadings, EMSA's motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for
summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
n3 After awarding summary judgment on the §
1983 claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Dancy's remaining state law claims.