UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
DENNIS E. JONES-EL et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
V
S.E. GRADY et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 02-2406
November 21, 2002 *, Submitted
December 16, 2002, Decided
NOTICE: RULES OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS MAY LIMIT CITATION TO UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE
REFER TO THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
ORDER
A Wisconsin
law, on the books for a dozen years but amended several times, directs the
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide a "challenge
incarceration program for inmates" who meet certain criteria. Wis. Stat. §
302.045. In a nutshell, the law allows certain inmates, selected by the
department, to participate in a strenuous program of exercise, manual labor, substance
abuse treatment, military-like drill, and counseling in exchange for a shorter
sentence. The program, commonly called "boot camp," is aimed at
youthful offenders (those under 30) with substance abuse problems. The
appellants in this case, Dennis E. Jones-El and Rufus Lynch, n1 are [*857]
prison inmates serving time for armed robbery convictions. They brought
this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tommy Thompson, Wisconsin's former
governor, and several DOC officials, claiming they were illegally excluded from
the program.
The
appellants claim their exclusion from the program was based on their race
(black) and status (the DOC lists them as "violent offenders") in
violation of substantive due process and equal protection. They allege that the
named defendants directly violated their rights and conspired to violate them
contrary to law. The district court, sensing that the case was meritless, denied
the appellants an opportunity to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed their
complaint pursuant to the court's gatekeeping responsibilities under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We
affirm.
In 1994,
allegedly at the direction of former Governor Thompson, the DOC directed that
"violent offenders" be excluded from the boot camp program. Inmates
convicted of armed robbery, as the appellants in this case were, are classified
as violent offenders. Thus, they are excluded from the program. Obviously, the
defendants had a rational basis for treating violent offenders differently from
other prisoners who were otherwise eligible to participate in the boot camp
program and get out of prison faster than they would ordinarily see the light of day. And because "violent
offenders" are not a suspect class, see Shifrin v. Fields, 39 F.3d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 1994), the
DOC's decision to exclude
them from participating in the boot camp program does not amount to a violation
of rights because it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate penal
purpose. See Martinez v.
Flowers, 164 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998); Wottlin v. Fleming, 136 F.3d
1032, 1036-37 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). So it follows that because the
appellants were not denied their right to be considered for the program in
light of their "violent offenders" status, they have no standing to
claim that they were excluded from the program for any other reason, including
their race.
If the boot camp program was accepting only white armed robbers or only white "violent offenders" but excluding black armed robbers or other black "violent offenders," our appellants would have a case. But as alleged in their complaint, Judge Crabb in the district court was correct to brand this case as frivolous under her gatekeeping responsibilities. Accordingly, we DISMISS the appeal of Raymond Massie X for want of prosecution, and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court with respect to Jones-El and Lynch.
* The appellees notified this court that they were never
served with process in the district court and would not be
participating in this appeal, which has been submitted
without a brief from them. After examining the appellants'
brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument
is unnecessary. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2).
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Although this appeal purportedly is
brought on behalf of Jones-El, Lynch, and Raymond Massie X, another plaintiff,
only the appeals of Jones-El and Lynch are properly before this court. While
all three appellants signed the notice of appeal, only Jones-El and Lynch
signed the brief filed in this court. Because pro se litigants may not proceed
on anyone else's behalf, see Lewis v.
Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 1986); McCall v. Pataki, 232
F.3d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 2000), and because Massey X has not submitted his own
brief, we accordingly dismiss his appeal for want of prosecution. See United States v. Sosa, 55 F.3d 278, 279
(7th Cir. 1995). An additional plaintiff, Floyd Morgan, was deemed to have
opted out of the suit by the district court, and he did not appeal.