May, 2001 web edition

Federal appeals court affirms the termination of a police officer for a moonlighting violation.  From a federal perspective, evidentiary irregularities at the hearing do not invalidate the proceedings, unless they are irrational or shocking.

     The plaintiff claimed that the police department failed to follow basic “chain of custody” safeguards in the storing of documents used against him and in conveying them to a handwriting expert.

     He also alleged that the handwriting expert was not qualified under the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).  The Daubert case condemned the use of self-styled experts and “junk science” in federal lawsuits.

     A federal appeals court has rejected these assertions.  If true, they were insufficient to establish that the disciplinary process was “truly irrational” or “shocking to the conscience,” and did not state a claim for a denial of substantive due process under the 14th Amendment.  Young v. City of St. Charles, #00-1892, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 4552 (8th Cir.).

Text: www.findlaw.com/casecode/courts/8th.html

Arbitrator overturns suspensions for not backing up a fellow officer.  There was no formal policy requiring a backup, and none had been requested by the responding officer.

     The responding officer investigated a call regarding three men parked in a truck. Although it was a longstanding practice that suspicious activity calls are responded to by two officers, there was no policy, written or verbal, requiring two officers.

     The arbitrator also noted the responding officer never requested a back up from another officer, and that both of the suspended officers “always covered him when he asked them to do so.”  City of Sumner and Sumner Police Guild, 115 LA (BNA) 580, (Calhoun, 2001).

Arbitrator overturns a five-day disciplinary suspension given a federal officer for harassment of his ex-wife.  Inconsistencies in testimony warranted reversal.

     A Border Patrol agent claimed his ex-wife was harassing him by filing groundless complaints. The arbitrator found that her testimony that he was in uniform (when he was not) and driving a Border Patrol vehicle (when he did not have access to an official vehicle) impaired the woman's credibility.

     He ordered the grievant’s pay to be restored and an expungement of the suspension from his personnel record.  U.S. Border Patrol and AFGE L-2366, FMCS #00/03035, 115 LA (BNA) 660 (Goodman, 2001).

Federal appeals court revives a sergeant’s damage suit against the police chief and others, for due process violations.  He claimed he was selected to get all the blame for a highly publicized brutality complaint.

     A St. Louis police sergeant was initially accused of assaulting an arrestee, by striking him with a baton and spraying irritant in his face after he had ceased resistance.  A criminal action was brought against the sergeant, and he was acquitted of all criminal charges. In a parallel disciplinary action, the Police Board was unable to determine who beat the arrestee, or when or how it happened.  The Board concluded, however, that the sergeant failed to prevent an illegal beating and demoted him.

     The sergeant sued the city, the Police Board, the chief and others in federal court.  The trial court dismissed his complaint, and a three-judge panel of the Eight Circuit reversed.  They said the sergeant introduced evidence that management had “committed itself to producing a culprit ... before any such wrongdoing was actually established.”

     Dispatcher and 911 tape recordings demonstrated that the sergeant did not arrive near the scene until after the arrestee had been subdued.  He had to park far down the street because up to 13 police cars blocked the street.

     Among statements which imply that he was being set up to get the blame, the former police chief (who is black) purportedly said, “I want the sergeant ... the white sergeant.”  The panel concluded that “a reasonable jury could conclude that some or all of the defendants intentionally set Moran up as a scapegoat.”  Moran v. Clarke, #00-1015, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6439 (8th Cir.).

Text: www.findlaw.com/casecode/courts/8th.html

South Dakota Supreme Court affirms the firing of a deputy sheriff for nonserious, but insubordinate behavior.

     A deputy sheriff in South Dakota was administratively charged with refusing to arrest the aggressor in a domestic disturbance after being directed by the sheriff to do so, rudeness to the victim, and “was very rude and unreasonable and showed great favoritism toward the aggressor.”  Although the husband was taken into custody, the deputy defiantly wrote the sheriff’s name as the arresting officer.

     After an evidentiary hearing, where the deputy was represented by counsel, the county commission sustained the charges.  On appeal, the state supreme court concluded that the deputy was afforded due process and the offense was serious.

     Although South Dakota is an “at-will employment” state, the county had adopted a “Disciplinary Action and Grievance Procedure,” requiring some degree of misconduct.  The justices said the deputy’s misconduct was not major, but he acted at cross-purposes with the sheriff and used questionable judgment.

     The justices sustained the termination, because, “as the Sheriff testified, it came down to a matter of trust.”  His defiance, “taken together with his unprofessional treatment of [the victim] will sustain his discharge for disciplinary purposes.”  Hollander v. Douglas Co., #21365, 2000 S.D. 159, 620 N.W.2d 181, 2000 S.D. Lexis 158, 17 IER Cases (BNA) 615 (Amended 2001).

Text: www.sdbar.org/opinions/default.htm

Knowingly making false statements in a police report supported an officer's termination.

     A NYPD officer was fired for failing to correct a report of the loss of his shield and ID, after learning that it was incorrect. A five judge appeals panel said he was properly dismissed for lack of honesty and candor.  Morgan v. Safir, #3688, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 3193.

Text: www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/Decisions.htm

New York's highest court warns lower courts not to reduce disciplinary penalties unless they are “shocking.”  Sergeant with 29 years on the job was fired for falsifying security officers training record.

     A NYPD sergeant with 29 years service was fired for engaging in unauthorized off-duty employment as a security guard instructor and falsifying training certificates.

     An intermediate appeals court reduced the penalty and ordered reinstatement, in view of the sergeant's service record and his numerous awards; the sergeant would have forfeited his pension.

     The state's highest court reversed, 7-to-0.  A court cannot modify disciplinary action unless the penalty "constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law."  They said the penalty of an administrative agency must be upheld "unless it is so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness," which this was not.  Kelly v. Safir, #43, 2001 N.Y. Lexis 566, 2001 N.Y. Int. 0026.

Text: www.law.cornell.edu/ny/ctap/_I010026.htm

Federal appeals court upholds a body cavity search of a corrections officer, based on a tip thought to be reliable.  Even if the search violated official prison policies, it did not create civil liability.

     An inmate informant with prior reliability told the warden that a woman corrections officer intended to smuggle drugs into the facility in a tampon. Based on the tip, she was subjected to a visual body cavity search. No drugs were found.

     She sued the department for civil rights violations. The district court denied the warden's motion for dismissal on qualified immunity.  A three-judge appeals court has reversed.

     The intrusive search was based upon a reasonable suspicion, it was conducted in a sensitive and professional manner and the search was within the scope of the warden’s duties. The appellate court wrote:

We recognize that a prison employee ... does not forfeit all privacy rights when she accepts employment. Her expectations of privacy are, however, diminished in light of the prison's manifest interest in preventing the introduction of drugs, weapons, and other contraband.  ... we conclude that prison authorities generally may conduct a visual body cavity search when they possess a reasonable and individualized suspicion that an employee is hiding contraband on his or her person.

     The appellate court emphasized that the more personal and invasive the search activities of the authorities become, the more particularized and individualized the articulated supporting information must be.

     Another important ruling favoring management concerns the fact that the search purportedly violated departmental guidelines. That fact that the search deviated from the institution's formal policies and procedures "does not render it unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."

     Even if the department's policy on body cavity searches of employees was violated, “such a violation does not in itself rise to constitutional dimensions.”  Leverette v. Bell, #00-1407, 247 F.3d 160, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6255, 17 IER Cases (BNA) 877 55 (4th Cir.).

Text: www.law.emory.edu/4circuit

Kansas City suburb pays $60,000 settlement after denying an insulin-dependent applicant a job as a fire dept. paramedic.

     A settlement reached with the Justice Dept. resolves an ADA complaint filed by a firefighter/paramedic applicant after the city withdrew a preliminary job offer, on learning that he has insulin-dependent diabetes.

     The applicant is an experienced firefighter and was the city's top-ranked applicant at the time he applied. He was working successfully as a firefighter/paramedic in a neighboring fire dept.

     The applicant uses insulin to control his diabetes.  Under the settlement agreement, the city will:

1. pay $60,000 as compensation for the applicant's losses;

2. agreed to stop making disability-related inquiries or requiring medical examinations of applicants until after a conditional offer of employment has been extended; and

3. evaluate applicants on an individualized case-by-case basis.

U.S. v. City of North Kansas City, Mo. (W.D. Mo. 2001).

Justice Department announces agreements with six communities to improve access for disabled persons at courthouses, police stations, and other locations.

     The six settlements announced in April take the total number to 28 agreements. The DoJ continues to work on another 27 investigations. They require the communities to

1. remove physical barriers to wheelchairs;

2. install TTY equipment for 9-1-1 emergency services for people with hearing or speech impairments;

3. install assistive listening systems in courtrooms;

4. provide sign language interpreters and materials in Braille, large print, or on cassette tapes, and

5. establish grievance procedures for resolving complaints of violations of title II of the ADA.

ADA requirements and examples of compliance are on the DoJ website at:

www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/adahom1.htm

Arbitrator holds that detectives were not entitled to a FTO pay supplement if they were accompanied by newly appointed evidence technicians that they were not required to evaluate -- even though patrol FTOs were additionally compensated.

     In the bargaining agreement the union agreed to replace commissioned police officers with civilian evidence technicians.  The agreement was silent on the on-the-job training of the replacements.

     In the Patrol Division, field training officers (FTOs) receive a $265 monthly pay supplement.  Detectives who were accompanied by newly hired civilian technicians demanded similar treatment.  An arbitrator resolved their grievance in favor of management, for three reasons.

1. Although familiarizing another employee to replace one's job “is one of the hardest tasks for an employee to accomplish,” there should be "a recognized custom or past practice" to warrant additional compensation.  The FTO program had only been used in the Patrol Division.

2. The evidence technicians were not members of the same bargaining unit.

3. The detectives were not, and are not FTOs.  Patrol officers who qualify for a FTO designation are required to meet prescribed standards and must evaluate newly recruited officers.  The detectives had no training or authority to evaluate the qualifications of the technicians.

     As an interesting side-point, the Police Dept's web page mentioned a field training program for evidence technicians. The arbitrator ruled that a web page announcement does not modify the content of a collective bargaining agreement or change the meaning of a CBA term or phrase.

     A web site differs from an employee handbook or rules applicable to employment.  San Antonio (City of) and San Antonio POA, AAA Case #70-390-00121-98, 115 LA (BNA) 513 (Moore, 2001).

N.J. Supreme Court invalidates police vacancy procedures, but allows those who were unlawfully hired to stay in office.

     A New Jersey community enacted an ordinance providing that the number of positions in its police force may be established by resolution. Under that law a person was appointed deputy chief and was later promoted to chief.

     Competitors for the chief's position filed a lawsuit challenging the legitimacy of the process. The trial and appellate courts held the deputy chief position was invalid, and as a result, the incumbent should be removed as chief.

     The N.J. Supreme Court affirmed the holding 6-to-1, but unanimously disagreed with the remedy.  The interests of justice and fairness required that decision be given only prospective application.  There was a long-term interpretation of the law that an ordinance was not required to create new police positions, which was followed by other municipalities.

     The justice said, “if we were to a apply the rule in this case retroactively, our interpretation would have the effect of undermining many police appointments throughout the state. No purpose is served by such an approach.”  Reuter v. Bor. of Fort Lee, #A-117 S.T. 1999, 768 A.2d 769, 2001 N.J. Lexis 329.

Text: lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/search.html

Justice Dept. sues State Police for discriminatory employment examinations.

     The Dept. of Justice sued the Delaware State Police, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination against African Americans for state trooper applicants.

     DoJ claims that the written examination used to select troopers did not predict successful job performance, and disproportionately excluded African-American applicants from consideration for employment.

     Although the State Police have discontinued using the controversial test, the suit asks for employment for denied applicants, back pay, remedial seniority and other benefits.  U.S. v. Delaware State Police (D. Del., filed 2001).

Federal appeals court affirms termination of a black officer for having sex with an inmate, even though a white officer was only reprimanded for kissing an inmate, and racist remarks were made by coworkers.

     A Colorado corrections supervisor was fired for having sex with an inmate, once in an office and once in the prison law library. Evidence included DNA tests on seminal stains found on the carpet, which matched (1:2000) with his blood sample, taken pursuant to a court order.

     In his defense, he played the race card; he argued that “a climate of racial intolerance” demonstrates that the motivation for his termination was racist.  He also raised a disparate treatment claim.

     A three-judge federal appeals panel rejected his racial motivation claim.  To prevail on a racial animus complaint, an employee who claims pretextual discipline must show some nexus between circumstantial evidence of racism and the decision to terminate him.

     The panel said that isolated, racist remarks by co-workers are insufficient to carry the burden of proof.  While a racially biased atmosphere inferentially supports the claim, the employee must also show that the reason for the employment decision was a sham.

     As for the disparate treatment claim, the evidence that a white female prison officer was only reprimanded for kissing a female inmate; the appellant had sexual intercourse with an inmate on at least two occasions.

     When comparing the treatment of two, “the violations must be of comparable seriousness.”  English v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., #99-1452, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 7645  (10th Cir.).

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/10th/991452.html

Complaints of sabotaged work, threats and false accusations are sufficient allegations to warrant a jury trial on her gender discrimination and wrongful-termination lawsuit.

     A woman NYPD officer for 13 years was fired for not following procedures, failing to appear in court, losing property, uncompleted paperwork, discourtesy, and tardiness.

     In her Title VII lawsuit, she claimed that she had been subjected to years of derogatory remarks, burdensome assignments, sabotaged work, threats, and false accusations of misconduct -- because she was a woman and had complained of her mistreatment.

     The trial court dismissed her suit because the conduct was not sufficiently severe.  A three-judge appellate panel has reversed, saying it was a question for a jury.  Raniola v. Bratton, #00-7215, 243 F.3d 610, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 4904 (2nd Cir.).

Text: www.tourolaw.edu/2ndCircuit

Eighth Circuit rejects gender bias in a trooper termination lawsuit. Patrol supervisors documented her deficiencies and she lacked sufficent  evidence of discriminatory treatment.

     After scoring high in the academy and above-average in field training, a state trooper began receiving poor evaluations.  She was not retained at the end of her probationary period, and sued for sex discrimination.  A series of reports cited her mishandling of a stolen vehicle incident, a felony stop, a road hazard and other situations.  She allegedly exercised poor judgment and displayed a lack of assertiveness.

     She argued that she was the victim of a gender-based hostile work environment because she was humiliated by superiors in front of male troopers and citizens.  She contended that the evaluation process was a pretext to insult, accuse and intimidate her because of her gender.

     The trial court, and a three-judge appellate court disagreed.  She lacked hard evidence demonstrating either gender bias or discriminatory treatment.  Genosky v.  Minn. Dept. of Public Safety, #99-4277, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 5407 (8th Cir.).

Court opinions website: www.ca8.uscourts.gov/index.html/

Federal appeals court dismisses a damage suit because of corrective memos placed in a black police officer's file.  He was not disciplined and lost no benefits.

     A black police officer claimed that he had suffered adverse employment action because of his race.  Management placed two corrective job performance memos in his personnel file and he was temporarily removed as the designated officer-in-charge on two occasions.

     The jury returned a verdict for $1.00 in nominal damages. The trial set aside the verdict as a matter of law. On appeal, a three-judge panel affirmed.  The incidents amounted merely criticisms of his job performance and did not result in tangible job consequences.  Davis v. Town of Lake Park, #00-10305, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 4564 (11th Cir.).

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/11th/00-10305.html

Federal court finds it is a jury question whether a commissioned special or reserve officer that is salaried by another employer is also an “employee” of the law enforcement agency for Title VII purposes.

     A school security officer sued the sheriff for revoking his reserve deputy commission, after his firearm was discharged in violation of departmental policy.  He claimed that other reserve deputies in previous similar situations did not lose their commissions.  After the revocation of his deputy commission, the school reassigned him as a custodian, without loss of pay.

     The sheriff countered that the plaintiff was not an employee, and the commission was analogous to a licensing relationship, and is outside the scope of protection of Title VII.  The plaintiff did not dispute this, but asserted that there was a protected employment relationship, because of the ways in which the sheriff's office exerts control over its reserve deputies.

     The federal judge declined to dismiss the lawsuit.  The plaintiff had a colorable claim of employment-like control, sufficient to make it a question for the jury.  Elie v. Hilton, 131 F.Supp.2d 835, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1648 (W.D. La.).

Supreme Court reiterates that Title VII sexual harassment lawsuits must involve conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.

     In a per curiam decision, the justices said that  “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.”

     In this case, a male supervisor said to the plaintiff, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon.” No reasonable person would believe that remark, although insulting and sexual in nature, altered the work environment.  Clark Co. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, #00-866, 2001 U.S. Lexis 3365; 69 U.S. Law Week 3684.

Court opinions website: www.supremecourtus.gov/

Federal appeals court upholds a police rule against wearing religious or other pins on uniforms.

     A Texas police officer, while working in plainclothes, wore a small cross as a symbol of his evangelical Christianity. He continued to wear the pin after he was reassigned to a uniformed position, until he was challenged by management.  The chief suggested the officer wear a cross bracelet or ring, or wear the pin under his uniform shirt or collar; or transfer to a non-uniformed position. He declined, and filed suit.

     The trial judge dismissed the action, noting that “a police officer's uniform is not a forum for fostering public discourse or expressing one's personal beliefs.” A three-judge federal appeals panel has affirmed.

     “Visibly wearing a cross pin ... takes on an entirely different cast when viewed in the context of a police uniform.”  The “honestly held belief that one must announce such conviction to others ... is not a matter of public concern ... in the constitutional sense.”

     The no-pins policy “serves a legitimate governmental purpose in the context of uniformed law enforcement personnel.”  Although the chief, in 1990, encouraged officers to wear red ribbons commemorating the slaying of a federal drug agent, a religious symbol is different because “seemingly inoffensive religious symbols ... [could] indicate to others [a] hostility to their own religious beliefs.”  Daniels v. City of Arlington, #00-11191, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6018 (5th Cir.); certiorari denied, #01-187, 2001 U.S. Lexis 9494 (Oct. 9, 2001)

Text: www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/00/00-11191-cv0.htm

» Research Note: Courts are more likely to uphold a no-pin rule than labor relations authorities.  The Supreme Court upheld a military uniform regulation that barred the wearing of a yarmulke (Jewish cap) in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); it also upheld police “uniformity” in grooming standards in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).

     The 5th Circuit upheld a ban of union pins on Border Patrol uniforms in U.S. Dept. of Justice v. FLRA, #91-4153, 955 F.2d 998, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 4726, 139 LRRM (BNA) 2820 (5th Cir. 1992).

     The 3rd Circuit rejected a suit to enjoin the wearing of a flag patch on correction officer uniforms in Troster v. Pa. Dept. Corr., #94-3162, 65 F.3d 1086, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25852, 10 IER Cases (BNA) 1714 (3rd Cir. 1995).

     A federal court in NYC sustained the termination of a public employee who refused to wear a protective helmet for religious reasons.  Kalsi v. N.Y. Transit Auth., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20062 (E.D.N.Y.).

     But another federal court allowed a civilian employee to wear an anti-abortion button at work, but affirmed the employer's right to require her to conceal the fetus on the button.  Wilson v. U.S. West Comm., #94-2752, 58 F.3d 1337, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 16605, 68 FEP Cases (BNA) 341 (8th Cir.).

     The 2nd Circuit has held that a NYC Transit Authority rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons on their uniforms without management's approval violated their rights of free speech. Scott v. Myers, 191 F.3d 82, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 20098, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2077 (2d Cir. 1999).

Second Circuit website: www.tourolaw.edu/2ndCircuit

     The NLRB has overturned a management rule which prohibited private sector employees from wearing union insignia on their clothing.  Flamingo Hilton and Hotel Empl. L-86, #32-CA15627, 1999 NLRB Lexis 856, 330 NLRB No. 34.

NLRB website: www.nlrb.gov/

     The FLRA allowed an immigration inspector to wear a union pin on his uniform, contrary to INS regulations.  Immig. and Nat. Service, San Ysidro, Cal. and I.N.S. Council AFGE, L-2805, #8-CA-50544, 25 F.L.R.A. 447, 1987 FLRA Lexis 711, 25 FLRA No. 30 (1987).

     An arbitrator ordered reinstatement and back pay for a Muslim hospital worker who wore a skull cap and shirt hanging over his trousers, in defiance of the facility's dress code. Liberty Medical Center, 109 LA (BNA) 609 (Gentile, 1997).

     The Mississippi Supreme Court has allowed non-uniformed public employees to wear religion-inspired headgear at work. Miss. Emp. Sec. Cmsn. v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324, 1990 Miss. Lexis 5, 51 FEP Cases (BNA) 1491 (1990).

     In 1990, the Oregon Employment Relations Board allowed uniformed public employees to wear union buttons on their lapels. IAFF L-1817 v. Jackson Co. Fire Dist. 3, #UP-64-90, 29 (1400) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 139 (1990) in spite of a 1986 decision of the Oregon Supreme Court which held that a public employer may prohibit the wearing of religious garb while on duty.  Cooper v. Eugene School Dist. 4J, 301 Ore. 358, 723 P.2d 298, 1986 Ore. Lexis 1458, 53 FEP Cases (BNA) 1012 ; appeal dismissed, 480 U.S. 942, 107 S. Ct. 1597 (1987).

Arbitrator reinstates a fire lieutenant that polluted a urine sample. He did not abuse drugs, but did engage in deception. Reinstatement without back pay was sufficient punishment.

     A fire lieutenant was on a fishing boat and, while sleeping, passively inhaled marijuana smoked by others.  When directed to give a urine sample as part of an ongoing drug screening program he added a nitrite powder to his urine to foil the test.

     He falsely signed a certificate that the specimen was his own and had not been altered.  When the lab discovered adulteration, management brought charges of adulterating the specimen and deception; they did not dispute the passive inhalation excuse. An arbitrator set aside his termination as an excessive penalty.

     Disciplinary action was a consequence, not of drug use, but his attempt to deceive his superiors.  Fraud, said the arbitrator, calls for strong discipline, but not discharge.  The lieutenant was ordered reinstated with full seniority, but without more than 9 months of back pay.  Fort Lauderdale (City of) and Prof. Firefighters L-1545, 115 LA (BNA) 418 (Mittenthal, 2001).

     A terminated public employee must utilize existing procedures and  remedies before filing a lawsuit for reinstatement.

     An officer was terminated from an Alaska police force because of a physical impairment from an accidental gunshot wound.  He then applied for and received a disability pension. He later filed a wrongful termination suit against the police department. The trial court dismissed it because he had failed to challenge his separation administratively or via the grievance method.

     The state supreme court agreed, noting that employees must exhaust their contractual or administrative remedies before pursuing a lawsuit against their employer.  Grant v. Anchorage Police Dept., #S-8844, 2001 Alas. Lexis 28.

Court website: www.alaska.net/~akctlib/homepage.htm

Clark Co. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, #00-866, 2001 U.S. Lexis 3365; 69 U.S. Law Week 3684. [76]
Cooper v. Eugene School Dist., 301 Ore. 358, 723 P.2d 298, 1986 Ore. Lexis 1458. [78]
Daniels v. City of Arlington, #00-11191, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6018 (5th Cir.). [76-7]
Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993). [67]
Davis v. Town of Lake Park, #00-10305, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 4564 (11th Cir.). [75]
Elie v. Hilton, 131 F.Supp.2d 835, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1648 (W.D. La.). [75-6]
English v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., #99-1452, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 7645  (10th Cir.). [74]
Flamingo Hilton and Hotel Empl. L-86, 1999 NLRB Lexis 856, 330 NLRB No. 34. [77-8]
Fort Lauderdale (City of) and Prof. Firefighters L-1545, 115 LA (BNA) 418 (Mittenthal, 2001). [78]
Genosky v.  Minn. Dept. of Public Safety, #99-4277, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 5407 (8th Cir.). [75]
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). [77]
Grant v. Anchorage Police Dept., #S-8844, 2001 Alas. Lexis 28. [79]
Hollander v. Douglas Co., #21365, 2000 S.D. 159, 620 N.W.2d 181, 2000 S.D. Lexis 158. [69]
IAFF L-1817 v. Jackson Co. Fire Dist. , 29 (1400) G.E.R.R. (BNA) 139 (1990) . [78]
INS San Ysidro and AFGE L-2805, 1987 FLRA Lexis 711, 25 FLRA No. 30. [78]
Kalsi v. N.Y. Transit Auth., 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20062 (E.D.N.Y.). [77]
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). [77]
Kelly v. Safir, #43, 2001 N.Y. Lexis 566, 2001 N.Y. Int. 0026. [69-70]
Leverette v. Bell, #00-1407, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6255 (4th Cir.). [70-1]
Liberty Medical Center, 109 LA (BNA) 609 (Gentile, 1997). [78]
Miss. Emp. Sec. Cmsn. v. McGlothin, 556 So.2d 324, 1990 Miss. Lexis 5. [78]
Moran v. Clarke, #00-1015, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 6439 (8th Cir.). [68]
Morgan v. Safir, #3688, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. Lexis 3193. [69]
Raniola v. Bratton, #00-7215, 243 F.3d 610, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 4904 (2nd Cir.). [75]
Reuter v. Bor. of Fort Lee, #A-117 S.T. 1999, 768 A.2d 769, 2001 N.J. Lexis 329. [73]
San Antonio (City of) and San Antonio POA, 115 LA (BNA) 513 (Moore, 2001). [72-3]
Scott v. Myers, 191 F.3d 82, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 20098 (2d Cir. 1999). [77]
Sumner, City of and Sumner Police Guild, 115 LA (BNA) 580 (Calhoun, 2001). [67]
Troster v. Pa. Dept. Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 25852(3rd Cir.). [77]
U.S. Dept. of Justice v. FLRA, 955 F.2d 998, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 4726 (5th Cir.). [77]
U.S. v. Delaware State Police (D. Del., filed 2001). [73]
U.S. v. City of North Kansas City, Mo. (W.D. Mo. 2001). [71]
U.S. Border Patrol and AFGE L-2366, FMCS #00/03035, 115 LA (BNA) 660 (Goodman, 2001). [68]
Wilson v. U.S. West Comm., 58 F.3d 1337, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 16605 (8th Cir.). [77]
Young v. City of St. Charles, #00-1892, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 4552 (8th Cir.). [67]