CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION
Labor Department
38 Wolcott Hill Road
Wethersfield, Connecticut
In the Matter of Arbitration Between :
The City of Ansonia [Department]: Award Date: November 18, 2003
Employer :
and Hearing: 12/19/02, 3/19/03, 4/11/03
Earl Stanley
Grievant:
Case No: 2003-A-0141
Processing of the Grievance:
The State Board of Mediation and Arbitration (the “Board”) appointed a tripartite panel to hold a hearing on Earl Stanley’s termination case.(herein “the Grievant”) and the first hearing was held on December 19, 2002. At the hearing the City of Ansonia (herein “the City”) and the Grievant were unable to frame a joint submission to the Panel. At our request they provided argument on what the submission should be. They subsequently briefed the matter. Upon reviewing the briefs, the Panel voted to frame the issue in the manner proposed by the City.
On March 19 and April 11, 2003, the Panel held hearings and received evidence, argument and testimony regarding the merits of Mr. Stanley’s grievance. The parties elected to file post hearing briefs before closing the record. The Panel received their briefs on or around May 5, 2003 and met on two occasions to deliberate. The Panel now issues this ruling with regards to the merits of Earl Stanley’s grievance.
Issue Presented:
The Panel framed the issue for consideration in the following manner:
Whether the Respondent City of Ansonia Board of Police Commissioners had just cause to terminate the employment of the Grievant Officer Earl Stanley; at if not, what should the [*2] remedy be?
Relevant Contractual
Provisions, Duty Manual and Charter Sections A.
On August 6, 2002 the Town of Ansonia Board of Police Commissioners (“BPC”) heard argument, evidence and testimony and concluded that it had just cause to terminate Earl Stanley’s employment. Only four of the five Commissioners were present, however, amongst those present and voting, the vote was unanimous. The decision to terminate the 36 year old officer was made after all concerned parties were given an opportunity to be heard. The termination was predicated on the alleged violation of eight sections of the “Rules and Regulations of the Ansonia Police Department”. (City Exh. 4, City Brief at 7)
During the hearing many issues came to the attention of the “UBPC”. The first issue was sexual misconduct. This was first discussed with reference to a 19 year old resident, Jennifer Stopa (herein “Stopa”) Those allegations first surfaced on January 15, 2001. Stopa gave two written statements under oath to the Ansonia Police Department whereby she alleged that Officer Stanley had used “unwelcome and unsolicited sexual and vulgar language” and had “grabbed her buttocks”. (City Exh. 8, City Brief at 1) Stopa was at the August 6 hearing, testified credibly and her testimony was not rebutted by the Grievant who elected not to testify.
On January 19 the Police Department turned the matter over to the State Police and decided not to conduct an internal investigation. Because of the ongoing criminal investigation, the City felt justified in withholding the Stopa complaint from Mr. Stanley until May 6, 2002. The parties agree that the Stopa complaint is a “nondepartmental complaint” but disagree on whether the same should have been disclosed in the manner provided by Article 14, Section G of their collective bargaining agreement. (Id.)
The Stopa allegations resulted in a criminal investigation by the State Police. On January 29, 2001 the State Police interviewed Jennifer Stopa who gave them sworn statement. On February 16, the State Police also received a sworn statement from Kate Barto who alleged she had been subjected to lewd, obscene and sexually harassing conduct. (herein “Barto”). In her statement Barto alleged being subjected to “obscene gestures” and being touched on “her ass” on several occasions. She also recounted being offered liquor at a wedding reception by Stanley when she was 17 in the midst of his making “lewd and obscene comments” to her. Furthermore, Barto insisted that Stanley was “doing everything possible to have sex” with her. She indicated that the Grievant “illuminated my car with his spotlight” and followed her on numerous occasions in his cruiser. (City Exh. 8)
Barto, who was a co-worker of Jennifer Stopa and introduced her to Stanley, indicated that the Grievant had “blown kisses” and ‘licked his lips in a sexual way in front of Jennifer”. (City Exh. 8) women claimed in their statements to be afraid of the Grievant and feared that he would hurt them and alleged that the Grievant’s advances were resisted and rejected. It is not clear, however, what role, if any, the Barto statement played in the action which was to come next. It does appear that the Stopa complaint was the main reason why the State Police brought criminal charges against Mr. Stanley. Obviously the Barto complaint had corroborative value and was very significant. However, the same contained details of behavior that involved Barto and went beyond corroboration.
As revealed at the time of the hearings on this matter, the charges by the State Police also prompted the Ansonia Police Department to begin an Internal Investigation. The Officer assigned to do the investigation was Lieutenant Michael Abbels. It is not clear from the record when the Ansonia Police Department got a copy of the Barto statement. It is clear, however, that the Grievant did not receive a copy of the same until around May 6, 2002.
Stanley was arrested on April 6, 2001 and charged with Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree. After his arrest Stanley signed a “written waiver with Chief Hale regarding Section D” of the collective bargaining agreement. As a result, a disciplinary hearing was not required until the “outcome of the criminal charges ... or independent verification of alleged misconduct”. On August 30, 2001, a third complaint surfaced from a 22 year old female, Michelle Mrazik, (herein Mrazik) who had similar problems with the Grievant. (City Exh. 6 and 8)
Like Barto, Mrazik complained that Stanley frequently stopped her by flashing a “spotlight into her car” and asked her “to come to his house”. Mrazik also complained that she was watched by the Grievant while she was getting out of the shower and while he “was in an Ansonia Police Car” and “flashed the blue and red lights on the roof of his car and drove away”. This type of on duty conduct was also complained of by Kate Barto. Given other acts complained of by Mrazik, the latter conduct appeared calculated to be a use of Stanley’s police [*10] authority inappropriately. Similar conduct included Stanley assuring Mrazik that he would try and help her out “with the Prosecutor of the Derby Court” when she got arrested because she had caused a fight. At that time Stanley “leaned towards [victim’s] face with his face” as if to kiss her. (City Exh. 8)
Stanley’s case came before the Court on December 14, 2001 at which time the Grievant applied for Accelerated Rehabilitation after undergoing a “psychosexual evaluation and risk assessment”. (Joint Exh. 4 and Union Exh. 1) Neither the Mrazik or Barto matters were addressed at that proceeding. Stanley did not receive a copy of the Mrazik complaint until May 6, 2002. Neither were these matters discussed during the risk assessment conducted prior to Mr. Stanley’s court appearance.
The evaluation was based on the assumption that the Grievant “has never been accused or convicted of a prior sexual offense or convicted or any other criminal behavior”. The above assumptions were coupled with Stanley’s denial “of the current charges against him”. Under such conditions the Grievant was evaluated as being free from any psychopathology and/or sexual psychopathology”. He was also evaluated as having a low risk for sex offender recidivism”. Stanley did admit “having sexually charged conversations with the victim and her friend”, touching of Stopa, and seemed “to recognize that they were inappropriate”. (Union Exh. 1)
During his Court appearance Stanley’s attorney indicated that his client recognized that “whatever behavior he engaged in that day (with Stopa) wasn’t appropriate”. He also indicated that the incident was a learning experience that taught Stanley “something about boundaries and appropriate behavior”. Mr. Stanley did not address the Court. In granting the accelerated rehabilitation the Court noted that the victim did not object and that “this was not an on duty misuse of authority”. It did find that Stanley’s conduct was “sufficient to warrant an arrest” and that the age difference between the victim and Stanley made the “limited touching” which occurred “inappropriate”. (Joint Exh. 4)
While the Court did not make a determination of guilt, it did not exonerate the Grievant. As a result of the proceedings, Stanley was placed on a two year probation and admonished not to have contact with Ms. Stopa. He was further required to continue in counseling, make restitution to the victim for lost wages, pay up to $1,000 for her counseling and to perform 100 [*11] hours of community service. (Id The Court’s determination on Mr. Stanley’s application did not involve consideration of the on duty conduct alleged by Kate Barto and Michelle Mrazik and the Krill statement, which will be discussed below.
During the Spring of 2002, with the criminal charges being disposed of, the Internal Affairs Investigation intensified. As a result, Stanley was questioned on May 6, 2002 and he was advised of the identity of the women who had accused him and the nature of the accusations. He was told of the alleged “unsolicited sexual vulgarity and sexual contact” and “inappropriate use of a police cruiser and lights”. According to Lieutenant Michael Abbels, the interrogator, Stanley denied the allegations made by the complainants” He also stated that, in his opinion, the Grievant, “intentionally lied to him” and “tried to mislead him”. (City Brief at 6, City Exh. 8)
To buttress his conclusion Abbels pointed out that Stanley “denied trying to have a relationship with Stopa or Barto” but “finally admitted that he was trying to have a sexual relationship with them”. The Lieutenant also pointed out that the Grievant denied shining or flashing his lights at females in cars. However, Abbels indicated that Officer Tirella, who had been in Officer Stanley’s patrol car “many times”, indicated to him that Stanley did so on many occasions, while he was present. Based on the above circumstances, Abbels concluded that he needed to conduct another meeting with Stanley to clear the “many inconsistencies”. He scheduled and held said meeting on June 14. (City Exh.. 8)
On July 10, 2002, a fourth statement was given to the Ansonia Police Department. The same related to conduct which occurred two years prior. The statement had a familiar tone to it as the 41 year old female, Martha KriIl, discussed “being flagged down by Officer Stanley”. Krill knew Stanley well because he had dated her daughter. According to the statement, on one occasion the Grievant encountered her and told her that she looked nice”. He subsequently told her “why don’t you pull up your shirt and show me your breasts”. Krill stated that “in the past an Ansonia Police Car would park next to [ house and shine the spotlight into my bedroom window”. While Krill admitted not being able to discern who the officer was, she said that “after I confronted Earl Stanley about it, it never happened again”. (Id.) [*12]
On the above date Lieutenant Abbel presented his Internal Affairs Investigation report. On July 23, the Grievant was given a copy of the same and notice that the report was being presented to the Board of Police Commissioners on July 30. He was told that on July 30 the “BPC” “will convene a hearing to consider whether any disciplinary action should be taken against you”. That hearing was postponed and reconvened on August 6. (City Exh. 5)
At the August 6 hearing, the “BPC” “heard evidence and testimony from witnesses presented by Chief Hale and also on behalf of Officer Stanley”. They also received evidence concerning relevant charter provisions and the “CBA”. At the end the Board of Police Commissioners found that “the evidence of the witnesses called by the Police Department held greater weight”. They also found that the violations of Section 2.1.3, 2.1.6, 2.1.10, 2.1.11, 4.4.3, 2.3.3 and 2.3.22 of the Duty Manual were substantiated. Based on their conclusion, the “BPC” “decided to terminate the services of Earl Stanley with immediate effect as of August 6, 2002”. A motion was subsequently made and approved by the four commissioners who were present and voting.
Position of the Parties:
A. City:
The City argues that the conduct
engaged in by Earl Stanley was egregious and unbecoming of a police officer.
Furthermore, they contend that the same violated multiple departmental rules
and regulations and gave the “BPC” just cause to terminate the Grievant’s
employment. They point out that said conduct was corroborated by uncontradicted
testimony from the victims at the August 6 hearing. Furthermore, the
City points out that the Grievant was never exonerated of the charges brought
by the State with regards to the Stopa complaint and that the granting of
accelerated rehabilitation did not involve the consideration of the allegations
of on duty misconduct made by Barto, Mrazik and Knit. Of the statements and
testimony provided the City states “the nature of their complaints, although
not fully uniform, was consistent”. According to the City, the latter “detailed
the use of unsolicited vulgar and sexually explicit language, unsolicited
sexual contact and/or improper use at night of the APD cruiser and spotlights”.
[*13] (Note 4)
The ‘City argues that Officer Stanley “denied many of the victims’ allegations, but then conditionally admitted to their validity” and generally was not truthful during the department’s investigation of the complaints against him. They point out that his actions “violated a societal network of relationships of trust which must be in place in order for him to be an effective and respected officer”. According to the City, the Grievant also abused the considerable clout and authority which is concomitant with his duties, as well as his responsibility to use departmental resources and equipment solely for official department business.
The City argues that it did not violate the Grievant’s rights under the collective bargaining agreement. First, they point out that they were not required to give Mr. Stanley a copy of the Stopa complaint because of the ongoing criminal investigation by the State. They also point out that they were not required to give him a copy of the Barto complaint because the same was made during the pendency of the criminal investigation and was not made to them. Lastly, they argue that they did not have an obligation under the collective bargaining agreement to give the Grievant a copy of the Mrazik complaint, or the Knit statement, because the same were obtained during the pendency of an Internal Affairs Investigation. According to the City, neither of the last two situations is covered by the Article 14, Section G language. In their opinion, the latter points are buttressed by a longstanding past practice which comports with the way they handled the Stanley case.
According to the City, the “BPC” acted within the procedural parameters established in the collective bargaining agreement C’CBA”), the only “controlling document”. They also argue that the procedural requirements relied upon by the Grievant are inapplicable. They further point out that the five month limitation in Section G does not apply under the circumstances described above for the very same reasons. They categorically deny that Mr. Stanley was deprived of his right to a closed hearing and contends that the vote of the Board of Police Commissioners was indeed unanimous as required by the City Charter. Finally, the City argues that the unanimity of the vote was not vitiated by the fact that one commissioner recused due to a legitimate conflict.
B. Grievant:
As evidenced by the Grievant’s Attorney post hearing brief, there are a number of challenges made by Mr. Stanley. The first is that the City’s disciplinary action was prompted [*14] only by the Stopa complaint. According to Mr. Stanley’s counsel, that alleged misconduct, if any, occurred off duty. Therefore, since the City did not prove any adverse impact on its operations, its employees or its reputation, they can not discipline Mr. Stanley for said misconduct since it did not establish a direct relation between the misconduct and Stanley’s job.
As a second line of argument, the Grievant focuses on alleged procedural irregularities. The first focuses on the City’s failure to give Mr. Stanley a copy of the various complaints as required by Article 14, Section G. The next challenge deal with the fact that the four complaints relied upon by the Department to justify his dismissal were more than five months old, again a violation of the above provision. According to Stanley, these violations caused great prejudice to his ability to defend himself. The Grievant also challenges the denial of his request for a closed hearing. Lastly, Mr. Stanley alleges that the decision to terminate him violated Section 68 of the City Charter because the same was made by a non-unanimous vote of the Board of Police Commissioners.
For all the above reasons, Earl Stanley requests that we sustain his grievance, reinstate him “to his position as an officer of the Ansonia Police Department, with a full restoration of all back wages, seniority, attorney’s fees and prerequisites of his employment.
The Panel met in executive session to analyze the record and evidence presented by the parties in light of the terms of the CBA and the issue framed by the Panel. Having done so, the Panel sustains Earl Stanley’s grievance. That ruling is supported by the premises outlined below.
Based on the above information, the Panel concludes that the City of Ansonia violated Earl Stanley’s rights under Article 14, Section G. In view of this violation, we conclude that the City did not have just cause to terminate Officer Stanley. Our conclusion is based on the fact [*15] that the CBA does not expressly exclude the complaints, statements or allegations used as a basis for his termination from the 5 month limitation period in that section of the “CBA”. It is also clear to us that Article 14 does not expressly create an exception for these type of complaints insofar as the disclosure requirements contained therein. Neither does it create an exemption for complaints or allegations which arise during the pendency of an Internal Affairs investigation as claimed. The language in both cases refer to “a written complaint” without further qualification.
For this reason, we believe that the City violated the CBA’s procedural requirements when it did not provide the Grievant a copy of the Stopa and Mrazik complaint within 7 days of receiving the same. By the terms of the Agreement, the City could not use the Stopa or Mrazik complaint as a basis for terminating the Grievant since those complaints were more than five months old at the time when the Board of Police Commissioners “acted on” them. As argued by the Grievant, we believe that the passage of time could curtail his ability to defend against these complaints. This type of deprivation gains critical importance when an individual’s continued employment is on the line.
The situation is somewhat different with the Barto statement since the same was given directly to the State Police. To be sure, the Panel is unable to determine when the Barto statement was provided to the Ansonia Police Department. Therefore, we have no way of determining whether the disclosure requirement in Article 14 was violated with respect to this complaint, though there is a likelihood it was. Clearly the complaint was more than five months old when the City “acted on” the same and should not have been used as a basis for the termination. There is no clear indication on the record whether Mr. Stanley was given a copy of the Krill complaint within seven days of it being filed. However, it is obvious that the City “acted on” the complaint within the five month limitation period.
Based on our review of the record we find no evidence to establish that the advent of criminal investigations trumped the Grievant’s contractual rights under Article 14. A preponderance of the evidence fails to persuade us that the City’s rendition of Section G of said article was ever contemplated in negotiations or embodied by any proposals offered by the City during the negotiation of the “CBA”. The record is also devoid of convincing evidence that there was a past practice which abrogated Mr. Stanley’s Article 14 rights. The evidence presented by the City on the latter issue is simply unpersuasive. The same can not “clarify” the language in [*16] Article 14 because said language is clear and unambiguous.
Even if we assume arguendo that the language is ambiguous, the evidence submitted by the City is of no consequence because the same fails to establish that the practice was unequivocal or clearly enunciated. There is no evidence whatsoever of similar cases or circumstances where other officers received like treatment. Clearly, there is no evidence that the practice was acted upon or that the same was “readily ascertainable over a reasonable period of time as a fixed and established practice accepted by both parties”. In view of the above, this Panel can not accept the City’s defense for their failure to abide by the requirements of Article 14.
After all, the Panel’s function is to enforce the CBA not to re-negotiate its terms. When language is clear and unambiguous we can not weigh the equities and take matters in our hands. To do so would be a dereliction of our duties. The City has never proven that it tried to comply with the requirements of Article 14. On the other hand, an analysis of the evidence in the record shows that their failure to comply is inexcusable. To be sure, the contract between the parties did not permit the employer to withhold information from the Grievant regarding a written nondepartmental complaint simply because a criminal investigation was in progress. After all, the City did not even try to comply by finding less invasive forms of disclosure. If it had, perhaps we would have a different case.
The fact is that the record is devoid of any credible support for the City’s interpretation of the disclosure requirement and limitation period in Article 14, Section G. In view of that, the Panel unanimously finds that they violated the CBA’s procedural requirements for terminating the Grievant. In sum, the City of Ansonia did not have just cause to end Mr. Stanley’s employment.
While we believe that the Grievant’s rights were violated, we do not feel that an award of back pay is warranted. Our conclusion is based on an examination of the record as a whole. Said evidence clearly establishes that the Grievant was not exonerated of the charges brought by the State. Neither did he rebut the allegations made against him at the August 6 hearing. A preponderance of the evidence also establishes that a significant part of Officer Stanley’s misconduct occurred while on duty, a factor not considered during his court proceeding. It is clear to the Panel from Judge Sequino’s comments, however, that she would have considered this type of misconduct to be serious if the case before her (the Stopa complaint) had involved [*17] the same.
Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the Panel also concludes that Officer Stanley used his position of authority to influence and intimidate the victims. He also violated the trust placed on him by the public since he preyed on their fear of his position as a police officer. The evidence also establishes that Stanley’s statements were inconsistent, if not outright contradictory, at various stages of the Internal Affairs Investigation which made it look as if he was less than candid with the investigators and had something to hide. Besides that, Officer Stanley did not express remorse, though he admitted through counsel in Court that he engaged in lewd and sexually charged conversations which were inappropriate, especially for an individual who is a police officer. Also of concern to the Panel is the disturbing nature of Officer’s Stanley’s physical touching which by credible accounts was unsolicited, unwanted and rebuked and which, by his account, was intended to facilitate having sexual relations with the victims.
In view of the above, the Panel concludes that Earl Stanley’s rights under Article 14, -Section G were violated and we sustain his grievance. Therefore, we order the City of Ansonia Police Department to reinstate him. For the reasons spelled above, the Panel does not award Mr. Stanley any back pay. [*18]
Notes:
1. Commissioner Casetti recused himself due to a conflict of interest and left the hearing on July 30 He did not attend the recessed hearing on August 6th. (City Exh. 1,3, City Brief at 7)
2. Further corroboration was provided by another co-worker, John Fair. (City Exh. 8)
3. The Court indicated that the dismissal “shall not operate to destroy the documents, and that they may be released to the Police Department in the event there should be any legal action by the victim. (Joint Exh. 4, p. 8
4. The text of the rules and regulations involved has been included in preceding portions of this opinion.
5. In reaching our decision we have not specifically addressed the Grievant’s other arguments in detail. A cursory review indicates to us that the off duty misconduct argument is without merit since there is ample evidence of some on duty misconduct (Barto, Mrazik, Krill) and the same played a role in the City’s decision to terminate Stanley. The Panel also concludes that the decision of the Board of Police Commissioners was indeed unanimous. We also reach the conclusion that Mr. Stanley’s right to a private hearing was not violated when Stopa’s mother was allowed to be present. The Panel notes for the record that all the written complaints involved here are considered by the parties to be nondepartmental complaints.
By:__________________________
Ruben E. Acosta, Esq.
Panel Chair, Public Member
By:___________________________
Madeline Matchko
Labor Member
By:_____________________________
James Curtin
Management Member
Sections A. Collective Bargaining Agreement (Joint 1)
Article 2 - Non Discrimination and Management Rights
Except as provided for in this Agreement, the City reserves the rights of all customary functions of management, including, but not limited to, the direction of the working force, the right to hire, layoff for lack of work or other legitimate reasons, discipline or discharge for just cause, to take any action appropriate in the management of the function of the Ansonia Police Department in accordance with its judgment, provided that this will not be used to discriminate against the Union, or any of its members, or to avoid any provisions of the Agreement.
Article 14 - Discipline and Discharge
Section A
No employee shall be discharged, terminated, demoted, suspended, or disciplined in any other manner except for just cause.
Section B
As used herein, the term “demoted” shall include the transfer of an employee laterally or otherwise, resulting in a reduction of the employee’s base wages.
Section C
The Chief may award discipline for just cause, to a maximum penalty of five (5) days suspension without pay.
Such discipline may also include a lesser suspension and/or warnings or reprimands. Such discipline may be awarded without a formal hearing, provided that an employee subject to such discipline shall have the right to confer with the Chief, together with a Union representative of his or her choice (Union lawyer, Union business agent, or Union steward) prior to the imposition of the discipline. The employee may appoint his or her own attorney provided a waiver is sought and granted by the union. The representative chosen by the employee must be available so that the conference with the Chief takes place no later than ten (10) working days from the date that the Chief notifies the employee of the intention to impose discipline.
Section D [*3]
Discipline other than that described in Section C above, shall be imposed only by the Board of Police Commissioners, who shall also be authorized to award those lesser amounts of discipline described in Section C above, provided that no employee shall be discharged, terminated, demoted, suspended or disciplined in any other manner by the Board of Police Commissioners except for just cause, and after opportunity for a hearing before said Board of Police Commissioners and provided that in the event an officer is arrested for an alleged violation of the criminal code, the Chief may suspend such officer without pay for up to thirty (30) calendar days pending a hearing before the Board of Police Commissioners. The Chief may place such officer on administrative duty with pay within the department at any time prior to the hearing. If such employee is unavailable for administrative duty, the employee will be suspended without pay pending the hearing before the Board of Police Commissioners.
Section E
All disciplinary proceedings before the Board of Police Commissioners shall require notice to the employee at least seven (7) calendar days prior to the date of the hearing; parties to have the right to reschedule hearing for cause. Said notice shall contain the particular provisions of the department’s rules and regulations, where applicable, the employee is alleged to have violated, and shall further contain a description of the acts allegedly committed by the employee in violation of said rules and regulations, where applicable.
Section F
At all hearings before the Board of Police Commissioners, all witnesses shall be sworn, and the employee shall have the right to representation of his choice and at his expense. All disciplinary hearings shall be open to the public, including the press, unless the employee requests that the hearing be closed. The Board of Police Commissioners shall render their decision and notify the employee and the Union thereof not later than twenty (20) calendar days after the hearing is closed.
Section G
Whenever a non departmental complaint is made against an employee or group of employees, such complaint shall be submitted in writing under oath. If such complaint relates to the conduct of said employee(s) as police officer(s) or the manner in which said employee(s) discharged police duties, and the police officer was acting reasonably and lawfully in the course of his or her employment when engaging in the conduct which is the subject of [*4] the complaint, and no charges are brought against the employee(s) by the City, said complaint results in court action, said employee(s) shall be entitled to be represented by the City’s attorney, or, at the City’s option, another attorney of the City’s choice, whose fees shall be paid for by the City. Any employee against whom a written complaint has been filed, must be provided a copy of such complaint within seven (7) days of its being filed. Such complaint shall be dismissed if not acted on by the Board of Police Commissioners within five (5) months of the date the complaint being filed.
Section H
Employees shall be entitled to representation by a Union representative of choice (Union lawyer, Union business agent or Union steward) at any meeting or an inquiry during which the employee may be subject to interrogation if the employee reasonably anticipates discipline may result from such meeting or inquiry. The employee may appoint his or her own attorney provided that a waiver is sought and approved by the national union. The meeting or inquiry may be delayed up to 24 hours to provide the employee with a specific individual as his/her union representative.
Section I
No grievance addressing a non probationary employee’s discharge, termination or demotion, including the severity of punishment, can be submitted directly to the Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration without the approval of the Union. The Union may submit said grievance directly to the Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration, requesting arbitration with respect thereto in accordance with the rules of the Board. Such request must be submitted in writing, with a copy to the City, within fifteen (15) calendar days of the date the discipline was imposed. The arbitrators are hereby empowered to render a final and binding arbitration award with respect to said grievance.
Section 3
Any employee who has been disciplined or discharged and who is subsequently exonerated, shall be reinstated without prejudice or loss of seniority and compensated for any loss of wages covering the period of any suspension or discharge for which he/she had been exonerated.
Article 23 - Rules and Regulations
Section A [*5]
The Department shall provide to each employee, upon employment, a copy of the Department’s Duty Manual. The Duty Manual shall be that which was adopted June 10, 1987, as modified by agreements of the parties reached in November 1990. Future changes or amendments which affect matters that are mandatory subjects of bargaining shall be subject to negotiation with the Union.
B. Duty Manual (City Exhibit 3, Joint Exhibit 3-5) Section 2 Standards of Conduct
Standards of conduct shall apply to members and employees of the Department. Members of the Department shall be deemed to be those persons who have been sworn for duty. Employees of the Department shall be to be those persons who are unsworn and who have been engaged to perform specific duties for the Department.
Section 2.1
In addition to the specific duties of each individual rank and assignment, as set forth in Section Three of this Manual, all sworn members of the Department shall:
2.1.6 Truthfulness - Speak the truth at all times and under all circumstances. In cases in which he is not allowed by the regulations of the Department to divulge facts within his knowledge, he will decline to speak on the subject.
2.1.10 Respect - extend the proper courtesy and respect toward all members of the Department and others at all times.
2.1.11 Civility - be civil, orderly, diligent, discreet, courteous and patient as a reasonable person is expected to be in all situations and shall not engage in any altercation, physical or otherwise whether on duty or not, with any other member or employee of the Department.
2.1.13 Oath of Office, Code of Ethics -carry out their oath of office and the code of police ethics to the best of the member’s ability.
Section 2.3 Prohibited Conduct
The following acts by a member of the Department are prohibited or restricted.
2.3.2 Conduct Unbecoming of An Officer - conducting himself in a way which reflects discredit upon the member as a police officer, or upon his fellow officers or the Police Department, or which tends to indicate that the officer is unable or unfit to continue as a member of the Police Department, or tends to impair the operation of the Police [*6] Department or its officers.
2.3.3 Neglect of Duty - conducting or omitting the performance of one’s duty such that performance is not in accordance with established and ordinary duties or procedures, or which constitutes use of unreasonable judgment in the exercising of any discretion granted to a police officer.
2.3.22 Duty Time Limited To Police Work - conducting personal business while on duty or devoting any of his “on duty” time to any activity other than that which relates to police work or performing any police duty in uniform for the purpose of private gain, unless properly authorized.
Section 4 Disciplinary Charges, Hearings and Procedures
4.4.3 Offenses and Violations - departmental offenses and violations include but are not limited to the following:
D. Neglect of Duty or Disobedience of orders - police officers while on duty shall devote their time and energies to the duties and responsibilities of rank, grade, or position to which they are assigned. In carrying out those duties, officers shall direct and coordinate their efforts in such a manner as will tend to establish and maintain the highest standard of efficiency. Any conduct or omission which is not in accordance with one’s established and ordinary duties and procedures, or which constitutes use of unreasonable judgment in the exercise of the discretion granted to an individual officer, shall be considered neglect of duty.
C. City
Charter (City Exhibit 2 and Joint Exhibit 2) Section 67 Police Department
Generally
There shall be in said city, a police department, which shall consist of three (3) commissioners, one chief and such numbers of lieutenants, sergeants, detective sergeants, detectives and patrolmen as the board of aldermen shall from time to time determine, all of whom shall be appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the board of aldermen. In the absence of the chief, the chief shall designate a lieutenant who shall be the second in command to fulfill such duties of said chief. When the office of the chief is vacated, the mayor (by using the personnel policy of said city) shall appoint a successor with the approval of the board of aldermen.
When the office of lieutenant, detective sergeant, sergeant and detective are [*7]
vacated, the mayor (after proper testing procedures) shall appoint any police officer of said city who has been a member of said department for three (3) years with the approval of the board of aldermen.
Section 68 Authority of Police Commissioners Generally
Said police commissioners are authorized to regulate and define the duties of the members of the police department and to make regulations for the government and control of said department; and may, after giving reasonable notice and after a hearing, punish, by reprimand, forfeiture, suspension of pay or dismissal, any member of said department; and may suspend, pending a hearing on charges, any member of said department.
The chief, lieutenants, sergeants, detective sergeants, detectives, and patrolmen, shall hold office until removed for cause and only after written charges have been presented. The vote of all commissioners is necessary to affect such removal.
Section 69 Action By Police Commissioners When Complaint Filed
Whenever a written complaint shall be presented to said police commissioners signed by any three (3) residents of said city, charging any member of said department with a refusal or neglect to discharge the duties imposed upon him, it shall be the duty of the commissioners to fix a day and place for a hearing upon such charges, and shall notify such accused member to appear before them at the time and place named. If said commissioners shall find such charges are true, they shall thereupon impose such punishment as in their judgment will be just. Said commissioners shall have the power to summon witnesses and to compel the production of books, papers, or documents bearing upon said charges, in the same manner and to the same extent as a court may do in the trial of any action, civil or criminal. Said commissioners shall monthly certify to the board of aldermen the total amount of expenses incurred by them during the preceding month, giving details as far as possible.
Section 70 Duties of Police Generally; Neglect, Etc., of Duty
It shall be the duty of the members of said police department to be vigilant, alert, and active in the discharge of the duties imposed upon them by the laws of this state, or by the ordinances of said city, and any refusal or neglect to discharge said duties, without good cause therefor, shall be sufficient to justify said commissioners to impose the punishment authorized by this Act.