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FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
NEW YORK
JAMES MCGUIRE III, et. al.,
Plaintiffs,
-v-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et. al.,
Defendants.
03 Civ. 1182 (JSR)
301 F. Supp. 2d 333
February 11, 2004,
Decided
February 13, 2004, Filed
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
The
plaintiffs here are ten motorists from, variously, New York, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania who were arrested in New York between 2001 and 2003 for driving
with suspended licenses in violation of section 511(1) of the New York State
Vehicle and Traffic Law. See First Amended Class Action Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages ("Complaint") PP 2,
9-16. That section reads in pertinent part:
A person is guilty of the offense of aggravated
unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree when such person
operates a motor vehicle upon a public highway while knowing or having reason
to know that such person's license or privilege of operating such motor vehicle
in this state or privilege of obtaining a license to operate such motor vehicle
issued by the commissioner is suspended, revoked or otherwise withdrawn by the
commissioner.
N.Y. Veh & Tr. L § 511(1)(a). Plaintiffs allege that they were
unaware that their licenses were suspended and that they were arrested because
the arresting officers, in accordance with the practice of the New York City
police department, relied entirely on records of the New York State Department
of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") showing that plaintiffs' licenses had been
suspended. Complaint PP 2, 17. Plaintiffs claim that this was an insufficient
basis to give the arresting officers probable cause to believe that the
plaintiffs had the scienter required for violation of § 511(1), because the DMV
records did not show that plaintiffs had received actual notice of their
suspensions. Plaintiffs further allege that even assuming the police officers
had reason to believe such notice had been given, in actuality the DMV failed
to take the steps that were necessary to provide such notice in a manner
reasonably calculated to reach the plaintiffs. Complaint PP 145-152. On these grounds, plaintiffs allege that the
constitutional rights of plaintiffs and others similarly situated were violated
by the arresting officers, [*335] their superiors (i.e., the New York City
Police Commissioner and the Mayor of New York), the City of New York, and the
Commissioner of the DMV (Raymond Martinez), Complaint PP 18-26. Plaintiffs seek
both damages and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Complaint
at 28 ("Relief Requested").
Following extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the
Court granted summary judgment in favor of the arresting officers, the Mayor,
the Police Commissioner, and the DMV Commissioner on grounds of qualified
immunity, as well as on various other grounds particular to certain of these
defendants. See transcript, October 9, 2003, at 10-11, 20. n1 The Court
reserved, however, on the plaintiffs' remaining claim against the City, which
asserted that the City's practice of arresting persons for violation of §
511(1) based solely on a computer check of DMV suspension records violated 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Court now grants summary judgment in favor of the City of
New York on that claim as well. Relatedly, the Court here sets forth an
additional ground for its previous determination granting summary judgment in
favor of the DMV Commissioner.
The
pertinent facts, either undisputed or, where disputed, taken most favorably to
the plaintiffs, are as follows. When a motorist is stopped by New York City
police for traffic violations or the like, the police routinely run a
computerized check of the DMV's records relating to the motorist's license. If
the records show that the motorist's license is suspended -- which may occur
for any of various reasons, including failure to pay traffic fines or respond
to traffic summonses, cancellation of vehicle liability insurance, or
commission of a fraudulent act -- the police will routinely arrest the motorist
for driving with a suspended license in violation of § 511(1).
In determining probable cause
for such an arrest, the police presume, based on routine DMV practices, that
the motorist has received notice of the suspension. Specifically, it is the
DMV's practice to mail notification of the suspension to the most recent
address of the motorist known to the DMV. For example, in the case of a
suspension resulting from failure to respond to a traffic summons, the notice
of suspension is sent to the address that appears on the summons itself as
obtained from the motorist at the time the summons was issued, unless the
motorist has thereafter supplied a more recent address to the DMV. Declaration
of Holly Thompson ("Thompson Decl."), dated August 29, 2003 at PP 5,9. In the case of a suspension based on
cancellation of liability insurance, the notice of suspension is sent to the
most recent address in the DMV's records for the motorist's automobile
registration. Declaration of Adria Denisulk ("Denisulk Decl."), dated
August 29, 2003 at P 13. In the case of a suspension based on commission of a
fraudulent act, the notice of suspension is sent to the most recent address the
DMV has on file anywhere in its records. Declaration of Elizabeth Carpenter
("Carpenter Decl."), dated August 29, 2003 at P 4.
Addressing,
first, the constitutional adequacy of these notice procedures, it is
well-established that notice by mail is ordinarily sufficient to comply with
due process. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306,
318, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950). While plaintiffs purport to question
whether the suspension notices were even mailed to them, their sole basis
[*336]for this assertion is the fact that they purportedly did not receive the
notices. See Plaintiffs' Counter Statement to Defendant Martinez's Local Civil
56.1 Statement ("Pl. CS 56.1") at P 22. However, quite aside from
fact that this is contradicted as to at least two plaintiffs by the deposition
testimony of the plaintiffs themselves, see Compendium of Exhibits
Submitted in Support of Defendant
Raymond P. Martinez's Motion for Summary Judgment, Deposition of James McGuire,
Aug. 14, 2003 (Exhibit 51 at 74-76), Deposition of Jorge Nunez, Aug. 7, 2003
(Exhibit 52 at 58-59), the Second Circuit has held that mere denial of receipt does not create an
issue of fact as to mailing if regular office procedures were followed. Leon v.
Murphy, 988 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir. 1993). Here, the DMV has introduced
undisputed evidence that its regular office procedure is to mail out notices of
every suspension, see, e.g., Thompson Decl. P 9; Denisulk Decl. PP 11-13;
Carpenter Decl. P 4.
Plaintiffs
fall-back position is that, even if the DMV's practice of mailing notices otherwise
complies with due process, it is constitutionally defective because it fails to
adequately keep track of changes of addresses (which plaintiffs hypothesize is
the most likely reason some of them failed to get their suspension notices),
see Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Martinez's Motion for Summary
Judgment, 3-5. However, this argument ignores the fact that New York law
reasonably places the burden of keeping the State aware of address changes on
the motorists themselves. Specifically, section 505 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law provides that:
It shall be the duty of every licensee to notify the commissioner in
writing of any change of residence of such licensee within ten days after such
change occurs and to make a notation of such change of residence on such
license in the place provided by the commissioner.
N.Y. Veh. & Tr. §
505(5). n2
Thus,
plaintiffs' claim as to the allegedly defective notification procedures of the
DMV reduces, in the end, to a contention that the State may not simply rely on
this statutory mandate to motorists to notify the DMV of any changes of
address, but that, instead, the State is constitutionally obligated to initiate
some independent or supplemental inquiry of its own. Neither precedent nor common
sense supports this novel assertion. n3
Accordingly,
since the plaintiffs have not raised a genuine issue of constitutional defect
with respect to the notification procedures of the DMV, their claim against DMV
Commissioner Martinez, which has already been dismissed from the bench on other
grounds, see supra, must be dismissed on this ground as well. n4
[*337] Moreover,
even if the DMV procedures were somehow defective, this would not prevent
dismissal of the only remaining count, viz., plaintiffs' claim that the City of
New York's practice of arresting persons for violation of section 511(1) of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law solely on the basis of computer checks of DMV records
showing the drivers' suspensions is constitutionally defective because the
police lack probable cause to infer scienter. Plaintiffs have not adduced any
admissible evidence that the arresting police, or the City police force in
general, is aware of the defects plaintiffs allege against the DMV notification
system. Thus, an arresting officer has
every reason to believe that the motorist has received adequate notice through
the mail that the motorist's license has been suspended. This is more than
sufficient to provide probable cause for the police to infer that the motorist
either knows or at least has "reason to know" that the motorist's
license has been suspended -- which is all that § 511(1) requires. See
Mahase v. City of New York, 96 Cv.
6105, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2046, *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2000) (rejecting
argument that arresting officer lacked probable cause as to the intent
requirement of § 511 and holding that "[a] computer printout showing that
[plaintiff] was driving with a suspended license is 'reasonably trustworthy
information' that she knew her license was suspended"); Verdin v. City of
New York, 97 Cv. 1044, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 19387, * 9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26,
1998)(same). See also Mayer v. City of
New Rochelle, 01 Civ. 4443, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8761, *18 (S.D.N.Y. May 27,
2003). n5
Accordingly,
for the foregoing reasons, as well as those previously stated from the bench,
the Court grants summary judgment to defendants and dismisses the Complaint in
its entirety, with prejudice. Clerk to enter judgment.
SO ORDERED.
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J.
Dated: New York, New York
February 11, 2004
FOOTNOTES:
n1
Previously, the Court had denied plaintiffs' motion to certify the class but
without prejudice to their renewing the motion, see transcript, July 15, 2003,
at 7. Although plaintiffs subsequently renewed their class certification
motion, this Court's instant dismissal of the entire Complaint renders that
motion moot.
n2 The
same is true as to vehicle registrants. N.Y. Veh. & Tr. L. § 401(3)(a) .
n3
Subordinately, plaintiffs claim that at least some such burden should be
shouldered by the State with respect to out-of-state residents (including three of the ten plaintiffs here), who
arguably are not statutorily required to update their address changes once they
obtain out-of-state licenses. But these licensees, having committed the
violations that led to their New York licenses being suspended, can hardly
complain if, because of their own failure to voluntarily notify the DMV of
their new out-of-state residence and license, they thereby create the very
situation where the DMV's records will continue to list them as New York
addressees whose licenses have been suspended. More generally, as defendants
point out, due process surely does not require the State to undertake a
continuing 50-state search for the new addresses of New York suspended
motorists who have now moved out-of-state.
n4 In so
ruling, the Court has also considered plaintiffs' other allegations of still
further supposed defects in the DMV procedures, such as the failure to provide
30 days between the mailing of the notice of suspension and the suspension
itself and the failure of the notice to specify appeal procedures, but finds
them so entirely lacking in merit as not to warrant further discussion.
n5
Again, the Court has also considered plaintiffs' other arguments and
allegations regarding the City but finds them too meritless to warrant further
discussion.