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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA,
BIG STONE GAP DIVISION
GARY NEAL SADLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
S.K. YOUNG, ET AL.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:00CV70581
325 F. Supp. 2d 689; 2004
U.S. Dist. Lexis 13701
July 21, 2004, Decided
James P. Jones
Chief United States District Judge
This is a
prisoner's rights action filed under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2003) , against
Virginia state prison officials who completely immobilized the plaintiff for
nearly forty-eight hours by strapping his wrists, ankles, and chest to a prison
bed after he slapped his food tray onto a guard. A jury found for the
defendants and the plaintiff has moved for judgment as a matter of law as to
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. While the initial restraint of the
prisoner did not violate his rights, I find that his continued restraint was
without legitimate purpose. Accordingly, I will grant the plaintiff's motion
and afford him a new trial limited to the issue of damages.
I
On April 2,
2000, while incarcerated at Wallens Ridge State Prison ("WRSP"), in
Big Stone Gap, Virginia, Gary Neal Sadler "slapped" a food tray onto
an officer as the officer attempted to deliver the tray to him. In response to
this incident, WRSP officers immediately confined Sadler in five-point
restraints and continued to keep him restrained for forty-seven hours and
twenty minutes. Sadler was bound face-up to a prison bed by plastic restraints
at his wrists, ankles, and across his chest. During his confinement, he was
dressed in his undershorts, without a blanket or other covering. Sadler was
temporarily released from the five-point restraints only six times during the
nearly two days, for approximately fifteen minutes each time, to use the toilet
and eat.
Sadler
filed this § 1983 suit pro se claiming that his constitutional rights to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and to not be
deprived of liberty without due process of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment were violated by the defendants. The four defendants are employed at WRSP.
n1 David Allen Taylor is a correctional officer who recommended that Sadler
be confined in five-point restraints and supervised his initial
placement in them. John M. Eaton and Terry Givens are correctional officers who
supervised Sadler's temporary releases from the five-point
restraints. Stanley K. Young is the warden of WRSP and did not
participate in the decision to restrain
Sadler or to keep him restrained
but is [*691] responsible for the overall operation of the institution. Young
also reviewed the grievance
Sadler filed after his release
from confinement and determined that the officers had complied with prison
policy.
Sadler was housed in a Connecticut prison at the time of the
trial and represented himself via video conferencing. The jury was instructed
as to liability and damage issues and returned a verdict for the defendants.
Sadler thereafter moved in a timely fashion for judgment as a matter of law and
a new trial.
I have reviewed the parties' briefs on the motions, the trial
transcript, and the trial exhibits. The motions are now ripe for decision.
II
Pursuant to Rule 50, a district court may grant a motion for a
judgment as a matter of law after the jury has reached a verdict "if ...
there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for [the non-moving] party." Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294,
301 (4th Cir. 1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. The motion should not be granted
unless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to support the jury
verdict, "the evidence is so clear that reasonable men could reach no
other conclusion than the one suggested by the moving party." Persinger v.
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1189 (4th Cir. 1990). In considering a
Rule 50 motion, this court cannot "weigh evidence or assess the
credibility of witnesses." Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1433
(4th Cir. 1985).
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light of the foregoing
principles, shows as follows.
A. The Events Leading to Sadler's Confinement in Five-Point
Restraints.
Sadler is a
Connecticut inmate who was temporarily incarcerated at WRSP. n2 On April 2,
2000, Sadler was housed in WRSP's segregation unit, which is under twenty-three
hour lockdown. n3 Because an inmate in segregation is under lockdown,
correctional officers deliver meals to him by sliding a food tray through a
narrow slot in the cell door that can only be unlocked by the officers. Sadler
testified that during the lunch service on April 2, he had observed
Correctional Officer Young "taking something out of his mouth and
putting it inside some food trays he was [*692] delivering to the
inmates." (Tr. at 4.) Sadler said that he had informed Young
that he would report him and that he did not wish to receive his lunch,
but that Young had continued to slide the food tray into
his cell's tray slot despite this request.
Sadler told the jury that as he
blocked the tray slot with his hands in order to prevent the meal from entering
his cell, the tray fell back toward
Young and spilled onto him. Young
then closed and locked
Sadler's tray slot and left.
Officer Young
is no longer at WRSP and did not testify at trial, but he did record his
account of the event in an incident report that day. In his report, he wrote
that at approximately 11:30 a.m., when he had handed Sadler his food tray
through the cell's tray slot, " Sadler
came to the door and slapped his tray and food on me and the floor. The
beans hit me from my face to my boots. Sgt. Davidson was notified
immediately." (Pl.'s Ex. 3.) Officer
Young was not injured during
this incident. (Tr. at 67.)
Captain Taylor, the watch commander, was notified of the incident
and recommended to his supervisor, Administrative Duty Officer
("ADO") Randy Phillips, that
Sadler be placed in five-point
restraints for three reasons: (1) He believed that the assault of Young
with the food tray was deliberate; (2) he was informed that after the
incident Sadler began "raising hell" verbally; and
(3) in the past Sadler had attempted to assault an officer by
jerking the officer's arm through his cell's food tray slot while the officer
had been cuffing him. n4 (Id. at 70-71.) At trial, Taylor testified that he had
neither witnessed Sadler's verbal hell raising nor could he recall the nature
of the threats that the officers had described to him. Pursuant to Taylor's recommendation,
ADO Phillips ordered that Sadler be placed in five-point restraints and on
restrictive feeding to prevent further staff assaults and ensure the safe and
orderly operation of the unit. n5 Taylor testified that the purpose of placing
Sadler in five-point restraints instead of leaving him in his cell had not been
to punish him, but to ensure that he did not assault the staff. ADO Phillips
did not testify at trial.
It is
unclear how much time elapsed between
Young's encounter with Sadler
and Taylor's recommendation to place
Sadler in five-point
restraints. Young's Incident Report states that the tray
incident occurred at approximately 11:30 a.m. Taylor's Serious Incident Report
states that the incident occurred at approximately noon and that ADO Phillips
was notified at 12:10 p.m. Sadler, however, testified that Young
had not returned to his cell with Taylor and the other officers to
restrain him for about an hour. Despite the ten-minute time lapse Taylor had
indicated in his Serious Incident Report, at trial he testified that to the
best of his recollection not more than five minutes had elapsed from the time
that he had received the report of a disturbance until the time that he had
arrived at Sadler's cell to restrain him.
At least
eight officers, including Taylor, were involved in the process of physically
restraining Sadler. Sadler complied with their orders to back up to the tray
slot to [*693] have his wrists cuffed, kneel on the floor to have leg irons
placed on him, and be escorted to the restraint cell, where he was placed
face-up on the restraint bed. One officer held an electronic shield over
Sadler's chest as he lay on the mattress but did not activate it. Other
officers removed Sadler's right ankle from the leg iron and secured it to the
bed with a restraint, removed Sadler's left ankle from the leg iron and secured
it to the bed with a restraint, removed Sadler's right wrist from the handcuffs
and secured it to the bed with a restraint, and then removed Sadler's left wrist
from the handcuff and secured it to the bed with a restraint. The chest strap
was then secured. The five-point restraints were checked by Nurse Harber and
found to be applied correctly. All staff then exited the cell and secured the
cell door.
In his
Serious Incident Report, Taylor reported that "there was no use of force
during this incident and no injury to staff or inmate." (PL's Ex. 3.)
Taylor's description in his Serious Incident Report is consistent with the less
detailed incident reports filed by the seven other officers who participated in
restraining Sadler. (Id.)
Sadler fully complied with all of the officers' orders: He put his hands
through the food slot so that he could be cuffed; he kneeled in his cell away
from the door so that the officers could unlock the cell door, enter the cell,
and shackle his ankles; he was peacefully escorted to the restraint cell by the
officers; he permitted the officers to undress him down to his undershorts; he
lay down on a plastic mattress in the restraint cell; and he did not resist
while the officers placed him in five-point restraints by restraining his legs,
wrists, and chest to the mattress. Once Sadler was secured in the five-points
restraints, he was lying on his back on the mattress, wearing only his shorts,
with his legs restrained to the bottom portion of the mattress, his arms
restrained to the sides of the mattress, and a restraint across his chest.
Sadler admitted at trial that he had yelled at the officers
while they had restrained him, stating that he had done so "because I was frustrated with
what they were doing to me, but at no time did I threaten them." (Tr. at
10.) Taylor testified that although Sadler had not physically resisted the
officers during the restraining process, he had engaged in a
"tirade," had "insinuated that we needed a riot there," had
"made some sexual comments," and had asked "[me if I] had ever
been shot with a real gun." (Id. at 84, 90, 62, 65-66.) The officers
videotaped the application of restraints and that tape reveals that Sadler did
not yell at the officers until he was at least partially secured in the
five-point restraints. When he did yell, with a spit mask on most of the time,
he said that the officers had lived a fortunate life because they had probably never
been shot by a "real" gun, as people in his neighborhood had, and
because they had probably never had a riot in their prison. The officers stood
around Sadler while he made these comments, waiting for the nurse to arrive and
examine him. At one point Captain Taylor responded, "You watch too much
T.V."
Sadler testified that when he
had asked the officers how long he was going to be restrained, they said that
"the sergeant would come by whenever he wanted, or that [he] would be in
the restraints for two days." (Id. at 11.)
B. The Prison's Policy on the Use of Five-Point Restraints.
The
Commonwealth of Virginia's policy on the "Use of Restraining Devices"
at correctional facilities at the time that Sadler was restrained permitted the
restraint of an inmate solely for security purposes and only by the
authorization of the Warden [*694] or the ADO. n6 (Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 3.) The
policy provided that "any restraints applied within a cell should be
removed if the inmate's dangerous or disruptive behavior has subsided and it
has been determined [that] the inmate no longer poses a threat to himself or
others." (Id.) The policy prohibited the use of restraints beyond
forty-eight hours "without the express approval of the Deputy Director,
Division of Field Operations." (Id.) It mandated that restrained
inmates be partially or completely released from restraints at meal times and
for toilet use a minimum of four times during each twenty-four hour period,
including prior to each meal, and that restrained inmates be observed at
fifteen minute or more frequent intervals by institution staff as directed by
the physician or qualified mental health professional. n7 Correctional officers
were required to prepare written documentation stating the reason for the application
of restraints, the dates and times of observations, the dates and times
observed by medical staff, and the dates and times when the inmate was
partially or totally released from restraints. n8
According to the defendants' responses to the plaintiff's
interrogatories, the ADO had final authority in placing inmates in or releasing
them from restraints. Watch commanders, sergeants, and lieutenants could only
make recommendations on whether an inmate should be released from restraints.
Verbal abuse without accompanying indications of a security threat did not
constitute cause to place an inmate in restraints. (Pl.'s Ex. 6 at No. 5.)
Correctional sergeants and lieutenants were normally in charge
of temporary releases of inmates from five-point restraints. The sergeant or
lieutenant would directly supervise correctional officers during the release
and ensure that it was filmed and documented. The supervisor was responsible
for providing the inmate with a meal, if scheduled, as well as access to appropriate
medical staff, conducting the release in a manner to prevent injury to staff or
the inmate, and documenting the release in an incident report.
At trial,
Sadler presented evidence of seventeen cases between January and June 2000 in
which WRSP inmates were confined in five-point restraints for approximately
forty-eight hours. n9 (See Pl.'s Ex. 4 at Encl. A.) According to Warden [*695]
Young's responses to interrogatories and his testimony at trial, there were
eight incidents in which inmates who were restrained between January and April
2, did not engage in any dangerous or disruptive behavior while placed in
five-point restraints or during any of their temporary releases, yet they were
restrained for a total of approximately forty-eight hours. (Id.; Tr. at
144-47.) In five of the seventeen incidents the inmate engaged in dangerous or
disruptive behavior upon being placed in five-point restraints, but did not
engage in any dangerous or disruptive behavior during any temporary release
from five-point restraints, yet they were restrained for approximately
forty-eight hours. (P1.'s Ex. 4 at Encl. A; Tr. at 144-47.) Indeed, one
confinement lasted over seventy-two hours even though the inmate did not engage
in any dangerous or disruptive behavior during the temporary releases. (Id.)
According
to Warden Young's responses to interrogatories introduced at trial, no WRSP
officer had been disciplined or reprimanded for misusing five-point restraints
prior to April 2, 2000. (P1's Ex. 2 at No. 12.) At trial, over three years
after that date, Warden Young testified that he was "not aware of any
occasion where the review had demonstrated a failure of the individuals in
charge to follow procedures." (Id. at No. 14.)
C. The Duration of
Sadler's Confinement.
Sadler was placed in five-point restraints under
Captain Taylor's supervision on April 2, 2000, at 12:05 p.m. (P1.'s Ex. 6 at
1.) He was temporarily released under Sergeant Parlier's supervision on April 2
at 9:12 p.m., under Sergeant Eaton's supervision on April 3 at 7:30 a.m., 1:10
p.m., and 5:30 p.m., under Sergeant Givens' supervision on April 3 at 11:45
p.m., and again under Sergeant Eaton's [*696] supervision on April 4 at 7:50
a.m. (Id. ) Sadler was permanently released from five-point restraints on April
4 at 11:25 a.m. under Sergeant Eaton's supervision. (Id.) Therefore, he was
confined in five-point restraints for a period of forty-seven hours and twenty
minutes, including the release intervals.
At trial,
Warden Young testified that the prison policy on restraints had permitted the
warden or ADO to order the restraint of inmates in order to protect themselves
or others, to prevent escapes, or to maintain control of the inmate. He testified that he knew
that the policy had required that the inmate be removed from restraints if his
dangerous or disruptive behavior had subsided and if it had been determined
that the inmate no longer posed a threat to himself or others. Young
testified that neither the incident reports nor the videotape of the
temporary releases provided him with enough information to assess whether it
had been appropriate to confine
Sadler in five-point restraints
for forty-seven hours and twenty minutes.
In an interrogatory response introduced at trial, Young
submitted that at the time of
Sadler's restraint, possible
alternatives to the use of five-point restraints had included the use of the
disciplinary process, restrictions on inmate privileges, cell restriction, cell
reassignments, and intermediate restraint procedures. Young also contended that
his officers "do not use five-point restraints where the situation can be
satisfactorily be [sic] handled through
other means." (P1.'s Ex. 2 at No. 15.) Ambulatory restraints are an
intermediate restraining procedure in which a chain is fastened around the
inmate's waist that connects to handcuffs and leg irons. Ambulatory restraints
permit an inmate to walk and use his arms, but in a severely restricted
manner. Young testified that ambulatory restraints had not been utilized as a
less forceful alternative to five-point restraints at the time of Sadler's
confinement because inmates so restrained were still able to throw
fluids at the guards through cracks at their cell doors. That policy has
changed and ambulatory restraints are now an option at WRSP because those
cracks have since been sealed.
Young also testified that the
policy regarding the use of ambulatory restraints had been modified in response
to changes in the prison's security level and in the staff's qualifications and
experience. n10
Taylor testified at trial that he had recommended that Sadler be
placed in five-point restraints because he felt that Sadler had reached a
"state of mind" that made him "dangerous at that moment."
(Tr. at 74.) Taylor said that after he had made the recommendation and after
ADO Phillips had ordered Sadler's confinement in five-point restraints, he
provided Sadler with the opportunity to tell his side of the story. (Tr. at
80-81.) However, there is no mention in Taylor's Serious Incident Report or in
the other officers' shorter incident reports that Sadler had the opportunity to
speak with Taylor and defend himself either before his initial confinement in
restraints or at any time after he was secured in them. (See Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
Taylor testified that he had not possessed the authority to
release Sadler from the restraints, but as the shift commander it had been his
duty to view Sadler twice a day to ascertain whether the continued application
of restraints was necessary and to make a recommendation to the ADO, which the
ADO would probably follow. Taylor testified that he had called the unit
supervisor to check on Sadler before his [*697] shift ended at approximately 3
p.m. on April 2, three hours after
Sadler was first restrained, and was advised that Sadler was still yelling at
staff. He therefore decided not to recommend his permanent release at that
time. Taylor was not on duty for the remainder of Sadler's confinement.
Eaton supervised Sadler's temporary releases at 7:30 a.m., 1:10
p.m., and 5:30 p.m. on April 3, and his final release at 11:25 a.m. on April 4.
Parlier was Eaton's supervisory officer and was present during these releases,
but was unavailable to testify at trial because he was on active military duty.
Eaton testified that his records did not indicate that Sadler either verbally
abused or physically resisted the officers, yet he did not make a
recommendation to the ADO or watch commander as to whether it was necessary to
keep Sadler restrained. Eaton said that he did not have the authority to
permanently release an inmate from restraints, that the ADO did, but he did not
recall whether the ADO had been present during the temporary releases.
Givens supervised Sadler's temporary release on April 3 at 11:45
p.m., and testified that Sadler had made a threatening comment as the
restraints were being removed:
[Sadler] had made verbal
threats [when informed that he was to be temporarily released and] before we
brought [him] up off the five points such as, 'I' get even,' or, 'Pay backs are
hell.' That's what [he] made the statements to before we brought [him] up off
the restraints.
(Tr. at 107.) Givens did not
list this alleged verbal threat in his incident report form because he did not
think it was appropriate to do so:
I felt it was inappropriate [to include the verbal threat in my
Incident Report] because in the five point restraints there was nothing I felt
like he could do at the time. He was no threat unless he was being brought up
from the five points, or being placed in them. Verbal threats, he's made those
ever since he's been at Wallen's Ridge State Prison. He makes those all the
time, sir.
(Id. at 109.) Givens
testified that after having released Sadler he had helped him to regain his
balance and "even allowed [him] to go to the back of the cell and exercise
slightly away from my officers ... There were no physical restraints ... [He
was] walking and doing [his] own thing." (Id. at 110.) When at trial
Sadler asked Givens whether he had resisted the officers, Givens testified,
"No. You didn't resist anybody," and, "No, you were not fighting
in any way. You were not physically trying to hurt anyone that I know of."
(Id. at 109-10.)
Givens said that as shift supervisor, he did not have the
authority to permanently release Sadler from the restraints, but he did not
directly respond to the question of whether he could recommend that Sadler be
released from restraints, except to say that if Sadler had any physical needs
he would have notified the appropriate authorities. Like Eaton, Givens did not
provide the ADO with an assessment on whether it was necessary to keep Sadler
restrained.
The incident reports completed by Parlier, Eaton, and Givens and
reviewed and signed by their respective watch commanders, Lieutenant Lester,
Captain Hockett, Lieutenant Reynolds, and Lieutenant Combs, of Sadler's
temporary releases from five-point restraints state that no force was used on
Sadler during any of the releases and do not indicate any form of misconduct or
resistance on Sadler's part. (Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
D. Sadler's Release.
Sadler was permanently
released from confinement in five-point restraints on [*698] April 4, 2000, at
approximately 11:25 a.m. At trial, having reviewed the records pertaining
to Sadler's confinement in restraints and Investigator Hutchinson's
investigation of it, Warden Young could not explain how it was determined
that Sadler no longer needed to be restrained or who made that determination,
although he "assumed it was Mr. Phillips, the administrative duty officer
that week." (Tr. at 163-65.)
After his release,
Sadler filed a grievance with
Warden Young, who determined that
Sadler's claims were unmerited
and the policy concerning the use of restraints had been followed. (Tr. at
25.) Sadler was charged with an "Assault on any Person," received a
hearing, and was convicted of assaulting Officer Young with a food tray.
(Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
E. Sadler's Complaints of Pain and Injury.
Sadler claimed that
upon arriving at the restraint cell he had smelled human waste and had seen
urine and feces on the restraint mattress. Taylor, however, testified that the
restraint cells had been cleaned by inmates on a daily basis, and that he had
checked Sadler's restraint cell and had not seen any human waste in it.
Sadler testified that he had suffered immense physical pain
throughout the two days of confinement. He said that his body "[had] hurt
as if [he] had been beaten," that his chest had burned, and that he had
asked the officers to allow him to use the toilet but they had refused. (Tr. at
10-11.) He testified that he had urinated on himself a few times and had been
left to shiver from the wetness and cold while the officers had walked by his
cell door laughing at him. (Id. at 11, 21.)
Sadler said that he had suffered mental pain while restrained:
It was like a mental thing
... When I got put back into the restraints [after a temporary release,] I had
the urge to want to move, and my body would hurt even more because I couldn't
move. When I got up ... [the pain] wouldn't be as bad, same thing when I had to
use the bathroom. There was times I might have got up, and I didn't feel like I
had to use the bathroom, and when I was put back in the restraints, almost
immediately I had to use the bathroom.
(Id. at 9.) He said that
throughout his confinement he had suffered from hallucinations that bugs were
crawling on his body. (Id. at 14.) He also claimed that he had been unable to
sleep for even one hour of his nearly two-day confinement because the ceiling
light above him had remained on at all times.
Sadler testified that he had difficulty standing and walking
each time the straps were removed:
I could barely stand up or
walk because my body was ... hurting. I guess my muscles had relaxed or
something. My entire body was hurting, especially my wrist. Now, my feet, my
feet were hurting as if, you know, as if, as if I had been laying on them too
long and I had a numb feeling when I got up and tried to walk.
(Id. at 12-13.) He said that
he had been so weak and in pain during these releases that he could not get up
by himself and the officers had to grab him by his arms to stand him up. Sadler
claimed that during the releases the officers had refused his requests to wash
off the urine that had dried up on him or clean it from the plastic restraint
mattress. He testified that during these breaks he had been able to sit up and
eat his meals while one wrist and both ankles remained strapped to the bed, but
had been in pain while doing so.
When Sadler was permanently released from the five-point
restraints, the officers had to assist him because he was unsteady. Givens
testified that most inmates have [*699] difficulty standing when initially
released from restraints, but will regain their mobility after a few minutes.
In his opinion, Sadler's instability upon being released was not
unusual. Warden Young, however, testified that he believed
that Sadler had acted deceptively before the camera. Young
explained, "Normally [inmates] are ... stiff [when released from
forty-eight hours of confinement in five-point restraints], but as far as the
not being able to walk, can't stand up, can't sit up, that is not a normal ...
reaction for an individual his age." (Id. at Vol. 2 p. 21.)
Sadler claimed that in between his fourth and fifth temporary
releases, between 5:30 p.m. and 11:45 p.m. on April 3, he had felt his chest
continue to burn, had suffered from hallucinations, had urinated and defecated
on himself, and had vomited on himself due to the foul stench while the
officers had walked by laughing at him. He said that during the 11:45 p.m.
break, the officers had turned his mattress over because it was soiled with his
vomit and waste, but had refused his requests to clean the waste and vomit off
of himself. At the end of the temporary release, they had confined him
face-down on his stomach to prevent him from choking on his vomit.
Givens supervised Sadler's fifth temporary release at 11:45 p.m.
on April 3, and he testified that he had checked the cell and filmed the floor
and mattress and did not see any evidence of vomit. This testimony is
inconsistent with Givens' incident report which states that "Sadler was
throwing up and [therefore] placed face down" when returned to restraints.
(Pl.'s Ex. 3.) However, at trial Givens explained that what he had meant to
write in his report was that Sadler had claimed that he had vomited but that
there was no evidence to support his claim. (Pl.'s Ex. 3; Tr. at 116.) Givens
testified that his officers had turned the mattress over because it was wet
from Sadler's profuse sweating and that they had restrained him face-down due
to the medical staff's instruction to do so as a precautionary measure. (Tr. at
112, 115-16.)
Sadler testified that since being confined in restraints he
suffers from nightmares and becomes agitated and claustrophobic when placed in
small spaces, as whenever he is shackled, handcuffed, and transported.
Sadler claimed that his left wrist had been injured by tight
handcuffs a few days before his confinement in five-point restraints, and that
injury had been aggravated by his initial placement in the restraints. He
testified that when he had complied with the officers' orders to lie on his back
on top of his cuffed wrists while they restrained his legs, the combination of
his own body weight with the pressure of a large shield that an officer had
held over him caused further injury to his left wrist. When this happened, he
had yelled out in pain. After having successfully restrained his legs, the
officers had uncuffed his wrists in order to strap them to the sides of the
mattress, at which point Sadler had seen that his wrists had been bruised and
were bloody and swollen. After he was fully restrained, the officers called in
Nurse Harbor, who briefly checked Sadler's wrists for injury and found none.
The prison's medical records, including the regular examinations by nurses
while Sadler was restrained, also do not indicate that Sadler's left wrist was
ever injured. An X-ray report dated May 4, 2000, stated that Sadler's left hand
was normal, and that the smaller bones of the wrist were intact. (Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
III
Sadler claims that the officers' application of force violated
his rights protected by the Eighth Amendment.
[*700] The Eighth
Amendment prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. It "protects inmates from
inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned." Williams v. Benjamin,
77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). "Not every governmental action affecting
the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny ....'After incarceration, only the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain'" ... constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319,
89 L. Ed. 2d 251, 106 S. Ct. 1078 (1986) (citations omitted).
In order for Sadler to show that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment while incarcerated, he must prove both that the officers
"acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind")(the subjective
component) and that "the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on [him]
was sufficiently serious" (the objective component). Williams at 761.
The subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that the
force was not "applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline," but was applied "maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7, 117
L. Ed. 2d 156, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321. The factors
considered in determining whether the officers acted maliciously and
sadistically for the purpose of causing harm to the inmate are: (1) the need
for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the
amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials; and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7; Whitley at 321. "The absence of serious
injury is ... relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end
it." Hudson at 7. "From such considerations inferences may be drawn
as to whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or
instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of
harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur." Whitley at
321. See also Williams, 77 F.3d at 761-62.
The objective component addresses whether "the alleged wrongdoing
was objectively 'harmful enough' to establish a constitutional violation."
Hudson at 8. "The Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual' punishments necessarily excludes
from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided
that the use of force is not of a sort 'repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.'" Id. at 9-10 (citation omitted). The issue of whether the force
applied is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" is
"contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency." Id.
Therefore, to prove the objective component, a plaintiff must either show that
the officials' use of force was more than de minimis or, in the alternative,
that it was repugnant to the conscience of mankind.
A
The first
Eighth Amendment issue is whether the officers used unconstitutionally
excessive force in initially confining Sadler in five-point restraints.
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996), is the single
Fourth Circuit case addressing an excessive force challenge to the use of
restraints. In Williams, the prison officials were confronted with Williams and
five other inmates who were throwing liquids out of the food service windows of
their cells. Williams at 759. The prison officials responded by first
instructing [*701] the six inmates to stop and then macing them, which resulted
in the prisoners immediately ceasing their actions. Id. While Williams hollered
in pain from the mace, the officers imposed four-point restraints on him. Id at
760. Williams was left in four-point restraints for more than eight hours
without being provided the opportunity to wash the mace from his eyes or body
or to use the toilet. Id. Williams claimed to have "suffered with great
difficulty and immense pain while inhaling the chemical munitions" left in
his cell from the mace. Id. Williams appealed the district court's decision
granting summary judgment to the defendants on his excessive force and due
process claims to the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 760-61.
The first factor to be considered in assessing an official's
intent is the need for the application of force. As the Williams court
explained, "the necessity of the guards' actions is not the proper focus
of the inquiry. Instead, we focus on whether the evidence supports the inference
that the guards wantonly punished [the inmate]." Id. at 763-64 (citations
omitted). The court held in Williams that it could not "conclude that
there was no 'need' for the application of force or that the guards were
unreasonable in their apparent belief that the imposition of four-point
restraints was necessary to obtain 'order and control'" because "only
minutes had elapsed since the disturbance had begun, Williams was still
'hollering,' and it was not obvious that the disturbance had ended." Id.
at 764.
Considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendants, the decision to
place Sadler in five-point restraints was made, according to Captain Taylor's
testimony and Serious Incident Report, approximately five to ten minutes after Sadler
had "slapped" a tray at Officer Young. Additionally, when
Taylor approached Sadler's cell to restrain him, he was informed by
other officers that Sadler had "raised hell" verbally with
them before his arrival. For these reasons, it was not obvious that the
disturbance had ended. As for the third factor, the threat reasonably perceived
by the responsible officials, it was not unreasonable for the officers to have
perceived a threat from Sadler considering that he had just slapped a tray onto
one officer during a routine feeding and then proceeded to yell at the other
officers.
In Williams, the Fourth Circuit combined its analysis of the
second and fourth factors--the relationship between the need for force and the
amount of force used and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful
response--and found that the "imposition of such restraints is seemingly a
not uncommon 'next' step, if verbal commands, show of force, and mace, are
ineffective in controlling prisoners." Id. at 764. Warden Young reported
that a few alternatives to five-point restraints were available at the time,
including the disciplinary process, restrictions on inmate privileges, cell
restriction, cell reassignment, and intermediate restraint procedures. (Pl.'s Ex.
2 at No. 15.) Cell reassignment was not an option because Sadler was already in
segregation. Instead, the officers combined the disciplinary process and
restrictions on inmate privileges along with the application of five-point
restraints to control Sadler by charging him with attempted assault and
placing him on restrictive feeding. (Pl.'s Ex. 3.) As for intermediate
restraints, Warden Young testified that the use of ambulatory
restraints, which are less severe than five-point restraints, had not been
utilized by WRSP at that time because an inmate confined in ambulatory
restraints could have still thrown fluids at guards through an unsealed crack
at the cell door.
[*702] It was reasonable for the officers not to use ambulatory
restraints in this case. Although there is no indication that Sadler had thrown
liquids at any officer, he had slapped a tray and food onto an officer. It was
thus reasonable for the officers to believe that ambulatory restraints, leaving
at least one hand free to throw food, liquids, or other items at the officers,
would not effectively control the situation.
It is
settled that prison officials must be granted great deference in controlling
potentially dangerous inmates. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. Without considering
whether Sadler has met the objective component of the Eighth Amendment
violation, I find that he has not sufficiently proved the subjective element of
such a violation because a reasonable jury could find that the officers'
decision to initially confine Sadler in restraints does not support the
inference that they wantonly punished him.
B
The next
issue is whether confining Sadler in five-point restraints for forty-seven
hours and twenty minutes violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment.
After due
consideration of the record, I hold that no reasonable jury could find that
Sadler's conduct necessitated an application of force for nearly forty-eight
hours. There is simply no evidence indicating a need for continued restraint
after 3 p.m. on April 2, three hours after Sadler was initially placed in
five-point restraints. Taylor testified that Sadler had yelled at the officers
who had restrained him and had continued to yell three hours later, at 3 p.m.
However, there is no evidence that Sadler continued to yell after that time.
Indeed, the uncontradicted evidence shows that the remainder of Sadler's
confinement in restraints was uneventful. Sadler was temporarily released six
times during his nearly two-day confinement to eat and use the toilet, and each
of the six incident reports signed by defendants Eaton, Givens, and Parlier,
who supervised and assisted in these temporary releases, states that Sadler
fully complied with their orders and that there was no need to apply force
during the releases. (See Pl.'s Ex. 3.) Neither the testimony nor the reports
suggest any reason for keeping Sadler restrained for nearly two days.
Even when
Sadler made a threatening comment to Givens, Givens did not perceive him as a
threat because he felt Sadler made such comments all the time. Givens testified
that during Sadler's fifth temporary release at 11:45 p.m. on April 3, Sadler
had said either, "Pay backs are hell," or, "I'll get even,"
as he was being "brought up from the restraints," but he told the
jury that had chosen not to record the statement in his Incident Report because
"[Sadler had] made [verbal threats] ever since he's been at Wallen's Ridge
State Prison. He makes those all the time." (Tr. at 107, 109.) In spite of
Sadler's comment, Givens testified that he had "allowed [Sadler] to go to
the back of the cell and exercise slightly away from [the] officers [without
physical restraints]." (Id. at 110.) Instead of using this freedom to
execute his threat to get even, according to Givens, "[Sadler] didn't
resist anybody" and "[was] not fighting in any way [or] physically
trying to hurt anyone." (Id. at 109-10.) Construing Givens' testimony in
the light most favorable to the defendants, I find that it does not provide a
reasonably sufficient basis on which to find that Givens perceived Sadler as a
threat because Givens said that Sadler made such comments "all the
time" and he was so unintimidated by the comment that he not only continued to temporarily
remove the restraints, but he also indulged Sadler with the additional freedom
to exercise while officers were present in his cell.
[*703] In Williams, the Fourth Circuit explained that "when ... prison administrators
initially apply force in a good faith effort to maintain discipline, 'how long
restraint may be continued calls for the exercise of good judgment on the part
of prison officials.'" 77 F.3d at 765. But the court cautioned that
"deference to prison administrators does not give them constitutional
license to torture inmates." Id. It held that there are limits to how long
a prisoner can be constitutionally restrained, even if the initial restraint
was in good faith: "[When] the immediacy of the disturbance is at an end
... the unnecessary infliction of continued pain throughout a prolonged time
period clearly supports an inference that the guards were acting to punish,
rather than to quell the disturbance." Id. at 765 (citing United States v.
Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 789 (4th Cir. 1990) ("Punitive intent behind a defendant's
use of force may be inferred when the force is not reasonably related to a
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective.") (quotations omitted)).
The absence
of evidence of a need to restrain Sadler for nearly two days indicates that the
defendants were executing a forty-eight hour punishment of Sadler as opposed to
responding to an immediate disturbance. The policy on the use of restraints
permitted the application of restraints only for security purposes and required
that the restraints be removed "if the inmate's dangerous and disruptive
behavior had subsided and it had been determined [that] the inmate no longer
pose[d] a threat to himself or others." (Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 3.) Sergeants and
lieutenants could make recommendations to the ADO, who commanded the final
authority to release an inmate from restraints if his dangerous and disruptive
behavior had subsided. (Pl.'s Ex. 5 at No. 5.) Although neither Eaton nor
Givens perceived Sadler to be a threat, both sergeants failed to recommend his
release to the ADO or even their watch commanders, who also could have
presented a recommendation to the ADO. At trial, both Eaton and Givens
testified that they had lacked the authority to permanently release inmates
from five-point restraints, but neither explained why they had not at least
recommend Sadler's release, a recommendation that the policy had empowered them
to make. I find that Taylor, however, acted in good faith in keeping Sadler
restrained and not recommending his release to the ADO before leaving his shift
at 3 p.m. on April 2, because he reasonably perceived Sadler to be a threat due
to the recency of the tray incident and his continued yelling three hours
later.
Although in Williams the Fourth Circuit explained that a failure
to comply with prison policy on the use of restraints "would not mean that
[the plaintiff] would automatically prevail on his Eighth Amendment
claim," id. at 766 n.5, in this case Eaton's and Givens' failure to comply
with the policy evidences their wanton intent. It proves that even though they
repeatedly recorded in their incident reports that Sadler's temporarily
releases were uneventful, they failed to report to the ADO or watch commander
that the need to restrain him had long passed.
The prison
policy on the use of restraints prohibited the application of restraints beyond
forty-eight hours "without the express approval of the Deputy
Director." (Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 3.) There is no evidence, other than
speculation by Warden Young, confirming that anyone actually made a
determination to permanently release
Sadler. (See Tr. at 164-65.)
Instead of a determination to release
Sadler once his dangerous and
disruptive behavior had subsided,
Sadler was kept restrained until
further restraint would have demanded the inconvenience of seeking express
approval from the Deputy
Director. [*704] The only reasonable inference is that the de facto policy at
WRSP was to keep inmates restrained for forty-eight hours regardless of whether
they continued to engage in dangerous or disruptive behavior, as further
evidenced by the eight documented incidents in which WRSP officers continued to
apply five-point restraints for approximately forty-eight hours on inmates who
had not engaged in any dangerous or disruptive behavior during the restraining
process or any of the temporary releases.
For these reasons, I hold as
a matter of law that the remaining defendants did not act in good faith in
restraining Sadler for forty-seven hours and twenty minutes because there is no
reasonably sufficient evidentiary basis showing that the defendants perceived
Sadler to be a threat after 3 p.m. on April 2, three hours after he was first
restrained. At some point, an inmate's continued restraint without evidence of
its necessity is unconstitutional. It is not necessary to determine at what
point Sadler should have been released--whether it was immediately after he
stopped yelling or after the first, second, or third temporary release was
completed without incident--only that forty-seven hours and twenty minutes was
too long and that his confinement for that period of time had no legitimate
purpose.
I also find
that there are two grounds on which Sadler has established the objective
component of his excessive force claim. First, any reasonable jury would find
that completely immobilizing an inmate in five-point restraints for nearly
forty-eight hours constitutes more than de minimis pain, even when the inmate
is temporarily released for six approximately fifteen minute periods, and
regardless of whether there is proof that the inmate suffered any lasting
injury. In Williams, the Fourth Circuit noted that "mankind has devised
some tortures that leave no lasting physical evidence of injury" and
"for this reason, courts should be wary of finding uses of force that inflict
'merely' pain but not injury to be de minimis, and therefore beyond requiring
justification under the Eighth Amendment." 77 F.3d at 762, 762 n.2. The
physical and mental pain Sadler suffered while his arms, legs, and chest were
restrained for forty-seven hours and twenty minutes, including the breaks, is
more than sufficient to meet the objective component of a prisoner's excessive
force claim. Second, any reasonable jury today would find that confining an
inmate in five-point restraints for nearly two days with short breaks is the
sort of force that is "repugnant to the conscience of mankind."
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10.
IV
Sadler claims that the defendants violated his rights protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. n11
Liberty interests can arise from two
sources, the Due Process Clause itself and state law. Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 484, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). The Due Process
Clause may create a liberty interest when the restraint imposed upon an inmate
exceeds her sentence in an "unexpected manner." Id. [*705] State
prison rules may also create liberty interests that are protected by the Due
Process Clause when they "impose[e] [an] atypical and significant hardship
on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id.
at 484-86 (holding that prisoner has no state-created liberty interest in being
free from segregated confinement because it does not constitute an atypical,
significant deprivation).
In Williams, the court acknowledged that the inmate's transfer
from administrative segregation to "total immobilization in [four-point]
restraints surely 'work[ed] a major disruption in his environment.'" n12
77 F.3d at 759,769-70 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486). Although the court
rejected the plaintiff's due process argument for other reasons, it held
that an inmate has a "liberty
interest" in not being confined in four-point restraints:
Simply because the initial
application of the restraints occurred soon after a disturbance does not mean
that four-point restraints may be imposed indefinitely. At some point in time,
an inmate so restrained would be entitled to some procedural protection to
ensure that his liberty interest was not being arbitrarily and capriciously denied.
In this appeal, we decline to resolve where that point exists.
77 F.3d at 770 n.10.
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit has held that inmates have a "liberty
interest" in not being "arbitrarily and capriciously" confined
in four-point restraints, though it has yet to determine at what time
protection of that liberty interest is due.
In order to determine whether Sadler possessed a liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause, I must "compare the
conditions to which [he was] exposed in [the five-point restraints] with those
[he] could expect to experience as an ordinary incident of prison life."
Bevaranti v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997). Being completely
immobilized in five-point restraints for almost forty-eight hours is unlike the
administrative segregation or the denial of work release situations that the
Fourth Circuit has held do not invoke due process protections. Kitchen v.
Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 185-87 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that Virginia law does
not provide prisoners with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
work release because there is nothing atypical about being denied permission to
leave jail in order to work); Bevarati, 120 F.3d at 502-04 (holding that
administrative segregation does not impose an atypical and significant hardship
on prisoners). The "ordinary incidents of prison life" do not include
strapping an inmate's wrists, ankles, and chest to a bed for nearly two days
with six short breaks to eat and use the toilet. Even though Sadler was already
in the segregation unit and therefore had fewer privileges, fewer recreational
opportunities, and less room to move than inmates in general population, his
immobilization here constitutes a serious departure from even the ordinary
incidents of life in segregation.
I find that there are three grounds on which Sadler may maintain
his due process claim. First, the application of five-point restraints on
Sadler for almost forty-eight [*706] hours, including the six temporary releases,
posed an atypical and significant hardship on him; I therefore hold that he has
a state-created liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Second,
Sadler also possesses a state-created liberty interest as a matter of law
because (as the Fourth Circuit held in Williams) "at some point in
time" the imposition of four-point restraints, which are less restrictive
than five-point restraints, entitles the inmate to "some procedural
protection to ensure that his liberty interest was not being arbitrarily and
capriciously denied." Third, I hold that the Due Process Clause by its own
force also provides Sadler with procedural protection because confinement in
five-point restraints for nearly forty-eight hours exceeds a prisoner's
sentence in an "unexpected manner."
As a matter
of law, no reasonable jury could disagree that the defendants violated Sadler's
right to due process by failing to provide him with any process during his
confinement. It is not necessary to determine the exact moment during the two
days when the defendants should have provided Sadler with procedural protection or
what kind of procedure was necessary. In Williams, the Fourth Circuit stated
that "at some point in time" a restrained inmate is "entitled to
some procedural protection to ensure that his liberty interest was not being
arbitrarily and capriciously denied." That the defendants Eaton and Givens
were present throughout Sadler's lengthy confinement and did not provide him
any process during the nearly forty-eight hours that Sadler was safely secured
in the restraints is enough for any reasonable jury to find a violation.
Because Taylor was only on duty during the first three hours of Sadler's
confinement, and because Sadler was not entitled to process during that time, I
will deny Sadler's Fourteenth Amendment claim against Taylor.
The defendants argue that if
Sadler had a right to due
process, he received it because Taylor gave him the opportunity to tell his side
of the story before he was restrained and because he received a disciplinary
hearing after his release in which he was convicted of assaulting Officer Young.
(Defs.' Brief Opp'n at 12-13.) I find that these procedures are
irrelevant to Sadler's right to have received procedural protection
at some time during his confinement to ensure that the remainder of his
confinement was not arbitrary and capricious. It should also be noted that ADO
Phillips had ordered Sadler's confinement before Taylor gave Sadler the
opportunity to tell his side of the story, thus rendering that opportunity to
defend himself futile.
The reasons the Williams court provided for denying the
plaintiff's due process claim are not present here. In Williams, the court
rejected the inmate's due process argument for three reasons: First, the inmate
had not made an argument as to what sort of procedural protections were
required; second, process was not possible because the restraints were imposed
in response to a disturbance; and third, the inmate had not alleged that his
post-deprivation state remedies were inadequate. Williams at 769-70. None of
these points is relevant here because they speak to the situation in which the
inmate seeks process before initial placement in restraints, whereas I merely
hold that Sadler was entitled to process at some point during his nearly two
days of confinement in five-point restraints. The holding in this case departs
from the Williams court's holding that a restrained inmate is "entitled to
some procedural protection" "at some point" only by holding that
the point had passed by the time the restraint had ended.
[*707] The
defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity from liability
for Sadler's due process claim.
The qualified immunity defense "[shields] government officials
performing discretionary functions ... from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
It was clearly established in 2000, by the Supreme Court's opinion in Sandin v.
Connor, that inmates have a liberty interest in freedom from restraint that
imposes an atypical and significant hardship on them. See 515 U.S. at 484.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Williams v. Benjamin clearly
provides an inmate confined in four-point restraints "to some procedural
protection to ensure that his liberty interest was not being arbitrarily and
capriciously denied." Because
Sandin and Williams were clearly established constitutional standards at the
time of the offense, the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on
the plaintiff's procedural due process claim.
V
Warden Young
claims that he is not liable for any constitutional violations arising
from Sadler's confinement in five-point restraints because he was not involved
in the decision to restrain him or to keep him restrained. (Defs.' Br. Opp'n at
16.)
Supervisory officials may be held liable for the actions of their subordinates under § 1983 if the plaintiff can show: (1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinates were engaged in conduct that posed "a pervasive and high risk" of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show "deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices"; and (3) that there was an "affirmative causal link" between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Randall v. Prince George's County, Md., 302 F.3d 188, 206 (4th Cir. 2002); Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
A "pervasive" and "unreasonable" risk of
harm requires evidence that the subordinates' "conduct is widespread, or
at least has been used on several different occasions and that the conduct
engaged in by the subordinate[s] poses an unreasonable risk of harm of
constitutional injury." Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Deliberate indifference may
be established by showing the supervisor's "continued inaction in the face
of documented widespread abuses." Id. Such inaction provides "an
independent basis for finding [the supervisor] either was deliberately indifferent
or acquiesced in the constitutionally offensive conduct of his
subordinates." Id. Causation may be direct, "where the policy
commands the injury of which the plaintiff complains," or proximate, pursuant to the tort principle that
"holds a person liable for the natural consequences of his actions."
Id.
In Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff
filed suit against prison officers and their supervisors because the officers
had used high-pressure water hoses against him while in a one-man cell. 737
F.2d at 371. First, the court found that the plaintiff had established that the
warden had knowledge of the officers' pervasive conduct because the warden
testified that he knew that high-pressure water hoses had been used against
inmates housed in one-man cells on seven occasions in the year preceding the
attack on the plaintiff, he had personally approved such a use on one other
occasion, a guard testified that the warden permitted [*708] the practice, and
there was evidence that the warden had opposed state-proposed regulation of the
use of high-pressure water hoses in the past. Id. at 373-74. Second, the court
determined that the warden was deliberately indifferent to the officers' use of
high-pressure water hoses because despite his knowledge, "he failed to
offer adequate guidance to his subordinates concerning the appropriate use of
such techniques." Id. at 374. Third, the plaintiff showed an affirmative
causal link between the warden's indifference and the application of force on
him because the incident he experienced was a "natural and foreseeable
consequence of the supervisors' indifference." Id. at 376.
In the
present case, no reasonable jury would doubt that Warden Young
knew that his subordinates were engaged in conduct that posed "a
pervasive and high risk" of constitutional injury to inmates. At
trial, Sadler presented evidence of eight cases between January and April 2,
2000, in which WRSP inmates were placed in five-point restraints for
approximately forty-eight hours although they had not engaged in any dangerous
or disruptive behavior while being placed in the restraints or during any
temporary release from them. Each time a prisoner is placed in five-point
restraints, the warden reviews the corresponding Serious Incident Report to determine
whether procedures were properly followed. (Pl.'s Ex. 2 at No. 14.) Warden Young
testified that he had reviewed the reports in these eight cases. (Tr. at 147.) Therefore,
according to Warden Young's own testimony, he had knowledge of at least
these eight incidents in the three months preceding Sadler's confinement in
which his officers continued to apply five-point restraints for approximately
forty-eight hours on inmates who had not engaged in any dangerous or disruptive
behavior during the restraining process or the temporary releases.
Second, any
reasonable jury would find that Warden Young's response to the knowledge that
his officers were abusing the restraining process was so inadequate as to show
deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of their practice.
Although he testified to reviewing incident reports cataloguing cases where
officers continued to confine inmates in restraints without reporting any
evidence that the inmate continued to pose a threat during or after the application
of restraints, he did nothing. In fact, in response to the plaintiff's
interrogatories, Warden Young said that no WRSP officer had been disciplined or
reprimanded for misusing five-point restraints prior to April 2, 2000. (Pl.'s
Ex. 2 at No. 12.) The warden did not provide evidence that he took any action
in response to evidence of the officers' widespread abuses. As did the warden
in Slakan, Warden Young has implicitly admitted that he knew of, but
did not act upon, evidence that his officers were using excessive force in
restraining inmates.
Third, any
reasonable jury would find a causal link between Warden Young's
inaction and Sadler's constitutional injuries. Had
Warden Young taken action, for example, by reprimanding those officers who had
unnecessarily restrained inmates for lengthy periods of time, or providing
restrained inmates with the opportunity to explain why they should be released,
then he may have prevented the further misuse of five-point restraints and Sadler
would not have suffered an excessive use of force without justification
and punishment without the benefit of process.
VI
Prison
officials face difficult challenges. Prisons may be dangerous places, both for
inmates and staff. It is right that we give prison administrators considerable
leeway in handling disruptive inmates. Nevertheless, [*709] any society based
on the rule of law must impose limits on the treatment of those convicted of
crime. The uncontradicted evidence presented at trial shows that the officials
here crossed that line. Inmate Sadler may deserve to be in prison, but he did
not deserve under the facts of this case to be tied to a bed for nearly two
days. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in this opinion, it is ORDERED
that the plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law is granted as to
the liability of defendants Young, Eaton, and Givens, and denied as to
defendant Taylor. The court will schedule a jury trial limited to the question
of damages as to defendants Young, Eaton, and Givens.
ENTER: July 21, 2004
/s/ JAMES P. JONES
Chief United States District Judge
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Two WRSP nurses, Vicki Harber and Phyllis Hobbs, and a WRSP investigator, Michael E. Hutchinson, were also defendants, but Harber's and Hutchinson's motions for summary judgment were granted before trial and Hobbs' motion for judgment as a matter of law was granted at trial. Another defendant, D. Parlier, a correctional officer, was severed and granted a continuance because he had been called up on active military duty.
n2 Sadler
was one of about five hundred Connecticut prisoners transferred to WRSP
under a contract between the Virginia and Connecticut state governments in
order to relieve prison crowding in Connecticut. The transfer was controversial
in Connecticut, particularly after the deaths of two Connecticut inmates at
WRSP. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 259 (4th Cir. 2002)
(regarding Warden Young's libel suit against Connecticut newspapers). The
Connecticut inmates have since been removed, following an inquiry by the
Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities and
a federal lawsuit in Connecticut. See Craig Timberg, Connecticut Pulls
Prisoners From Wallens Ridge, Wash. Post, July 25, 2001, at B01. One of the
allegations in the lawsuit involved the indiscriminate use of five-point
restraints. Id.
n3 Inmates can be placed in the segregation unit by a watch commander, if, for example, they receive an institutional infraction such as disobeying a direct order or if an inmate fears for his safety. Inmates confined in segregation receive fewer privileges, fewer recreational opportunities, and less room to move than inmates in general population. Within seventy-two hours of being placed in segregation, the inmate receives an Inmate Classification Authority ("ICA") hearing at which the warden reviews the decision to place the inmate in segregation and determines the appropriate length of confinement depending upon the infraction. The inmate then has the opportunity to make statements in his defense. The record does not reveal why Sadler was confined in segregation.
n4
Sadler received disciplinary convictions at WRSP between January (when he first
arrived at WRSP) and April 2000 twice for disobeying direct orders (refusing to
open food slot and refusing to leave shower) and once for attempting to assault
an officer (jerking officer's arm through food tray slot while being cuffed).
n5 The
institutional physician, Dr. Nwuache, approved the use of restrictive feeding
on Sadler. (Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
Sadler's placement on
restrictive feeding was authorized by Warden
Young on April 2, 2000, starting
with his Sunday supper meal that day and ending with his Sunday supper meal on
April 9. ( Id.)
n6
Although the policy specifically refers to "four-point restraints"
and does not refer to "five-point restraints" or "humane
restraints" (a term the defendants' witnesses often used at trial to refer
to five-point restraints) it was apparently understood by the officers at WRSP
that this policy also governed the use of five-point restraints. Four-point
restraints are less restrictive than five-point restraints because they secure
wrists and ankles, but not the chest.
n7 The
policy was changed in October 2000 to specify a total of seven temporary breaks
from restraints, although it did not specify how many hours may pass between
breaks. (Pl.'s Ex. 5 at No. 7.
n8 A
log indicates that Sadler was checked by a correctional officer every fifteen
minutes between 12:05 p.m. on April 2 and his release at 11:25 a.m. on April 4.
(Pl.'s Ex. 3.)
n9
During the three months prior to Sadler's confinement in restraints, between
January and April 2, 2000, there were eight occasions in which WRSP inmates
were confined in five-point restraints for approximately forty-eight hours
though they did not engage in any dangerous or disruptive behavior while being
placed in restraints or during their temporary releases. These are the cases in
which inmates were so confined: Victor Velasco was placed in five-point
restraints for forty-eight hours and ten minutes, from January 18, 2000 at 6:10
p.m. to January 20, 2000 at 6:20 p.m.; B. Jocelyn was placed in five-point
restraints for forty-eight hours and thirty-five minutes, from January 24, 2000
at 5:20 p.m. to January 26, 2000 at 5:55 p.m., and for forty-seven hours and
thirty minutes, from March 7, 2000 at 8:45 a.m. to March 9, 2000 at 8:15 a.m.;
R. Luciano was placed in five-point restraints for forty-eight hours and forty
minutes, from January 26, 2000 at 7:25 a.m. to January 28, 2000 at 8:05 a.m.;
A. Griffin was placed in five-point restraints for forty-five hours and ten
minutes, from February 17, 2000 at 10:00 p.m. to February 19, 2000 at 7:10
p.m., for forty-five hours and fifty minutes, from March 28, 2000 at 10:10 a.m.
to March 30, 2000 at 8:00 a.m.; F. Adorno was placed in five-point restraints
for fifty-two hours and thirty-one minutes, from February 8, 2000 at 12:50 a.m.
to February 10, 2000 at 5:21 a.m.; and D. Bonner was placed in five-point
restraints for forty-six hours and fifty minutes, from February 9, 2000 at 9:25
a.m. to February 11, 2000 at 8:15 a.m. (Pl.'s Ex. 4 at Encl. A.)
From April 2, to June 2000, there were
three additional occasions in which inmates were confined in such a way: Trini
Davis was placed in five-point restraints for forty-eight hours and thirty-two
minutes, from April 16, 2000 at 10:11 p.m. to April 18, 2000 at 10:43 p.m.; T.
Donovan was placed in five-point restraints for forty-eight hours and
thirty-five minutes, from June 17, 2000 at 7:05 a.m. to June 19, 2000 at 7:40
a.m., and for seventy-three hours and twenty-eight minutes, from June 21, 2000
at 7:02 p.m. to June 24, 2000 at 8:30 p.m. (Id.)
In five of the seventeen cases of confinement
presented by Sadler, the inmate engaged in dangerous or disruptive behavior
upon being placed in five-point restraints, but did not engage in such behavior
during any of his temporary releases, even though he remained confined for
approximately forty-eight hours. These are the cases in which inmates were
restrained in such a way: Benjamin Cruz was placed in five-point restraints for
forty-nine hours and twenty minutes, from January 12, 2000 at 4:50 p.m. to
January 14, 2000 at 6:10 p.m.; T. Donovan was placed in five-point restraints
for forty-six hours and fifty minutes, from February 26, 2000 at 7:13 p.m. to
February 28, 2000 at 6:03 p.m., for forty-eight hours and twenty-three minutes,
from May 31, 2000 at 7:05 p.m. to June 2, 2000 at 7:28 p.m., for seventy-three
hours and twenty minutes, from June 21, 2000 at 7:02 p.m. to June 24, 2000 at
8:30 p.m.; and K. Ibrahim was placed in five-point restraints for forty-five
hours and forty minutes, from January 10, 2000 at 5:20 p.m. to January 12, 2000
at 3:00 p.m. (Id.)
The average length of confinement in
five-point restraints in these seventeen cases was forty-nine hours and
nineteen minutes. (Id.)
n10 At the time of Sadler's restraint, WRSP had been open only one year and over sixty-two percent of the staff were new and inexperienced hires.
n11 The defendants assert that the pro se plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action or facts supporting a cause of action under the Due Process Clause. Although the plaintiff did not cite the legal bases for his claims in his complaint, he did allege facts sufficient to state a due process claim, specifically that he had been punished without justification. (Compl. at D.) Regardless, the defendants do not claim that any inadequacy in the plaintiff's pleadings harmed them. In fact, the defendants' brief on the present motion fails to assert any defenses to the due process claim that the defendants did not present at trial. (See Defs.' Br. Opp'n at 11-13.)
n12 In considering the plaintiff's due process claim, the Williams court also looked for mandatory language in the applicable prison policy and consent decree. See 77 F.3d at 769. It is not necessary to do so here because since Williams, the Fourth Circuit has abandoned the mandatory language requirement. See Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 185-86 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Sandin court had "reconsidered its reasoning" as to the mandatory language requirement); Bevarati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Sandin court had "retreat[ed] from the mandatory language approach").