February, 2001 web edition

Employers cannot be sued for a suicide following an allegedly age-biased reduction in the workforce.

     Seven discharged employees were over 50 years of age; the reduction did not affect 43 salaried employees under the age of 50.  One worker killed himself two months after the layoff.

     A federal District Court has decided that the next of kin cannot recover for wrongful death because of an ADEA violation.  The ADEA does not allow tort-based compensatory damages, nor does it invite litigants to turn to state law for additional remedies.  Kulling v. Grinders, #99-74339, 115 F.Supp.2d 828, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15134 (E.D. Mich.).

 »  Research Note: We previously reported [1997 FP 93-4] that an appellate court in California approved the award of worker's comp death benefits for the family of a police sergeant who killed himself. The officer suffered stress from low performance evaluations.  Chu v. W.C.A.B., #D025723, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 221, 49 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1996 Cal.App. Lexis 928.

Text: caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/ca/

U.S. Office of Personnel Management issues Rule on Personnel Suitability.

     The final Rule establishes determination criteria, debarment, procedural requirements, and MSPB appeals for the federal workforce.  5 C.F.R. Part 731; 65 (250) Fed. Reg. 82239- 46 (Dec. 28, 2000).

Court upholds a discrimination commission finding that a corrections officer was fired because she was a black female; management punished whites and males less severely.  Duty to accept new employment was not excused for “defense preparation” time.

     A state Dept. of Corrections terminated an officer for maintaining a romantic relationship with an inmate.  She filed race discrimination charges, claiming that white and Hispanic officers were treated less severely for similar misconduct.

     A Commission hearing officer found that the DoC disciplined males and females of all races, but that the discipline imposed on the complainant and another black woman officer was more severe than the discipline imposed on men and white and Hispanic women for comparable or worse offenses.

     The state's Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ordered the Dept. of Correction to pay back wages, without mitigation.  Although the complainant had rejected other work while pursuing her claim, she had spent as much as 20 hours a week researching and preparing her case.

     A reviewing court upheld the claim of disparate treatment.  The two officers that were fired were black females.  However, case preparation is not an excuse to avoid taking another job while pursuing a claim.  “There is no logical reason why general principles on damages should not apply to a civil rights action.”  Conn. Dept. of Correction v. Cmsn. on Human Rights, #CV990497891S, 2000 Conn. Super. Lexis 2887 (Hartford Dist.).

Illinois appellate court allows a surprise prosecution witness to testify at a police termination hearing.

     At the administrative hearing where white police officers were charged with an unnecessary flashlight beating of a black man, an expert witness was called by the city, without prior notice to the defense.

     Following their terminations, the procedure was challenged.  A three-judge appeals panel said there were no rules or regulations requiring parties to disclose all of their witnesses prior to the start of the hearing.

     The Chicago Municipal Code does not mandate a hearing by the formal or technical rules of evidence, except that hearsay is inadmissible.  In Illinois, a fair hearing must include the opportunity to be heard, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and to receive an impartial ruling.

     A disciplinary hearing officer has the discretion to allow witnesses to testify, even they are not disclosed to the other side until after the hearing begins.  Comito v. Police Bd. of Chicago, #1-99-0043, 739 N.E.2d 942, 2000 Ill. App. Lexis 851.

Full text: www.state.il.us/court

It was not a violation of due process for the employer to prepare a written notice of termination, prior to a pretermination review.

     In this case, a private sector employer was accused of shoplifting while off-duty.  At a pretermination review, where she was represented by union agents, she was given the opportunity to speak but had nothing to say. She was then served with a written notice of dismissal.

     She grieved and at the arbitration hearing, the union argued that she was denied due process because the notice of termination was prepared before her pretermination review.

     The arbitrator rejected that defense, noting that ``It is not uncommon for management to prepare a termination notice in advance of a termination meeting, during which the affected employee is given an opportunity to speak.  US West and CWU L-777, FMCS #000412/09060-7, 115 LA (BNA) 57 (Prayzich, 2000).

Arbitrator sustains the termination of an employee, accused of sick leave abuse, who refused to answer her superiors' questions on the advice of her attorney.  Reliance on bad legal advice is no defense.

     The grievant worked for her employer for 17 years.  She was photographed dancing at an event, while she was on sick leave.  When an internal investigation began, she engaged counsel.  He informed the employer's counsel:

While I respect the right of [the employer] to hire incompetent and arrogant counsel, you are hereby ... notified that [the grievant] is being represented by this law firm ... Should you or your agents attempt to contact her while she is on suspension, I will personally file a complaint against you with the ... Bar Association Grievance Committee.

     The employer warned the grievant on at least three occasions that her failure to answer the job-related questions would be considered insubordination and could result in her termination.  Acting on the advice of her attorney, she refused and was fired.

     The arbitrator noted that “the grievant had the right to hire an attorney to represent her in this matter” but the employer had a legal duty “to recognize the Union as the exclusive bargaining agent.”  The grievance was denied; a grievant is responsible for the consequence of following an attorney's advice. CITGO Refining and CITGO Employees Federation, AAA Case #70-300-00087-00, 115 LA (BNA) 65 (Moore, 2000).

 »  Research Note: We previously reported [2000 FP 6] that an attorney’s advice of counsel not to attend a required hearing did not protect the employee.  Reliance on bad legal advice was fatal to his claim for reinstatement.  Mass. Parole Bd v. Civil Serv. Cmsn., #98-P-148, 47 Mass.App. 760, 716 N.E.2d 155, 1999 Mass. App. Lexis 1063.

     In another case from Massachusetts, the discharge of a public employee was not barred because he had relied upon the advice of his counsel. His attorney erroneously informed him that he had a legal right not to answer certain questions.  Silverio v. Municipal Court of Boston, 355 Mass. 623, 247 N.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 878, 90 S.Ct. 151 (1969).

Arbitrator reinstates a county employee who sent sexually inappropriate e-mails in violation of a written sexual harassment policy.  Management was lax on enforcement and some managers were themselves guilty of similar behavior.

     In this case, the grievant sent many “extremely inappropriate” e-mails in violation of County directives. However, the County had lax enforcement procedures. The arbitrator said “an employer who, over a period of time, condones and tolerates violations of policies is barred by principles of waiver and estoppel from disciplining an employee.”

     Even “a written rule covering certain misconduct may not be enforceable if management has knowingly let violations go unpunished,” giving employees a message such misconduct is acceptable.

     The grievant's immediate supervisor as well as two other senior managers knowingly tolerated, condoned and joined in e-mail violations.  The grievant was to be reinstated with full back pay, benefits, and seniority.  Snohomish Co. and IBEW L-77, FMCS #00/50033, 115 LA (BNA) 1 (Levak, 2000).

Massachusetts court invalidates health coverage for the domestic partners of Cambridge city employees.

     Massachusetts state laws on group health insurance specifically limit dependent coverage to spouses and children. A state court judge has invalidated a 1992 Cambridge ordinance providing for the coverage of 71 domestic partners.

     A prior lawsuit in Boston was effective on appeal.  The judge noted that although Boston's coverage was adopted by a Mayoral Executive Order and the Cambridge plan was enacted by an Ordinance, both cities exceeded the authority granted them by state law.  Catavolo v. City of Cambridge, Middlesex Co. #00-1319, 38 (1887) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1297 (Mass.Super.Ct. 2000).

 »  Editor's Note: The Boston case was discussed in a prior issue at 1999 FP 150: Connors v. Boston, #07945, 430 Mass. 31, 1999 Mass. Lexis 482, 714 N.E.2d 335.

Full text: www.state.ma.us/courts/courts.htm

Appeals court allows a chief or sheriff to restrict the arrest and concealed weapons powers of officers who successfully appeal their removal.  Reinstated officers are entitled to administratively challenge any such restrictions, however.

     While off-duty, a deputy used profanity and pointed his service weapon at a motorist that cut off his private vehicle.  The sheriff later demoted the deputy to correctional officer.  An arbitrator reversed, based on procedural impairments.

     A California sheriff's deputy is exempt from the concealed firearm law and has the authority to make an arrest.  The sheriff then restricted his off-duty powers because of his ``poor judgment.''  His duty firearm was removed and he was prohibited from carrying a concealed firearm and from exercising peace officer powers during off duty hours.

     The deputy sued to overturn the restrictions.  The Superior Court rejected his suit, and an appellate panel affirmed, in part.  A Sheriff has the authority to administratively restrict a deputy's powers to arrest and to carry a concealed firearm “when the deputy has shown he may present a danger to the public if he is allowed to exercise those powers.”

     Although the public can be protected from an officer prone to overreaction, an officer has a right to take an administrative appeal, contesting the legitimacy of any such restrictions.  Gordon v. Horsley, #A088568, 86 Cal.App.4th 336, 2001 Cal. App. Lexis 21, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 910, 2001 C.D.O.S. 4556 (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 2001).

Full text: www.findlaw.com/cacases/

 »  Research Note: In a prior case, a California appellate court held that a police officer who was in extremely poor physical condition could be disarmed and transferred to a nonenforcement assignment.  Stuessel v. City of Glendale, 141 Cal.App.3d 1047, 190 Cal.Rptr. 773 (1983). The panel said that “a peace officer has no fundamental or vested right to carry a firearm or exercise the power to make arrests where ... there is a ... reason involving his own safety and that of the public for removing those rights.”

Federal court finds that the firing of a police officer for minor infractions was actually retaliation for public criticism of the Street Crimes Unit.

     After the shooting of Amadou Diallo, an unarmed African immigrant, a NYPD officer spoke at a televised press conference wearing a hood, dark glasses, and a scarf across her face.  Although the voice was electronically altered, but it was still possible to tell it was a black woman speaking.

     Later she appeared on ABC’s Nightline, again in disguise.  Speaking from first-hand observer experience, she accused the SCU of racially discriminatory practices.  She then testified before the N.Y.C. Council, also in disguise, following the testimony of the Police Commissioner.  Later that day, she was informed that she was dismissed from the Police Dept., for violating sick leave regulations.

     She sued for reinstatement, alleging First Amendment violations.  Management agreed that the disguised speaker was entitled to constitutional protection, but claimed that they were unaware of her identity -- even though she was the only black woman in the SCU who had been assigned to street patrols.

     The federal judge said it would not have been difficult to ascertain her identity, and despite official denials, he found that the Police Commissioner knew her to be the speaker.  The court found that the plaintiff was an effective police officer, earning 18 commendations in the SCU, and that she was punished for her public criticism of the unit's enforcement practices:

... [plaintiff’s] infractions in overstaying doctor visits before returning to her home were regarded ... as minor infractions of the type that would normally have led to command disciplines, not dismissal, even of an officer in probationary status ... and ... she would not have been dismissed had she not spoken out publicly ... on an issue of immediate and substantial concern ...

     The remedies and amount of damages to be awarded was postponed for further proceedings.  She is represented by counsel from the N.Y. Civil Liberties Union.  Walton v. City of N.Y., 122 F. Supp.2d 466, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17008, 17 IER Cases (BNA) 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

EEOC holds, in two cases, employers violated Title VII and the PDA by not providing prescription benefits to women for contraceptives.

     Various methods are available to avoid pregnancy, one of which is prescription contraceptives, which are used only by women.  Some employers pay for surgical procedures.  Some plans also pay for Viagra for men.

     In two cases, the employers provided various benefits but excluded prescriptive contraceptives.  The EEOC Agency decision found the exclusion to violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

     The decision held that employers must cover the expenses of prescription contraceptives to the same extent as other drugs and devices, and must also offer the same coverage for contraception- related outpatient services as are offered for other outpatient services.

     Maximum benefits payable may be applied to contraception as well.  Litigants are not identified in agency determinations, but the decision can be viewed at:

www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.html

Federal workers now allowed 4 hours time off for some health screenings.

     Federal employees with limited available sick leave will be able to take up to four hours of additional paid time off each year for mammography, pap smears, blood pressure and cholesterol checks.

     The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program currently covers screening for prostate, cervical, colorectal and breast cancer and screening for sickle cell and blood lead levels.

White House Executive Dept. Memorandum, “Preventive Health Services at the Federal Workplace,” (Jan. 4, 2001).

Text: www.opm.gov/ehs/presmem.htm

Lesbian police lieutenant could bring a damage action against the city for violation of a city charter provision that prohibited sexual orientation discrimination.

     A Detroit police lieutenant had rejected advances from male coworkers because of her sexual preferences.  She filed harassment complaints, but the city took no action.  Instead, she was transferred to a desk job.  She complained that she was not allowed to participate in investigations, and that she was the only lieutenant so assigned.

     The city charter prohibited sexual orientation discrimination, but provided no remedy.  A trial court dismissed the suit, but a divided appellate panel has reversed.  The majority said she could use other laws to remedy an unlawful practice.

     A dissenting judge said it was poor public policy to require a city to pay damages for going beyond the requirements of state law in civil rights protections.  Mack v. Detroit, #214448, 243 Mich. App. 132, 2000 Mich. App. Lexis 233.

Text: www.icle.org

A resignation given at the request of his employer, and seniority provisions in the collective bargaining agreement did not deprive a reservist of his right to reemployment as his prior rank, under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.

     A detective who served in the military on leave sought reinstatement to his prior rank.  The county declined because (1) he had signed a letter of resignation (requested by the sheriff) and (2) the bargaining agreement provided he must return as a deputy, without seniority rights.  A civil action was brought in federal court under the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-employment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S. Code |4301-4333, and Mich. Laws |35.355.

     The judge noted that the 8th Circuit has held that a general letter of resignation also waives an employee's rights under the USERRA: Paisley v. Minneapolis 79 F.3d 722/at 725 (8th Cir. 1996) and Smith v. Mo. Pac. Transp., 313 F.2d 676/at 680 (8th Cir. 1963).

     Other Circuits have held, that to exclude statutory protections, a resignation letter must indicate an awareness of one's rights under the USERRA and have an expressed intent to waive them.  Loeb v. Kivo, 169 F.2d 346/at 349 (2nd Cir. 1948) and Sykes v. C&G Rwy., 117 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1997).  Michigan is in the 6th Circuit.

     The judge observed that the statute was intended to thwart employers who hand a resignation form to an employee who has opted for military service.  No social or contract interest is served by honoring such ``resignations'' and enforcing them undercuts the law by allowing employers ``to take advantage of the youth and ignorance'' of those enlisting in military service.

     The employee clearly expressed an intent to return to the Sheriff’s Department. He signed it only after it was prepared and requested by the Sheriff for “administrative purposes.” The resignation made no mention of the federal right to re-employment.  The judge found, as a matter of law, that the right of re-employment was not waived under the circumstances.

     Moreover, the rights of a veteran cannot be abrogated by a collective bargaining agreement. ``Were this the case, the employer could simply contract around provided statutory benefits to returning veterans,'' said the court.  Other appellate cases are in agreement: Waltermyer v. ALCOA, 804 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1986); Rudisill v. C&O Rwy., 167 F.2d 175/at 178-9 (4th Cir. 1948).

     The court granted summary judgment for the ex-officer and against the county. He was entitled to the relief sought under the statute as a matter of law.  Wrigglesworth v. Brumbaugh, 121 F.Supp.2d 1126, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17418 (W.D. Mich.).

FLRA holds that management did not commit an unfair labor practice when it ordered a military safety officer to undergo drug testing and psychiatric evaluation after he made threatening remarks concerning a sergeant.

     A 20-year employee who was the union local’s safety officer told a supervisor that a staff sergeant was “a stupid son-of-a-bitch and I'd like to shoot him in the back of the head with a rivet gun.”  The supervisor reported the comments; management bared the grievant from the premises and ordered him to take a psychiatric evaluation and urinalysis.

     The union filed ULP charges.  A federal administrative law judge held that the employer had legitimate security concerns and that the management could not simply ignore the threat.  The Federal Labor Relations Authority affirmed the mandatory psychological review and drug test, 3-to-0.

     “Removing [the grievant] from contact with the subject of his threat had an obvious, plausible connection with safety and security concerns of management.”  Management’s action in “ordering psychological and drug testing also were appropriate responses to [his] rivet-gun threat ...” Air Force, 437 Wing and AFGE L-1869, #AT-CA-90669, 56 FLRA No. 160, 39 (1893) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 47 (11/30/00).

Full text at: www.flra.gov/decisions/v56/56-160ab.html

Justice Dept. sues Delaware State Police for rejection of black applicants during a period when the agency relied an entry test no longer in use.

     The Department of Justice has filed suit against the Delaware State Police, alleging past discrimination against African Americans trooper applicants. Until 1999, the DSP used a written examination that disproportionately excluded blacks and which allegedly did not predict successful job performance.  The suit asks for offers of employment, back pay, and remedial seniority.  United States v. Delaware, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D.Del. 2001)

Arbitrator reinstates an officer who had dual residences, on the condition that he vacates the second home.

     A Cicero, IL police officer and his wife had a house in a distant suburb and also maintained a basement apartment in his in-laws' home in Cicero.  He had no lease, paid no rent, but did have a phone in the basement apartment, with call forwarding to his main residence.

     Testimony revealed that the police chief said that he didn't care where an officer's family resided as long as the officer lived in Cicero when he worked.  While working 10/4 shifts, he slept in the Cicero apartment during those three nights.

     The arbitrator concluded that the grievant could rely on the policies of the chief.  Before attempting to fire him, the town should have served him with written notice to reside at all times with his family only in Cicero.  He was ordered reinstated, with back pay, subject to the following conditions:

 1. That he shall vacate his other home, as it is not a weekend or vacation type house.

 2. He may have only one principal residence and it shall be in the Town of Cicero, and must live in it at least 320 days per year.

 3. That both he and his wife shall have their driver’s licenses, telephone, and utility bills at the residence in Cicero.

Cicero (Town of) and IL FOP L-2, 115 LA 8 (Winton, 2000).

Federal judge overturns a $50,000 verdict for a retaliatory transfer, after a NYPD detective complained of national origin discrimination. Lateral change had no “adverse” impact.

     An NYPD Detective-3 of Chinese ancestry complained of discrimination when he was not promoted to Detective-2.  Following his complaint, he was transferred from the Mayor's bodyguard detail to the 72nd Pct. Detective Squad.  He sued in Federal Court for discrimination and retaliation.

     The jury found for the City on the discrimination claim, but awarded $50,000 on the retaliation claim.  The judge set aside the award, noting that the detective did not suffer any “adverse employment action.”

     “A purely lateral transfer that involves no demotion in form or substance is not a materially adverse action” unless the new position “is materially less prestigious, less suited to one's skills, or less conducive to advancement.”

     Although the bodyguard detail is an “elite” assignment, the plaintiff offered no evidence that Precinct Detectives had lesser responsibilities  or that they were less likely to be promoted, or that he suffered any significant economic harm from the transfer.  Chu v. City of N.Y., 99 Civ. 11523, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18513, 84 FEP Cases 1118 (S.D.N.Y.).

 »  Editor's Note: Another federal court found that an involuntary transfer, when accompanied by a loss of overtime and a take-home vehicle was a “constructive demotion.”  The officer recovered $31,000 general and $121,000 punitive damages, but the judge overturned the verdict on qualified immunity.  Chan v. City of Chicago, 777 F.Supp. 1437 and 916 F.Supp. 804 (N.D. Ill. 1991 & 1996).  See our articles at 1996 FP 174 and 1992 FP 55.

Pennsylvania denies stress claim to officer who attended to two officers who were shot, and suffered from PTSD.

     A Philadelphia police officer helped carry one of the officers; one later died from gunshot wounds, the other was paralyzed.  He began to suffer emotional problems including nightmares and domestic difficulties.

     In Pennsylvania, to receive workers’ compensation for a mental injury, a claimant must experience “abnormal” working conditions.  However, the courts hold police officers to a higher standard because stressful situations are part of their job.  See our prior article at 1999 FP 172-3.

     At his compensation hearing, his expert testified that he could not return to police work because of post-traumatic stress disorder.  Despite the fact that seven different officers testified that the events he experienced were extraordinary, the appellate court denied his claim.  Rydzewski v. W.C.A.B., (Philadelphia), #856 C.D. 2000, 767 A.2d 13,  2001 Pa. Commw. Lexis 16.

Arbitrator holds that management could establish clothing requirements for detective rank and require officers to wear soft body armor without bargaining.

     The department's only detective objected to a dress code for his rank and the wearing of body armor, if in uniform.   Prior to Feb. 1999, he was permitted to wear casual shirts, a windbreaker, running shoes and jeans. He is now required either to wear a uniform or “business-type attire,” including a jacket, tie, and shined shoes.

     The arbitrator concluded that management did not have to negotiate a prohibition of casual shirts, windbreakers or running shoes.  The grievant can elect to “wear a uniform or to wear any kind of dress shoes he choose, even loafers, if they can be shined, and ... can choose the dress slacks, the shirt and the sport coat or suit coat he desires. He has full choice of fabric, color, style and cut.”

     The arbitrator also sustained the wearing of body armor when in uniform.  “... body armor or bulletproof vests come under the category of equipment, and ... is within the Department's sole discretion.”  The fact the chief, a lieutenant and staff officers at headquarters was exempt is not discriminatory.  Ossining (Town of) and Ossining Police Assn., NY-PERB Case #A99- 195, 114 LA (BNA) 1761, 39 (1895) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 122 (Henner, 2000).

At-will government employee could not be fired for refusing to make a false sexual harassment complaint against a coworker.

     A school district employee touched a coworker’s arm with his hand and informed her that she was violating an unwritten dress code for wearing a sleeveless top. Her superior informed her that she was “a victim of sexual harassment” and that she “must cooperate or she would be fired.”  Her superior said he was looking for a way to terminate the coworker.

     She refused to characterize the touching as harassment.  Thereafter, she was subjected to intense supervision, and eventually was terminated for minor reasons.  She sued for damages in state court.

     Although a nontenured employee, she alleged public policy considerations: a refusal to make a false report against a coworker.  The trial judge found that she was wrongfully discharged and awarded damages in the amount of $100,000.

     A three-judge appellate panel has affirmed, saying that “an at-will employee may not be terminated for fulfilling an important societal obligation,” and “refusing to make a false allegation” is such an obligation.  Thorson v. Oregon, #A106804, 171 Ore. App. 704, 2000 Ore. App. Lexis 2139.

Court site: 159.121.112.45/

     “Developing a partnership to enhance police recruitment and retention” and “Effective medical screening can safeguard an aging law enforcement workforce,” the Police Chief, Jan. 2001; www.theiacp.org/

     “Early Warning Systems for Police: Concept, History and Issues” by Walker, Albert & Kenney, 3 (2) Police Quarterly (PERF/ACJS) 132-152 (June 2000).

Info: www.sagepub.com ; single-issue $20 e-mailorder@sagepub.com

     “Electronic Communication: Union Access and Employer Rights,” by Susan Robfogel, 16 (2) The Labor Lawyer (ABA) 231- 252 (Fall 2000); info: abasvcctr@abanet.org

     “Federal Workplace Guide to Preventive Health Services,” U.S. Office of Personnel Management (Jan. 2001). Text: www.opm.gov/ehs/health3.htm

Air Force, 437 Wing and AFGE L-1869, #AT-CA-90669, 56 FLRA No. 160 (11/30/00). [26-7]
Catavolo v. City of Cambridge, Middlesex Co. #00- 1319,
     38 (1887) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1297 (Mass.Super.Ct. 2000). [22]
Chan v. City of Chicago, 777 F.Supp. 1437 and 916 F.Supp. 804 (N.D. Ill. 1991 & 1996). [28]
Chu v. City of N.Y., 99 Civ. 11523, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18513 (S.D.N.Y.). [28]
Chu v. W.C.A.B., #D025723, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 221, 49 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1996 Cal.App. Lexis 928. [19]
Cicero (Town of) and IL FOP L-2, 115 LA 8 (Winton, 2000). [27-8]
CITGO Refining and CITGO Employees Federation,
     AAA Case #70-300-00087-00, 115 LA (BNA) 65 (Moore, 2000). [21]
Comito v. Police Bd. of Chicago, #1-99-0043, 739 N.E.2d 942, 2000 Ill. App. Lexis 851. [20]
Conn. Dept. of Correction v. Cmsn. on Human Rights, #CV990497891S, 2000 Conn. Super. Lexis 2887. [19-20]
Connors v. Boston, #07945, 430 Mass. 31, 1999 Mass. Lexis 482, 714 N.E.2d 335. [22]
EEOC Decision: contraceptives <www.eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.html>. [24-5]
Gordon v. Horsley, #A088568, 2001 WL 38784, 2001 Cal. App. Lexis 21 (Cal.App. 1st Dist. 2001). [23]
Kulling v. Grinders, #99-74339, 115 F.Supp.2d 828, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15134 (E.D. Mich.). [19]
Loeb v. Kivo, 169 F.2d 346/at 349 (2nd Cir. 1948). [26]
Mack v. Detroit, #214448, 243 Mich. App. 132, 2000 Mich. App. Lexis 233. [25]
Mass. Parole Bd v. Civil Serv. Cmsn., #98-P-148,
     47 Mass.App. 760, 716 N.E.2d 155, 1999 Mass. App. Lexis 1063. [21]
Ossining (Town of) and Ossining Police Assn., NY-PERB Case #A99-195,
     114 LA (BNA) 1761 (Henner, 2000). [29]
Paisley v. Minneapolis 79 F.3d 722/at 725 (8th Cir. 1996). [26]
Rudisill v. C&O Rwy., 167 F.2d 175/at 178-9 (4th Cir. 1948). [26]
Rydzewski v. W.C.A.B., (Philadelphia), #856 C.D. 2000, 2001 Pa. Commw. Lexis 16, 2000 WL 1946655. [29]
Silverio v. Municipal Court of Boston, 355 Mass. 623, 247 N.E.2d 379 (1969). [22]
Smith v. Mo. Pac. Transp., 313 F.2d 676/at 680 (8th Cir. 1963). [26]
Snohomish Co. and IBEW L-77, FMCS #00/50033, 115 LA (BNA) 1 (Levak, 2000). [22]
Stuessel v. City of Glendale, 141 Cal.App.3d 1047, 190 Cal.Rptr. 773 (1983). [23]
Sykes v. C&G Rwy., 117 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 1997). [26]
Thorson v. Oregon, #A106804, 171 Ore. App. 704, 2000 Ore. App. Lexis 2139. [30]
United States v. Delaware, U.S. Dist. Ct. (D.Del. 2001). [27]
US West and CWU L-777, 115 LA (BNA) 57 (Prayzich, 2000). [20-1]
Waltermyer v. ALCOA, 804 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1986). [26]
Walton v. City of N.Y., 122 F.Supp.2d 466,
     2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17008, 17 IER Cases 49 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). [23-4]
Wrigglesworth v. Brumbaugh, 121 F.Supp.2d 1126, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17418 (W.D. Mich.). [25-6]