November, 2000 web edition

Federal court sentences NYPD officers in Louima bathroom torture case.

     A federal judge has sentenced three more officers in connection with the incident where Abner Louima was “sodomized” by a NYPD officer with a handle.  Last year, the principal wrongdoer, Justin Volpe, was sentenced to 360 months imprisonment, five years of supervised release, restitution, and a permanent prohibition on possession of a firearm.

     In sentencing Volpe, who pled guilty, the court departed downward because it found that he faced unusually restrictive conditions of imprisonment because of “the extra-ordinary notoriety of this case ... coupled with [his] status as a police officer,” making him “unusually susceptible to abuse in prison.” U.S. v. Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d 887 and 78 F. Supp.2d 76, at 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).

     Officer Schwarz, who assisted in the incident, was recently sentenced to imprisonment of 188 months, five years supervised release, and restitution to Louima at $25.00 per month.

     Officers Bruder and Wiese, who assisted in the coverup, are to be imprisoned for 60 months, plus two years supervision. U.S. v. Bruder; U.S. v. Schwarz; U.S. v. Wiese, #98 CR 196, 103 F.Supp.2d 155, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9382 (E.D.N.Y.).

Divided federal appeals court dismisses a due process post-termination suit brought by a fire chief who was unaware that he had failed to exhaust his administrative appeal remedies.

     A fire district board warned its chief of a severe morale problem and asked him to present a plan.  He never responded; nearly all of the firefighters later signed a no confidence petition.

     The board notified the chief of his substandard performance and announced a decision to terminate him. It offered him an opportunity to present arguments and evidence in his defense at a special meeting. At that meeting, the chief's attorney objected to the procedures but did not dispute the substantive allegations.

     Under state law, a tenured public employee can call and examine witnesses under oath, introduce documents and exhibits, file supporting affidavits, and object to the introduction of evidence.  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 536.070 and 536.010-150; see Wheeler v. Bd. of Police Cmsnrs. of K.C., 918 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.App. 1996).

     The chief refused to address the board or answer questions, and left the meeting. He sued in federal court, alleging due process violations.  The trial judge dismissed the suit.

     An appellate panel has affirmed, 2-to-1; the majority said that the chief's failure to participate in a contested administrative termination procedure waived any federal due process claims.  Although he was unaware of the procedural requirement, he could have learned of it from a “reading of the statutes and pertinent cases.”

     A dissenting Judge wrote that:

... the court now establishes precedent that a tenured employee must have the necessary legal skills or hire and pay counsel with the necessary legal skills to research state law to find any potentially applicable administrative procedures or risk waiver of a constitutional right. This flies in the face of established precedent.

     He said that requiring a tenured public employee to be knowledgeable about administrative remedies was wrong “as a matter of policy and as a matter of law.”  Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., #99-4235, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 24940 (8th Cir.).

Full text: ls.wustl.edu/8th.cir/

Nebraska joins with those states that admits unlawfully seized evidence in disciplinary hearings.

     Omaha police officers served a search warrant at the home of two city employees.  They found a marijuana growing operation and $10,000 worth of city property.  The criminal charges disappeared when the search warrant was quashed, on the ground of unproven reliability of the informant.

     The city’s Personnel Board likewise suppressed the evidence, and the city appealed.  An appellate court has reversed, concluding that “the exclusionary rule should not have been applied in [an] administrative employment status case.”

     The opinion was based on U.S. Supreme Court decisions in noncriminal cases and similar holdings in the courts of other states.  Omaha v. Savard-Henson, #99-645, 9 Neb. App. 561, 615 N.W.2d 497, 2000 Neb. App. Lexis 243.

Full text: court.nol.org/opinions/opinindex.htm

 »  Research Note: Other states admitting illegally obtained evidence in disciplinary hearings are AZ, AR, CA, CO, IL, MD, NJ and NY; MA, NM and OK do not.  See the our online digest for the cases.

Terminated firefighter must offer proof at the civil service hearing that union activities were the reason for disciplinary action; a later court challenge will fail, absent evidence of a hostile motivation.  He failed to offer proof that his termination for obesity was inspired by his presidency of the union.

     The president of a firefighters' union weighed 240 lbs. — 3 over the maximum allowable, under a body-fat measurement system.  As a competitive body builder and weightlifter, he was even more overweight on standardized height/weight charts.

     Because it was his third weight policy violation in a 12-month period, the chief sought his termination.  At a subsequent hearing before a city personnel board, he did not testify or present any evidence; instead, he argued that the city's body-fat test was not fair.  He did not raise a claim that he was being disciplined for his union presidency or other First Amendment issues.

     He sued the city and officials in a seven-count complaint, complaining that they “had a pervasive custom and practice of threatening, coercing, and intimidating firefighters to keep them from joining Local 1444.”

     His suit was dismissed by the trial court; the state supreme court affirmed, 9-0.  If a public employee wants to challenge the findings of a personnel board on the ground that it is a “rubber stamp” for the actions of a dept. chief and the city, “he must present substantial evidence to that effect.”

     An employee must prove that a personnel or civil service board “was aware of, acquiesced in, or ratified” the hostility allegedly harbored by a department head toward the union.  Cremeens v. City of  Montgomery, #1971571, 2000 Ala. Lexis 406, 164 LRRM (BNA) 3137.

Full text: www.findlaw.com/11stategov/al/alca.html

Appeals court overturns a controversial arbitration award that annulled the punishment of 28 firefighters who drank on duty and made racially offensive remarks on a videotape.  Although the delay between the incident and punishment was 8 years, public policy required disciplinary action.

     We previously reported  [1999 FP 38-9] than an arbitrator annulled all disciplinary action against 28 Chicago firefighters who took part in a videotaped 1990 stationhouse party.

     The tape depicted firefighters drinking alcohol before responding to fire calls, making offensive racial, gender, and ethnic slurs, and exposing their bare private body parts before the videocamera.

     The CFD's IAD director had failed to open an investigation or apprize his superiors of the existence of the videotape -- which was publicly revealed by a local TV station in 1997. The arbitrator ruled that the delay was unreasonable.

     A trial court confirmed the award, but a three-judge appellate court has reversed, citing a matter of strong public policy `”favoring safe and effective fire prevention services.”  Ordinarily, courts will not overturn an arbitrator's decision to require rehabilitation or to “order reinstatement of the employee to a position in which he poses no danger to the public.”  The panel of judges said:

The order of the arbitrator fails to show that any precautionary steps were taken to deter any future misconduct or to ensure that it would not be repeated. The arbitrator merely concluded, based on his own assumptions, that the firefighters would fail to engage in any offensive activities in the future.

The arbitrator held no hearing whatsoever on the merits of the alleged infractions committed by the 28 firefighters, and failed to consider any evidence that the firefighters took responsibility in any way for the conduct they engaged in and the charges leveled against them.

The arbitrator's award fails to promote the safety and welfare of the public in direct contravention of well- established public policy... [and] it is the court's responsibility to protect the public interest...

     The three-judge panel concluded by saying that “courts will not give the drunken pilot the opportunity to fly a commercial airliner again even though no harm befell his passengers.”  Chicago Fire Fighters Union L-2 v. City of Chicago, #1-99-2647, 735 N.E.2d 108, 2000 Ill. App. Lexis 674, 165 LRRM (BNA) 2100.

Full Text: www.state.il.us/court/2000/1992647.htm

Arbitrator upholds a 3-day suspension of a city employee who took city property worth $2.

     The civilian city worker defended his action by claiming that many other employees took items worth only a few dollars and were not disciplined. The arbitrator said even if everyone did it, “that is not an excuse,” because “theft is theft -- whether of two dollars or two million.”

     He noted that the city considered the amount in assessing the penalty, and that a three day suspension was more lenient than excessive.  Oakland Park and Feder. of Public Employees, FMCS Case #00/02324, 114 LA (BNA) 1192 (Abrams, 2000).

Maryland appellate court affirms the termination of a male corrections officer who allowed female inmates to live with him after their release.

     The county had a rule that corrections personnel “will not establish a personal relationship with an inmate ... beyond what is required to perform official duties.”  Management proved that three female inmates came to live at the appellant's house after their release.

     In affirming his termination, a three-judge appellate panel said that correctional officers have authority over inmates, and personal conduct must be measured with that responsibility in mind, “even if motivated by good intentions.”

     Behavior that demonstrates an abuse of authority “should be of the greatest concern to the public and to the Department.”  The conduct undermined the public's confidence or trust in the Department.  Stover v. Prince George’s Co., #775-1999, 132 Md.App. 373, 752 A.2d 686, 2000 Md. App. Lexis 92.

Full text: www.courts.state.md.us/T40/

Missouri appellate court allows a city to give preference on hiring lists to those employed in other city agencies.

     A union challenged a city policy that gives current city employees priority in firefighter hiring, over non-city employees.  A three judge appellate panel has upheld the preference.  City appointments and promotions in the city were required to be on “the sole basis of merit and fitness ... ascertained by ... competitive tests, or service ratings, or both.”

     Whether for promotions or transfers, the city could use service ratings as well as competitive examinations in creating an eligibility list.  Deeken v. City of St. Louis, #ED77336, 2000 Mo.App. Lexis 1433.

 »  Editor's Note: The wording of a city charter or civil service law is sometimes determinative.  Generally, preferences may be given to armed services veterans, to applicants with prior experience in the same or similar fields, and to candidates with prior or current service with the same entity.

Federal court awards over $700,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to 13 employees who claimed they were unlawfully disciplined for speaking Spanish on the job.  Employer's policy had no exceptions for meal or break periods.

     A federal court in Dallas has found that an employer’s comprehensive policy of banning all languages other than English, except to non-English speaking callers, discriminated against workers based on their national origin and violated their civil rights.

     The policy prohibited all speaking of Spanish on the premises, including the free time between taking calls, during meal periods in the employee break room, when making personal telephone calls to home, and at any other non-duty time when in the employer's building.

     There was evidence that Hispanic employees “unconsciously, or inadvertently, switched from English to Spanish when speaking informally with other Hispanic employees.”

     The EEOC language guideline is codified at 29 C.F.R. §1606.7 and divides English-only rules into two categories: (1) rules that apply at all times; and (2) rules that apply only at certain times.  Rules falling into the first category are presumed to violate Title VII. Rules falling into the second category, however, are allowed where the employer demonstrates a business necessity for the rule.

     The court rejected the employer's defense that the policy did not have a disparate impact on Hispanic employees because they are bilingual and could easily comply with the English-only policy.

     In an earlier ruling, the court specifically found that the plaintiffs could receive punitive damages as possible relief.  In the current action, terminated employees received back pay awards of approximately $59,000 and $50,000 each in compensatory and punitive damages.  EEOC v. Premier Operator Serv., #3:98-CV-198 (N.D. Tex. 2000); prior decis. at 75 F.Supp.2d 550, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20710.

Federal prison system settles overtime claims for $120 million; officers were not paid when getting or returning their equipment, before and after their shifts.

     The Bureau of Prisons will pay $120,353,105 to satisfy overtime sought by AFGE prison locals. The claims arose from the uncompensated 15 minutes or more each day officers spent getting or returning equipment.

     Almost 34,000 workers were affected between 1989 and 1996. Payments will be based on the length of service during the covered period. Payments will range from $365 to $8,040 each. AFGE will receive $10,000 in legal fees, and up to $25,000 in administrative costs.  AFGE and Dept of Justice, 38 (1879) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1065 (Aug. 2000).

Two lawyer-police officers who accepted executive assignments lost their right to claim overtime as nonexempt employees. The fact their pay stubs listed hourly pay and leave time was not determinative of their exempt status.

     A police lieutenant assigned as chief legal advisor was classified as a “Supervisory and Professional” employee at $77,000 per year.  A lawyer-sergeant was also assigned to duties as a police legal advisor.  Both sued for overtime, claiming they are not exempt under the FLSA and state law.

     They argued that their pay stubs list their accrued vacation time, sick time, and compensation time in hourly increments, and that they were required to report their leave in hourly increments.

     The court said there was some “evidentiary minutia that might, in some strained sense, tangentially support the notion that the City viewed them as nonexempt employees.”  However, the underlying and controlling question is whether the nature of their job duties classifies them in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity; see 29 U.S. Code §213(a)(1).

     When they accepted their assignments as legal advisors, they lost any overtime rights they may have retained as a lieutenant and sergeant.  Kavanagh v. City of Phoenix, 87 F.Supp.2d 958, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2776, 6 WH Cases2d (BNA) 661 (D. Ariz).

 »  Editor's Comment: The failure to design payroll and leave software to reflect a worker's exempt status can lead to expensive litigation.  Alternatively, an employer can distribute a form that explains that hourly compensation and leave records appearing on payroll check stubs may not be applicable in all cases.

     More importantly, those individuals who are offered an assignment classified as exempt from overtime should execute a form acknowledging that status.

Firefighter was not entitled to sick leave to care for a live-in woman who was pregnant with his child.  Neither the FMLA or the CBA defines a her as a domestic relative.

     The need for definitional clarity in writing bargaining agreements is apparent where modern-day domestic relationships are concerned.  The grievant lived with a woman for almost 5 years; she was 9 months pregnant with his child, and ill.

     The federal FMLA did not support a claim.  The bargaining agreement and city policy authorized paid leave to care for one's spouse, specified blood relatives and “other relatives of the employee who reside in the employee's household.”

     Leave was later granted, properly, to care for the infant, when born.  An unwed mother has no protected relationship to an employee for leave purposes.  The grievant was not entitled to take paid leave to care for her.  McAlestar, City of and IAFF L- 2284, FMCS Case #00124-04902-8, 114 LA (BNA) 1180 (Crow, 2000).

Federal appeals court rejects suit by an activist who was banned from a city facility because of her rude and disruptive behavior.

     In a 2-to-1 holding, the Fourth Circuit threw out a suit by an animal rights activist who sued the police chief and other officials, after she was banned from visiting the city’s shelter.

     The majority said “we believe that it was not unlawful for [city officials] to have ushered [the plaintiff] from the Shelter on the three occasions when they were confronted with what they perceived was rude and disruptive conduct by [her].”

     The shelter had a regulation which prohibits “insolent, profane, or derogatory language.”  The dissenting judge said that dismissal was premature because the plaintiff denies engaging in disruptive conduct.  Mcafee v. Deale, #99-2361, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 21411 (4th Cir.).

Full text: www.law.emory.edu/4circuit

Arbitrator upholds disciplinary action against a police officer for speaking obscenities to a superior, even though the agency tolerated obscene and vulgar comments in general.

     The arbitrator said “there is a sharp distinction” between describing a citizen as a “fucking moron” and directly calling your superior officer such in a one-on-one dispute.  The first may be inappropriate because of a chance being overheard by an outsider, but the other is “inexcusable  insubordination and lack of respect for authority.”

     He said that toleration of general speech obscenities does not excuse provocatory language to a superior or justify a defense of unequal treatment.  A 30-day suspension was upheld, because the bad language was accompanied by insubordination.

     Additionally the officer wrongfully refused to drive a patrol unit that had a disabled siren.  The car was in good mechanical condition and the emergency lights worked.  Metrop. Wash. Airports Auth. and IUPA L-5004, FMCS 300/01801-8, 114 LA (BNA) 589 (Moore, 2000).

An employer did not violate the ADA by rejecting job applicants whose pre-employment tests revealed a proclivity of developing carpal tunnel syndrome.

     An occupational health clinic used a physical exam to determine whether applicants were suited to the demands of repetitive tasks and had abnormal neurometry -- with a high likelihood of developing RMIs.

     The court said, in a case brought by the EEOC, the applicants were not regarded as disabled because there was no evidence that they were restricted from a wide class of jobs. They were disqualified for performing work requiring a high volume repetitive motion.

     The court relied on two recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999) — where pilot applicants who wore corrective lenses were rejected, and Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999) — where an applicant with high blood pressure was passed over.

     In both cases the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs were not disabled, because the applicants were qualified for work in a broad class of jobs.  In this case, the employer's perception, whether justified or not, did not bar the rejected applicants from a broad range of jobs.  EEOC v. Woodbridge, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15140, 69 U.S. Law Week 1232 (W.D. Mo. 2000).

Federal court upholds termination of a corrections officer taking Coumadin, an anticoagulant.

     A 15-year veteran officer was terminated, after spending more than 2 years on light duty. She was taking Coumadin, “which put her at risk of acute blood loss if she suffered physical trauma.”  Inmate supervision poses a risk of physical trauma, a “function of [the] plaintiff's job as a corrections officer.”

     The court said, “even if the risk that a corrections officer will be exposed to physical trauma is minimal, it may still be an essential part of the job.”  She failed to show that a reasonable accommodation was available. The undisputed facts establish that inmate supervision, and the concomitant risk of physical trauma,” was an essential function of plaintiff’s job as a corrections officer.”  Pickering v. City of Atlanta, 75 F.Supp.2d 1374, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18136 (N.D. Ga.).

Termination of a police officer because of his hearing difficulty did not violate the ADA, where there was no permanent light duty position.

     A housing police officer was fired for hearing impairment.  He had rejected job transfers as a clerk, van driver and dispatcher.  In his ADA suit, he sought permanent assignment to a light duty position (quartermaster).

     The court noted “that the extreme loss of high frequency hearing rendered plaintiff unfit for duty as a police officer.”  It also was questionable if he was “disabled.” The impairment did not limit a major life activity. “The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

     Finally, there was no permanent light duty position available.  Stinson v. Baltimore City, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13565, 10 AD Cases (BNA) 1562, 2000 WL 968445 (D.Md. 2000).

Federal judge rejects a suit that claims that the plaintiffs’ fitness-for-duty exams violated the Fourth Amendment; the sole remedy was an administrative appeal.

     A federal court in Sacramento has dismissed a suit filed by two former Deputy U.S. Marshals.  They claimed that the Marshals Service violated their rights to be free from unreasonable searches by requiring them to undergo fitness-for-duty examinations, in order to return from extended time off without pay.

     One of the plaintiffs also alleged the Marshals’ Service gave false information about him to a sheriff’s dept. when he applied for a job there.

     The judge ruled that their sole remedy for any abuses lie within the Civil Service Reform Act.  Orsay v. Enemoto, unreported (E.D. Cal. 2000); the Sacramento Bee (9/20/2000).

Federal appeals court revitalizes a lawsuit claiming that a city systematically disapproves injury claims of black police officers because of their race.

     A Chicago police officer was injured while on duty when he slipped on icy pavement and fell.  A white superior refused to authorize injured on duty status and made it very clear that because the officer was African-American, he did not believe his story, supposedly saying “I'll get your black ass off this job yet.”

     Later, a police physician, without performing a medical examination, refused to rate the officer as unfit for duty, and allegedly said , “You blacks are all the same [and] I’m going to have the department fire you for insubordination.”

     The officer attempted to show that Chicago “has disapproved claims of African-American police officers for injury-on-duty status at a greater rate than the claims of similarly situated white officers... [giving] rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”

Full text: www.ca7.uscourts.gov/

     A three-judge appellate panel found that the district judge erred in dismissing the municipal liability claims in the officer's amended complaint.  They said the complaint alleged discriminatory treatment of blacks by high level policy-making officers, and remanded the case for further proceedings.  McCormick v. City of Chicago, #99-2365, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 25686 (7th Cir.).

Full text: www.ca7.uscourts.gov/

Federal jury awards a black, ex-LAPD officer $5.3 million for race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation.

     The first black member of the elite LAPD bomb squad did not receive the pay differentials given to white squad members.  He was issued protective clothing that was too small and never replaced.

     During a training session, white coworkers detonated explosives before he had reached a protective barrier. He was called ``boy'' by a supervisor and was racially insulted by another superior officer.

     Disabled by job stress, he resigned and filed suit.  The jury ruled 12-0 on all allegations, awarding him $5.3 million.  (John) Francois v. City of Los Angeles, Super.Ct., Los Ang. Co., Cal. #BC186536, 38 (1884) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1222 (10/6/00).

Federal court holds that a union can be sued for failing to assist a member with ongoing sexual harassment and for condoning harassment.

     A woman correctional officer was assigned to a prison hospital ward.  A male officer showed her sexually explicit photographs of another woman officer and suggested that she pose with him for a similar photograph.

     She then reported the situation to the Deputy Warden and the DoC’s EEO office. The next day the Deputy Warden reprimanded her for reporting the incident to the EEO, and threatened to transfer her.  She also complained to her union rep and asked for assistance in filing a sexual harassment complaint. She was told the union would not help her and the union rep. allegedly began to harass her.

     Eventually, the EEO issued a determination that union had aided and abetted the DoC in discriminating against her, that a union official had abused his position to harass her, and that the union should have taken remedial action. She filed suit in federal court.

     The City of New York settled her claims for $409,259.  She continued her action against the union, claiming that it failed to prosecute her sexual harassment grievance against the DoC, did not take any remedial measures, treated her rudely, retaliated by failing to investigate her charges against her union rep., and  breached its duty of fair representation.

     The federal judge noted that a union must serve the interests of all members “without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.”

     The court rejected the union's argument that sexual harassment charges are not grievable because a union is not in control of the workplace.  There was evidence that the union rep failed to assist her and that he had used his authority to harass her, thus breaching the duty of fair representation.

     The union had both actual and imputed knowledge of the rep’s conduct.  The judge declined to dismiss her claim that the union caused, or attempted to cause, a hostile work environment.  Agosto v. Correctional Ofcrs. Benev. Assn., 107 F.Supp.2d 294, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10387, 83 FEP Cases (BNA) 1042 (S.D.N.Y.).

City was not obliged to pay a resigning officer for his unused sick leave.

     A West Virginia city had an unwritten policy of not paying unused sick leave to resigning police officers.  A resigning officer with more than 99 days of accumulated sick pay sued in state court.

     The jury awarded him $6,956 in pay, $2,100 in liquidated damages, attorney's fees, interest and costs. The state supreme court reversed because the city's policy of never paying unused sick leave to separated police officers was well-known.

     A dissenting judge said that “wages” includes all fringe benefits capable of calculation and payable directly to an employee.  Ingram v. City of Princeton, #26351, 2000 WL 966140, 141 Lab.Cas. P 59,014, 2000 W. Va. Lexis 92.

Full text: www.state.wv.us/wvsca/opinions.htm

AFGE and Dept of Justice, 38 (1879) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1065 (Aug. 2000). [168-9]
Agosto v. Correctional Ofcrs. Benev. Assn., 107 F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.). [174]
Chicago Fire Fighters Union L-2 v. Chicago, 735 N.E.2d 108, 2000 Ill. App. Lexis 674. [165-6]
Cremeens v. City of  Montgomery, #1971571, 2000 Ala. Lexis 406, 164 LRRM (BNA) 3137. [165]
Deeken v. City of St. Louis, #ED77336, 2000 Mo.App. Lexis 1433. [167]
EEOC v. Premier Operator Serv., #3:98-CV-198 (N.D. Tex. 2000). [168]
EEOC v. Woodbridge, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15140, 69 U.S. Law Week 1232 (W.D. Mo. 2000). [171]
Francois v. City of Los Angeles, Super.Ct., 38 (1884) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1222 (10/6/00). [173]
Ingram v. City of Princeton, #26351, 2000 WL 966140, 2000 W. Va. Lexis 92. [174-5]
Kavanagh v. City of Phoenix, 87 F.Supp.2d 958, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2776 (D. Ariz). [169]
Krentz v. Robertson Fire Prot. Dist., #99-4235, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 24940 (8th Cir.). [163-4]
Mcafee v. Deale, #99-2361, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 21411 (4th Cir.). [170]
McAlestar, City of and IAFF L- 2284, FMCS Case #00124-04902-8,
     114 LA (BNA) 1180 (Crow, 2000). [169-70]
McCormick v. City of Chicago, #99-2365, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 25686 (7th Cir.). [173]
Metrop. Wash. Airports Auth. and IUPA L-5004, 114 LA (BNA) 589 (Moore, 2000). [170-1]
Murphy v. UPS, 527 U.S. 516 (1999). [171]
Oakland Park and Feder. of Pub. Empl., 114 LA (BNA) 1192 (Abrams, 2000). [166-7]
Omaha v. Savard-Henson, 9 Neb. App. 561, 615 N.W.2d 497, 2000 Neb. App. Lexis 243. [164]
Orsay v. Enemoto, unreported (E.D. Cal. 2000); the Sacramento Bee (9/20/2000). [172]
Pickering v. City of Atlanta, 75 F.Supp.2d 1374, 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18136 (N.D. Ga.). [171-2]
Stinson v. Baltimore City, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13565, 2000 WL 968445 (D.Md. 2000). [172]
Stover v. Prince George's Co.,32 Md.App. 373, 752 A.2d 686, 2000 Md. App. Lexis 92. [167]
Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999). [171]
U.S. v. Bruder, 103 F.Supp.2d 155 (E.D.N.Y.). [163]
U.S. v. Schwarz, 103 F.Supp.2d 155 (E.D.N.Y.). [163]
U.S. v. Volpe, 62 F.Supp.2d 887 and 78 F.Supp.2d 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). [163]
U.S. v. Wiese, 103 F.Supp.2d 155 (E.D.N.Y.). [163]
Wheeler v. Bd. of Police Cmsnrs. of K.C., 918 S.W.2d 800 (Mo.App. 1996). [163]