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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
RONNIE L. JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF DAYTON, OHIO, et al.,
Defendants,
THOMAS W. PETERSON, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
No. 01-4165
61 Fed. Appx. 183
March 20, 2003, Filed
NOTICE: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION. SIXTH CIRCUIT RULE 28(g) LIMITS CITATION TO SPECIFIC SITUATIONS. PLEASE SEE RULE 28(g) BEFORE CITING IN A PROCEEDING IN A COURT IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. IF CITED, A COPY MUST BE SERVED ON OTHER PARTIES AND THE COURT. THIS NOTICE IS TO BE PROMINENTLY DISPLAYED IF THIS DECISION IS REPRODUCED.
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. This is an interlocutory appeal from an
order denying the defendant police officers' motion for summary judgment on the
basis of qualified immunity. Because the district court found there to be a
genuine issue of material fact, and because the defendant officers chose not to
make a timely concession that the plaintiff's version of the facts was correct,
the appeal will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
I
Late one
August evening in Dayton, Ohio, police officers searching for a suspect who had
fled the scene of shooting detained a 12-year-old boy who fit the suspect's
description. The boy's uncle, along with several other family members who were
attending a barbecue in the vicinity, protested the detention. The nature of
the protest, and the officers' reactions, are matters of factual dispute.
[*184]
According
to the officers, a group of family members that included Mr. Jones surrounded
them, demanded the boy's release, and ignored instructions to step back and
stop asking questions. Jones, they say, swore at the officers and tried
repeatedly to approach his nephew, pushing an officer at one point in an effort
to get past him.
Mr. Jones
tells a different story. He says he was peaceably providing information about
the boy, from a distance, when a police officer pushed him and tried to force
him to the ground. At that juncture, says Mr. Jones, he told the officer that
the use of force was not necessary, and he voluntarily put his hands behind his
back to be handcuffed.
Mr. Jones
was arrested, in any event, and was charged with obstruction of official
business, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. He was eventually
acquitted. Jones then brought the instant civil rights action against the
officers, the police chief, and the city, alleging, among other things,
violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, asserting as to Mr. Jones' constitutional claims that the
officers had probable cause to arrest Jones, that they did not use excessive
force, and that they were entitled to qualified immunity.
The district court granted
the motion in part and denied it in part. Of relevance here, the court
"found a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the
Defendants-police officers had probable cause to arrest the Plaintiff, such
that this Court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, whether their conduct ...
violated clearly established law." The court thus rejected the officers'
assertion of qualified immunity with respect to Mr. Jones' claim that there was
no probable cause for his arrest. The officers have taken a timely appeal from
the court's ruling.
II
A denial
of summary judgment may be appealed immediately if it is based on a legal
determination that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. See Mitchell
v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-28, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985), and
Skousen v. Brighton High School, 305 F.3d 520 at 525 (6th Cir. 2002). "If
the denial of summary judgment turns on the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact," however, "an interlocutory appeal is improper, and we
are without jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Skousen, 305 F.3d at 525;
cf. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20, 132 L. Ed. 2d 238, 115 S. Ct. 2151
(1995). The denial of summary judgment in the case at bar turned on the
district court's finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact.
This court could exercise
jurisdiction, of course, if the officers were willing to concede Mr. Jones'
version of the facts. See Berryman v.
Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 562 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Skousen, 305 F.3d at 525.
But the officers -- in their main brief, at least -- have not conceded that the
events in question unfolded as Mr. Jones has claimed. To the contrary, they
insist that Jones "interfered" with the detention of his nephew by
"yelling" and "attempting to gain access" to the boy,
Appellants' Br. at 5, even though Mr. Jones has testified that he merely spoke
to the officers without obstructing them in any way. Further, the officers say
that Mr. Jones ignored their commands and refused to step back, id. at 17, even
though Jones has denied this. Indeed, the officers expressly decline to concede
Mr. Jones' version of the facts, instead "requesting that this Court
review the record and determine the appropriate facts." Id. at 4 n.1.
In their reply brief, it is true, the officers argue that "even relying on Jones['][*185] statement of events, probable cause still exists to support his arrest." Reply Br. at 5. They drop all references to Mr. Jones' physical obstruction of the officers and argue that "verbal actions" alone can rise to the level of obstructing police business. Id. at 8-10. But this effort to preserve the officers' appeal comes too late. Cf. United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392 at 401 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the appellant cannot raise new issues in a reply brief; he can only respond to arguments raised for the first time in appellee's brief" (internal quotation marks omitted)). And significant factual issues would remain whether or not the officers conceded that Mr. Jones did not physically obstruct them.
The appeal is DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction.