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Assault and Battery: Physical

     Despite the seriousness of an arrestee's crime of bank robbery, FBI agents' alleged response in using the force they did in apprehending and arresting him was not reasonable or proportionate. Accepting, for purposes of appeal, the arrestee's version of the incident, at the time of the arrest he was submitting to the agents' authority, was focused on self-protection, was in a passive position, and did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or anyone else. He allegedly also did not actively resist arrest or attempt to evade it. The agents were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. Abel v. Harp, No. 06-4371, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11440 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).

     Even if a woman's behavior at the time of her arrest was caused by her having suffered several seizures that day, the arresting officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner in using force against her. Her conduct constituted fleeing, eluding, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer, and she posed an immediate threat to the officers and to other members of the public since she refused orders to place her vehicle in park at the conclusion of the chase, and it continued to push against a police cruiser. Under the circumstances, the officers couldn't be expected to know that her non-responsiveness to their requests was due to a seizure. Ryan v. Hazel Park, No. 07-1659, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11042 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).

     A deputy sheriff and a U.S. Forest Service officer didn't use excessive force by attempting to arrest a protester who had climbed a tree by denying her supplies, food, and water, subjecting her to a risk of severe dehydration. Her own decision to remain in the tree was the cause of her injuries, and the case she relied on for her argument that excessive force was used involved the direct use of force, such as pepper spray, in instances where police could have easily removed protesters without infliction of injury or pain. The defendants' actions in the immediate case were consistent with the court's ruling in that past case. The officers had no obligation to "care" for her while she was in the tree, since she was not in their custody. Smith v. Ball, No. 07-35080, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 1059 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

     Officer did not use excessive force in restraining a DUI arrestee who was not compliant with directions to put his hands behind his back, but instead was moving his arms forward and flailing from side to side. Additionally, even if the force used was unnecessarily, it was minimal and caused only minor injury. Anderson v. City of Tampa, No. 8:07-CV-00993, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35931 (M.D. Fla.).

Assault and Battery: Stun Guns/Taser

****Editor's Case Alert****

Jury awards more than $5 million against manufacturer in lawsuit over death of man subjected to multiple Taser shocks, but rejects claims that police officers used excessive force in deploying Tasers against the decedent.

     In a lawsuit over the death of a man who died after being subjected multiple times to Taser shots, a federal court jury has returned a verdict in favor of defendant police officers and the city which employed him on all claims, including federal civil rights and negligence claims, while awarding damages, including $5.2 million in punitive damages, on a negligent failure to warn theory against Taser International, Inc., the manufacturer of the Tasers used by the officers.

     Police in the case responded to a 911 call from the decedent's father reporting that his son was acting "strangely," and that he suspected that his son, who had a history of substance abuse, might be under the influence. When the son later started throwing household items out of the front door, police officers, having previously left, returned, and fired Tasers at him. They allegedly discharged their Tasers multiple times. He became unconscious and paramedics were able to restore his breathing and heartbeat. He was taken to a hospital, did not regain consciousness, and died the following day.

    The jury rejected any claim that an act or omission by one or more of the four defendant police officers caused the decedent to be subjected to excessive force during his arrest or detention "by deployment" of Tasers against him.

     The jury answered "yes" on a jury verdict form to the question whether a "reasonably prudent manufacturer of an electronic control device knew or reasonably should have known that the Taser ECD [electronic control device] was dangerous or likely to be dangerous because prolonged exposure to electric shock from the device potentially causes acidosis to a degree which poses a risk of cardiac arrest in a person against whom the device is deployed?" The jury further found that the manufacturer failed to adequately warn Taser purchasers of that risk, and that the failure to provide such warnings of the "risk of prolonged deployment" was a "substantial factor in causing the officers to use the device in such a way" against the decedent.

     The jury rejected, however, a strict products liability claim, stating that at the time of the manufacture and sale of the Tasers, the manufacturer did not know and/or it was not knowable "by the use of available scientific knowledge" that prolonged exposure to shocks from Taser ECDs "potentially causes acidosis to a degree which poses a substantial danger, namely of causing a person against whom the device is deployed to have a cardiac arrest."

     The jury awarded $21,000 in compensatory damages to the decedent's estate for injuries he suffered prior to his death, along with $200,000 in punitive damages. The jury also awarded $1 million in compensatory damages to the parents of the decedent for losses resulting from the death of their son, along with $5 million in punitive damages. Finally, the jury found that the decedent's own negligent conduct contributed to causing his death, and found that the decedent was 85% at fault for his death, with Taser International 15% at fault. Taser International was therefore found 15% responsible for the $1,021,000 in compensatory damages, as well as for a total of $5,200,000 in punitive damages.    

     Heston v. City of Salinas, No. C 05-03658, U.S. Dist. Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division (June 6, 2008). To view the jury verdict form in the case, click here. To view the initial complaint filed in the case, click here. The result of any subsequent appeal in this case will be reported in future issues of this publication.

     In a case where a police officer accidentally shot and killed a suspect, drawing her gun while thinking it was her Taser, a federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the Taser manufacturer on a products liability design defect claim. The court noted that the Taser and holster were not "used" when the injury occurred, and such use was necessary for the design defect claim. The court also found that the manufacturer exercised reasonable care in choosing a gun-shaped design for the Taser, when the only evidence presented on the decision-making process indicated that a handgun-shape was better for accuracy and feedback from training officers indicated that they preferred a handgun-shaped design. The court also rejected failure to warn, negligent warning, and training claims. Torrest v. City of Madera, No. 05-16468, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10169 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

     In an excessive force lawsuit by a man shot with a Taser six times after he became violent following taking excessive amounts of anti-seizure medication, the trial court did not act erroneously in barring the jury from considering the use of the Taser against him as the cause of his kidney failure. There was not sufficient evidence to prove that the use of the Taser caused rhabdomyolysis in the arrestee. The appeals court upheld the denial of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages after he was awarded a total of $1,000 against one officer for his use of the Taser. The appeals court vacated an attorneys' fee award of $10,616, and ordered reconsideration of the amount of that fee. Lash v. Hollis, No. 07-2356, 2008 U.S. Lexis 10247 (8th Cir.).

Defenses: Qualified Immunity

     A trial court's denial of summary judgment to a police officer in an excessive force lawsuit was not the same as a denial of qualified immunity, when the trial judge explicitly said that there was not enough information about the force used to make a qualified immunity determination. The denial of summary judgment, therefore, was not immediately appealable, as a denial of qualified immunity would have been. Watts v. Harrison, No. 07-7008, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11319 (Unpub. D.C. Cir.).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: Consular Rights

     An arrestee who is a citizen of Uruguay claimed that law enforcement personnel violated his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations treaty by failing to inform him about or provide him with the right to contact the Uruguayan consulate about his arrest. The court ruled that article 36 of the treaty did not confer individual rights on an arrestee that could be judicially enforced in U.S. courts, and the rights stated in the treaty were instead meant to aid in the exercise of "consular functions." The court therefore rejected his claims for damages under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Gandara v. Bennett, No. 06-16088, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11088 (11th Cir.).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: No Warrant

     A sheriff's eyewitness testimony identifying the arrestee as the man who sold him two bags of marijuana was sufficient to provide probable cause for his arrest, despite discrepancies between the serial number that the sheriff stated was on the $20 bill he paid with and the serial number arresting officers testified to at trial, and the fact that the $20 bill itself was never recovered. Fox v. Graff, No. 07-14720, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11219 (Unpub. 11th Cir.).

     Police detective developed probable cause to arrest the plaintiff when, during the course of his investigation, he learned facts from credible sources which gave him reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect had willingly participated in fraudulent schemes. He had probable cause under the totality of the known facts and circumstances. Cranmer v. Tyconic, Inc., No. 06-16383, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10596 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

     There was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a police detective had probable cause to believe that a woman had knowingly made a false incident report claiming that her ex-boyfriend had called her from jail and left a message on her answering machine in violation of an order of protection. The detective arrested her for falsifying a police incident report concerning the identity and location of the caller, but allegedly did not have information showing that she actually knew that her former boyfriend was out of jail at the time. The detective was therefore not entitled to summary judgment in a false arrest lawsuit. Brewton v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-3574, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 36455 (E.D.N.Y.).

     When an arrestee had a "full and fair opportunity" to challenge the question of whether there was probable cause for his arrest at a preliminary hearing, he was barred from relitigating the issue in his federal civil rights lawsuit. McIntosh v. Prestwich, No. 06-56868, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10148 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

     Police officers had probable cause to arrest a man they found holding an iron bar while involved in a "heated, expletive-filled" argument with another person also holding such a bar. The officers were not required to wait until the two men actually came to blows before arresting them. There was, however, a genuine issue of fact as to whether the force used by the officers in twisting the arrestee's arms was excessive, based on the arrestee's assertion that he did not attempt to evade arrest or resist them. Zantello v. Shelby Township, No. 07-1640, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10014 (Unpub. 6th Cir.).

False Arrest/Imprisonment: Warrant

     Even though information allegedly omitted from an affidavit supporting the issuance of an arrest warrant might have given the arresting officer a basis for questioning the truth of the complainant's story, the officer also conducted an investigation and questioned a number of persons, and also obtained partial confirmation of the complainant's version of events when the arrestee himself stated that he had "jokingly" made comments to the complainant which were similar to what she reported. Accordingly, a federal appeals court upheld summary judgment for the officer on the plaintiff's false arrest claim. Feehan v. Lengyel, No. 06-5250, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10852 (Unpub. 2nd Cir.).

Federal Tort Claims Act

     An FBI agent who turned over potentially exculpatory evidence to a prosecutor fulfilled her non-discretionary duty in doing so, and the federal government could not be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b)(1) and 2671 et seq. for alleged wrongful prosecution of the plaintiff for engaging in a sexual act with a person under the age of twelve on an Indian reservation. The plaintiff's conviction for the offense was overturned based on the prosecutor's failure to turn that exculpatory evidence over to the defense. Once the FBI agent presented the exculpatory evidence to the prosecutor, however, her actions satisfied due process. Further, a private party in Montana, the location of the case, who acted as the FBI agent did, would not have been liable for the prosecutor's subsequent failure to turn over the material to the defense. Gray v. Dept. of Justice, No. 07-35171, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9597 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

Firearms Related: Accidental Use

     When the evidence showed that a DUI arrestee was kicking, spitting, and refusing to cooperate with officers just before he was accidentally shot by an officer in the left buttock, the officer was entitled to use reasonable force. The officer intended to draw and fire his Taser, but mistakenly pulled out and fired his gun instead. The court found that the plaintiff's claim that the officer was not entitled to use any force at all was barred. Additionally, the fact that the arrestee was convicted for resisting the officers was inconsistent with his claim that he had offered no resistance to them, so that they were unjustified in any use of force. The plaintiff could, however, pursue his claims arising out of the accidental use of deadly force. Yount v. City of Sacramento, No. S139762, 2008 Cal. Lexis 5426.

Firearms Related: Intentional Use

     A police officer's shooting and killing of a man charging at her from 10 to 15 feet away was not excessive, entitling her to qualified immunity. The officer was responding to a 911 call from the man's sister stating that he was drunk and physically abusive, and the suspect vandalized nearby apartments and threatened a resident before the officer arrived. The officer was not required to use the "least intrusive amount of force" possible when the suspect was larger than her and posed an immediate threat to her and to others. Lehman v. Leichliter, No. 07-30405, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11268 (Unpub. 5th Cir.).

     When a trial judge's instructions about the legal standard for excessive use of force were correct, the judge's error concerning instructions about the proper use of a police investigator's report concerning the shooting of a suspect were harmless. The report, containing statements the shooting officer made to a supervisor after the shooting, while "hearsay within hearsay" could have properly been considered as admissions by a party-opponent in the lawsuit. The trial court had, however, allowed the report to be entered into evidence, and the statements in the report were mostly useful for purposes of impeachment. As the plaintiff's attorney used the statements for that purpose, any error in instructions concerning the use of the report were harmless. Alicea v. Ralston, No. 06-4521, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10736 (Unpub. 3rd Cir.).

     A police officer acted reasonably in shooting and killing a suspect armed with a box cutter who brandished it while advancing upon her despite her commands for him to drop the weapon. Even though the blade of the box cutter was not then extended, the officer could reasonably believe that the suspect constituted a serious threat of death or serious physical injury. The suspect was only two feet away from the officer at the time, and the officer was back up against her police cruiser. Njang v. Montgomery County, Maryland, No. 07-1815, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10394 (Unpub. 4th Cir.).

     Since it is well established that a police officer may not use deadly force against a non-dangerous and unarmed person, and the other officer present at the scene of the plaintiff's shooting stated that the plaintiff did not act in any way that would have justified the shooting, the officer who shot the plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity. The shooting officer did not give any warning before shooting, and the plaintiff alleged that, at the time of the shooting, he had stopped advancing towards the officer and did not making threatening movements. Kiles v. City of North Las Vegas, No. 06-16420, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9958 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

****Editor's Case Alert****

New York high court upholds decision providing that a man paralyzed after being shot by a police officer, initially awarded $76.4 million by a jury, shall receive nothing, based on his failure to appear at a second trial in the case, at which a second jury still awarded him $51 million despite his absence.

     The highest court in New York, in a brief one-line order in Barnes v. City of New York, has upheld an intermediate appeals court decision which results in a man shot and paralyzed by a police officer twenty years ago, and who was initially awarded $76.4 million by a jury receiving nothing, and being assessed $100 for court costs. The plaintiff had fired a gun at a police officer who chased him while he was running with a Tec-9 semiautomatic pistol. The officer returned fire, resulting in spinal injuries, which paralyzed the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that the officer shot him in the back after he dropped a gun he picked up during a fight with two other men. He also claimed that he did not see the officer, who was in plain clothes. A jury awarded him $76.4 million, which was later reduced to $8.9 million by a trial court before a new trial was ordered by an intermediate New York appeals court, based on the improper exclusion of evidence at the trial that the plaintiff was a member of a group that believed in resisting arrests with violence. A jury at a second trial awarded the plaintiff $51 million, which was subsequently reduced to $10.75 million by the trial judge. In Barnes v. City of New York, #9969, 2007 NY Slip Op 06260, 44 A.D. 3d 39, 840 N.Y. Supp. 2d 582, 2007 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 8781 (1st Dept.), an intermediate New York appeals court overturned that second award of damages, based on the plaintiff's failure to appear at the second trial. The appeals court stated that:

"By avoiding his obligation to testify at a trial in which he was seeking millions of dollars, plaintiff was able to frustrate the City's fundamental common-law right to cross-examine a witness. Plaintiff, of course, had good reason to avoid coming to court to testify. His strategy denied the City the opportunity to confront and test his credibility on such matters as his assertion that he had no familiarity with guns and that he did not fire at the officer, and to impeach him by way of his plea of guilty to attempted assault in the first degree (i.e., by means of a deadly weapon). That deadly weapon was found at plaintiff's feet with two empty shell casings, thus corroborating the officer's account that plaintiff had fired the gun at him."

First Amendment

     A man's removal from a public meeting of a county planning commission did not violate his First Amendment rights when he had refused, while speaking, to relate his comments to the issue under discussion, or to cease speaking and sit down after refusing to stay on topic. The commission had a right to set its agenda, and a policy barring personal attacks during meetings served a legitimate interest in preserving order. The action taken was "content neutral" because it was not based on the speaker's viewpoint, and the plaintiff did not show that other people were allowed to speak off-topic. Steinburg v. Chesterfield County Planning Commission, No. 07-1181, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11417 (4th Cir.).

     Police officers were entitled to qualified immunity for arresting (for disorderly conduct) protesters awaiting the passing of a presidential motorcade who stripped down to their thong underwear and formed a human pyramid for purposes of protesting the war in Iraq. The demonstrators were released after two hours in custody, and charges against them were dropped. The police needed to make a "split second" decision in circumstances where the boundaries of free speech were "muddled," the court concluded, so that their actions could not be viewed as a willful violation of the law or incompetent. Egolf v. Witmer, No. 06-2193, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11079 (3rd Cir.).

     A police officer ejected an artist from a city park after telling him that a city ordinance barred him from conducting business there without a license. That ordinance barred selling art in the park, but permitted the display of such art there, but the officer misunderstood it. Because the artist denied ever selling art there, and had no intention of doing so, and because there was also no showing that he abandoned any such intention out of fear of arrest, he did not have standing to challenge the ordinance as a violation of his First Amendment rights. Travis v. Park City Police Dept., No. 07-4192, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10543 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).

Malicious Prosecution

     Two police departments, two counties, a district attorney, and a correctional facility were all entitled to summary judgment in an arrestee's lawsuit for malicious prosecution because he failed to show the necessary elements of a lack of probable cause, actual malice, and a favorable termination of the criminal proceeding in his favor. Rush v. County of Nassau, No. 2007-04522, 2008 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 4183 (2nd Dept.).

Negligence: Vehicle Related

     A police officer driving at high speed without emergency lights or sirens was responding to an emergency even though the other officer who requested his assistance did not say that he or others were in immediate danger. A motorist who was injured in a collision with the officer's vehicle had not been deprived of an ability to yield the right of way by the officer's actions. The officer did not act for a malicious purpose or in a wanton or reckless manner, so he was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under Ohio state law. VanDyke v. City of Columbus, No. 07AP-0918, 2008 Ohio App. Lexis 2221 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.).

Police Plaintiff: Defamation

     A former member of the Ohio House of Representatives was not entitled to immunity under state law for a letter she wrote concerning police officers' execution of a search warrant and shooting of a person present on the premises. The appeals court rejected the argument by the House of Representatives that the trial court, in order to deny immunity, had to find by clear and convincing evidence that she acted with "actual malice." The court found that there was no requirement that such malice be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, nothing showed that the former representative had any information from which a reasonable person could believe that the statements in her letter were true. While she could state her personal opinions about the officers' actions, this did not justify her accusation that the officers acted with the criminal intent to murder an individual. Habeeb v. The Ohio House of Representatives, No. 07AP-895, 2008 Ohio App. Lexis 2225 (Ohio App. 10th Dist.).

     The trial court's issuance of an injunction barring a deputy sheriff's ex-wife from publishing false and defamatory statements or confidential personal information about him or from initiating contact with the sheriff's department concerning him, except for the purpose of reporting criminal conduct under emergency circumstances violated her free speech rights under both the U.S. and California constitutions. The order was an unconstitutional prior restraint and was overbroad and vague. False and defamatory statements cannot be enjoined before they are found, at trial, to be defamatory. The prohibition on the publication of confidential personal information would require a more specific description of the information at issue, although, if sufficiently described, its publication might violate a right of privacy under the California constitution. Finally, the wife had a constitutional right to petition the government that included contacting the sheriff's department in non-emergency circumstances, and the order prohibiting her from doing so was not justified by the evidence in the record. Evans v. Evans, No. D051144, 2008 Cal. App. Lexis 689 (4th Dist.).

Police Plaintiff: Malicious Prosecution

     There was probable cause to investigate and charge former university police officers for allegedly having falsified police logbook time entries during their employment in violation of a Nevada state "false claims" law, particularly based on a finding of probable cause at a court hearing during the criminal proceedings. The officers, therefore, could not pursue their claims for malicious prosecution, despite the fact that a jury subsequently found them not guilty. Dias v. Elique, No. 05-16440, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 9990 (Unpub. 9th Cir.).

Search and Seizure: Home/Business

     Success on his claims that law enforcement personnel engaged in activities intended to induce false statements to obtain search warrants for his house and person, to arrest him, and to use at his criminal trial would imply the invalidity of his conviction, which had not been overturned, an arrestee could not pursue his federal civil rights lawsuit. His lawsuit was barred under the principles set down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey, #93-6188, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Hindman v. Healy, No. 07-12931, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10749 (/Unpub. 11th Cir.).

Search and Seizure: Persons

     Child welfare caseworker who interviewed a brother and sister at a private school as part of a child abuse investigation was not entitled to qualified immunity for examining the children's bodies, including under their clothes, for signs of abuse. Consent from the school's principal for the interviews did not extend to a search of the children's bodies, and their right to be free from unreasonable searches under these circumstances, absent a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or valid consent, was clearly established. Michael C. v. Gresbach, No. 07-1756, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 10805 (7th Cir.).

     While police acted properly in stopping a motorist's vehicle for a traffic violation, and in asking her to exit the vehicle when she could not produce her vehicle registration or proof of insurance, there were questions of genuine fact as to whether they acted in an objectively reasonable manner in acting as though she posed a risk to them or others based on her "argumentative" behavior, and in conducting a pat-down search, even though they never stated that they believed that she was armed. During the traffic stop, the motorist fell, appeared to have a seizure, and died, apparently of a ruptured berry aneurysm. The court rejected a state law wrongful death claim, since there was no evidence that anything the officers did caused the bleeding or the motorist's death. The plaintiff, the motorist's estate, could proceed with a Fourth Amendment claim arising out of the pat-down search. Pinnock v. City of New Haven, No. 3:05cv927, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39008 (D. Conn.).

Search and Seizure: Vehicle

     A county sheriff could not be sued, on the basis of his role as supervisor of deputies who arrived on the scene after FBI agents arrested the plaintiff for bank robbery, and impounded the getaway car, resulting in the impound lot later selling the vehicle after sending the arrestee a notice and publicly posting one. Even if the deputies were found to have violated the plaintiff's rights, the sheriff did not personally participate in, authorize, or acquiesce in their actions. The court also rejected the argument that the impounding of the vehicle under these circumstances constituted conversion since a law enforcement officer may tow and impound a vehicle following a driver's arrest for bank robbery or similar offenses. Eaton v. Whetsel, No. 07-6262, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11367 (Unpub. 10th Cir.).

Wiretapping, Video Surveillance, and Internet Legal Issues

     Florida appeals court upholds summary judgment for city in lawsuit challenging city policy of recording all telephone calls to and from 911 call center. The plaintiffs contended that this included the improper recording of personal outgoing calls made by city employees and of non-emergency incoming calls. While the appeals court did not agree with the city or the trial court that all calls needed to be recorded to comply with a state 911 statute, the city had a good faith basis for its belief that the manner in which the "instant playback" system was installed in the center was legal, and the city's playback system was in compliance with the requirements of a Florida state 911 plan. Brillinger v. City of Lake Worth, Florida, No. 4D07-2033, 2008 Fla. App. Lexis 5200 (Fla. App. 4th Dist.).

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     Article: "Civil Liability and Criminal Prosecution in Federal Court for Police Misconduct," by Richard G. Schott, 77 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin No. 5, pg. 23-32 (May 2008). "Law enforcement officers should be aware of the legal basis for being the subject of federal civil actions and federal criminal prosecutions." [PDF]

     Article: "Future Technology in Law Enforcement," by Ben Reed, Jr., 77 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin No. 5, pg. 15-21 (May 2008). "Technology is developing rapidly in areas relative to the law enforcement profession." [PDF]

     Article: "Traffic Stops," by Anthony J. Pinizzotto, Edward F. Davis, and Charles E. Miller III, 77 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin No. 5, pg. 1-10 (May 2008). "These routine, repetitive tasks can turn deadly for officers accustomed to resolving them by issuing a traffic violation notice, written warning, or verbal reprimand." [PDF]

     • Abbreviations of Law Reports, laws and agencies used in our publications.

     • AELE's list of recently-noted civil liability law resources.