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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY
JORGE ORTIZ
JIMENEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No.
02-245
245 F. Supp. 2d 584
February 20, 2003, Decided
RODRIGUEZ, District Judge
This matter comes before the
Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion to remand the matter to state court and to
recover attorneys' fees and costs. For the reasons stated below, Defendants'
motion will be granted and Plaintiff's motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
When
considering a motion to dismiss a complaint, the district court is required to
accept as true all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and view all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Jordan v.
Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff has alleged in his Amended Complaint the following facts, which will
be accepted as true for the purpose of deciding this motion.
On July 26, 1999, at
approximately 1:00 a.m., Plaintiff was arrested by Atlantic City police
officers. (Amended Complaint, First Count, P 6.) Plaintiff remained in jail
[*586] for a period of nearly twenty two months, at which point all charges were dismissed. (Amended
Complaint, First Count, P 7.) Plaintiff alleges that, during his incarceration,
he requested a DNA test that he contended would prove his innocence. (Amended
Complaint, First Count, P 10.) On April 26, 2001, Plaintiff was informed of the
test results, which he alleges were "inconclusive." (Amended
Complaint, First Count, P 11.) Thereafter, on May 9, 2001, Plaintiff was
released from prison. (Amended Complaint, First Count, P 7.)
Plaintiff
filed the original complaint on November 15, 2001 in the New Jersey Superior
Court, Law Division, Atlantic County, Docket No. ATL-L-3716-01, captioned,
Jorge Ortiz Jimenez v. State of New Jersey, et al. Plaintiff's complaint
alleged violations of his constitutional rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and various state torts claims. The summons was served upon Defendants on
December 18, 2001. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441, with this Court on January 17, 2002. n1
PLAINTIFF'S
§ 1983 CLAIMS
Plaintiff
asserts claims against all Defendants n2 for violations of his constitutional
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The only
alleged constitutional violation raised by Plaintiff is that, while
incarcerated, he requested a DNA test and one was not administered as
expeditiously as he expected, thereby leading to his continuous incarceration
for approximately twenty two months. Plaintiff does not specifically allege the
reason for the delay or the personal involvement of any of the Defendants. n3
In addition, he was released when the results of the tests were reported as
inconclusive.
Defendants argue that they are
entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims because Plaintiff does not
have a constitutional right to a DNA test; alternatively, Defendants argue that
their conduct [*587] was reasonable in that any such right was not clearly
established. This Court agrees and therefore dismisses Plaintiff's complaint.
Government
officials are generally granted qualified immunity and are "shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396,
102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982). When conducting a qualified immunity analysis, the
court first considers "whether plaintiff's allegations, if true, establish
a constitutional violation." Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct.
2508, 2513, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002). "If no constitutional right would
have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for
further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001). If a constitutional right
is found, however, then the court's next inquiry is to determine whether that
right was clearly established based on "whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted." Id. at 202 (citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 143 L.
Ed. 2d 818, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999)).
Therefore, the Court's first
inquiry is whether there is a constitutional right to DNA testing. The only
published opinions to address this issue under § 1983 involved incarcerated
plaintiffs who were seeking injunctions to obtain access to genetic evidence
for the purpose of conducting DNA testing. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th
Cir. 2002) (deferring to legislature the issue of the potential constitutional
right to post-conviction DNA testing for persons convicted of federal crimes
and declining "to fashion a broad constitutional due process right of
access to DNA testing"); Godschalk v. Montgomery County District
Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding that the
plaintiff had a "due process right of access to the genetic material for
the limited purpose of DNA testing"). Although the two cases came to opposite
results, both courts relied on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), in which
the Supreme Court stated that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Therefore, the alleged constitutional right to DNA testing
in those matters was analyzed as a right to access potentially exculpatory
information.
This case presents a different
situation. Here, the Court is being asked to consider whether a defendant in a
criminal case has a constitutional right to DNA testing prior to trial.
Essentially, Plaintiff's claim is that his constitutional right was violated
because the state did not perform a DNA test in making its case against him in
a more timely manner and before being ordered to do so by a court. Accordingly,
this Court concludes that the Plaintiff's claim is more appropriately analyzed
under Youngblood v. Arizona, 488 U.S. 51, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281, 109 S. Ct. 333
(1988). There, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require the "State to preserve evidentiary material of
which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the
results of which might have exonerated the defendant." Id. at 57. The
Court further stated, "If the [state supreme] court meant ... that the Due
Process Clause is violated when the police fail to use a particular
investigatory tool, we [*588] strongly disagree ... The police do not have a
constitutional duty to perform any particular tests." Id. at 58-59.
Applying the analysis presented
in Youngblood, it is clear that, as the law stands, Plaintiff did not have a
constitutional right to DNA testing in the pretrial stages of his criminal case.
Had the matter gone to trial and Plaintiff was currently seeking
post-conviction relief or access to the physical evidence itself, a different
case would have been presented and a different result may have been
appropriate. See Godschalk, 177 F.
Supp. 2d at 370 (granting access to DNA evidence); State v. Thomas, 245 N.J. Super.
428, 586 A.2d 250 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (ordering post-conviction
DNA testing where state's evidence against defendant was "not
strong"). Here, Plaintiff had not yet been tried and the matter was still
in the pretrial stages. Therefore, despite the passage of nearly twenty two months,
Plaintiff has not specifically alleged the reason for this delay or the
personal involvement of any of the defendants. As a result, Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint, alleging a constitutional violation because DNA testing was not
performed earlier in the investigation of his case, will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. n4 Further inquiries
concerning qualified immunity are not necessary. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct.
2151 (2001).
PLAINTIFF'S
STATE LAW CLAIMS
Defendants
also move to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claims, arguing that the claims are
barred by the New Jersey Tort Claims Act ("Act"), N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
59:1-1 to 12-3 (West 1992 & Supp. 2002). The Act provides that "[a]
public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or
enforcement of any law." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-3 (West 1992). The New
Jersey Supreme Court established that "the same standard of objective
reasonableness that applies in § 1983 actions also governs questions of good
faith arising under the Tort Claims Act." Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey,
162 N.J. 375, 744 A.2d 1146, 1153 (N.J. 2000). Thus, having found that the
defendant's conduct was reasonable in that no constitutional rights were
violated, the Court further concludes that Plaintiff's state law claims against
the individual defendants fail.
The Act
further provides that "[a] public
entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of a
public employee where the public employee is not liable." N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 59:2-2(b) (West 1992). Thus, the State of New Jersey and the Division of
State Police are also shielded from liability.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED this 20 day of February, 2003 that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint [18] is GRANTED; and [*589]
IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand and for Attorney's Fees and
Costs [17] is DENIED; and
IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
JOSEPH H.
RODRIGUEZ
U.S.D.J.
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Plaintiff argues that removal
was inappropriate and therefore moves for remand to state court. This argument
fails on two grounds. First, a federal
district court has removal jurisdiction over claims that arise from a federal
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994).
Since Plaintiff's claim involves an action founded on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court's removal jurisdiction is invoked.
Further, the Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims
because the entire case may be removed
when a separate or independent claim is removable based on the Court's federal
question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §
1441(c) (1994). Therefore, the § 1983 claim confers the Court jurisdiction over
the state law claims as well as the federal claims.
Second, a motion to remand for any reason other than subject matter
jurisdiction must be made within 30 days of the filing of the notice of
removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (Supp. 2002). Here, the notice of removal was
filed on January 17, 2002. Having found that the Court does have subject matter
jurisdiction over the entire controversy, additional arguments regarding
removal would be untimely.
n2 Plaintiff's claims against the State of New Jersey and the New Jersey
Division of State Police fail under § 1983. The Supreme Court expressly held
that the term "person" in the
statute does not include the state or state officials acting in their official
capacity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 105 L. Ed. 2d 45, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). Thus,
only the claims against the individual defendants remain.
n3 It is unclear from the Amended
Complaint whether the claims are based on individual liability or upon a theory
of respondeat superior. The Supreme Court has held that "Section 1983 will
not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of
liability." Polk County v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981). Thus, to
the extent that any of Plaintiff's claims are based on the theory of respondeat
superior, these claims will be dismissed.
n4 The Court's conclusion is
consistent with an unpublished decision from the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. Harrison v. Abraham,
1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19432, 1996 WL 752285 (E.D. Pa. December 19, 1996).
There, the plaintiff alleged that he repeatedly requested a DNA test and
continually pleaded his innocence. The plaintiff remained in prison for ten
months, at which point the DNA test proved that he had not had sexual relations
with the victim and all charges were dropped. The Court relied on Youngblood
and dismissed the plaintiff's claims that were based on the failure to perform
DNA testing before being ordered to do
so. The plaintiff's claims of violations of his other constitutional rights,
including arrest without probable cause and failure to provide for a speedy
trial, survived the defendant's motion to dismiss.