June, 2001 web edition

City, for valid financial reasons, could not unilaterally change the benefits paid on its health plan, where the bargaining agreement prohibited a reduction of benefits.  Past practices were not controlling.

     An Oklahoma police union grieved various unilateral changes in the city's health plan:

* The generic prescription co-payment was raised from $10 to $20

* The non-generic drug co-payment went from $10 to $30.

* The out-of-network deductible was raised from $200 to $500.

* A $20 co-payment on physical therapy visits was required.

* A 3-month waiting period was established for new employees.

* A $500 deductible was established for non-generic prescriptions.

     The city argued that the past practice of the parties established the city's right to modify the components of the health insurance plan without formally negotiating with the union.  However, the contract clearly stated that “the city may not reduce the benefits to a level below those provided in the preceding fiscal year.”

     The arbitrator ruled that the specific language of the contract controls, and that it was “not necessary to review the past practice of the parties.”  A union's failure, in past years, to grieve benefit changes does not operate as a waiver of its right to enforce clauses in a current agreement.

     Here, the city changed the benefits to maintain the solvency of its insurance fund and there was no evidence of bad faith, or an effort to undermine the collective bargaining process.  Nevertheless, the City violated the bargaining agreement by unilaterally implementing the changes.  The grievance was sustained.  Norman (City of) and FOP L-122, FMCS #00/15703-8, 115 LA (BNA) 827 (McReynolds, 2001).

»  Research Note: A union's past failure to grieve significant changes does not constitute a waiver of its right to insist on performance of a current contract.

     Recently, a Wisconsin arbitrator held that a town violated the bargaining contract, which provided that management could change insurance carriers -- provided that the benefits remained equivalent.

     When the new carrier increased the prescription drug co-payment from $30 to $40 per month, the employee benefits were materially diminished.  Oconomowoc (Town of) and Wis. Prof. Police Assn., Grievances #98-311 and 00-220, 115 LA (BNA) 169 (Petersen, 2000).

     A Nebraska award also rejected a benefits change by reference to the past-practices clause.  The bargaining history of the contract stated that the employer ``shall install cost containment programs.''  That language did not give the employer a unilateral right to require employees to pay more for health- care expenses than the contract specifically provided.

     Language in the contract which specified co-payments and stop-loss maximums prohibited a switch to a preferred provider organization that charged more for using non PPO hospitals.  Excel Corp. (Nebraska) and United F&CW L-22, FMCS #96/03048, 106 LA (BNA) 1069 (Thornell, 1996).

Arbitrator upholds the firing of a Florida deputy sheriff who solicited an act of prostitution.  Termination was not inconsistent with the penalties given others for similar offenses.

     Following lengthy due process procedures, a Florida sheriff terminated the employment of the deputy with 10 years of seniority and no disciplinary record for “Conduct Unbecoming an Employee.”

     While off duty, the grievant was caught in a Sting operation and was arrested for soliciting prostitution in an adjacent county.  The arbitrator wrote that he did not share the sheriff's view regarding the severity of the offense or the penalty.  Soliciting an act of prostitution is only a misdemeanor in Florida.

     Under the bargaining agreement, the sheriff could “suspend, demote, discharge, or take other disciplinary action against an employee for just cause.”  The arbitrator noted that there was “no evidence that the penalty imposed on the grievant was inconsistent with those previously imposed on like employees who committed like offenses under like circumstances, or that he was subjected to any disparate treatment.”

     He rejected the union's contention that the penalty was unfair because termination had not been imposed in cases of tax evasion, the improper release of a prisoner, driving under the influence of alcohol and domestic violence.  None of those instances was sufficiently like this offense to establish an inconsistency or showing of disparate treatment.

     The arbitrator concluded under these circumstances, he had no authority to substitute his judgment for that of the employer, in the absence of proof of an abuse of discretion, or fundamental unfairness.  He denied the grievance and sustained the deputy's termination.  Broward Co Sheriff's Office and Federation of Public Employees, 115 LA (BNA) 708 (Richard, 2001).

Arbitrator refuses to grant spousal benefits for domestic partners, in spite of a ban on sexual orientation discrimination.

     An arbitrator has ruled that a public employer did not violate the bargaining agreement when it failed to provide insurance benefits to the same-gender domestic partners, even though the contract prohibits discrimination on basis of sexual orientation.

     The agreement authorized benefits for “spouses” which “plainly refers to only one particular type of partnership relationship ... marriage.”   Spouse has a specific meaning and there is no legal authority, arbitral authority, or evidence to interpret it to mean a domestic partner.  Youngstown State Univ. and Ohio Educ. Assn., FMCS #000519/0336-6, 115 LA (BNA) 852 (Heekin, 2001).

OSHA officially withdraws its controversial ergonomics rule.

     The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has formally removed its final rule which had established an Ergonomics Program Standard.  President Bush signed a congressional resolution disapproving of the standard.

     The Congress has been considering whether to direct OSHA to work on the creation of a new standard to replace the disapproved rule.  S.598 would require the Labor Dept. to adopt a standard within two years.  OSHA Ergonomics Rule Withdrawal, 39 (1909) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 515, 66 Fed. Reg. 20403 (4/23/01); Congressional Resolution, 39 G.E.R.R. (BNA) 384 (3/27/01).

Appeals court finds that the inability to drive is not a disabling impairment.

     A county employee sought accommodation of her recovery from focal onset epilepsy.  Although on medication (Lamictal) she was not allowed to drive for six months. The trial court rejected her ADA claim, and an appellate panel has affirmed.

     The inability to drive, even where public transportation is not available, is not an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.  Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Co., #00-10691, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 8802 (11th Cir.).

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/11th/0010691opn.html

Arbitrator upholds a long custom of taking the fire truck to sporting events, even though the department manual prohibited the personal use of city equipment or leaving the station except on official business.

     The bargaining agreement stated that firefighters were “permitted to drive city owned vehicles to and from their place of duty and for emergency calls only.”  It also read that departmental practices and operation of the fire dept. shall remain “unchanged” unless modified by specific terms in the agreement.

     In the past, firefighters would take the fire truck to various sporting events and, if needed, answer calls from those locations.  After the current agreement was signed, the city council prohibited the practice, and the union grieved.

     The arbitrator found that attending sporting events while on duty was a working condition as much as eating meals, watching TV, listening to music or working out while waiting for an emergency.  ``The discontinuing of such a privilege is a material change to an established custom.''

     Moreover, the city made no showing that the revocation of a longstanding practice was more efficient, more economic or posed a threat to safety or public policy.  The grievance was upheld.  Pawhuska (City of) and IAFF L-3887, FMCS Case #000927/16571-8, 115 LA (BNA) 714 (Moore, 2001).

»  Editor's Note: There are valid reasons to enforce past practices and customs, which are “equally a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed in it,” Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (1960).  The justices have cited Steelworkers in 47 subsequent opinions.

Text (of Steelworkers case): laws.findlaw.com/us/363/574.html

Court orders website to remove police officers Social Security numbers.  Site could continue to post officers' names, addresses and their salaries.

     The City of Kirkland, WA, sued the operators of a website that is critical of local law enforcement personnel.  It contains political argument and also lists of names, addresses, birthdates, telephone numbers, social security numbers and other information of law enforcement personnel and their relatives.

     A Superior Court in Seattle allowed the site to continue publishing names and personal information, but required the defendants to remove the social security numbers.  He wrote:

Access to an individual's SSN enables a new holder to obtain access to and to control, manipulate or alter other personal information.

     He added, however, that people have a compelling interest in keeping their Social Security numbers private and that the numbers are of no legitimate concern to the public.

     Local authorities also expressed a concern that if SSNs are published, officers could become victims of credit fraud.  Kirkland (City of) v. Sheehan, #01-2-09513-7 (Super. Ct. King Co. 5/10/01).

Text: www.metrokc.gov/kcsc/rulings/kirkvsheehan.htm

»  Research Note: Washington has a financial disclosure law, §42.17 R.C.W.  The controversial website is at www.justicefiles.org   It is not illegal to sell lists of individual SSNs, which could facilitate identity theft and fraud.  Militia groups have filed false liens against real estate owned by law enforcement personnel and other public officials.

     U.S. Senate Bill 324 (introduced 2/14/2001) would prohibit such sales by financial institutions.  S.848, the Social Security Number Misuse Prevention Act of 2001 (introduced 5/9/2001) would create various penalties.

     In parallel suit, also in Seattle, another judge has ordered King County to pay $13,716 in attorney fees because the Sheriff's Office refused to disclose the names and ranks of its deputies to the same website.  The county lost its suit to exempt the information.  King County v. Sheehan, (Super. Ct. King Co. 5/10/01), Seattle Post-Intelligencer 5/8/01.

California Attorney General rules that the home addresses of California couples who sign up as domestic partners under a 1999 state statute are open to public disclosure

     In 1999, the California Legislature enacted a statutory scheme authorizing the registration of domestic partnerships by persons of the same gender, or if older than 62, by persons of opposite sexes; see Family Code §297-299.6.  A major purpose of the law was to allow current and retired public employees to claim their partners for health insurance, life insurance and other spousal-type benefits.

     The state's Attorney General, in writing an official opinion on residential disclosures, balanced the protection of individual privacy with public access to information under Gov. Code §6250- 6258.

     He concluded that “a public interest exists in ensuring that the information is accurate and that fraudulent misrepresentations are not being maintained in the agency's files.”  This overrides a concern that a “social stigma may attach to ... domestic partners ... [and that] harassment ... may result from the disclosure ...”

     Under state law, the residential addresses from marriage license records are disclosed, as well as the addresses of persons who carry concealed weapons, etc.  However, a government agency can withhold records if it demonstrates, in a particular case, that the public interest is better served by withholding the records, citing City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.4th 1008 (1999).  Cal. A. G. Opinion #00-910 (Apr. 2001).

Full text: caag.state.ca.us/opinions/search.htm

Federal appeals court dismisses a suit by a promotional candidate who was rejected because of allegedly defamatory statements in his personnel file.  Defamation is not a federally protected right in nondisciplinary cases.

     A Florida firefighter received the highest score of all candidates for lieutenant, but the City passed him over and promoted three individuals with scores that ranked second, third and fourth place. The fire chief told the plaintiff that he was passed over for the promotion because of a memorandum that the assistant fire chief had placed in his personnel file -- which “included stigmatizing statements” about him.

     His federal civil rights claim alleged that although he lacked a legally-enforceable property right to the promotion, he should have received a name-clearing hearing.  The Supreme Court said that a name-clearing hearing is required in the case of a termination.

     The stigmatizing statements need not be the cause of one's termination, only that they occur during the course of the termination.  Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980).

     Although a person may lack a “property right” to their job, such as civil service, there is a federally-protected ``liberty interest'' to a hearing -- to clear one's reputation in termination situations.

     The trial judge dismissed the lawsuit, and a three-judge appeals panel has affirmed.  In the 11th Circuit, to establish that a deprivation of a public employee's liberty interest has occurred without due process of law, the employee must prove that:

(1) a false statement (2) of a stigmatizing nature (3) attending a governmental employee's discharge (4) was made public (5) by the governmental employer (6) without a meaningful opportunity for employee name clearing.

            Buxton v. City of Plant City, 871 F.2d 1037 (11th Cir. 1989).

     In Florida, because of their ``Sunshine'' public records law, merely placing information in a public employee's personnel file is ``publication.''  All of the other elements necessary were present except one: ``that the stigmatizing information was placed in [his] file during the course of his discharge from employment.  He was not discharged or demoted; rather, he was repeatedly denied a promotion.

     The panel noted that the Supreme Court has held that “defamation by the government does not constitute a deprivation of liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976).

     A plaintiff claiming a deprivation based on defamation must establish the defamation plus the violation of a more tangible interest, before he or she can invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.  Defamation, by itself, is a tort actionable under the laws of most States, but not is a constitutional or civil rights deprivation.

     A transfer or a missed promotion, based on defamation, is not enough to trigger the protections of federal law.  Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, #00-12568, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 8492 (11th Cir.).

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/11th/0012568opn.html

»  Research Note: A prior trial court decision held that stigma- plus claims did not require that the plaintiff-employee have been terminated.  Kamenesh v. City of Miami, 772 F.Supp. 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991).

     Since then, an appeals court case held, in the case of an involuntary transfer, that defamatory statements do not suffice.  There was no loss of income or demotion, and the loss of a promotion is not the same thing as a demotion.  Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1992).

Federal appeals panel upholds chronological age as a neutral tie- breaker for promotional candidates with the same score and seniority.

     The Chicago Police promotes by rank on eligibility tests and officers who receive the same score are ranked by seniority. Ties are ranked by age and an older officer is promoted first.

     An African-American candidate scored the same as 33 other officers who were eligible for promotion at the same time. She tied with an older officer for the last position, and her promotion was delayed by a year.  She sued, claiming the policy of using a date of birth as a tie-breaker had a disparate impact on minorities and lacked a rational basis.

     The appellate court rejected her claims.  First, the date of birth method of establishing a priority was memorialized in the collective bargaining agreement.  Second, the policy protects against age discrimination claims.  Third, there was no evidence the system created any adverse impact.

     The panel concluded that the methodology for promoting eligible candidates was a neutral criterion and was “eminently rational.” Price v. City of Chicago, #00-3536, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 10594 (7th Cir.).

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/7th/003536.html

FBI agrees to outside mediation, revised promotional procedures and the payment of individual damage claims to settle (for a second time) the claims of black agents.

     After more than a decade of off-and-on litigation, a federal judge in Washington approved a second settlement in a discrimination lawsuit filed by more than 500 black FBI agents.  They claimed that FBI personnel policies and practices discriminate against black agents in performance evaluations, disciplinary proceedings, training, awards, bonuses, access to personnel files, transfers, general assignments, and special team assignments such as SWAT and Hostage Rescue.

     In a prior settlement the Bureau agreed to specified changes; judicial action was sought in 1999 when these were not implemented.  The main complaint was that assignments and promotions were influenced by personal relationships which excluded blacks from becoming supervisors.

     Under the current court-approved agreement, agents can have certain employment claims referred to an outside mediator.  Some agents will be eligible for lost wages and up to $300,000 in damages.

     Until a new system is in place, class members can bring discrimination complaints to the neutral mediator as an alternative to having their claims heard by the FBI's equal employment opportunity office.  Under the settlement, the FBI is required to accept the mediator's decisions unless they are clearly erroneous or lack substantial justification.

Johnson v. Ashcroft, #93-0206, 39 (1910) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 535 (D.D.C. 4/30/01 - settlement approved); prior decis. at 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5347 (D.D.C. 1996) and at 31 G.E.R.R. (BNA) 142 (D.D.C. 1993).  Also see Van Meter v. Thornburgh, #91-0027, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18936, 57 FEP Cases (BNA) 911 (D.D.C. 1991); Rochon v. Attorney General, #87-3008, 734 F.Supp. 543, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4381, 52 FEP Cases (BNA) 1157 (D.D.C. 1990); Graham v. Reno, Civ. #92-1018 (D.D.C.).

»  Editor's Note: In separate litigation in Chicago, the FBI and a publisher agreed to pay $50,000 to a black ex-agent who alleged harassment, retaliation and defamation.  Rochon v. Simon & Schuster, 1994 FP 154, 140 (135) Chgo. D. Law Bull. 1 (1994).

     In earlier litigation, the same agent was allowed to sue white coworkers for conspiring to violate his civil rights. He alleged ethnic slurs, anonymous threats, receipt of unordered merchandise and a "fart contest'' in front of his wife.  Rochon v. Dillon, 713 F.Supp. 1167, 1989 U.S. Dist Lexis 5164, 49 FEP Cases (BNA) 1481 (N.D. Ill.).

     In a parallel action, the Justice Dept. and black INS agents agreed to a $5 million settlement -- the largest ever against a federal agency.  DoJ gave back pay differentials to over 800 agents and created 29 senior management positions for black agents.  Potter v. Reno, #340-93-3770X, 36 G.E.R.R. (BNA) No.1749 (C.D.Cal. 1998).  A similar action was brought by Latino INS agents.  Quintanar v. Reno, #96-7066, 36 G.E.R.R. (BNA) No.1749 (C.D.Cal.).

     An attorney for the black FBI agents also is representing a group of past and present African American Secret Service agents in a discrimination class action against the Treasury Dept.  Moore v. Summers, #00-00953, 38 G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1003 (D.D.C. 2000).

Federal appeals court upholds the firing of 33 probationary officers, 32 of whom are minorities.  Exams mirrored the content and emphasis of the police academy curriculum.

     Probationary police officers in Chicago who were discharged for failing a state certification examination sued, alleging a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic officers in violation of Title VII.

     Probationary officers have three chances to pass the certification exam. In some years, all recruits passed the exam.  Until 1998, only 33 of 5,181 probationary officers failed the exam. Thirty-two of the failing officers were minorities, who comprised approximately half of all the probationary officers. The overall pass rate for African-Americans was 98.24% and 99.96% for whites.

     The trial judge dismissed the lawsuit, and a three-judge appeals panel has affirmed.  The city and state showed that the cutoff score was reasonable and consistent with normal expectations of acceptable proficiency within the work force.

     Moreover, the exams ``mirrored the content and emphasis of the police academy curriculum, creating a correlation between a probationary officer's score and ... mastery of the knowledge necessary to be a police officer.''

     The test construction firm, Justex, ensured the reliability of the exam by pretesting and modifying questions based on pre-test results.  See Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1099 (7th Cir. 2000). To determine the cutoff score, Justex determined how incumbent officers performed.

     The panel said that ``to reduce a cutoff score to the point where all test-takers pass likely renders the test a futile exercise because it ceases to act as a measuring device. The cut- off score met the business necessity and job relatedness standard.''  Bew v. City of Chicago, #00-1867, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 9247 (7th Cir. 2001).

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/7th/001867.html

Arbitrator reinstates a state employee whose driver’s license was suspended for DUI, where he suffered from major depression. He should have been placed on FMLA leave even though he did not request leave. Management had a “duty” to see if the grievant's illness qualified for FMLA and to assist him in his recovery and continued employment.

     A state transportation employee had his driver's license revoked for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages.  He also suffered from episodic depression.  His superiors terminated him, and the union grieved.

     The arbitrator noted that “an employee may be shielded from discipline even though it was his own behavior that lost him his driving privileges” provided that he takes unpaid leave time to recover and the absence does not put an undue burden on the employer.

     He said that if an employee is legitimately ill, an employer's refusal to grant sick leave denies the employee a contractual right.  He found that the major depression suffered by the grievant was a ``serious health condition'' as defined under the FMLA.

     The arbitrator said that management treated the situation as a loss of license for behavioral reasons, and ignored the underlying medical condition. The fact that the grievant did not seek FMLA leave and extended unpaid leave was fully excusable.

     Management was aware that the grievant “had severe depression requiring hospitalization and an inability to return to work for a month.”  The arbitrator said:

... this information raised the issue of a FMLA-qualifying event.  It was incumbent upon the Employer to make a determination as to whether the grievant's illness qualified for FMLA or to inquire further. The Grievant may be excused from applying for FMLA or sick leave through the usual administrative procedure because... he had been told ... that sick leave was not allowed ... for loss of license.

     He concluded that the grievant should have been offered medical leave and was removed without just cause.  Ohio Dept. of Transportation and Ohio Civ. Serv. Employees L-11, Case #31-01-00309-08-01-06, 115 LA (BNA) 563 (Smith, 2001).

»  Editor's Note: Twice in two years, the grievant was arrested for DUI, refused to take a breath test, and was ultimately convicted.  He had been twice referred to Employee Assistance Programs and participated both times.  He also had been disciplined twice before, including a ``last chance'' agreement (which presumable expired).

     Nevertheless, the arbitrator required management to look beyond his behavioral problems and to actively assist in his recovery and return to full duties.

Federal appeals court allows monetary sanctions against an employer that filed frivolous lawsuits against the unions.

     In labor law, there is a principle that an employer may be penalized for filing an unmeritorious lawsuit against an employee in retaliation for the employee engaging in protected activities.  A federal appeals court has extended the principle to retaliatory civil suits brought against various unions as an entity.

     In this case, the Labor Relations Board ordered the employer to cease and desist from certain illegal activities and to reimburse the unions for their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against unmeritorious lawsuits.  The filing of unfounded lawsuits were determined to constitute an unfair labor practice.

     The court reasoned that protected activity by two or more employees would lose protection of the law, if engaged in by a union on their behalf.  BE&K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., #99-6469, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6013, 2001 FED App. 0105P, 166 LRRM (BNA) 2971 (6th Cir.).

Text: pacer.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions/main.php

Federal jury awards former police chief and deputy chief $1.7 million in damages.  They had sued for wrongful termination and malicious prosecution after they refused to reveal to the mayor's lawyer the content of their corruption disclosures to the FBI.

     The former police superintendent and deputy superintendent of the Chicago suburb of Cicero have won $911,000 and $801,000 each in their wrongful termination lawsuits.  The verdicts included punitive damages of $100,000 against the mayor and $50,000 against a former special legal counsel.  Cicero also will have to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, which will increase the total to an estimated $2.3 million or more.

     Oddly, the two were recruited to clean up the town made that has been infamous since the days of bootlegger Al Capone.  Eight town officials have been indicted by federal grand juries in the last three years.  The main plaintiff was appointed superintendent in 1997, after a year-long national search.

     After they were hired, the mayor praised them highly -- but then turned on them after they began investigating a towing firm that had a lucrative town contract.

     The two whistleblowers had contacted the FBI and testified at a federal grand jury.  The mayor then appointed a special counsel to ``investigate'' the towing contract -- who sought information about what the two had told the Feds.  The chief and his deputy were fired when they refused to discuss those statements or cooperate with his special investigation.

     Shortly before their dismissal, they told the Chicago Tribune that ``Cicero police officers had made false arrests to elicit bribes, shook down illegal immigrants and let solvable murder cases languish.''  The Cicero Police were so inept and mistrusted, that for several months, the State Police had to answer local police calls.

     The size of the verdicts is surprising because the town's defense lawyers managed to eliminate from the jury all professional people and anyone who had earned more than $30,000 in annual wages.  Niebur v. Town of Cicero, #98-C-4157 (N.D. Ill., verdict May 21, 2001).  Interim rulings at 90 F.Supp.2d 930, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3969 and at 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 15425.

Appeals court rejects an employer's demand that a claimant work out of a tiny home office.

     A Pennsylvania computer operator has been awarded worker's comp. benefits for a job-related lumbrosacral strain. His employer appealed, claiming that he improperly rejected an offer to work at home.

     The claimant and his wife had a tiny apartment (528 sq. ft.) and had to work from a bedroom computer with only two feet between it and the bed.  There was no other place in the apartment where the computer could be located and the claimant's wife was bedridden for illness.

     An appeals court has concluded that it would be unreasonable for an employer to avoid a worker's comp. award by insisting on continued employment from a residence that was too small to accommodate a home-office environment.  Bussa v. W.C.A.B., #1266 C.D. 2000, 2001 Pa. Commw. Lexis 336.

Text: www.courts.state.pa.us

     “John Rocker and employee discipline for speech,” 16 (3) The Labor Lawyer (ABA) 439-448, abasvcctr@abanet.org

     “The failure to breach the blue wall of silence: The circling of the wagons to protect police perjury,” by Jennifer Koepke, Wonter 2000 Washburn Law Journal, 39 Washburn L.J. 211 (24,920 words).

BE&K Const. Co. v. N.L.R.B., #99-6469, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6013, 166 LRRM (BNA) 2971 (6th Cir.). [93]
Bew v. City of Chicago, #00-1867, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 9247 (7th Cir. 2001). [91-2]
Broward Co Sheriff's Office and Federation of Public Employees, 115 LA (BNA) 708 (Richard, 2001). [84]
Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1099 (7th Cir. 2000). [91-2]
Bussa v. W.C.A.B., #1266 C.D. 2000, 2001 Pa. Commw. Lexis 336. [94]
Buxton v. City of Plant City, 871 F.2d 1037 (11th Cir. 1989). [88]
Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, #00-12568, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 8492 (11th Cir.). [88-9]
Chenoweth v. Hillsborough Co., #00-10691, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 8802 (11th Cir.). [85]
Excel Corp. and United F&CW L-22, FMCS #96/03048, 106 LA (BNA) 1069 (Thornell, 1996). [84]
Graham v. Reno, Civ. #92-1018 (D.D.C.). [90]
Johnson v. Ashcroft, #93-0206, 39 (1910) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 535 (D.D.C. 4/30/01 - settlement approved). [90]
Kamenesh v. City of Miami, 772 F.Supp. 583 (S.D. Fla. 1991). [89]
King County v. Sheehan, (Super. Ct. King Co. 5/10/01), Seattle Post-Intelligencer 5/8/01. [87]
Kirkland (City of) v. Sheehan, #01-2-09513-7 (Super. Ct. King Co. 5/10/01). [86-7]
Moore v. Summers, #00-00953, 38 G.E.R.R. (BNA) 1003 (D.D.C. 2000). [91]
Niebur v. Town of Cicero, #98-C-4157 (N.D. Ill., verdict May 21, 2001); see also 90 F.Supp.2d 930. [93-4]
Norman (City of) and FOP L-122, FMCS #00/15703-8, 115 LA (BNA) 827 (McReynolds, 2001). [83]
Oconomowoc (Town of) and Wis. Prof. Police Assn., Griev. #98-311 ,
     115 LA (BNA) 169 (Petersen, 2000). [83]
Ohio Dept. of Transportation and Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. L-11, 115 LA (BNA) 563 (Smith, 2001). [92-3]
Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir. 1992). [89]
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980). [88]
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976). [89]
Pawhuska (City of) and IAFF L-3887, FMCS Case #000927/16571-8, 115 LA (BNA) 714 (Moore, 2001). [86]
Potter v. Reno, #340-93-3770X, 36 G.E.R.R. (BNA) No.1749 (C.D.Cal. 1998). [91]
Price v. City of Chicago, #00-3536, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 10594 (7th Cir.). [89-90]
Quintanar v. Reno, #96-7066, 36 G.E.R.R. (BNA) No.1749 (C.D.Cal.). [91]
Rochon v. Attorney General, #87-3008, 734 F.Supp. 543, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4381 (D.D.C. 1990). [90]
Rochon v. Dillon, 713 F.Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1989). [91]
Rochon v. Simon & Schuster, 1994 FP 154, 140 (135) Chgo. D. Law Bull. 1 (1994). [90-1]
San Jose (City of) v. Superior Court, 74 Cal.App.4th 1008 (1999). [88]
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347 (1960). [86]
Van Meter v. Thornburgh, #91-0027, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18936,
     57 FEP Cases (BNA) 911 (D.D.C. 1991). [90]
Youngstown State Univ. and Ohio Educ. Assn., FMCS #000519/0336-6,
     115 LA (BNA) 852 (Heekin, 2001). [85]