April, 2000 web edition

Federal court strikes down a California law allowing peace officers to bring a lawsuit against citizens who lodge false complaints against them “with spite, hatred, or ill will.”

     California law generally immunizes citizen complaints from lawsuits for defamation, but creates an exception by allowing defamation suits by police officer against individuals who falsely charge them with misconduct; Civil Code §47-47.5.

     A federal court in Los Angeles noted the exception was “a form of content-based discrimination” and is constitutional only if it serves “compelling state interests.”  The exception was facially unconstitutional and violates the 1st and 14th Amendments.  Gritchen v. Collier, 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16579.

  »  Research Note: A similar statute in Florida was struck down by the state's Supreme Court, in a 5-to-2 opinion.  Mesa v. Rodriquez, 357 So.2d 711, 1978 Fla. Lexis 4767, construing Fla.Stat. 112.532(3) (1978).

     Police officers, like other public officials and employees, enjoy the same right as citizens to sue for defamatory nonprivileged statements.  Generally, statements made to a governmental entity and judicial pleadings are absolutely privileged against lawsuit for reputational injuries.

Federal appeals court rejects a suit against the city filed by a dispatcher who was fired for making a false crime report.  City kept the details of her termination confidential and did not violate her reputational rights.

     A 911 operator claimed she was sexually assaulted in her home.  The city determined that she had concocted the story and fired her.  She then sued for civil rights violations, claiming wrongful discharge and that the allegations against her became known to others.

     The U.S. District Court dismissed her claims and a three-judge appellate panel has affirmed.  To recover, a plaintiff must prove that the damaging information is attributable to the public employer.  There is no liability when an agency has carefully kept the charges confidential and the plaintiff has caused them to be made public."

     They also concluded the city had provided her with a meaningful opportunity to deny the charges.  Hughes v. City of Garland, #99-10482, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 1789 (5th Cir.).

Full text: www.law.utexas.edu/us5th/us5th.html

Federal impasses panel mandates a union-proposed, warning in a Treasury Dept. contract dispute. It would apply to inquiries where criminal wrongdoing is suspected.

     A union local of Federal Bureau of Engraving employees initiated an impasse procedure after they failed to agree with management on “whether, prior to being interviewed on a criminal matter, an employee who is not in custody should be advised of what the Union refers to as “Beckwith rights.”

     The so-called "Beckwith Warning," is similar to the "Escobedo" warning that preceded the Miranda decision.  It cautioned a person against self-incrimination and advised of his right to consult with an attorney, but did not contain the fourth Miranda right to obtain a free lawyer if the interviewee is unable to afford private counsel.  Free lawyers are not provided to persons who are not in custody, although members of a federal bargaining unit would be entitled to a “Weingarten representative.”

     The Union sought to impose the following mandatory warning:

You have a right to remain silent if your answer may tend to incriminate you. Anything you say may be used against you as evidence later in an administrative proceeding or any future criminal proceeding involving you. If you refuse to answer the questions posed to you on the grounds that the answer may incriminate you, you cannot be discharged solely for remaining silent. However, your silence can be considered in an administrative proceeding for its evidentiary value that is warranted by the facts surrounding your case.

     The Federal Services Impasse Panel adopted the Union's proposal.  It said that the warning "would help to ensure that due process is being observed" and is likely to avert future litigation on the matter.  Management failed to demonstrate the warnings would harm internal investigations.  Treasury, Bur. of Engraving. v. C-201 NTEU, #99 FSIP 96, 1999 FSIP Lexis 41.

Text: www.flra.gov/20.html

  »  Research Note: The Beckwith case did not mandate warnings; the 8-1 ruling simply held that a criminal suspect, who was interviewed in his home but not placed under arrest, was not entitled to receive the Miranda warnings.  Beckwith v. U.S., 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1976 U.S. Lexis 147 (1976).  Federal agents did warn him that:

“Under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, I cannot compel you to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers or information might tend to incriminate you in any way.  I also advise you that anything which you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in any criminal proceeding which may be undertaken.  I advise you further that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance of an attorney before responding.”

Appeals court upholds the firing of a police officer who, after an off-duty shootout with his wife, threatened to kill responding officers during an eight hour standoff.

     A male police officer was shot in his home by his wife, a corrections officer.  He also shot her in the abdomen with his gun and later claimed it was an accidental discharge.  For eight hours, others officers were unable to enter the home because he threatened to shoot them.  He later claimed he was "confused" because of his gunshot injury.

     A three-judge appellate court said termination was justified because he held his wounded wife as a hostage for eight hours and threatened to kill himself and officers from the barricade and hostage team.  McCloud v. Rodriguez, #1-98-1859, 710 N.E.2d 37 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 1999).

Full text: www.state.il.us/court

Appellate court sustains the termination of a police sergeant for covering up a sexual harassment incident.

     A four-judge appellate court in New York has upheld the termination of a NYPD sergeant who failed to investigate or report a complaint of aggravated sexual harassment by a subordinate and then made false and misleading statements to internal investigators.  Taggart v. Safir, 688 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. 1999).

Text: www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/Decisions.htm

Appeals court affirms the termination of a corrections officer who allowed her boyfriend to launder money in her home.

     The four-judge panel found adequate grounds to fire a corrections officer when her live-in boyfriend was caught in a money laundering scheme in her small apartment.  She also delayed entry by investigating officers for 10-15 minutes while he attempted to hide the evidence.  Miller v. N.Y.C.D.O.C., 688 N.Y.S.2d 46 (App.

Text: www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/Decisions.htm

Federal appeal court holds that the termination of a public employee because his wife had filed a lawsuit against public officials violates the First Amendments right to have intimate associations.

     The Second Circuit has upheld a suit brought by a N.Y. state employee who was fired in retaliation for another lawsuit, filed by his wife against a state official.  The three-judge panel found that his right of intimate association was protected by the First Amendment.

     The panel cautioned that a public employer might be able to take adverse job action if there is a justifiable nexus between the worker's duties and the objectionable activity by the worker's spouse or family.

     They cited Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984) where a police officer dated the daughter of an organized crime figure.  Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 16687, 15 IER Cases (BNA) 490 (2nd Cir.).

Full text: www.tourolaw.edu/2ndCircuit

  »  Research Note: We previously reported [1994 FP 109] that a new police chief could transfer his confidential secretary because she was married to a sergeant.  McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 1904 (11th Cir.).  The First Amendment does not apply to private employers, and the only remedy is a marital status discrimination claim, if permitted under state law (see Marital Status Discrimination, below).

     N.Y. state law would not afforded this plaintiff a remedy, because N.Y. courts interpret marital discrimination narrowly.  See Manhattan Pizza Hut v. N.Y. Hum. Rts. Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980).

President bans genetic testing and data collection in federal employment.  Federal agencies may not classify or base employment decisions on genetic information.  They forbidden to request, acquire or collect genetic information concerning federal workers.

     A genetic test includes DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites “to detect disease-related genotypes or mutations.”  However, metabolic tests “not intended to reveal the presence of a mutation” are exempted, which would include drug screening techniques.  Genetic monitoring of the biological effects of toxic workplace substances is also permitted.

     The President called on the Congress to pass similar legislation affecting nonfederal employers, insurance underwriters and health care organizations.  The action was endorsed by the American Medical Association, the American College of Medical Genetics and other professional organizations.  Executive Order #13145, 68 Law Week 2474 (2/8/2000).

Text: www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/2/8/8.text.2

Officer recovers just under $1 million.  She was forced to continue working near another officer who allegedly raped her.

     A police officer who suffered from post traumatic stress disorder, resulting from the treatment she received from a coworker, sued the city for the failure to accommodate her disability.  She testified she was followed, choked, raped, and burglarized by the male officer, then required to continue working only a few yards away from him.   The male officer is still on the force.

     A federal jury has awarded her $964,327; another $261,930 in attorneys' fees and costs was sought from the defendants.  The recovery was under the ADA; a Title VII gender discrimination claim was dismissed by the judge.

     The total verdict included $250,000 each, against the police chief and a former deputy chief.  The jury found the two chiefs had engaged in outrageous, extreme, atrocious and intolerable conduct.  Wimmer v. Stiers, #96-N-1547, 38 (1849) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 216 (D. Colo.).

EEOC adopts the position that a disabled person has job assignment priority over a more-qualified minority.

     What if there is one job opening available for a person with disabilities and a more qualified minority who seeks the position under an affirmative action program?  In a Letter Opinion, the EEOC advises that accommodating a disabled person takes priority over offering the job to a better-qualified minority under a voluntary affirmative action plan.

     The agency cautioned that an affirmative action plan would be superior if it is mandated by a court decree or a Federal Executive Order (such as EO 11246, affecting federal contractors).  In re U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 68 Law Week 2472, 38 (1849) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 220 (Ltr. Opin. 1-31-2000).

Florida rejects claim of a man who claimed he was fired because his wife brought a lawsuit against his employer.

     A private sector worker sued her former employer for sex discrimination and retaliation.  Her husband, who worked for the same firm, was terminated for allegedly poor performance.  He sued in state court for marital discrimination; the employer removed it to federal court, and the judge dismissed the action.

     On appeal, the employer argued that marital discrimination laws, such as Florida's, only protects marital status in general and do not protect a person because he/she is married to a particular person, e.g., a troublemaker.  The Federal Appeals court asked the Florida Supreme Court to define marital status discrimination.

     In its 5-to-2 opinion, the Florida justices said that most states that have interpreted marital status, have done so in context of an antinepotism or no-spouse employment rule.  Others have narrowed the interpretation to the status of being married, single, divorced, widowed or separated.

     The majority opted for the narrow reading and found the discharge of the husband did not violate Florida's martial discrimination law.  Donato v. AT&T, #SC93534, 2000 Fla. Lexis 67, 81 FEP Cases (BNA) 1302.

Full text: www.law.ufl.edu/opinions/supreme/index.shtml

Illinois Appellate Court recognizes a cause of action for the tort of invasion of privacy where investigators, who posed as coworkers, exceeded their duties in seeking information on theft and drug use.

     Although the case arose in the private sector, the decision could apply to law enforcement agencies that cooperate with private employers who report pilferage or drug sales by their workers.  A retail store distribution center that employs 500 employees engaged private investigations to gather information on theft and drug use.

     One investigator posed as a janitor; another was assigned to work in the repacking section.  They were asked to detect "theft, sabotage, safety, and drug use."  They sent written reports that contained information of:

(1) employee family matters (criminal conduct of employees' children, incidents of domestic violence and impending divorces);

(2) romantic interests/sex lives (number and gender of sexual partners);

(3) future employment plans (who was looking for another job and/or was planning to quit without advance notice);

(4) worker gripes about the employer; and

(5) personal matters and private concerns (employee health problems, paternity, and alcoholism).

     The employer's human resources director was terminated for unrelated reasons and snitched to plant employees, 55 of whom joined in a lawsuit in state court.  They alleged that the employer invaded their privacy, their seclusion, and publicized private facts.  They also claimed the employer intentionally inflicted emotional distress.

     A three-judge appellate panel agreed, noting there are four elements to prove that claim:

(1) an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiff's seclusion;

(2) an intrusion that is offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person;

(3) the matter upon which the intrusion occurs is private; and

(4) the intrusion causes anguish and suffering.

    They said:

     It is true... that plaintiffs willingly provided these personal details to the investigators ... [but] the means used ... were deceptive. Specifically ... the act of placing private detectives, posing as employees, in the workplace to solicit highly personal information ... [by] deception cannot be said to be a truly voluntary disclosure. Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation that their conversations with “coworkers” would remain private, at least to the extent that intimate life details would not be published to their employer.

     The panel said that the public disclosure requirement may be satisfied by a disclosure to an employer.  To recover on the emotional distress claims, however, plaintiffs must show that the employer's conduct was extreme and outrageous and that severe emotional distress likely result.  Johnson v. K Mart Corp., #1- 98-2172, 2000 Ill. App. Lexis 16, 15 IER Cases (BNA) 1605 (1st District).

Full text: www.state.il.us/court/2000/1982172.htm

NYC patrolmen's union stops merit raises for 2,000 officers; management failed to negotiate pay increases, and awarding detective pay to patrol officers would deprive the patrolmen's union of members.

     New York City's collective bargaining law requires management to bargain with the affected unions over all compensation issues.  In 1998, without bargaining, the city attempted to pay "assignment bonuses" to 2,000 officers.  The PBA won an improper practice charge.

     The city then tried, without bargaining, to promote the officers to “detective specialists,” thereby removing approximately 2,000 officers from the membership of the PBA.  Detectives are represented by another union and most of those who were to be promoted would remain in patrol assignments.

     The PBA sought injunctive relief.  The judge commented that the selected officers may well deserve recognition pay, but such benefits "can only be obtained through mandatory collective bargaining."  PBA v. City of New York, QDS:22702130, N.Y.L.J. 2- 22-2000 (Sup. Ct. 2000).

Full text: www.nylj.com/decisions/00/02/022200b1.htm

Federal appeals court holds than employees who are seriously assaulted by a coworker because of their race or gender can sue for a Title VII hostile work environment.

     A corrections officer in Chicago assaulted a coworker, twisting her wrist severely enough to require surgery.  She reported the incident, but the sheriff's department did not investigate or discipline the offender.

     She sued the Sheriff's Dept. and the sheriff, alleging a Title VII hostile work environment. The trial court dismissed the action, but a three-judge appellate panel has reversed.  To recover, a claimant must prove:

1. The offensive conduct is based on a protected status, e.g., gender.

2. The conduct must be severe or pervasive.

3. There must be some basis for making the employer liable, such as failing to take reasonable steps to discover or remedy the misconduct.

     In this case, there was proof the offender behaved aggressively toward women coworkers, but not men.  Her injuries were substantial and the failure to discipline the officer raised the specter of employer liability.  Smith v. Sheahan, No. 98- 2445, 189 F.3d 529, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 20279, 80 FEP Cases (BNA) 1071 (7th Cir. 1999).

Full text: www.kentlaw.edu/7circuit/

Federal appeals court affirms termination of a Jehovah's Witness who refused to work when paired with a woman.

     The plaintiff was fired because his religious beliefs prevent him from making overnight trips with women workers, other than his wife.  The three-judge panel found that accommodating his wishes would unduly burden his co-workers.

     Title VII does not require an employer to force other workers to change their schedules, they said, citing similar cases involving Seventh Day Adventists.  Weber v. Roadway Exp., #98-1146, 199 F.3d 270, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 150, 81 FEP Cases (BNA) 1138 (5th Cir.).

Full text: www.law.utexas.edu/us5th/us5th.html

  »  Research Note: Another federal appeals circuit upheld the termination of a Jehovah's Witness who refused to wear a firearm for religious reasons.  Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655 (2nd Cir. 1993).

Appeals court sustains demotion of a jail sergeant who claimed he saw his lieutenant mistreat an inmate.  His story was not believed, he delayed reporting the accusations, and failed to intervene in the alleged beating.

     A jail sergeant alleged his lieutenant, while in a violent rage, threw a handcuffed inmate head first into a wall and kicked him.  A subsequent internal investigation, and an external investigation by a Texas Ranger, exonerated the lieutenant.  The sergeant was demoted and sued, alleging he was disciplined for protected whistleblowing activity.

     A jury also exonerated the lieutenant, and a three-judge appellate panel has affirmed.  The sergeant waited a day before reporting a serious act of misconduct, and failed to intervene in what he claimed was a continuing act of brutality.  The inmate gave six different versions of the event.  LaGrange v. Nueces Co., 989 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.App. 1999).

Text: www.courts.state.tx.us/appcourt.htm

Federal court refuses to dismiss a harassment suit against the local and national unions, for failing to process her harassment grievances.

     The only woman police dispatcher repeatedly complained about sexual harassment to superiors and the union.  After neither would help her, she quit, sued the town, the local and national unions, and selected officers.  The union sought dismissal.

     The court said the local union was aware of “severe and constant harassment” and “failed to file grievances because of some discriminatory motive or attitude which pervaded both the union and plaintiff's place of work.”

     The court also said that a jury should decide whether the national would be liable for the local's actions.  Rainey v. Warren, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 295 (D.R.I).

Federal panel overturns a ban on the use of smokeless tobacco in the workplace.  Tobacco chewers would have to go to designated smoking areas and would be exposed to secondary smoke.

     A union of federal employees disagreed with management at an Air Force Base over the implementation of a ban on smokeless tobacco products in the workplace, AF vehicles, and on aircraft.

     Employees wishing to use smokeless tobacco had to do so in the same designated areas used by smokers and are be limited to one 15 min. break per 4 hours of work plus a 20 to 60 min. lunch period.

     The Federal Services Impasse Panel adopted the union's position for two reasons:

1. Limiting access to smokeless tobacco might encourage workers to switch to cigarettes.

2. Placing smokers and smokeless tobacco users in the same tobacco use areas exposes nonsmokers to secondary tobacco smoke.

Dept. of Air Force, Dover, Del. and L-1709 AFGE, Decis. #424, 99 FSIP 88, 1999 FSIP Lexis 31.

Text: www.flra.gov/20.html

Federal panel rejects the demand of a corrections union to allow officers to wear "utility" uniforms on duty in place of their dress uniforms, because it might lessen respect from the inmates.

     In two recent federal impasse cases, management prevailed on the issue of authorized uniforms.  Union officials at a federal prison wanted the option of not wearing their dress uniforms (white shirt, dress slacks, blazer and tie).  The alternative the union wanted, was a less expensive, washable, gray shirt and pants, known as the utility uniform.

     The Federal Services Impasses Panel adopted management's position, noting that "the Class A uniform, which appears more professional, may engender greater respect from inmates."  Fed. Bur. of Prisons, Lompoc, Cal. and L-4048 AFGE, Decis. #423, 99 FSIP 92, 1999 FSIP Lexis 28; Fed. Bur. of Prisons, Coleman, Fla. and L-506 AFGE, Decis. #424, 99 FSIP 104, 1999 FSIP Lexis 33.

Text: www.flra.gov/20.html

  »  Research Note: Although not cited in the above cases, a federal appeals court previously held that the INS had no duty to bargain with a border patrol union over clothing rules; management refused to negotiate the wearing of jean style trousers while on “rough duty.”  Dept. of Justice v. FLRA, 881 F.2d 636, 1989 U.S. App. Lexis 10862 (9th Cir. 1989).

Text: www.ce9.uscourts.gov/opinions

Arbitrator finds that a new warden must honor a past practice of allowing officers to wear jeans and sneakers.

     A federal correctional facility in Texas was bound by a preexisting contract, and management can not ban denim jeans or athletic shoes worn by correctional personnel.  The assignment of a new warden does not excuse noncompliance.

     Past practices are determined by relationships between institutions and employees, and not by the personal identity of managers.  Although no disciplinary action had been initiated, one person was sent home to change clothes.  The named grievant wears jeans because women officers must climb ladders, which is “embarrassing” when they wear skirts.

     The arbitrator declined to issue a cease and desist order, but made it clear than any dress code “expectations” of management must conform to institutional past practices during the life of the labor contract. Fed. Bur. of Prisons and AFGE L- 1298, FMCS Case #99/07979, 113 LA (BNA) 715 (Moore, 1999).

  »  Editor's Comment: Although the Bureau of Prisons may not be legally required to bargain over dress codes, once an institution tolerates a practice that existed prior to the latest bargaining agreement took affect, management must honor any recognized past practices.

NLRB orders an employer not to interfere with discussions among employees concerning their grievances and complaints.  Gag rule violates 29 U.S. Code §158(a)(1).

     A defense plant security guard had medical restrictions that prevented her from wearing a sidearm and from handling classified trash. Other guards discussed the situation with union representatives, because of their concern that the impaired guard could not assist others by using a weapon.

     Plant management ordered the guards to stop talking about the impaired guard's medical restrictions.  One guard was suspended for 3 days for talking with other employees about the situation (and for an unrelated matter).

     A supervisor said it was management policy to maintain the confidentiality of an investigation, and that employees should not discuss those investigations, to avoid conflict among employees.     The complainants alleged the employer “unlawfully promulgated and maintained a rule prohibiting employees from discussing employee discipline and disciplinary investigations with anyone.”

     An Administrative Law Judge concluded that the employer's rule “unlawfully restrained and coerced” employees in violation of 29 U.S. Code §158(a)(1).  On appeal, the Board directed the employer to:

1. “Rescind its rule prohibiting employees from discussing employee discipline and disciplinary investigations with anyone.”

2. Cease and desist from warning or reprimanding employees for discussing employee discipline and disciplinary investigations, employees' medical restrictions, and other subjects that may be grievable under their collective-bargaining agreement.

3. Cease telling union representatives to “shut up” during the course of investigatory interviews with employees; and

4. Refrain from “coercively interrogating employees” concerning their grievances and union activities.

Lockheed Martin and Fiala, #27-CA-14557 et al., 2000 NLRB Lexis 6, 330 NLRB No. 66.

Full text: www.nlrb.gov/

  »  Editor's Note: Although the NLRA does not apply directly to the public sector, state employment relations boards often cite NLRB decisions as persuasive authority.  Most state laws have language similar to Sec. 158(a)(1).

     “Defeating mandatory arbitration clauses,” Trial magazine (ATLA Jan. 2000) and online at www.atlanet.org/homepage/triaJ00.htm

     "English only rules in the workplace," 15 (2) The Labor Lawyer (ABA) 295-308 (Fall 1999).  $20.90; e-mail: abasvcctr@abanet.org

     “Due process protocol for mediation and arbitration of statutory disputes arising out of the employment relationship,” on Internet at:

www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/ababna/monographs/PROTOCOL.doc    The protocol is endorsed by the Amer. Bar Assn., Amer. Arbitr. Assn., Natl. Empl. Lawyers Assn., FMCS, ACLU, etc.

     “Symposium on genetic privacy,” nine articles covering laws, insurance, privacy, etc., 40 (1) Jurimetrics (ABA) 1-152, Fall 1999. Amer. Bar Assn., Sci. & Techn. Sec. e-mail: abasvcctr@abanet.org

Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 16687, 15 IER Cases (BNA) 490 (2nd Cir.). [53-4]
Air Force (Dept. of), Dover, Del. and L-1709 AFGE, Decis. #424, 99 FSIP 88, 1999 FSIP Lexis 31. [60]
Beckwith v. U.S., 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1976 U.S. Lexis 147 (1976). [52-3]
Donato v. AT&T, #SC93534, 2000 Fla. Lexis 67, 81 FEP Cases (BNA) 1302. [55-6]
Fed. Bur. of Prisons, Coleman, Fla. and L-506 AFGE, Decis. #424, 99 FSIP 104, 1999 FSIP Lexis 33. [60]
Fed. Bur. of Prisons, Lompoc, Cal. and L-4048 AFGE, Decis. #423, 99 FSIP 92, 1999 FSIP Lexis 28. [60]
Fed. Bur. of Prisons and AFGE L-1298, FMCS Case #99/07979, 113 LA (BNA) 715 (Moore, 1999). [61]
Gritchen v. Collier, 73 F.Supp.2d 1148, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16579. [51]
Hughes v. City of Garland, #99-10482, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 1789 (5th Cir.). [51]
Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 2000 Ill. App. Lexis 16, 15 IER Cases (BNA) 1605 (1st Dist.). [56-7]
Justice (Dept. of) v. FLRA, 881 F.2d 636, 1989 U.S. App. Lexis 10862 (9th Cir. 1989). [60-1]
LaGrange v. Nueces Co., 989 S.W.2d 96 (Tex.App. 1999). [59]
Lockheed Martin and Fiala, #27-CA-14557 et al., 2000 NLRB Lexis 6, 330 NLRB No. 66. [61]
Manhattan Pizza Hut v. N.Y. Hum. Rts. Appeal Bd., 51 N.Y.2d 506, 415 N.E.2d 950 (1980). [54]
McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1994 U.S. App. Lexis 1904 (11th Cir.). [54]
Mesa v. Rodriquez, 357 So.2d 711, 1978 Fla. Lexis 4767 (1978). [51]
Miller v. N.Y.C.D.O.C., 688 N.Y.S.2d 46 (App. 1999). [53]
Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655 (2nd Cir. 1993). [59]
PBA v. City of New York, QDS:22702130, N.Y.L.J. 2-22-2000 (Sup. Ct. 2000). [57-8]
Rainey v. Warren, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 295 (D.R.I). [59]
Smith v. Sheahan, 189 F.3d 529, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 20279 (7th Cir. 1999). [58]
Taggart v. Safir, 688 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. 1999). [53]
Treasury, Bur. of Engrv. v. C-201 NTEU, #99 FSIP 96, 1999 FSIP Lexis 41. [52]
Weber v. Roadway Exp., #98-1146, 199 F.3d 270, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 150 (5th Cir.). [58-9]
Wilson v. Taylor, 733 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1984). [54]
Wimmer v. Stiers, #96-N-1547, 38 (1849) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 216 (D. Colo.). [55]

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS & RULINGS:

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:
     U.S. Chamber of Commerce (In Re), 68 Law Week 2472, 38 (1849) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 220 (Ltr. Opin. 1-31-2000). [55]