October, 2000 web edition

Federal appeals court affirms the rejection of a police applicant who scored too high on the Wonderlic entry exam.

     A Connecticut corrections officer, who is a college graduate, was rejected for police employment because he scored 33 points on the Wonderlic Personnel Test and Scholastic Level Exam, revealing an equivalent IQ of 120-125.  27 others were disqualified for the same reason.

     The applicant sued in federal court, and gained national media attention after a CBS 60 Minutes vignette.  Last year, the judge dismissed the action because the plaintiff failed to prove he was a member of a protected class or “suspect group.”  The plaintiff “may have been disqualified unwisely, but he was not denied equal protection.”

     Moreover, the judge noted that “a body of professional literature concludes that hiring overqualified applicants leads to subsequent job dissatisfaction and turnover.”  The city used a professionally constructed test and followed the test provider's instructions.

     In affirming, a three-judge appellate panel said, “Plaintiff presented some evidence that high scorers do not actually experience more job dissatisfaction, but that evidence does not create a factual issue, because it matters not whether the city’s decision was correct so long as it was rational.”

     The “Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy.”  Jordan v. City of New London, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 22195 (1st Cir. 8/23/2000), affirming 1999 U.S.Dist. Lexis 14289, 15 IER Cases (BNA) 919 (D. Conn. 1999).

Text: www.tourolaw.edu/2ndCircuit

  »  Research Note: A prior law enforcement challenge to the Wonderlic and similar tests was rejected in Reynolds v. Arizona, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 9915 (9th Cir.).

Federal Labor Relations Authority finds that federal law enforcement agencies may videotape its internal affairs interviews, but must bargain over the "impact and implementation" of the process.

     We previously reported [1999 FP 54] that the U.S. Customs Service has had an ongoing dispute over its authority to employ videotaping at internal interview sessions.  The union claimed this was a mandatory subject of bargaining.  Customs maintains that:

1. Videotaping is a proper investigative technique to record the physical demeanor of the interviewee;

2. Videotaping is analogous to polygraph examination; both techniques record physical responses to “more accurately assess the truthfulness or reliability of the employee's response;”

3. Videotaping provides a visual record an interview, should the integrity of the process be questioned; and

4. Videotaping has a calming effect on witnesses, and reduces the potential for physical altercations that might occur during interviews.

     Initially, an Administrative Law Judge found that secret interview videotaping by management was a “coercive tactic,” an unfair labor practice, and not a management right.  In 1998, the Federal Labor Relations Authority reversed, holding that videotaping internal affairs interviews is not the subject of mandatory bargaining, if the taping is reasonably related to a legitimate agency need, such as internal security practices.  The FLRA remanded for further proceedings.  See Dept. of Treasury (Customs Service) and NTEU #143/#168, 1998 FLRA Lexis 257, 55 FLRA No. 16.

     This time the FLRA held that management may videotape interviews, but is "obligated to bargain over the impact and implementation of the change in employees' conditions of employment."  Customs Service and NTEU-143/#168, #DA-CA-60047,-48, 2000 FLRA Lexis 75, 56 FLRA No. 56. Text: www.flra.gov/

Full text: www.flra.gov/

  »  Research Note: State public employer personnel boards have held, on numerous occasions, that when an employer has no duty to bargain over the decision, management may still have a duty to bargain over the "effects or impact" of the decision, on the terms and conditions of employment of affected employees.  AFSCME Dist. 13 v. Pennsylvania, 16 PPER (LRP) #16,096, 1985 PPER (LRP) Lexis 59; Cornell Sch. Dist., 13 PPER (LRP) #13267 (1982); Jefferson Co., 9 PPER (LRP) #9097 (1978).

South Dakota high court upholds the termination of an off-duty officer who verbally abused gays and created a disturbance.

     An off-duty police officer with a minor disciplinary record went drinking with local and out-of-town officers.  The group was ejected from a gay bar because they brought in their own beer.  The appellant supposedly replied, “Asshole, fucking fags.”

     He went back inside looking for a companion, picked up a pool cue, and broke it over his knee. Management called 911 and an I-A investigation followed.  The appellant was charged with Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, and the city's civil service board terminated his employment.

     On appeal, the South Dakota Supreme Court said to justify a termination for CUBO, the behavior must be "a serious breach of law, morality, or decorum" and also must tend to "bring dishonor or disrepute on the offender's profession or organization."

     The officer argued that whatever he may have done on while off-duty should not reflect on his job performance.  The justices said:

Can anyone reasonably trust that an officer who harasses minorities by night will ungrudgingly protect their lives and property by day?  *  *  *  Police are duty-bound to enforce the law evenly, without bias and without favor. If intolerance and aggression are accepted, that attitude may permeate other aspects of the criminal justice system.  In the exercise of their duties, there can be no ‘second-class citizens’ in the eyes of peace officers. All people are entitled to impartial treatment.

Green v. City of Sioux Falls, #20982, 2000 SD 33, 607 N.W.2d 43, 2000 S.D. Lexis 30.

Full text: www.sdbar.org/opinions/default.htm

Arbitrator upholds disciplinary action against officers who ignored or reported late for uncompensated roll-call periods.

     In Chicago, a sheriff's dept. regulation required jail officers to be present 15 minutes before the their duty period for roll-call.  An officer is tardy if only 1 minute late.  The problem is that the 15-minute periods were totally uncompensated.

     In addition to preshift roll call, officers coming off duty must remain in their duty station until the count is cleared. They are not paid for this overtime of less than 15 minutes. When nearly a hundred officers began showing up late or missing roll- call entirely, disciplinary action was commenced, and the union grieved.

     The union claimed that because the periods were uncompensated, no disciplinary action could be taken.  The county said that roll-call periods have been recognized in more than 20 years of bargaining history, without a grievance — and was offset by a paid meal period.

     The arbitrator upheld management; the sheriff had a right to discipline employees who neglected roll-call.  “The fact that an assignment may not be properly compensated does not give an employee the right to refuse to work that assignment.”

     The rule of “obey and grieve” applied here. “The lack of compensation for roll-call should be addressed through the grievance procedure. ...  In disputes about pay, the proper procedure is to work the assignment and grieve the pay question.”  Cook Co. Sheriff and Metrop. Alliance of Police, #97-ADM-014, 114 LA (BNA) 389 (J. Cox, 1999; Rptd. 2000).

Arbitrator upholds a five-day suspension for filing an untrue sexual harassment complaint.

     The Fort Worth Police Dept. takes sexual harassment seriously.  Victims are required to report misbehavior. False allegations are also dealt with seriously because it reflects upon the integrity of the Department.

     In this case, a woman officer complained that a male coworker had kissed the back of her head.  The accused officer volunteered to take a polygraph exam and passed.  The complainant was then ordered to take the test, which revealed deception.

     Recommendations for penalty ranged from none to termination. A majority of the members of a disciplinary board recommended a 15-day suspension, but the former Chief reduced the penalty to five days.  The arbitrator affirmed the penalty.  Fort Worth (City of) and Individual Grievant, AAA Case #71-390-00132-99, 114 LA (BNA) 440 (H. Moore, 2000).

Jury finds that a black federal officer, fired for speeding violations, was more severely punished because of his race; $570,000 awarded.

     A black probationary canine enforcement officer with the U.S. Customs Service was terminated for two instances of speeding.  He sued, alleging disparate discipline.  A jury in El Paso has awarded him back pay and overtime of nearly $70,000, plus $500,000 for emotional distress.  The court has ordered his reinstatement.  Breaux v. Rubin, #EP-98-458-M, 43 ATLA L.Rptr. 218 (W.D. Tex. 2000).

Federal court refuses to dismiss overtime claim where officers volunteered for extra duty to be paid by the Housing Authority.

     It is common in some communities, for school or transit systems, park districts, housing authorities and other agencies to contract for additional police or firefighter services with a municipality.

     Kansas City KS police officers sued for time-and-one-half rates for their voluntary extra-duty patrol services for the Housing Authority, a separate agency from the police dept.  The police dept. sought dismissal and claimed that the overtime claim should be disallowed under the “special detail work” exemption, 29 U.S. Code §207(p)(1), and that all time spent patrolling Housing Authority areas should be excluded from overtime pay computations.

     A prior Department of Labor opinion established a test for extra duty for another governmental agency.  To be exempt from the requirement that the total time worked be counted cumulatively for overtime purposes, there are six components:

1. The agencies must be treated as separate employers from other agencies for payroll purposes.

2. The agencies deal with other agencies at arms' length concerning the employment of any individual.

3. The agencies must have separate budgets or funding authorities.

4. The agencies participate in separate employee retirement systems.

5. The agencies are independent entities with full authority to perform all of the acts necessary to their functions under State statutes, and

6. The agencies can sue and be sued in their own names.

FLSA Opin. Letter, 1993 WL 901149 (July 1, 1993).

     The judge refused to dismiss the officers' lawsuit because the issues of budgetary control or independence were unclear.  The court said that two separate agencies should be treated as the same employer if their budgets are controlled by the same governmental entity.  Barajas v. Unified Govt. of Kansas City, Kan., #99-2448, 87 F.Supp.2d 1201, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2976 (D. Kan.).

  »  Editor's Note: In our August issue, we reported that a federal court in New Jersey had ruled that a city “may not avoid the requirements of the FLSA by claiming that extra-duty officers are not its employees…”  The court found that extra-duty officers, contracted for by private businesses, were city employees during these periods.  Cahill v. City of New Brunswick, # 97-4359, 99 F.Supp.2d 464, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7193 (D.N.J.)

     Cahill and other officers claimed “time and a half wages for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week,’ under 29 U.S. Code 207 (maximum hours).  The court said that “the plaintiff police officers are employees of the defendant City ... during extra-duty assignments, within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act.”

     If a private employer contracts directly with the governmental agency to supply officers or other personnel, the public entity is exempt from any FLSA liability, even if the public entity (a) selects the workers from a roster of volunteers, (b) charges an administrative fee to the private employer, (c) negotiates the pay rates for secondary employment, and (d) requires adherence to the same policies and disciplinary rules that apply to regular, on-duty work.

     The exemption is not lost if the private employer is required to hire off-duty officers, etc., as a condition of a permit, license, zoning regulation, etc.  The exemption is lost if the officer or firefighter is compelled to work the assignment. Source: 29 CFR 553.227, 52 FR 2032 (Jan. 16, 1987).

     Sometimes a public entity will collect the compensation from the private employer and pay its officers in the same or a supplemental government paycheck.  This leaves the agency more vulnerable to a claim that hours worked at the secondary employment assignment count towards, or combine with the hours worked for the primary public agency employer for overtime purposes.  Two safe harbors are available to public employers:

(1) Collect only an administrative fee from the private firm and insist that it pay the employee(s) directly; or

(2) Collect an administrative fee plus at least 150% of the regular wage rate from the private firm, and pay time and one-half to the employee(s).

Federal appeals court rejects a First Amendment claim by a police union steward that her notices were removed from a stationhouse bulletin board.

     Milwaukee Police officers were required to obtain a supervisor’s approval and official stamp, before items were placed on official notice boards.  The plaintiff refused to follow official procedure and persisted on posting comments and notes -- which were removed.

     The steward also was given a two-day disciplinary suspension.  She filed a civil rights suit in federal court.  The city was given a summary judgment and a three-judge appeals panel has affirmed.

     The removal of unapproved notes was consistent with a legitimate interest in workplace efficiency.  Kuchenreuther v. City of Milwaukee, #99-3611, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 17441 (7th Cir.).

Full text: www.ca7.uscourts.gov/

  »  Editor's Note: The police union in Milwaukee is permitted to have bulletin boards in conspicuous locations at each station. The bargaining agreement, at the time of the incident, allowed official and social announcements, election campaign material, etc.

     Management can deny a noncertified employee association the privilege of using its bulletin boards.  However, management may not withhold the privilege because of the content of the messages.  Latino Ofcrs. Assn. v. City of N.Y., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2018 (S.D.N.Y.), discussed at 1999 FP 72.

Massachusetts Supreme Court upholds the termination of a public employee for telling a racist joke at a political event.

     An investigator with 12 years service told “a grossly racist and insulting joke” at a dinner meeting attended by city officials and community leaders.  The incident was reported by the press and 25 irate calls were received by the state agency employing the investigator.

     An arbitrator subsequently recommended that she be suspended for one year, but the Commissioner fired her.  A superior court judge ordered reinstatement, concluding that her remarks were protected by the First Amendment.

     The state Supreme Court reinstated the termination.  Applying a balancing test, the justices said that her joke was stupid and unthinking.  More importantly, she knew the joke could draw press attention. The justices said that “investigators ... face the often difficult task of making unwelcome investigations into the lives and homes of citizens.

     “A public agency cannot take the risk that inquiries will be impaired because its investigators are biased or lack judgment.  An agency, and its investigators, must be and be perceived to be impartial and fair.”

     As to the severity of the punishment, the justices deferred to the commissioner's judgment.  An investigator must behave in a manner that leaves no doubt as to his or her willingness to treat persons of “diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds with respect, dignity, and fairness.”  Pereira v. Cmsnr. of Soc. Serv., #08218, 432 Mass. 251, 733 N.E.2d 112, 2000 Mass. Lexis 406.

Full text: www.state.ma.us/courts/courts.htm

Federal Office of Personnel Management issues revised guidelines on the permissible personal use of Government equipment.

     The guidelines cover such things as computers, software, Internet services, e-mail, library resources, telephone and fax machines, photocopiers and office supplies.  OPM invites other governmental agencies to use the guidance as “a model example of how to write an Information Technology policy for their own organizations.”

     Federal OPM employees may make limited personal use of Government office equipment “if it involves minimal additional expense to the Government” and the use is during non-work time. Examples include of minimum expense include electricity, ink, toner or paper.

     Examples of non-work time include lunch periods, authorized breaks, before or after a workday, weekends or holidays, if the duty station normally is available at such times.

     The policy specifically prohibits the loading of personal software onto a Government computer or making configuration changes such as computer games, personal tax programs and personal schedulers.

     The policy also prohibits “creating, copying or transmitting any material or communication that is illegal or offensive to fellow employees or to the public, such as hate speech, material that ridicules others based on race, creed, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin or sexual orientation.”

     Personal long distance telephone calls are prohibited, except in an emergency.  Limited commuting area calls are allowed (car repair shop, doctor), and brief calls to a worker's home (to arrange transportation, check on a sick child, etc.).  Policy on Personal Use of Government Office Equipment, posted Aug. 15, 2000.

Full text: www.opm.gov/extra/itusepolicy.htm

EEOC issues new Enforcement Guidance on periodic medical examinations for public safety personnel.

     The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Cmsn. guidance specifically permits periodic exams "that are narrowly tailored to address specific job-related concerns."  The examples permit:

1. Visual tests and electrocardiograms, for firefighters;

2. Blood pressure screenings and stress tests, for armed officers expected to apprehend criminal suspects.

     It specifically prohibits HIV tests for law enforcement officers because “that condition alone is not likely to result in an inability or impaired ability to perform essential functions that would result in a direct threat.”

     If a public safety employer terminates or suspends an disabled employee because of the results of a medical examination, “it must demonstrate that the employee is unable to perform his/her essential job functions or, in fact, poses a direct threat that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.”

     Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), EEOC Notice 915.002 (7/27/00).

Full text: www.eeoc.gov/docs/guidance-inquiries.html

Federal appeals court dismisses the claim of a rejected applicant, who had been administered a pre-employment psychological test prior to a conditional offer of employment.

     A Kentucky police dept. sent an applicant for psychological testing. The results did not indicate any reasons to disqualify him.  He was later rejected for prior instances of "poor judgment."  In his federal suit, he noted that the ADA and regulations prohibit pre-employment medical and psychological exams until a conditional offer of employment has been made. 42 U.S. Code §12112(2)(A).

     He argued that the provisions apply to all job applicants, whether or not they have a disability, and the city was obligated to hire him.  A three-judge federal appeals panel disagreed.  “Poor judgment” is not a disability protected by the ADA.  Bone v. City of Louisville, #99-5813, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 14081 (6th Cir.).

Text: pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions/main.php

  »  Editor's Note: A divided 10th Circuit panel has held that a rejected applicant can sue a prospective employer if he was asked pre-offer medical questions, even if he was rejected because he lacked the skills needed for the position.  Griffin v. Steeltek, 160 F.3d 591, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 27682, 8 AD Cases (BNA) 1249 (10th Cir.), discussed in this publication at 1999 FP 24.

Full text: www.kscourts.org/ca10/

Arbitrator rejects a police union's demand for seniority preferences for shift selection.

     An Ohio Sheriff's Dept. resisted seniority rights for shift assignments, because management believed that the more senior officers would choose the daylight shift, leaving the junior deputies on road patrol during the evening and nighttime hours.

     An impasse arbitrator found that the rejection of a shift preference was proper. He said:

In law enforcement it is necessary that the shift or shifts be determined by the commanding officer and not by selection through use of seniority.  Better law enforcement is made through the employer's selection rather than the seniority  selection. The three shifts would then contain a mixture of senior and junior officers.

Tuscarawas Co. Sheriff and FOP L-4, 114 LA (BNA) 307, Ohio SERB #99-MED-09-0776 (M. Feldman, 2000).

Attorney General's Civil Rights Division issues a Policy Guidance document,  “National origin discrimination against persons with Limited English Proficiency (LEP Guidance).”

     “Recipients who fail to provide services to LEP applicants and beneficiaries in their federally assisted programs and activities may be discriminating on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI and its implementing regulations. Title VI and its regulations require recipients to take reasonable steps to ensure ‘meaningful’ access to the information and services they provide. What constitutes reasonable steps to ensure meaningful access will be contingent on a number of factors.

     “Among the factors to be considered are the number or proportion of LEP persons in the eligible service population, the frequency with which LEP individuals come in contact with the program, the importance of the service provided by the program, and the resources available to the recipient.”

     See: Vol. 65, No. 159 Federal Register Notices, pp. 50123- 50125 (Aug. 16, 2000) at www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/Pubs/lepguide.htm.

     Similar guidance will be offered by the U.S. Dept. of Education and the Dept. of Health and Human Services.

     The President also issued Executive Order # 13166, “Improving access to services for persons with Limited English Proficiency.” It requires federal agencies to review the services they provide, identify any need for services for those with limited English proficiency, and to implement a system for providing services to LEP individuals.

     Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating against or otherwise excluding individuals because of their national origin; see 42 U.S. Code §2000d (Tit. VI, Sec. 601).  In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786, 1974 U.S. Lexis 151 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a federal financial recipient must take steps to ensure that language barriers did not exclude LEP persons from effective participation in its benefits and services.

Federal court, in a disparate treatment lawsuit, denies production of psychological reports and affirms a psychotherapist privilege in cases where employees are compelled to participate in a fitness-for-duty exam.

     A group of police officers in Trenton, NJ sued, alleging that the city has policies and practices which treat black police officers differently from white police officers in promotions, training, educational opportunities, transfers and discipline. In a documents-discovery request, they sought various psychological fitness-for-duty reports.

     The city argued that the reports were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege and were irrelevant because the reports were never released to the Police Dept. The plaintiffs disagreed because the officers were not seeking treatment, but were sent for fitness evaluations.

     The court noted the discovery request is governed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 1996 U.S. Lexis 3879, 116 S.Ct. 1923, discussed at 1996 FP 139.  In Jaffee, the justices recognized a psychotherapist-patient privilege, whether an exam is for diagnosis or treatment.  Under the Jaffee holding, whether an employee sees a psychologist voluntarily, or is ordered to go, is not dispositive of the issue.

     The testing records of the five officers were privileged.  The psychologist did not disclose any confidential information and only provided a “Pass” or “Fail” recommendation.  Moreover, evidence of disparate treatment would be found in the disciplinary action taken by the Police Dept., based on a pass/fail diagnosis.  Caver v. City of Trenton, #99-1636, 192 F.R.D. 154, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2907 (D.N.J.).

Jury awards federal agent $1 million after suffering retaliation from a superior because he had filed two discrimination complaints; award capped at $300,000.

     A federal jury in Laredo, TX has awarded $1 million to a Customs Service agent who suffered retaliation for filing national origin discrimination complaints with the EEOC.  The jury found that the agent, who had been promoted from GS5 to GS12, was not the victim of discrimination, but was the recipient of retaliatory harassment.  Coworkers testified that they had been threatened because they refused to retaliate against the plaintiff.

     A former Assistant Commissioner of Customs testified that there was a culture within the Customs Service of retaliation.  An internal Customs report concluded that the plaintiff's supervisor had previously retaliated against subordinates who had testified before Congress.

     The award was capped at $300,000 under the Civil Rights amendments of 1991, 42 U.S. Code §1981a(b)(3)(D).  Salinas v. Rubin, #L-99-25, 38 (1871) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 854 (S.D. Tex. 6/26/2000).

Ohio appellate court allows a lawsuit to proceed, claiming that certain overtime claims were denied to communications technicians (who are mostly women) and were given to police officers (who are predominately male).

     Police communication technicians in Columbus, OH were denied “second day-off overtime,” but police officers received it.  Second day-off overtime allows a worker to be compensated at double his or her normal rate of pay, if he or she works on what would normally be the employee's second day off of work.

     Civilian employees are represented by AFSCME and sworn personnel are represented by the FOP. Both bargaining agreements allow second day-off overtime.  The city, however, has a policy that permits only sworn personnel to claim second day-off overtime.

     AFSCME filed a grievance and an arbitrator sustained the charge.  Ninety-seven technicians also filed a suit alleging gender discrimination under state law, Ohio Rev. Code 4112.02.  Civilian employees are 77.1% female, and sworn personnel are 87.5% male.

     A three-judge appeals court agreed and found a facially neutral policy that differentiated job classifications.  However, “because the vast majority of civilian personnel are female and the vast majority of sworn personnel are male, the policy adversely affects females.”  Unless the city can prove a business necessity for the different treatment in the trial court, the women will prevail.  Albaugh v. Columbus Div. of Police, 132 Ohio App.3d 545, 725 N.E.2d 719, 1999 Ohio App. Lexis 1425.

     “An analysis of the ‘screening out’" model of police officer selection,” 2 (1) Police Quarterly (ACJS) 79-95.  Discusses shortcomings in the current methods of psychological testing of applicants. Info: www.sagepub.com

     “Enforcing the ADA: Looking Back on a Decade of Progress,” A Dept. of Justice special report on enforcement of the ADA in employment, accessibility, and other areas, including the DoJ litigation against Denver. Online at <www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/ adahom1.htm>.

     “The Fair Retail Credit Act and workplace investigations,” 15 (3) The Labor Lawyer (ABA) 391-413 (11,224 words; Spring 2000). Discusses when the use of outside professionals triggers protections. Info:  abasvcctr@abanet.org .

     The U.S. Office of Personnel Management has a website for its Labor Agreement

Information Retrieval System.  LAIRS is a searchable database on labor-management relations in the Federal service, including the text of collective bargaining agreements and OPM publications.  Site: www.opm.gov/cplmr/lairs.html-ssi

AFSCME Dist. 13 v. Pennsylvania, 16 PPER (LRP) #16,096, 1985 PPER (LRP) Lexis 59. [148]
Albaugh v. Columbus Div. of Police, 132 Ohio App.3d 545, 725 N.E.2d 719, 1999 Ohio App. Lexis 1425. [158]
Barajas v. Unified Govt. of Kansas City, Kan., 87 F.Supp.2d 1201,
     2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2976 (D. Kan.). [150-1]
Bone v. City of Louisville, #99-5813, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 14081 (6th Cir.). [155]
Beaux v. Rubin, #EP-98-458-M, 43 ATLA L.Rptr. 218 (W.D. Tex. 2000). [150]
Cahill v. City of New Brunswick, # 97-4359, 99 F.Supp.2d 464 (D.N.J. 2000). [151]
Caver v. City of Trenton, #99-1636, 192 F.R.D. 154, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2907 (D.N.J.). [156-7]
Cook Co. Sheriff and Metrop. Alliance of Police, #97-ADM-014, 114 LA (BNA) 389 (J. Cox, 1999). [149-50]
Cornell Sch. Dist., 13 PPER (LRP) #13267 (1982). [148]
Customs Service and NTEU-143/#168, #DA-CA-60047,-48, 2000 FLRA Lexis 75, 56 FLRA No. 56. [147-8]
Fort Worth (City of) and Individual Grievant, 114 LA (BNA) 440 (H. Moore, 2000). [150]
Green v. City of Sioux Falls, #20982, 2000 SD 33, 607 N.W.2d 43, 2000 S.D. Lexis 30. [148-9]
Griffin v. Steeltek, 160 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 1998). [155]
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996). [157]
Jefferson Co., 9 PPER (LRP) #9097 (1978). [148]
Jordan v. City of New London, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 22195 (1st Cir. 8/23/2000). [147]
Kuchenreuther v. City of Milwaukee, #99-3611, 2000 U.S. App. Lexis 17441 (7th Cir.). [152-3]
Latino Ofcrs. Assn. v. City of N.Y., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 2018 (S.D.N.Y.). [152-3]
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 94 S.Ct. 786 (1974). [156]
Pereira v. Cmsnr. of Soc. Serv., 432 Mass. 251, 733 N.E.2d 112, 2000 Mass. Lexis 406. [153]
Reynolds v. Arizona, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 9915 (9th Cir.). [147]
Salinas v. Rubin, #L-99-25, 38 (1871) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 854 (S.D. Tex. 6/26/2000). [157]
Tuscarawas Co. Sheriff and FOP L-4, 114 LA (BNA) 307 (2000). [155-6]

OPM Policy on Personal Use of Government Office Equipment (2000). [153-4]
Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Under the ADA (2000). [154-5]
National Origin Discrimination Against Persons With Limited English Proficiency. [156]