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UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
KEITH HARBIN-BEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LYLE RUTTER et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 04-1458
2005 U.S. App. Lexis 17511
July 22, 2005, Argued
August 18, 2005,
Decided
August 18, 2005, Filed
OPINION:
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Keith Harbin-Bey, a Michigan prisoner,
filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
several officials employed by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC).
Specifically, the defendants are MDOC Inspector and Alger Maximum Correctional
Facility Security Threat Group Coordinator Lyle Rutter, MDOC Officer Bill
Martin, MDOC Central Office Security Threat Group Coordinator Robert Mulvaney,
MDOC Director William Overton, and MDOC Manager of Prison Affairs Michael
Powell. Harbin-Bey contended that his designation as a member of a Security
Threat Group (STG) without a hearing violated his constitutional rights.
The
district court initially dismissed all of Harbin-Bey's claims other than the
claim that Rutter had retaliated against him. It subsequently granted summary
judgment for Rutter on the retaliation claim as well. For the reasons set forth
below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I.
BACKGROUND
Harbin-Bey, an inmate at the Alger Maximum Correctional Facility in
Munising, Michigan, is a Moorish-American Muslim affiliated with a gang known
as the Vice Lords. In the fall of 2001, he began writing to family members and
to other inmates regarding the prison's STG policy directive. He stated in his
letters that the STG policy infringed on prisoners' constitutional rights and
on their ability to obtain parole, and he indicated that he was contemplating
legal action against Rutter, the prison's STG Coordinator. In addition, the
letters allegedly contained veiled references to the Vice Lords. For example,
they used the terms "golden sun" and "black moon," which are
gang symbols, and the phrase "la via va va," which is Vice Lord code
for "all is well."
Rutter intercepted one of Harbin-Bey's letters in November of 2001 and
issued a Notice of Intent to Conduct an Administrative Hearing (referred to as
an "NOI" in the realm of prison administration). He also ordered
Harbin-Bey to refrain from any further correspondence involving STG matters. In
numerous letters to Rutter, Harbin-Bey asserted that the allegedly offensive
references in his letters were religious and therefore should not be considered violations of STG policy. He did
not receive a reply from Rutter.
In
March of 2002, Rutter and Mulvaney notified Harbin-Bey that he had been
designated an STG leader. Harbin-Bey subsequently wrote to Mulvaney and
complained that his designation as an STG leader without a hearing violated his
rights to the due process of law.
In
May of 2002, Harbin-Bey was notified that an issue of FHM (For Him Magazine)
had been rejected by the prison because one of the articles in the magazine
contained depictions of gang signs. Prison policy prohibits inmates from
receiving such information. Harbin-Bey's request that he be given the magazine
with the offending article removed was denied. Shortly thereafter, he received
a postcard from FHM informing him that his subscription could not be continued
because the prison had returned the issue in question as
"unauthorized."
Harbin-Bey received a second NOI from Rutter in July of 2002. This NOI
notified Harbin-Bey that he was being classified as an "STG II"
because he had sent his grandfather a photograph of himself in which he
displayed an STG tattoo on his arm. Harbin-Bey wrote to Rutter and requested
that he not be so labeled without a hearing. He also wrote to Mulvaney,
demanding that he receive equal protection under the law. In August of 2002,
Harbin-Bey filed three grievances against Rutter, all of which were denied: one
for violating his constitutional rights, a second for retaliation, and a third
for tampering with his mail. He appealed the denial of the three grievances in
accordance with prison procedure.
Harbin-Bey filed the present lawsuit in January of 2003, alleging that
the defendants' conduct in applying and enforcing the prison's STG policies
against him violated his constitutional rights to (1) equal protection, (2) due
process, (3) access to the courts, (4) freedom from censorship of his mail and
publications, (5) freedom of religion, and (6) freedom from retaliation. He
sought both equitable and monetary relief.
With the exception of Harbin-Bey's retaliation claim against Rutter, the
district court dismissed Harbin-Bey's complaint on the basis that it failed to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court also denied Harbin-Bey's
motion to alter or amend the judgment. Rutter subsequently filed a motion for
summary judgment on the retaliation claim, which was granted by the district
court on the recommendation of the magistrate judge. This timely appeal
followed.
On
appeal, Harbin-Bey reasserts all of his original claims other than the one
based on freedom of religion. He also argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to supplement his complaint as to the
retaliation claim. Finally, Harbin-Bey argues that the district court abused its discretion in
ruling that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect
to defendants Martin and Powell.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
We
review de novo the dismissal of a prisoner's complaint on the basis that it
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir.
1997). In determining whether a prisoner has failed to state a claim, we
construe his complaint in the light most favorable to him, accept his factual
allegations as true, and determine whether he can prove any set of facts that
would entitle him to relief. Turker v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corrs., 157
F.3d 453, 456 (6th Cir. 1998).
We
also review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. Minadeo v.
ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 756 (6th Cir. 2005).
Summary judgment is proper where there exists no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district
court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538,
106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). The central issue is "whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether
it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986).
B. The district court did not err in
dismissing Harbin-Bey's equal-protection, access-to-the-courts, and First
Amendment claims
To
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and must show
that the deprivation of that right was committed by a person acting under color
of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40, 108 S. Ct.
2250 (1988). A complaint fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted when no relief is available under any
set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the
complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993).
1.
Equal protection and due process
Harbin-Bey's first claim is that his designation as an STG leader, which
caused him "to be permanently excluded from community placement, placed on
visitor restrictions, and more," violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. He contends that the failure to provide him with a hearing
prior to his designation as an STG leader constituted the unequal application
of state law, because all other prisoners who are given a special designation,
"such as homosexual predator, escape risks, high and very high risk
classification," receive a hearing prior to being so designated.
The
Equal Protection Clause provides that a state may not "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const., amend.
XIV, § 1. Legislation is generally presumed
to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221, 230, 67 L. Ed. 2d 186, 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981). But when a law
adversely affects a "suspect class," such as one defined by race,
alienage, or national origin, or invades a "fundamental right," such
as speech or religious freedom, the law will be sustained only if it is
"suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest." City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313,
105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
Here, the "rational-basis" test applies. Inmates are not a
suspect class. Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). Nor
does Harbin-Bey's claim involve the
denial of a fundamental right, because a prisoner does not have a
constitutional right to be placed in a specific security classification. See Moody
v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236, 97 S. Ct. 274 (1976).
Although Harbin-Bey claims that his STG designation was based on his religious
beliefs, the record clearly shows that he was designated as an STG member
because of his gang affiliation, not because of his religion.
The
MDOC's policy directive regarding the classification of inmates as STG members
is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of maintaining order in
the prison. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136, 53 L.
Ed. 2d 629, 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977) ( "There is nothing in the Constitution which requires prison
officials to treat all inmate groups alike where differentiation is necessary
to avoid an imminent threat of institutional disruption or violence.").
Identifying, reclassifying, and separating prisoners who are members of groups
that engage in planning or committing unlawful acts or acts of misconduct
"targets a core threat to the safety of both prison inmates and
officials." In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as
Five Percenters), 174 F.3d 464, 469 (4th Cir. 1999).
The
MDOC policy directive in question includes the following factors to consider in
designating a group as an STG: (1) history and purpose of the group, (2)
organizational structure of the group, (3) propensity for violence or specific
violent acts or intended acts that can be reasonably attributed to the group,
(4) illegal or prohibited acts that can be attributed to the group, (5)
demographics of the group, (6) existence of any written materials related to
the group, (7) specific illegal acts that can be associated with the group, and
(8) any other relevant information. None of these factors are discriminatory.
The
so-called "homosexual predators" and "escape risks" may, as
Harbin-Bey asserts, receive a hearing before being so designated. But this does
not mean that prisoners who are classified as STG members are necessarily
entitled to the same procedural protections, because the STG policy directive
is not aimed at a suspect class, nor does it invade a fundamental right. See City
of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. "Where individuals in the group affected by
a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has
the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant . . . to
closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent
those interests should be pursued." Id. at 441-42.
Harbin-Bey has not presented any authority to establish that prisoners
are constitutionally entitled to a hearing prior to receiving a special
designation. Because the state is not obligated to provide such a hearing, the
fact that it offers one for some prison classifications but not for others is
of no federal constitutional consequence so long as the choice is not an
arbitrary one. See Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000)
("Rational basis review is not a rubber stamp of all legislative action,
as discrimination that can only be viewed as arbitrary and irrational will
violate the Equal Protection Clause.") (emphasis in original). Threats to
prison security presumably demand more immediate attention than the threats
presented by the other categories mentioned by Harbin-Bey. The MDOC's differing
treatment for the STG classification is therefore not arbitrary. See Jones, 433
U.S. at 136.
Harbin-Bey also cites Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 132 L. Ed. 2d
418, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995), a case
involving the procedural due process rights of Hawaii prisoners, for the
proposition that "the denial of a hearing, appeal and judicial review . .
. as provided to prisoners similarly situated has denied plaintiff the equal
application of law." In Sandin, the Supreme Court held that, in some
cases, a restraint might be so extreme as to implicate rights arising directly
from the Due Process Clause itself. The Court recognized that states may create
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause where the freedom from
restraint imposed "atypical and significant hardships on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at
484.
But, as the district court below noted,
"an increase in security
classification, such as being classified as an STG member, does not constitute
an "atypical and significant' hardship in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life because a prisoner has no constitutional right to
remain incarcerated in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security
classification." See Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n.9 (rejecting a prisoner's
argument that a pending warrant and detainer adversely affected his prison
classification and qualification for institutional programs because not
"every state action carrying adverse consequences for prison inmates
automatically activates a due process right"); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215, 225, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976) (holding that "neither,
in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself protect a duly
convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another within the
state prison system," and noting that the fact "that life in one
prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself signify
that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a prisoner is
transferred to the institution with the more severe rules"); but see Wilkinson
v. Austin, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174, 125 S. Ct. 2384, 2389, 2394 (2005) (holding that
transfer to a "supermax" prison "imposes an atypical and
significant hardship under any plausible baseline" because "[conditions]
at [the prison] are more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in
Ohio").
We
conclude that Harbin-Bey's designation as an STG member fits well within the Jones
and Sandin decisions. His Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause claims
are therefore without merit.
2.
Access to the courts
Harbin-Bey further argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
access-to-the-courts claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. He contends that his designation as an STG leader without a hearing
violates his right to access to the courts because he is unable to seek
judicial review of his designation.
Harbin-Bey's contention is incorrect.
A prisoner may file a grievance contesting an STG designation pursuant
to MDOC Policy Directive 04.04.113, P AA. Once the prisoner has exhausted the
internal grievance process, he may present his claim in federal court. See Brown
v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998) ("This court will henceforth
require that prisoners filing § 1983 cases involving prison conditions must
allege and show that they have exhausted all available state administrative
remedies.").
In
order to state a claim for interference with access to the courts, however, a
plaintiff must show actual injury. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting
that "the requirement that an inmate show 'actual injury' derives from the
constitutional principle of standing"). Examples of actual prejudice to
pending or contemplated litigation include having a case dismissed, being
unable to file a complaint, and missing a court-imposed deadline. Jackson v.
Gill, 92 Fed. Appx. 171, 2004 WL 232148, at *2 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
Harbin-Bey has not demonstrated any cognizable injury as a result of his
designation as an STG leader. We therefore conclude that the district court
properly dismissed his access-to-the-courts claim.
3. First
Amendment
Harbin-Bey next argues that the district court erred in dismissing his First
Amendment claim regarding the prison's alleged censorship of his periodicals.
He contends that rejecting his FHM magazine was not rationally related to the
MDOC's proffered goal of maintaining prison security. Specifically, he claims
that the policy mandating rejection of the magazine was "an exaggerated
response" to the prison's security concerns. He further argues that
requiring the prison to allow inmates access to such magazines with any
offending articles or pictures removed would not be unduly burdensome.
A
prisoner's right to receive mail is subject to prison policies and regulations
that are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987), such as
"security, good order, or discipline of the institution." Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989). Courts
generally afford great deference to prison policies, regulations, and practices
relating to the preservation of these interests. Id. at 407-08. In Turner, the
Supreme Court set forth the following four factors to determine
whether a prison's restriction on incoming publications was reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests:
(1) whether there is a valid, rational
connection between the prison policy and the legitimate governmental interest
asserted to justify it; (2) the existence of alternative means for inmates to
exercise their constitutional rights; (3) the impact that accommodation of these
constitutional rights may have on other guards and inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives as
evidence of the reasonableness of the regulation.
Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 917 (6th
Cir. 1992) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89).
The
regulation in question here prohibits prisoners from receiving mail depicting
gang symbols or signs. Policy Directive 05.03.118, P HH(21). It requires that
the magazine be accepted or rejected as a whole; it does not allow the removal
of a prohibited article prior to giving the magazine to an inmate. Harbin-Bey
argues that the regulation is an exaggerated response to security concerns in
the prison because there are alternatives means of regulating incoming publications
short of wholesale rejection; namely, the removal of any offending material
from within the publication prior to forwarding it to the inmate.
He does not, however, provide any support for his contention that
requiring "prison officials to go through each magazine received by a
prisoner and remove all prohibited material so that it may be received by the
prisoner" would not, as the district court determined, be unduly
burdensome. Moreover, Harbin-Bey's FHM subscription was ultimately terminated
by the magazine's publisher, not by the prison, the latter rejecting only a
single issue. Because the policy directive was reasonably related to the
prison's goal of maintaining security and order, the district court properly
dismissed Harbin-Bey's claim that rejection of the offending issue violated his
First Amendment rights.
C. The district court did not err in granting
summary judgment for Rutter on Harbin-Bey's retaliation claim, or in refusing
to allow Harbin-Bey to supplement his complaint with respect to a new claim of
retaliation
1.
Summary judgment
Harbin-Bey contends that Rutter retaliated against him when Harbin-Bey
threatened to take legal action against Rutter and filed grievances against a
number of MDOC officials, including Rutter. He claims that Rutter retaliated by
interfering with and confiscating Harbin-Bey's outgoing mail.
Retaliation
based on a prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment rights violates the
Constitution. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 394.
In order to establish a First
Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected
conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter
a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and
(3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two -- that is, the
adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected
conduct.
Id. at 394.
The relevant question regarding the second prong of the Thaddeus-X test
is whether the defendant's adverse conduct was "capable of deterring a
person of ordinary firmness." Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir.
2002) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). Actual deterrence need not be
shown. Id.
Harbin-Bey failed to establish that he suffered any adverse action that
would satisfy the standard set forth in Thaddeus-X. He presented no evidence to
establish that Rutter had interfered with his mail, or even that his mail was
intercepted at all, after he filed his grievances against Rutter. Moreover,
even if Rutter had confiscated Harbin-Bey's mail, Harbin-Bey has not offered
any evidence to suggest that Rutter's conduct in issuing the NOIs was motivated
by the content of Harbin-Bey's letters or by the fact that he filed the
grievances. Finally, Harbin-Bey did not lose any privileges as a result of the
NOIs; rather, he was simply not permitted to send mail containing prohibited
STG materials. See Bell, 308 F.3d at 603 ( "Whether a retaliatory action is sufficiently severe to deter
a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her rights is a question
of fact [to be determined by the trier of fact]."). As the district court
concluded in adopting the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, an inmate of ordinary
firmness would not be deterred from filing grievances or writing to family
members about the possibility of taking legal action based on the issuance of
these NOIs by Rutter.
Harbin-Bey claims that "direct proof or evidence [of retaliation]
is impossible to come by in this type of case," but that he has
"presented circumstantial evidence, which constitutes more than bare
allegations." Admittedly, retaliation "rarely can be supported with
direct evidence of intent."Murphy v. Lane, 833 F.2d 106, 108 (7th Cir.
1987). But conclusory allegations of
retaliatory motive "unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient
to state . . . a claim under § 1983." Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534,
1538-39 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Williams v. Bates, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis
34260, No. 93-2045, 1994 WL 677670, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1994) (unpublished)
(holding that the plaintiff's claim of retaliatory transfer was "wholly
conclusory and so [was] insufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983").
We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in granting Rutter's
motion for summary judgment.
2.
Supplementation of Harbin-Bey's complaint
Nor
did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Harbin-Bey's motion
to supplement his complaint as to his retaliation claim. Harbin-Bey sought to
add allegations showing that Rutter had retaliated against him for filing the
present action. The district court denied his motion because Harbin-Bey failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies through the prison's grievance
procedures with regard to Rutter's most recent alleged misconduct.
Although Harbin-Bey filed a new administrative grievance against Rutter,
he did so only after commencing this lawsuit. This court has held that a
prisoner "may not exhaust administrative remedies during the pendency of
the federal suit." Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999)
(dismissing an Ohio prisoner's suit because he filed his federal complaint
before completing the administrative process). We therefore conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Harbin-Bey to
supplement his complaint.
D. The district court did not err in
determining that Harbin-Bey had not exhausted his administrative remedies with
regard to Martin and Powell
Finally, Harbin-Bey argues that the district court erred in ruling that
he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to Martin and
Powell. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a), a prisoner must exhaust all available administrative remedies prior
to bringing a § 1983 action with respect to prison conditions, even if the
state administrative process does not allow the specific type of relief sought
by the prisoner. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12, 122 S.
Ct. 983 (2002) (holding that the exhaustion requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied to an inmate's claims that he was beaten by corrections officers
without justification). This exhaustion requirement is mandatory and must be
enforced by the district court sua sponte. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104
(6th Cir. 1998) (enforcing the exhaustion requirement sua sponte and dismissing
without prejudice a prisoner's complaint on the basis that he had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies). The district court does not have the
discretion to order a continuance in the absence of exhaustion. Wright v.
Morris , 111 F.3d 414, 417 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that, prior to the enactment
of the PLRA, district courts had such
discretion).
Prisoners may grieve the application of a
policy directive if it affects them personally and involves a concern over
which the MDOC has control, but they may not grieve the content of the policy
itself. Policy Directive 03.02.130, P E, F-2. In a grievance, the prisoner must
specifically mention the allegedly offending parties so that the prison has an
opportunity to address the claims before they reach federal court. Curry v.
Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001). Harbin-Bey has submitted
documentation to establish that he has filed several grievances against Rutter.
But he has not demonstrated that he has filed grievances with regard to his
claims against Martin and Powell. As a result, he has not exhausted these
claims.
A
court, however, need not require exhaustion of available administrative
remedies where the claim is subject to dismissal because it is "frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Brown,
139 F.3d at 1103. Here, the district court dismissed Harbin-Bey's claims against
Martin and Powell in the absence of exhaustion because it properly determined
that Harbin-Bey had failed to state a claim against them upon which relief can
be granted. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in
dismissing Harbin-Bey's claims against Martin and Powell.
III. CONCLUSION
For
all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
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