October, 2001 web edition

Connecticut Supreme Court confirms an arbitration award reinstating a police officer who used poor judgment in drawing his weapon.  Arbitrators are free to disagree with a psychiatric report of unfitness and to fashion special conditions for reinstatement.

     A nine-year veteran officer responded to a school break-in report. He saw lights in a hallway and found a broken window in the rear of the gymnasium.  He found seven young men playing basketball.  He ordered them to the ground with his weapon drawn for about a minute.  After checking their IDs he decided to issue them citations for simple trespass.

     The boys later complained about the officer's display of his firearm.  Management ordered a psychological Fitness For Duty Exam. A psychiatrist and a psychologist found the officer was psychiatrically unfit for duty. The town terminated the officer.

     The officer and his union filed a grievance. The officer submitted a contrary evaluation which he obtained. A panel of arbitrators ordered his reinstatement, finding the town's evidence unpersuasive.

     Management sought judicial review. The case was eventually argued before the Connecticut Supreme Court.  The justices noted that the arbitrators found that “a more reasonable response to the evaluations would have been to allow for a second evaluation to be performed” and if in conflict, a third opinion should have been requested.

     The justices specifically rejected the town’s assertion that a simple preponderance (majority) of the evidence was sufficient to sustain the termination decision. Arbitrators may elevate the quantum of proof necessary to sustain a discharge.

     They also rejected a public-policy argument that reinstatement posed a danger to the public.  That argument “simply ignores the fact that, after a full hearing, and after the submission of competing expert witness evidence, the arbitrators found to the contrary.”

     Moreover, the arbitrators conditioned reinstatement “subject to training on the use and possession of firearms,” a “current fitness for duty statement by a medical expert of [the officer's] choice,” and continued counseling if recommended by that expert.

     This condition satisfied “any potential lingering questions regarding [the officer’s] suitability to use and possess firearms.”' The justices added, “When a challenge to the arbitrator's authority is made on public policy grounds ... the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award.”

     There was “no explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy that prohibited the arbitrators, in concluding that the termination had not been for just cause ....”  Discharge is an extreme penalty affecting benefits and one’s reputation.  South Windsor (Town of) v. S.W. Police Union L-1480, #16338, 255 Conn. 800, 770 A.2d 14, 2001 Conn. Lexis 118 (2001).

Text: www.jud.state.ct.us/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/cr32.pdf

The U.S. Government implements more stringent standards for new and current employees with jobs requiring a security clearance.

     Revised Defense Security Service criteria is now required under the Floyd Spence National Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S. Code §986.  Disqualified individuals include a person who:

1. was convicted in any court of the United States of a crime and sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of the amount of time actually served; or

2. was discharged or dismissed from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or

3. is an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, a controlled substance as defined in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S. Code §802; or

4. is mentally incompetent (emotional, mental, or personality disorders), as determined  by a credentialed mental health professional (clinical psychologist or psychiatrist).

A disqualifying mental health diagnosis should indicate:

(a) a “defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;” or

(b) a “pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;” or

(c) a “defect in his or her judgment or reliability;” or

(d) the “individual has failed to follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication.”

Mitigating conditions include:

(a) there is “no indication of a current problem;” or

(b) there is a recent opinion that previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder  “is cured, under control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;” or

(b) any “past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.”

     The DSS clears 800,000 applicants and employees for the DoD and 21 other government agencies.

Info site: www.dss.mil/isec/smithguidei.htm

Federal appeals court resurrects a damage suit against Utah's P.O.S.T. for impeding a former officer's future employment by releasing allegedly false and derogatory information about him.

     The plaintiff was a certified peace officer in the state of Utah, employed by the Tooele County Sheriff's Office.  It adopted a policy requiring its officers to reside within the county limits.  As he did not reside within the county or want to relocate, he applied for employment elsewhere.

     Although he ranked third in the testing and interview process for 17 open positions, he was rejected because of information provided by the state's Peace Officer Standards and Training Division alleging that he “had raped a young girl, assaulted a resident, resigned from ... [another] Sheriff’s Office under threat of termination, and was `at risk' as a peace officer.”

     The plaintiff attempted unsuccessfully to acquire records of the false allegations.  At no time did Utah POST initiate proceedings to suspend or revoke his certificate, conduct hearings, or provide notice of the allegations.  However, the state sought dismissal because it had taken no action to revoke his certification.  A three-judge federal appeals panel disagreed, saying:

In the instant action, Defendants have disseminated false and fatally damaging allegations against Appellant to his potential employers. Defendants have done this in lieu of statutory procedures, in excess of their statutory authority, and in contravention of statutorily-mandated procedural due process.

More importantly, the consequence of Defendants' actions is that Appellant cannot use his certificate to obtain employment. Absent relief by this court, Defendants could continue to prevent Appellant from acquiring employment.

A state agency cannot escape liability for depriving an individual of a legitimate property interest merely by arguing that it has not revoked or destroyed the actual legal title to that interest. Actions taken by the State which destroy the value or utility of a protected property interest constitute a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of that interest for which due process cannot be denied.

Accepting as true Appellant's well-pleaded allegations, it was error for the district court to dismiss Appellant's action for failing to state a claim for the deprivation of a protected property interest.

     The panel set aside the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for a trial.  Stidham v. P.O.S.T., #00-4036, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 20870 (10th Cir.).

Text: laws.findlaw.com/10th/004036.html

Arbitrator declines to sanction a public employer that refused to adopt union demands for expanded smoking facilities.  The law does not require compromises or agreement by either party to bargaining sessions, and none of the usual indicia of bad faith negotiation tactics were present.

     In 1995, an arbitrator ruled that a public employer improperly invalidated a prior policy that authorized smoking in ventilated smoking rooms located in its facilities.  Regional Transp. Dist. and A.T.U, FMCS #98-05974, Grievance #95-9401 (Anthony, 1995).

     The employer reactivated the closed smoking rooms but turned down a union proposal to expand the existing smoking facilities for economic and legal reasons.  Another grievance was filed because management failed to adopt the union’s proposals.

     In the second proceeding, the arbitrator refused to conclude that management had breached its duty to bargain the issue.  Saying “no” to a union demand is a counter-proposal, and offering only to maintain the status quo constitutes bargaining.

     The arbitrator noted that the union did not modify its demands, and bargaining laws do not require either party to agree to other party’s demands.  Public bargaining laws, he said, do not mandate that counterproposals be offered by the parties, or that compromises between competing positions be made as proof of “bargaining in good faith.”

     He said that a lack of good faith is demonstrated when a party employs delaying tactics, makes unreasonable demands, attempts to bypass the negotiators, makes unilateral changes in mandatory subjects of bargaining, fails to designate a bargaining agent with sufficient authority to conclude an agreement, or withdraws agreed-upon provisions.

     None of those conditions were present here. Management did not affirmatively disadvantage its employees and restored those smoking privileges that existed before the first grievance.  Regional Transp. Dist. and A.T.U, 115 LA (BNA) 1703 (Wyman, 1995).

In a disparate discipline claim, a federal court orders production of 880 personnel records for examination by plaintiff's counsel.

     A black state trooper sued in federal court, claiming disparate discipline and unequal treatment because of racial animus. He sought a discovery order to allow his counsel to examine two years of personnel records where similar discipline was imposed.

     The state complained that the disciplinary records of troopers was irrelevant and the retrieval of document, redaction of private matters, and photocopying would create a severe hardship.

     The District Judge overruled the relevancy claim. “Disparate treatment plaintiffs often build their cases from pieces of circumstantial evidence, which cumulatively undercut the credibility of various explanations offered by the employer.”

     The judge also rejected hardship defense. He ordered that the state “shall make available to Plaintiff’s counsel their personnel files since May 1, 1998, as they are customarily kept. Plaintiff's counsel -- and counsel alone -- may review the documents and photocopy their records of choice ...”  Rowlin v. Alabama Dept. of Public Sfty., #00-D-580-N, 200 F.R.D. 459, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6234 (M.D. Ala. 2001). (Not on Internet).

Appeals court confirms arbitration award reinstating a corrections officer who assaulted an inmate.  State had no policy mandating termination and there were mitigating factors.

     A state prison corrections officer was fired for initiating the use of force against an inmate and failing to report the incident.  An arbitrator rejected the penalty, and ordered reinstatement, without back pay.  The state sought judicial review.

     A three-judge appeals court said that judicial review of an arbitration award is extremely limited, and a court must find a clear public policy violation to justify reversal.  Although there is a public policy against battering prisoners, the arbitrator found that the risk of repeat misconduct was low, the officer was a 16-year veteran with a good behavioral record, the force was provoked and without premeditation.

     More importantly, the state failed to identify a contractual provision requiring the termination of an officer for hitting a prisoner. Nor did the state cite any statute or regulation that prohibits reinstatement for such conduct.  State of Illinois v. AFSCME C-31, #5-99-0688, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 749 N.E.2d 472, 2001 Ill. App. Lexis 368 (5th Dist. 2001).

Text: www.state.il.us/court/Opinions/AppellateCourt/2001/5thDistrict/May/Html/5990688.htm

Appeals court denies $2.8 million overtime claim for corrections officers who change into and out of their uniforms.  Employers do not have to pay for change time if the bargaining agreement, or a recognized custom or past practice excludes such payments.

     Philadelphia corrections officers sued for $1.4 million in overtime and $1.4 million in liquidated damages for unpaid periods in changing to and from their uniforms.  The city raised in its defense, 29 U.S. Code §203(o) which says “shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes ... which was excluded ... by custom or practice under a bona fide collective- bargaining agreement...”

     The union said the bargaining agreement did not mention clothes changing and an enforceable custom or practice must be mentioned in the bargaining agreement.  The trial judge disagreed; see 96 F.Supp.2d 460 (E.D. Pa. 2000).

     A three-judge appeals panel affirmed, noting that a custom or practice under a collective bargaining agreement does not have to be established through formal negotiations. “To the contrary, we view the phrase as simply restating the well-established principle of labor law that a particular custom or practice can become an implied term of a labor agreement through a prolonged period of acquiescence.”

     Here, the city has not compensated corrections officers for change time for 30 years or more.  The union did ask for and officers receive a uniform maintenance allowance and overtime pay at pre-shift rollcalls.  Finally, the union has never filed a grievance or demanded arbitration based on the non-compensability of change time.  Turner v. Philadelphia, #00-1519, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 18785 (3rd Cir.).

Text: laws.findlaw.com/3rd/001519.html

Arizona appeals court rejects overtime claims by officers who remained on call, in uniform, during their meal periods.

     County corrections officers in Tucson were required to carry portable radios and weapons (if they possessed one) and were expected to respond to any emergency situations or criminal activity that might arise. They also were subject to call and interruptions from fellow employees, inmates, or visitors to the jail facility.  They remained in uniform during lunch breaks.

     300 officers sued in state court, under the FLSA, claiming the meal periods were uncompensated work time.  The county sought a summary judgment because the restrictions were minimal and the meal periods were not for the employer's benefit.

     An Arizona Superior Court found that although they sometimes were interrupted during their lunch breaks, the breaks were primarily for the consumption of food.  The officers not entitled to overtime compensation for unpaid meal periods.

     A three-judge appellate panel affirmed and applied the “predominant benefit test” under which meal periods are considered as work time “only when an employee predominantly spends the time performing duties for the employer's benefit.”  Hahn v. Pima County, 2 CA-CV 00-0200, 24 P.3d 614, 2001 Ariz. App. Lexis 95, 7 WH Cases 2d (BNA) 434.

Text: www.apltwo.ct.state.az.us/cv000200.pdf

»  Editor's Note: Dept. of Labor's has adopted a standard set at 29 C.F.R. §785.19 which provides:

   (a) Bona fide meal periods. Bona fide meal periods are not worktime. Bona fide meal periods do not include coffee breaks or time for snacks. These are rest periods. The employee must be completely relieved from duty for the purposes of eating regular meals.

Ordinarily 30 minutes or more is long enough for a bona fide meal period. A shorter period may be long enough under special conditions. The employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating. For example, an office employee who is required to eat at his desk or a factory worker who is required to be at his machine is working while eating …

   (b) Where no permission to leave premises. It is not necessary that an employee be permitted to leave the premises if he is otherwise completely freed from duties during the meal period.

     Here, the plaintiffs sued in state court, hoping to avoid the string of pro management decisions in FLSA cases litigated in the Federal Courts.  A similar result obtained in Leahy v. City of Chicago, 96 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1996).  Chicago police officers unsuccessfully sought overtime for meal periods, because of similar restrictions on where they must eat, a requirement to remain in uniform, to respond to emergencies or requests for assistance by the public, and officers stay in radio contact.

Supreme Court rejects appeal of a worker who claimed he was handicapped because he was only able to have sex twice a month.  Appellate court had said it was not a major disability under the ADA.

     After repeated violations of his employer’s safety protocols, work attendance policies, and acts of insubordination, the plaintiff was fired by the company.  Among other things, he allegedly called a supervisor a “chingado” which is Spanish for motherfucker.  He had violated attendance policies seven times and was caught falsifying a time card to cover up one of the violations.

     He sued claiming national origin and disability discrimination.  He asserted that before suffering a back injury he was able to engage in sexual intercourse 20 times per month, but is able to do so only twice per month.

     A three-judge appeals court held he was not substantially limited in a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA.  The Supreme Court has denied review.  Contreras v. Suncast Corp., #00-1977, 237 F.3d 756, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 41, 84 FEP Cases (BNA) 1273, 11 AD Cases (BNA) 600; cert. den. #00-1877, 2001 U.S. Lexis 5637, 70 Law Week 3234 (2001).

Text: www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op3.fwx

California appeals court rejects a discrimination claim where the employee unsuccessfully appealed his termination at an administrative hearing.

     An Hispanic Los Angeles city employee unsuccessfully contested his termination in an administrative appeal.  He then sued under the California employment discrimination code.  The city sought dismissal under the doctrine of issue preclusion.  An appellate court upheld the defense.

     Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. The requirements for the doctrine are:

1. The issue is identical to that decided in the former proceeding,

2. The issue was actually litigated in the former proceeding,

3. The issue was necessarily decided in the former proceeding,

4. The decision in the former proceeding is final and on the merits, and

5. Preclusion is sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the former proceeding.

     In this case, the city's hearing examiner found sufficient evidence of the worker's unsatisfactory attendance and his termination pretext for discrimination.  Castillo v. City of Los Angeles, #B143598, 2001 Cal. App. Lexis 747, 01 C.D.O.S. 8342, 2001 DAR 10237.

Text: login.findlaw.com/scripts/callaw?dest=ca/caapp4th/slip/2001/b143598.html

Justice Dept. drops its opposition to a timed run used to screen transit police officers in Philadelphia.

     Twice we have discussed [1999 FP 137-8 and 1998 FP 138-140] a lawsuit where the Justice Dept. -- and rejected women applicants -- challenged a transit police force requirement that candidates run 1.5 miles in 12 minutes.

     Management argued that the test is necessary because many stations are above or below ground level and officers are required to run up to five blocks between stations. Officers wear 26 pounds of gear, including a ballistic vest.

     In the most recent ruling a federal court (for the second time) upheld the test.  On the day its brief was to be filed, the Justice Dept. announced that it was dropping its prosecution of the appeal.

     For four years the Clinton administration complained that the test rejected 93% of all women applicants.  A spokesman for the Bush administration said that “it is critical ... that police and firefighters be able to run, climb up and down stairs to rescue people quickly under the most trying of circumstances.

     The appeal will continue on behalf of the rejected women who joined in the suit.  They are represented by the Public Interest Law Center in Philadelphia.  Lanning v. SEPTA, as reported in The Legal Intelligencer (Oct. 5, 2001).  The decision being appealed is at 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17612 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 7, 2000) -- on remand from 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 14607, 181 F.3d 478 (3rd Cir).

Supreme Court rejects the appeal of Islamic employee who was transferred because she refused to stop wearing a head scarf.  Appellate court held that an involuntary transfer was not an “adverse employment action.”

     An Islamic customer service employee was told she must stop wearing a head scarf or she would be transferred to a position with no public contact.  She sued, and the trial court rejected her claim.

     42 U.S. Code § 2000e-2(a) makes it unlawful to “segregate or classify” employees “in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” because of religion.

     On appeal she unsuccessfully argued that the Congress elevated religious claims above those for gender, race, color, and national origin.  Both the American Jewish Congress and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee filed “friend of the court” briefs in her behalf before the Supreme Court.

     The Justices rejected her appeal without comment.  Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, #00-1041, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 3389 (Unreported, 4th Cir. 2001); cert. den. #00-1813, 2001 U.S. Lexis 7353, 70 Law Week 3245 (2001).

Federal appeals panel rejects a suit by a former officer who complained of discrimination because coworkers cursed each other and some asked her personal questions about her romantic life.

     Management fired a hospital officer for a repeated failure to report vital information, patrol deficiencies, smoking violations, and an improper response to a fire alarm.  She admits her work deficiencies but sued the hospital for age discrimination, gender bias and sexual harassment.

     She claimed that male coworkers uttered profanities and made obscene gestures to nurses or to one another -- but never to her.  She complained that coworkers repeatedly asked her about her celibacy, romantic relationships, and marriage plans.

     The trial court dismissed her claims.  The inquiries about her personal life were not physically threatening nor humiliating and did not interfere with her work performance.  The profanities and gestures were not directed at her.

     A three-judge appellate court has affirmed, noting that she failed to prove a hostile work environment claim under the multi- factor test required by the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993).  Conto v. Concord Hospital, #01-1017, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 20618 (1st Cir.)

Text: laws.lp.findlaw.com/1st/011017.html

Seventh Circuit holds that the hostile treatment of a woman sheriff's employee was not actionable as gender bias if it was a manifestation of the harasser's animosity towards her husband, another officer.  She must be victimized because of her gender.

     A former Sheriff's Dept. employee sued the sheriff alleging that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, subjected to multiple acts of retaliation -- including her eventual termination -- for complaining about her treatment.

     She claimed her supervisor said that he “would like to fuck” her daughter.  There was evidence that the supervisor harbored a strong animosity toward the plaintiff's husband, an investigator, and directed his hostility against him, through his wife.

     An appellate court panel rejected the suit for two legal reasons.  First, there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's termination.  Second, the supervisor's “deplorable behavior did not occur because of [the plaintiff’s] sex but instead was the product of [his] animosity toward [her] husband.”  Rizzo v. Sheahan, #00-2494, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 20633 (7th Cir.).

Text: laws.findlaw.com/7th/002494.html

City worker awarded $275,000 for retaliation; she complained of obscene language during a cable TV show shown in the employee break room.

     Various city employees were in the break room watching a videotape of the Howard Stern show -- a television “shock jock.” The narrator bragged about the size of his genitalia.  Male workers accused the only woman in the office of blushing and one said “You're too old to blush.”

     She reported the incident, and co-workers began to avoid or stonewall her.  She complained of retaliation, and the city gave seven workers one-day suspensions, and two superiors three-day suspensions.

     She then began to receive threatening phone calls at home, indicating that she “will be sorry” and that “we are going to get you.”  Her car and personal property was vandalized.  The city took no further remedial action, other than to involuntarily transfer her to another clerical position.

     Since her transfer, she was denied overtime -- which was about $10,000 a year -- and was notified that her position was to be eliminated.  She filed suit; the city denied any liability.

     A District Court judge ruled that she had alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation by the city in involuntary transferring her, reducing her duties and cutting her overtime hours after she had complained of sex discrimination.

     Following a three-day trial the jury deliberated eight hours and awarded her $275,000 for gender-based discrimination and retaliation.  Ericson v. City of Meriden, #3:99CV2143 (D. Conn.).  Verdict reported in The Connecticut Law Tribune (Oct. 8, 2001); prior ruling at 113 F.Supp.2d 276, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14496.

Ohio arbitrator holds that a captain's job stress and work- related depression were compensable under the city's “Injury Leave” provisions and should not have been charged to his accumulated Sick Leave.

     An Ohio police captain was stressed from a belief that subordinates were undermining his authority.  He lacked concentration, became confused and avoided coworkers. He also was the subject of a sexual harassment investigation.  He was involuntarily placed on sick leave for more than four months. He filed a grievance which led to arbitration.

     He introduced evidence that paid Injury Leave was the proper choice.  A medical evaluation found major depression from “work related stress,” dating back to a prior SWAT raid.  The city claimed the depression was from the sexual harassment complaint.  Management said that Injury Leave applied only to physical injuries, and that the Grievant's condition was not physical.

     The arbitrator found that the bargaining agreement includes both physical and mental injuries -- and that his forced sick leave was improper.  It provided that an employee who “is injured while on duty or has contracted a disease while on duty” is entitled to a maximum of 1040 hours of paid Injury Leave. Two medical opinions listed the cause of his depression as work- related.

     The city was ordered to restore the 125 days of Sick Leave.  Newark, Ohio (City of ) and Licking Co. FOP L-127, FMCS #00/07760, 115 LA (BNA) 1608 (Slonaker, 2000).

»  Editor's Note: Management should obtain a non-ambiguous diagnosis as to whether an employee's condition was caused or exacerbated by job pressures before concluding that a worker's stress is not a compensable “injury.”  Even if the stress is linked to a complaint of citizen or prisoner abuse, or the sexual harassment of a coworker, it still may be a job-related injury.

Appeals court in Ohio upholds covert video surveillance of an employee's break room.

     Management at a public school suspected graveyard shift custodians were loafing.  A videocamera was installed in the employee's break room.  It detected two workers not working for substantial periods.  The union negotiated a minor disciplinary settlement, but the workers sued under several theories.

     They claimed the surveillance violated the bargaining agreement, because it was not an authorized procedure.  The appellate court responded that the remedy is to use the employer's grievance procedure, not bring a lawsuit.

     The appeals court noted that the break room was open to fellow employees and that the workers lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Brannen v. Bd. of Educ., #CA2000-11-098, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3165, 17 IER Cases (BNA) 1405.

Text:  www.twelfth.courts.state.oh.us/Decisions/War00098.doc

»  Research Note: A federal appeals court came to a similar conclusion in a case where college security managers installed a hidden surveillance camera in a locker room.  Thompson v. Johnson Co. Community Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501 (D. Kan. 1996), aff'd 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997). (Not on Internet).

     “Revocation of police officer certification: a viable alternative for police misconduct?” by Roger Goldman and Steven Puro, St. Louis University Law Journal, Spring 2001, 45 St. Louis L.J. 541 (20,524 words, 238 endnotes).

Website: law.slu.edu/

     The article discusses the history of state involvement, types of revocations, grounds, the effect of domestic violence convictions, experiences in three states and the proposed National Data Bank.

Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 3389 (4th Cir. 2001). [155]
Brannen v. Bd. of Educ., #CA2000-11-098, 2001 Ohio App. Lexis 3165. [158]
Castillo v. City of Los Angeles, #B143598, 2001 Cal. App. Lexis 747. [154]
Conto v. Concord Hospital, #01-1017, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 20618 (1st Cir.). [156]
Contreras v. Suncast Corp., #00-1977, 237 F.3d 756. [153-4]
Ericson v. City of Meriden,, #3:99CV2143 (D. Conn.). Verdict (Oct. 8, 2001). [157]
Hahn v. Pima County, 24 P.3d 614, 2001 Ariz. App. Lexis 95. [152-3]
Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993). [156]
Illinois (State of) v. AFSCME C-31, #5-99-0688, 749 N.E.2d 472 (5th Dist. 2001). [151]
Lanning v. SEPTA (10/5/01); prior decis. 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17612 (E.D. Pa.). [154-5]
Leahy v. City of Chicago, 96 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1996). [153]
Newark, Ohio and Licking Co. FOP L-127, 115 LA BNA) 1608 (Slonaker, 2000). [157-8]
Regional Transp. Dist. and A.T.U, 115 LA (BNA) 1703 (Wyman, 1995). [150]
Rizzo v. Sheahan, #00-2494, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 20633 (7th Cir.). [156]
Rowlin v. Alabama Dept. of Public Sfty., 200 F.R.D. 459 (M.D. Ala. 2001). [150-1]
South Windsor v. S.W. Police Union L-1480, 255 Conn. 800, 770 A.2d 14 (2001). [147-8]
Stidham v. P.O.S.T., #00-4036, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 20870 (10th Cir.). [149-50]
Thompson v. Johnson Co. Community Coll., 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997). [158-9]
Turner v. Philadelphia, #00-1519, 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 18785 (3rd Cir.). [151-2]

Floyd Spence National Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S. Code §986. [148]