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UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
EUGENE L. CHERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW FRANK, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 04-1214
125 Fed. Appx. 63
March 8, 2005, Submitted
After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have
concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on
the briefs and the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
March 8, 2005, Decided
ORDER
Wisconsin
inmate Eugene Cherry appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment on
his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that prison officers subjected him to a cruel
and excessive strip search. He also challenges the district court's denial of
his request for appointment of trial counsel. We affirm.
We first note that Cherry fails to adequately develop on appeal
all but two arguments--that a strip search violated his Eighth Amendment
rights, and that the district court wrongly denied his request to appoint
counsel to help him present a claim of food-tampering on which he was allowed
to proceed to trial--and has thereby waived the rest of his claims. See Anderson
v. Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545 (7th Cir. 2001); United States ex. rel. Verdone
v. Cir. Ct. for Taylor County, 73 F.3d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1995). We recount
only those facts relevant to those two claims.
Cherry's
first claim arises from a strip search that occurred on February 8, 2003. The
facts on summary judgment establish that between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m., Officer T. Brown ordered Cherry to come out
of his cell so that it could be searched for contraband. Cherry refused to do
so until the supervising officer, Joan Gerl, arrived. Noting in an affidavit
that Cherry previously "had been in possession of staples" in his
cell and suspicious of Cherry's "resistance to having his cell
searched," Officer Gerl recounted that she believed Cherry to be possibly
"hiding contraband" and [*65] ordered him to be "strip-searched
for security reasons."
Officer
Brown brought Cherry to a strip cell away from other inmates for a visual strip
search. Cherry at first complied with orders that allowed Brown to visually
inspect his body. But Cherry refused "to take his braids out." In her
affidavit, Officer Gert attested that it "was necessary for security
purposes for [Cherry] to undo his braids because small objects, such as staples
or other small sharp objects like needles could be concealed in the
braids." Cherry was "becoming agitated," so Gerl ordered the officers to
leave Cherry in the strip cell to give him "time to calm down." When
Gerl returned to the strip cell at about 8:30 p.m., Cherry continued to refuse
to take down his braids. Instead, Cherry responded with sexualized language and
gestures.
Because
Cherry would not cooperate fully with the visual strip search by undoing his
braids, Officer Gary Boughton authorized the use of force to complete the
search. Several officers removed Cherry from the cell and placed him in wrist
and ankle restraints, so that Officer Corey Haney could safely perform a
physical search of Cherry. First searching Cherry's hair, Haney then searched
the rest of Cherry's body. According to Cherry, Haney at one point
"grabbed" and "tugged" on his genitals and "opened
[his] buttcheeks to perform a body cavity search." Haney attests that he
"manipulated [Cherry's] genitals" as was "necessary in order to
expose areas hidden from sight." According to Cherry, Gerl, who watched
the search, "turned a blind eye" to his calls for help. The entire
search lasted about five minutes. Upon Cherry's request following the search, a
nurse examined Cherry and found no injuries.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants on Cherry's claim that the search was unconstitutional. The district
court rejected Cherry's excessive force claim, determining that there was no
evidence that Officer Haney searched Cherry out of a desire to humiliate him.
Physical force was justified, the court explained, because Cherry initially
refused to comply with the search by not taking down his braids, and the
officers were concerned that Cherry transferred contraband from his
"unsearched braided hair to other parts of his body" during the two
hours he was left alone in the strip cell. The court, however, allowed Cherry
to proceed to trial on his claim that Correctional Officers Thomas Belz and
Henry Bray tampered with his food in violation of the Eighth Amendment and in
retaliation for complaints Cherry had made about the officers.
As trial approached, Cherry requested (for the eighth time
during these proceedings) that counsel be appointed. He asserted no new reasons
for this request other than to argue that surviving summary judgment entitled
him to counsel so that he could have his "fair day in court." The
district court again denied the request, having determined Cherry "is
capable of presenting his case and that appointment of counsel will not make a
difference in the outcome of the case."
Cherry thus represented himself at trial on his Eighth Amendment
and retaliation claims. He testified himself, presented one inmate witness,
and conducted cross-examination of
Officers Bray and Belz. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
On appeal Cherry first challenges the grant of summary judgment
on his claim that the strip search was unconstitutional, arguing that the
defendants acted "maliciously and sadistically to cause harm" through
a "needless use of force." [*66] Although conceding that he refused
to "take his braids down" during the visual search, Cherry contends
that he "cooperated with the strip search procedures," and that the
defendants' subsequent physical search served no purpose other than to
humiliate him.
For an Eighth Amendment claim that a search was excessive,
Cherry must show that Officer Haney conducted the physical search of Cherry's
person "in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict
psychological pain." Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003);
Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Eighth
Amendment standard for visual strip searches to physical searches). Such
searches must be "maliciously motivated, unrelated to institutional
security and hence totally without penological justification." Whitman v.
Nesic, 368 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citations
omitted); see Peckham v. Wis. Dep't of Corrs., 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir.
1998).
Nothing in
the record suggests that Officer Haney conducted the physical search of
Cherry's body without penological justification. Rather, the evidence shows
just the opposite: the physical search was based on legitimate, identifiable
concerns about security. By admittedly refusing to take down his braids, Cherry
did not comply with the visual search and increased suspicions that he had
hidden contraband in his braids. Compounding those suspicions, Cherry had the
opportunity during his several hours in the strip cell to transfer contraband
from his braids to other body parts. And when the officers returned to continue
the search, Cherry acted out against them with sexually inappropriate language
and gestures. See Bruscino, 854 F.2d at 166 (rectal search reasonable in light
of "incorrigible, undeterrable conduct"). Moreover, even if Officer
Haney had "grabbed" and "tugged on" Cherry's genitals, as
Cherry attests, Cherry never refutes Haney's stated purpose that he
"manipulated" Cherry's genitals in order to expose areas where he
believed Cherry may have hidden contraband.
Cherry
disputes any security justification for the search by asserting that he could
not have transferred contraband from his braids because he was "in the
stripcage for hours under the watchful eye of a staff member" and he was
"already 'naked.'" But he points to no evidence confirming that a
staff member watched him during the entire time he was in the strip cell. And
that he was naked does not address the defendants' concern that he may have
been hiding contraband in his braids. Without evidence to dispute the
defendants' legitimate, identifiable purpose for the search, Cherry cannot
establish that the search was unconstitutional. See Calhoun, 319 F.3d at 939.
Finally, Cherry argues that, given his limited education and
legal knowledge, the district court abused its discretion by not appointing him
trial counsel. But there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases,
even those that proceed to trial. In considering a request for counsel, a
district court assesses whether, given the difficulty of the case, the plaintiff
appeared competent at the time to try it himself and whether counsel could make
a difference to the outcome. Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1997); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322-23 (7th
Cir. 1993). The district court here determined that the case did not involve
complex, technical issues; that counsel could not affect the outcome because
the case had little merit; and that Cherry's pleadings and numerous past
lawsuits showed him to be sufficiently experienced to try the case. See Zarnes
v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288-89 & n.2 (7th [*67] Cir. 1995) (unlike claims
involving complex medical evidence, plaintiff's failure-to-protect claim was
not complex enough to require appointment of counsel). Based on the district
court's thorough consideration of these factors, it properly exercised its
discretion in denying his request.
AFFIRMED.
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