Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

EEOC Decision No. 85-3

1985 EEOC Lexis 2

February 12, 1985

Summary of Charge

Charging Party alleges that Respondent engaged in unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (the Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by discharging him for practicing polygamy in accordance with his religious beliefs.

Jurisdiction

Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 701(b) of the Act. Timeliness and all other jurisdictional requirements have been met.

Summary of Investigation

Respondent, a municipal law enforcement agency, is an employer within the meaning of Section 701(b) of the Act. Charging Party, a police officer, was discharged on December 1, 1982. On February 11, 1983, the discharge was upheld by the municipal civil service commission. The Respondent states that Charging Party was discharged for failing to comply with the state constitution and the provisions of the state criminal law which prohibit polygamy, and for failing to uphold his oath of office. Charging Party admitted that he would neither defend nor enforce the laws against polygamy in spite of the fact that his oath of office required him to do so. It is undisputed that Charging Party was practicing polygamy at the time of his discharge.

Respondent does not contend that Charging Party’s belief in polygamy is not sincere and meaningful. Neither does Respondent argue that his belief is not religious. n1 However, Respondent argues that Charging Party’s belief is unlawful and, therefore, not protected by the Act. This charge raises the issue of whether Charging Party’s sincere and religious belief is protected under the Act in spite of the fact that it is unlawful, n2 and, therefore, whether the Respondent had a duty to accommodate his religious needs.

In Seeger, the Court defined religion within the meaning of Section 6(j) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA) as, “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption. . . .” 380 U.S. at 176.

The Commission has recognized that the protections against religious discrimination under the Act must not conflict with the first amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In defining whether a sincerely held belief is religious under the Act, the Commission has stated that “[i]f ‘religion’ were construed more narrowly for Title VII purposes than it is in the context of Section 6(j), [of the UMTSA], then Title VII’s proscription of religious discrimination would conflict with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.” n3

Section 703(a)(1) of the Act makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, inter alia, “to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . religion. . . .” The term “religion” is defined in § 701(j) of the Act. It includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). It is clear from the Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 that “[t]he term ‘religion’ as used in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 encompasses . . . the same concepts as are included in the first amendment. . . . [Congress] thus intended to protect the same rights in private employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State, or local governments.” n4 Therefore, the legislative history of the Act indicates that “religion,” as used therein, is meant to be coextensive with the first amendment. Therefore, it is the Commission’s view that the protections of the Act against religious discrimination can be no broader or narrower than the protections afforded by the first amendment.

The issue of whether polygamy is protected under the first amendment was decided by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), where the Court considered whether federal legislation outlawing polygamy violated the first amendment. The Court held that polygamy is not protected by the first amendment’s guarantee of religious freedom. n5

Accordingly, since polygamy is not protected by the first amendment, the Commission finds that it is not protected under § 703(a) (1) of the Act. Respondent was, therefore, under no duty to accommodate the Charging Party’s religious needs.

Conclusion

There is no reasonable cause to believe that the Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, by discharging the Charging Party for practicing polygamy in accordance with his religious beliefs.

Executive Secretary to the Commission

Notes:

1. The Commission follows the Supreme Court’s standards for determining whether a belief is religious which are set forth in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 79-06 (Ku Klux Klan membership); Commission Decision No. 76-104 (Sabbatarian worship); Commission Decision No. 71-2620 (Black Muslim dress); and Commission Decision No. 71-779 (Old Catholic dress); see also EEOC Compliance Manual § 628.4(b)(1).

2. In Commission Decision No. 76-104, the Commission stated that beliefs are entitled to protection under the Act once it is established that they are “deeply and sincerely held religious convictions.” See, Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605, 45 Fed. Reg. 72610 (1980). Neither Commission Decision No. 76-104 nor the Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, id, address whether a Charging Party’s beliefs are protected under the Act even where those beliefs are not protected under the first amendment, as in this charge.

3. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 76-104; Commission Decision No. 71-2620; and Commission Decision No. 71-779.

4. 118 Cong. Rec. 1,705 (1972), reprinted in Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, at 713 (1972) (statements of Senator Randolph, made during the introduction of Section 701(j) of the Act).

5. This holding has been consistently followed in subsequent cases involving polygamy. Cf. Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946), reh’g denied (Court refused to hold that polygamy practiced in accordance with religious views was excluded from the Mann Act). See, e.g., State v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S. 829 (1945), reh’g denied, 324 U.S. 891 (1945) (state can enact legislation prohibiting polygamy); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (Court upheld territorial legislation requiring persons to take antipolygamy oath as a condition to vote); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885) (Court sustained federal statute barring polygamists from voting or serving on a jury); and Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1881) (conviction under same antipolygamy statute as in Reynolds upheld, and religious basis for polygamy practice rejected as a defense).

3. See, e.g., Commission Decision No. 76-104; Commission Decision No. 71-2620; and Commission Decision No. 71-779.