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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHANNON DALE
CASSELS
VERSUS
RICHARD STALDER,
SECRETARY OF
LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS,
ET AL.
CIVIL ACTION NO: 03
- 0709 - D - M2
342 F. Supp. 2d 555
October 20, 2004, Decided
October 20, 2004, Filed; October 21, 2004, Docketed
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR
PLAINTIFF'S UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS TO BE DEEMED ADMITTED
This matter
is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 18) and
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (doc. 25) and (doc. 34). Defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment are opposed (doc. 47).
Also before
the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Undisputed Facts to be Deemed Admitted
(doc. 48). This motion has been opposed (doc. 50). Subject matter jurisdiction
in this Court exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
Oral
argument was held on the motions on August 26, 2004, and this matter was
submitted on the briefs.
I. BACKGROUND
Shannon Cassels
("Plaintiff"), an inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary
("LSP"), Angola, Louisiana, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against: (1) Richard Stalder, Secretary of Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections; (2) Warden Burl Cain; (3) Lieutenant Shasyoski
Anderson; (4) Warden Leslie Dupont; (5) Major Richard Ducote; and (6)
Classification Officer Pauline Turner ("Defendants"). Plaintiff
complains that he was convicted of violating an unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad prison rule. In addition, he alleges this conviction was in
retaliation for his mother's placing an advertisement for legal assistance on
the internet.
Plaintiff was charged with
violating Rules 30k and 30w of the Louisiana Disciplinary Rules and Procedures.
n1 The disciplinary board dismissed the Rule 30w charge. n2 However, the
disciplinary board held that the plaintiff had "spread rumors" and
convicted him of violating Rule 30k. A proper analysis of Plaintiff's claims in
the instant suit requires a brief description of the events leading up to his
conviction for violating Rule 30k.
Plaintiff alleges that on or
about August 28, 2001 he was denied adequate medical treatment. Plaintiff
called his mother, Doris Bynog, who then called the prison and inquired why the
plaintiff was allegedly being denied medical treatment. Plaintiff was
subsequently admitted to the hospital for treatment.
Plaintiff claims after he was
released from the hospital, prison guards harassed him for calling his mother
to assist with his request for medical treatment. Plaintiff then filed an
Administrative Remedy Procedure ("ARP"), labeled ARP # 01-4552, in
which he alleged he was verbally [*558] and physically abused and denied
medical treatment on August 28, 2001. n3 Prison officials held there was no
evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations of harassment or denial of
medical treatment. n4 Thus, Plaintiff's request for administrative remedy was
denied. n5
In addition to filing the ARP,
Plaintiff either sent a copy of the ARP to his mother or read the ARP over the
phone to his mother. n6 His mother then placed an advertisement on the internet
requesting legal help for her son. n7 The advertisement contained the same
allegations that were set forth in the ARP. n8
Several months later, Warden
Deville of the Dixon Correctional Institute viewed the advertisement and
notified Lt. Anderson of the LSP Investigative Services. Lt. Anderson initiated
an investigation of the advertisement and wrote a disciplinary report regarding
a possible violation of Rule 30k. During the investigation, Warden Dupont
placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation. Shortly thereafter, Warden Cain
issued a memorandum stating any inmate who was found to be listed on any
internet site will be placed on mail watch and his telephone calls will be
monitored. n9
A disciplinary board convicted
Plaintiff of violating Rule 30k for spreading rumors about prison staff on the
internet. Plaintiff appealed this conviction once to Warden Cain and then a
second time to Secretary Stalder. n10 The disciplinary appeals are identified
as LSP 2002 - 13338. Plaintiff's conviction resulted in a loss of 90 days of
incentive wages and a custody change to maximum working cell block. n11
Plaintiff maintains his claims in the
current lawsuit do not pertain to the validity of the allegations set forth in
the ARP. Rather, the claims in the instant suit arise out of plaintiff's
conviction for "spreading rumors" in the internet advertisement.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary
judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file indicate that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. n12 When the burden at trial rests on [*559] the
non-moving party the moving party need only demonstrate that the record lacks
sufficient evidentiary support for the non-moving party's case. n13 The moving
party may do this by showing that the evidence is insufficient to prove the
existence of one or more elements essential to the non-moving party's case. n14
Although
this Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the non-moving party may not merely rest on allegations set forth in the
pleadings. Instead, the non-moving party must show that there is a genuine
issue for trial. n15 Conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated assertions will
not satisfy the non-moving party's burden, n16 as unsubstantiated or conclusory
assertions are incompetent summary judgment evidence and cannot defeat a motion
for summary judgment. n17 If, once the non-moving party has been given the
opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, no reasonable juror could find
for the non-moving party, summary judgment will be granted for the moving
party. n18
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary
of Plaintiff's claims.
1. Plaintiff
alleges disciplinary proceedings were filed against him in retaliation for
exercising constitutionally protected rights.
Plaintiff
alleges he has been retaliated against for engaging in activities that are
protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was convicted of violating Rule
30k in retaliation for seeking legal counsel. Thus, Plaintiff alleges the
retaliation interfered with his right to freedom of speech and his right to
access the courts.
Plaintiff is
seeking damages against the defendants in their personal capacity for mental
anguish, emotional distress, and lost wages that resulted from the alleged
retaliation.
2. Plaintiff
alleges Rule 30k is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and as
applied.
Pursuant to
Rule 30k, Plaintiff was convicted of spreading rumors. He is seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for being convicted of violating an allegedly
unconstitutional rule. He is additionally seeking damages against the
defendants in their personal capacity for mental anguish, emotional distress,
and lost wages. Plaintiff alleges these damages resulted from being convicted
pursuant to an unconstitutional rule.
B.
Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (docs. 25 & 34).
All of the
named defendants, except Defendant Turner, filed a motion for summary judgment
on April 16, 2004. On April 28, 2004, defendant Turner filed a motion for
summary judgment in which she raised no new arguments and adopted all the
arguments presented in the April 16, 2004 motion. Thus, the Court will examine
arguments set forth in the April[*560] 16, 2004 motion as they apply to each
defendant.
1. 11th
Amendment
Defendants
argue Plaintiff's state law claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Plaintiff stipulates he has no state law claims; hence, Defendants' Eleventh
Amendment arguments as to state law claims are a non-issue.
Defendants
have not raised the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to Plaintiff's claims under
federal law. However, Plaintiff clarifies in his opposition brief that he has
not asserted any claims against the defendants for damages in their official
capacity and therefore has not run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. n19
Although not an issue in this case, the Court notes that any claim for damages
against the defendants in their official capacity would be barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. n20
Accordingly,
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on grounds of Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
2. Failure
to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.
Defendants
move to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, contending that the plaintiff has
failed to exhaust administrative remedies as mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. n21
Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies against
the Defendants named in this lawsuit because they were not named in the ARP.
The instant suit arises from Plaintiff's conviction for spreading rumors in
violation of Rule 30k and is not premised on the claims made in the ARP.
Therefore, it is immaterial whether the Defendants herein were made parties to
the ARP and the Court finds this to be a non-issue.
The real
issues relative to exhaustion are whether Plaintiff exhausted his claim that
Rule 30k was unconstitutional and whether he was retaliated against for having
his mother place the internet advertisement. At oral argument, Defendants
argued Plaintiff failed to raise any constitutional challenges in his administrative appeals of the Rule 30k
conviction, thus failing to exhaust administrative remedies.
In
Plaintiff's appeal from the disciplinary board, he argued the advertisement was
placed "in seek of legal help." Plaintiff further argued in the
disciplinary appeal that he was "being retaliated against." Although
Plaintiff's disciplinary appeal did not explicitly state Rule 30k is
unconstitutionally vague, he implied the Rule is vague with several examples.
n22 The Court finds the Plaintiff adequately raised the following arguments in
the disciplinary appeals process: (1) access to courts and the right to seek
counsel, (2) retaliation, and (3) constitutional challenges based on the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth. Therefore, Plaintiff attempted to
exhaust his administrative remedies in good faith.
Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on grounds
that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
[*561] 3.
Defendants argue Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the
disciplinary board.
Plaintiff
has stipulated in his reply brief that he "has not asserted any due
process claims." n23 Therefore, Defendants due process argument is a
non-issue.
4.
Defendants argue Plaintiff's claim has prescribed.
Defendants
argue that Plaintiff received a final agency decision regarding ARP No. LSP -
00 - 3893 on November 19, 2001. First, "LSP-00-3893" is the incorrect ARP number. As Defendants' own
exhibits demonstrate, the correct ARP number is 01-4552. There was a final
decision on ARP 01-4552 on November 19, 2001. However, as the Court has already
noted, the claims before this Court do not arise from the allegations set forth
in ARP 01-4552.
Plaintiff's
constitutional challenges and retaliation claim arise from his conviction for
violating Rule 30k. This conviction was assigned the disciplinary appeal number
of LSP 2002-13338. The final appellate decision regarding LSP 2002-13338 was
rendered on February 5, 2003. The instant suit was filed on September 18, 2003,
well within the one year prescriptive period to file such suits.
As for Plaintiff's
retaliation claim, the disciplinary report was filed against him for violating
Rule 30k on September 6, 2002. However, any damages that may have been
sustained due to the alleged retaliation were not sustained until the
conviction was upheld. The final appellate decision regarding the Rule 30k
violation was rendered on February 5, 2003 and this lawsuit was filed on
September 18, 2003, within the one year prescriptive period.
Accordingly,
Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on grounds of prescription.
5. Qualified
Immunity
The Court
must examine which parties, in what capacities, are the proper defendants with
regard to each individual claim. Plaintiff is seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as damages and reimbursement of lost wages. The
plaintiff generally states he has sued each defendant in his or her individual
and official capacity.
When
analyzing a case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court must discuss the
difference between personal capacity suits and official capacity suits. n24
When a plaintiff files suit against an official in his individual capacity, the
plaintiff is seeking "to impose personal liability upon a government
official for actions he takes under color of state law." n25 Qualified
Immunity may be available to an official sued in his personal capacity.
Alternatively, when a plaintiff
names a government official in his official capacity, the plaintiff is seeking
to recover compensatory damages from the government body itself. n26 Qualified
immunity is not available in an official capacity suit. n27 More importantly,
the Fifth Circuit has recognized [*562] qualified immunity is not a defense to
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. n28
a. Qualified
Immunity for Plaintiff's Constitutional Challenge of Rule 30k.
1.
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.
Here,
Plaintiff claims that Rule 30k is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and
seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. n29 The appropriate defendants in a
claim to have a Louisiana prison disciplinary rule declared unconstitutionally
vague and enjoin its enforcement are Secretary Stalder and Warden Cain in their
individual capacities. n30 Because this claim is merely seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, Secretary Stalder and Warden Cain, in their individual
capacities, are not entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified
immunity. n31
2. Damages
for being convicted pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional rule.
Plaintiff is
seeking damages for being convicted pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional
rule. These damages include mental anguish, emotional distress, and lost wages.
Plaintiff's claims for damages are against the defendants in their personal
capacities.
Here,
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. The affirmative
defense of qualified immunity may provide officials with two types of
protection. First, it functions as a defense to liability when the actions
allegedly taken by officials did not violate clearly established law. n32 If
the law was not clearly established when officials acted, qualified immunity
bars an award of damages. In order for qualified immunity to be surrendered,
pre-existing law must dictate the conclusion for every similarly situated,
reasonable government agent that what he or she is doing violates federal law
in the circumstances. n33 Second, qualified immunity may provide officials with
an immunity from suit by relieving them from the burdens of both discovery and
a trial. n34
"The
bifurcated test for qualified immunity is quite familiar: (1) whether the
plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional
right; and, (2) if so, whether the defendant's conduct was objectively
unreasonable in the light of the clearly established law at the time of the
incident." n35
[*563] In the instant case, the
Court finds Plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right. The rights of free speech and access to the courts are
fundamental constitutional rights. n36
The second prong of the test
requires the Court to determine whether the defendants' conduct was objectively
reasonable pursuant to the clearly established law at the time of the incident.
The relevant inquiry is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable state
official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation which he confronted.
n37 Here, the Court must determine whether a reasonable state official would
have applied Rule 30k to this situation.
First, a disciplinary board
found the allegations made by the Plaintiff in the ARP were without merit.
Plaintiff then conveyed the same allegations to his mother, who then placed the
information on the internet. Because the allegations were held to be without
merit, a reasonable prison official could have concluded that the Plaintiff was
"spreading rumors." The Court is unaware of any definitive statement
from the Fifth Circuit or United States Supreme Court stipulating prison
officials cannot limit the dissemination of "rumors."
Considering the law available to
prison officials at the time they promulgated and enforced Rule 30k, it was not
unreasonable to limit the dissemination of certain information defined as
"rumor." Accordingly, as to Plaintiff's claims for damages for being
convicted pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional rule, Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity.
b. Qualified
Immunity as it Pertains to Plaintiff's Claim for Retaliation.
Plaintiff alleges the Rule 30k
disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him in retaliation for having the
advertisement placed on the internet. Plaintiff further alleges that placing an
advertisement seeking legal help was a constitutionally protected right.
Plaintiff is seeking damages for mental anguish, emotional distress, and lost
wages from each of the defendants in their personal capacities. n38
Defendants have filed for
summary judgment on grounds they are entitled to qualified immunity. As
discussed above, considering the law available to prison officials at the time they promulgated and enforced Rule
30k, it was not unreasonable to restrict the dissemination of information
defined as "rumor." Therefore, Defendants were acting objectively
reasonable when they initiated disciplinary proceedings and enforced Rule 30k.
Therefore, as to Plaintiff's claim for
damages due to retaliation, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
grounds of qualified immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff's retaliation claim will
be dismissed.
[*564] C.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 18).
1. The only
claim that remains is Plaintiff's constitutional challenge of Rule 30k, in
which he is seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Plaintiff alleges Rule 30k is
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and as applied. The Court
notes the appropriate defendants in an action to have a prison rule declared
unconstitutional and enjoin its enforcement are Secretary Stalder and Warden
Cain in their individual capacities. The United States Supreme Court set forth
the proper analysis for examining prison regulations in Turner v. Safely. n39
Because this lawsuit pertains to the rights of free speech and access to the
courts, the Court will utilize the Turner analysis. This Court must inquire "whether a prison regulation that
burdens fundamental rights is 'reasonably related' to legitimate penological
interests, or whether it represents an 'exaggerated response' to those
concerns." n40
Several factors are relevant in
determining the reasonableness of a prison regulation. n41 "First, there
must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it." n42 In the
instant case, Rule 30k cannot be sustained if the logical connection between
the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy
arbitrary or irrational. n43
Defendants have merely stated
they have legitimate security concerns with regard to the spreading of rumors
and false information about employees and any behavior that may impair or
threaten the security or stability of the institution. While there may very
well be a valid security concern regarding the spreading of rumors, this
concern does not permit the promulgation of vague prison rules. At oral
argument, Defendants' counsel could not respond to what constitutes a
"rumor." Hence, the substantially vague language contained in Rule
30k clearly does not have a valid, rational connection to any legitimate
government interest and is therefore unreasonable.
The second factor relevant in determining
the reasonableness of Rule 30k "is whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates." n44 The Court
takes notice that it must be "conscious of the 'measure of judicial
deference owed to corrections officials . . . in gauging the validity of the
regulation.'" n45
Here, the fundamental right at
issue is the inmate's right to convey information to obtain access to the
courts and legal counsel. Defendants contend that Plaintiff had alternative
means of exercising his rights. However, the language of Rule 30k would allow
prison officials to punish an inmate for
"spreading rumors." Defendants concede in their motion for
summary judgment that even if Plaintiff "used other media to spread
rumors, true or false, . . . [*565]his action would have been equally in
violation of Rule 30k."
In the instant case, Plaintiff
conveyed information over the telephone to his mother who then placed the
information on the internet to seek legal counsel for her son. Although
Defendants argue Plaintiff was not prevented from corresponding with his
attorney, the vague language of Rule 30k prevents Plaintiff from conveying any
information that prison officials deem to be a "rumor"
Once information is branded as a
"rumor," the language of Rule 30k prevents inmates from communicating
the information to any party. Rule 30k does not permit for alternative means
that would allow Plaintiff to convey the information to legal counsel. Hence,
the vague language in Rule 30k effectively shuts all avenues of communication
with respect to any information that prison officials define as
"rumor."
The third factor the Court
should consider is "the impact accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right will have on guards, and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally." n46 Allowing Plaintiff to
communicate information to parties outside the prison in order to obtain legal
counsel does not adversely impact guards or other inmates. Additionally, the
accommodation does not adversely impact prison resources.
The only accommodation necessary
is to allow inmates the ability to communicate freely when seeking legal
assistance. In order for an inmate to obtain an attorney's services, he or she
will have to disclose all of the pertinent facts. In certain instances, that
disclosure may include information prison officials have defined as
"rumors about an employee, visitor, guest, or inmate." Thus, allowing
Plaintiff the right to speak or convey information that is necessary to obtain
legal counsel yields no adverse impact on guards, other inmates, or prison
resources.
The final consideration is the
presence or absence of ready alternative regulations. n47 "If an inmate
claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's
rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider
that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship
standard." n48 Moreover, "the existence of obvious, easy alternatives
may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated
response' to prison concern." n49
Defendants suggest
"spreading rumors" may endanger guards or threaten the security of
the institution. However, if guards' safety or institutional security are the
relevant concerns, there are alternative Disciplinary Rules that do not limit
an inmate's ability to convey information required to obtain counsel.
These alternative Disciplinary
Rules prevent inmates from directly and indirectly harming or threatening
guards and also prevent inmates from influencing anyone to violate
institutional policies. n50 At oral argument, Defendants suggested that
"rumors" could be used to defraud the public. However, there is a
disciplinary rule which prohibits inmates from "organizing or
participating in a scam." n51 Therefore, a separate rule prohibiting
"rumors" is not required to prevent fraudulent [*566] activity.
Clearly, there are existing alternative remedies available to the prison which
would prevent potentially harmful statements and yet not prevent the flow of
information required to seek legal counsel. The totality of the aforementioned
factors suggests the vague language of Rule 30k is indeed an "exaggerated
response" and is not reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.
The Court is
cognizant of "the familiar proposition that 'lawful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.'"
n52 However, prison regulations which limit fundamental rights, such as the
right to access the courts and seek legal counsel, must be reasonable. The language
in Rule 30k is so vague and overbroad that even Defendants' counsel could not
describe what constitutes "spreading rumors."
The dictionary definition of
"rumor" is "talk or opinion widely disseminated with no
discernible source" or "a statement or report currently without known
authority for its truth." n53 According to Defendants' briefs, "the
rumors could have even been true." n54 Thus, Rule 30k prohibits any
information, whether true or false, that prison officials deem to be a "rumor."
Plaintiff challenges
Rule 30k on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, both as applied and facially. "The overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines are related yet distinct." n55 The doctrine of vagueness
protects individuals from laws lacking sufficient clarity of purpose or
precision in drafting. n56 On the other hand, overbroad legislation is
unconstitutional because it sweeps protected activity within its proscription.
n57
A. Facial
Vagueness Challenge
First, a person of ordinary
intelligence deserves a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. n58 There are various connotations of the word
rumor and it is virtually impossible to determine what speech is prohibited.
Defendants state a "rumor" could
be true or it could be false. Thus, an inmate may not know it is a
"rumor" until after officials have declared it such. Clearly a
prohibition on "spreading rumors" provides no opportunity whatsoever
for a person of ordinary intelligence to know what is prohibited. Therefore, the
Court finds Rule 30k is facially vague.
B. Vague as
Applied to Plaintiff
As applied to Plaintiff, the
Court concludes that Rule 30k is vague. Plaintiff submitted an ARP to prison
officials containing certain allegations of abuse. A disciplinary board found
the allegations in the ARP to be without merit. Plaintiff then conveyed the
allegations in the ARP to his mother, who then placed the information on the
internet with a request for legal assistance. Rule 30k simply did not [*567]
provide Plaintiff with any warning that reading his ARP over the phone to his
mother would result in a conviction for "spreading rumors." Thus,
Rule 30k is vague as applied to Plaintiff.
C. Facially
Overbroad
As the Court has already
described, a rule is overbroad if it includes protected activity within its
proscription. In the instant case, Rule 30k undoubtedly prevents protected
activities. Angola's legitimate concern over the spread of false or
inflammatory material can be achieved without prohibiting protected speech. In
Angola's attempt to prevent the "spread of rumors," it has prohibited
the flow of information that may be necessary to obtain legal counsel.
Therefore, Rule 30k is facially overbroad.
D. Overbroad
as Applied
Plaintiff was engaged in a
protected activity when he was seeking legal counsel. He made statements that
he believed to be true to a non-inmate for the purpose of obtaining an
attorney. Applying Rule 30k to Plaintiff resulted in the suppression of a
fundamental right, namely the right to access courts and seek counsel. Hence,
Rule 30k is overbroad as applied to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment on his claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based
on the grounds that Rule 30k is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its
face and as applied.
It appears that this ruling resolves all of
the claims in Plaintiff's first amended complaint. In accordance with the
findings of the Court, counsel for the Plaintiff shall submit a declaratory and
injunctive relief order and form of judgment after having obtained approval as
to form from Defendants' counsel. Plaintiff should be aware that 18 U.S.C. §
3626 stipulates that any prospective relief must be narrowly drawn. Therefore,
Plaintiff's order for declaratory and injunctive relief shall be within the
parameters of 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
D.
Plaintiff's Motion for Undisputed Material Facts to be Deemed Admitted.
Inasmuch
this ruling resolves all of Plaintiff's claims, the motion for undisputed
material facts to be deemed admitted is moot and will be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons
assigned, Defendants' motions for summary judgment (doc. 25) and (doc. 34) are
hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Defendants' motions for summary judgment
(doc. 25) and (doc. 34), with respect
to Plaintiff's claims for damages, are hereby GRANTED.
Defendants Secretary Richard Stalder and
Warden Burl Cain's motion for summary judgment (doc. 25), with respect to
Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, is hereby DENIED.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
(doc. 18), is hereby GRANTED with respect to his claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief from Defendants Stalder and Cain, and DENIED in all other
respects.
Plaintiff's motion for undisputed facts to
be deemed admitted (doc. 48) is hereby DENIED.
Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, October 20th, 2004
JAMES J.
BRADY, DISTRICT JUDGE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
FOOTNOTES:
n1 Rule 30k prohibits "spreading rumors about an employee, visitor,
guest, or inmate."
Rule 30w states "any behavior not specifically enumerated herein
that may impair or threaten the security or stability of the unit or well-being
of an employee, visitor, guest, inmate, or their families may still be the
subject of a disciplinary report and all Schedule B penalties except forfeiture
of good time."
n2 The Court makes no
determination with regard to Rule 30w because the plaintiff was not convicted
of violating Rule 30w and thus lacks standing to contest the constitutionality
of Rule 30w.
n3 See Complaint (doc. 1), Exhibit
1.
n4 See Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 27), Exhibit 5 (second step
response form regarding ARP # 01-4552).
n5 Id.
n6 Plaintiff's first amended
complaint stipulates he "read the ARP over the phone to his mother."
Plaintiff made a prior statement to Lt. Anderson that he "sent her a
copy." In any event, the information in the ARP was transferred to his
mother.
n7 The advertisement was entitled
"SHANNON CASSELS Legal Help Wanted."
n8 See Complaint (doc. 1), Exhibit
2 (the advertisement alleged that staff, identified by rank and initials,
verbally and physically abused the plaintiff, and poured feces and/or urine on
his possessions and hair).
n9 Plaintiff's first amended
complaint contends Warden Cain's memorandum is unconstitutionally broad.
However, neither Plaintiff nor Defendants briefed the issue in their motions
for summary judgment. The Court finds there are no facts to suggest Plaintiff
was convicted or punished pursuant to this memorandum. Therefore, the Plaintiff lacks standing to
contest the constitutionality of Warden Cain's November 1, 2002 memorandum.
n10 See Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 27), Exhibit 6 (disciplinary board
appeal dated February 5, 2003).
n11 Id.
n12 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
n13 Id.
n14 Id.
n15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 248-49, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
n16 Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental
Health, 102 F.3d 137, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1996).
n17 Bridgmon v. Array Systems
Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir. 2003)(citing Hugh Symons Group, PLC v.
Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2002)
n18 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see
also FED. RULE CIV. P. 56(c).
N19 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment n. 21 (doc. 47).
n20 See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 159-160, 52 L. Ed. 714, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908).
n21 Section 1997e (a) provides:
"No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1983), or
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted."
n22 See Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 27), Exhibit 6 (appeal from the
disciplinary board).
n23 See Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 47).
n24 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301, 112 S.Ct 358, 361-62 (1991) (personal and official
capacity suits distinguished).
n25 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 165, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985).
n26 See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.
464, 471-72, 83 L. Ed. 2d 878, 105 S. Ct. 873 (1985).
n27 See Harvey v. Blake, 913 F.2d
226 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding city official's liability for back pay was in her
official capacity, so doctrine of qualified immunity did not apply).
n28 See Yates v. Stalder, 217 F.3d
332, 333 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2000).
n29 See Minton v. St. Bernard
Parish School Baord, 803 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding official
immunity doctrines do not bar injunctive relief or suits in which officials are
sued only in their official capacities and, therefore cannot be personally
liable).
n30 Secretary Stalder, in his role
as Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, is
responsible for implementing the disciplinary rule at issue in this lawsuit.
Warden Cain, in his role as Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at
Angola, is responsible for enforcement of the disciplinary rules at Angola.
n31 See Yates, 217 F.3d at 333 n.
2 (5th Cir. 2000).
n32 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
n33 See Sorenson v. Ferrie, 134
F.3d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1998).
n34 See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985).
n35 Hare v. City of Corinth, 135
F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998).
n36 See Wilson v. Thompson, 593
F.2d 1375, 1387 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating "it is by now well established
that access to the courts is protected by the First Amendment right to petition
for redress of grievances")
n37 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001).
n38 Although not raised by either
party, the Court notes 42 U.S.C. 1997e (e) provides, "no federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other
correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury." (emphasis added).
n39 482 U.S. 78, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64,
107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
n40 Id. at 87.
n41 Id. at 89.
n42 Id. at 90 (citing Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438, 104 S. Ct. 3227).
n43 Id
n44 Id.
n45 Id. (quoting Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974)).
n46 Id.
n47 Id. (citing Block v.
Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 587, 82 L. Ed. 2d 438, 104 S. Ct. 3227).
n48 Id. at 91.
n49 Id. at 90.
n50 See Louisiana Disciplinary
Rules 3, 30b, and 30h.
n51 See Louisiana Disciplinary
Rule 30f.
n52 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822, 41 L. Ed. 2d 495, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974)(quoting Price v. Johnston,
334 U.S. 266, 285, 92 L. Ed. 1356, 68 S. Ct. 1049 (1948)).
n53 Definition of rumor at
http://m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=rumor&x=9&y=20
(September 21, 2004).
n54 Defendants' Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 27).
n55 J & B Entertainment, Inc.
v. City of Jackson, 152 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting American
Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1505 (11th Cir. 1990)).
n56 J & B Entertainment, 152
F.3d at 366.
n57 Id.
N58 Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104, 108, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972).
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